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TXX-16092

Ref. # 10CFR50.59

August 3, 2016

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 AND 72-74
SUPPLEMENT TO THE 10CFR50.59 EVALUATION SUMMARY REPORT 019

REF: 1. Letter dated February 24, 2016 from Kenneth J. Peters of Luminant Power to the NRC regarding 10CFR50.59 Evaluation Summary Report 019, 10CFR72.48 Evaluation Summary Report 004, and Commitment Material Change Evaluation Report 013 (ML16077A014)

2. Letter dated August 27, 2014 from Rafael Flores of Luminant Power to the NRC regarding 10CFR50.59 Evaluation Summary Report 019, 10CFR72.48 Evaluation Summary Report 003, and Commitment Material Change Evaluation Report 012 (ML14254A427)

Dear Sir or Madam:

Per Reference 1, Luminant Generation Company, LLC (Luminant Power) submitted summaries of evaluations required by 10CFR50.59(d)(2) which were completed at Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Units 1 and 2 between February 2, 2014, and August 1, 2015, and which were not reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a previous submittal. During review of our records, Luminant Power determined that one (1) additional summary is required in the Evaluation Summary Report. This report supplements the 10CFR50.59 Evaluation Summary Report submitted in Reference 1 with the additional information required.

Since the previous summary report (Reference 2) was provided less that 24 months in the past, the supplement to the report provided in Reference 1 is provided consistent with the timing requirement of 10CFR50.59(d)(2).

This communication contains no new commitments regarding CPNPP Units 1 and 2.

IE47
NMSS26
NRR
NMSS

Should you have any questions, please contact J. D. Seawright at (254) 897-0140.

Sincerely,

Luminant Generation Company LLC

Kenneth J. Peters

By: _____
Timothy A. Hope
Manager, Regulatory Affairs

Attachment: Supplement to 10CFR50.59 (Report 019) Evaluation Summaries

c - Kriss M. Kennedy, Region IV
Margaret M. Watford, NRR
Resident Inspectors, Comanche Peak

Supplement to 10CFR50.59 (Report 019)
Evaluation Summaries

10CFR50.59 Evaluation:

59EV-2010-000172-03-00

Supplement to 10CFR50.59 (Report 019)

Evaluation Summaries

50.59 Evaluation No. - 59EV-2010-000172-03-00 **Units 1 and 2**

Title:

Eliminate several manual actions for a postulated fire scenario resulting in an evacuation of the Main Control Room (MCR) with new protected circuits on the Hot Shutdown Panel (HSP).

Activity Description:

This design modification installs new control switches in the Hot Shutdown Panel (HSP) and Shutdown Transfer Panel (STP) for Motor Operated Valves (MOVs) LCV-0112B and LCV-0112D in Units 1 and 2 to allow control of these valves from the Hot Shutdown Panel. This will isolate the portions of the valve control circuit that is routed in the Control Room and Cable Spread Room and eliminate local operator manual actions during postulated Control Room evacuation scenarios.

Summary of Evaluation:

This evaluation is related to the provision to control the subject motor operated valves from the HSP in addition to the MCR.

The increase in likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety due to providing control from the HSP switches to control MOVs LCV-112B and LCV-112D is minimal because the STP and HSP circuitry is completely isolated from the MCR and automatic circuitry during all normal modes of operation. The transfer switches on the STP completely separate the two control locations. Automatic action to swap the suction source to the Centrifugal Charging Pumps due to either low-low level in the Volume Control Tank or Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) actuation remains unaffected by this modification. The transfer switches isolate the new portion of the circuit and the reactor protection system does not see the new control capability.

In the event that the MCR must be evacuated the control circuitry being added to the HSP is designed in accordance with the requirements for circuit independence that were applied to the other independent controls on the HSP. The proposed change is performed in accordance with the appropriate design and quality requirements and therefore the change does not increase the likelihood that the MOVs will fail to perform their required safety function(s). The new circuits will be included in all of the periodic testing and inspection requirements as the other HSP controls. This serves to assure that the HSP circuitry does not degrade the control room portion of the circuitry and the MCR circuitry does not degrade the HSP portion of the circuitry. Other MOVs have control from both the MCR and from the HSP using control circuitry that is physically independent of the MCR. Some of those MOVs are in ECCS systems or have automatic functions that actuate in the event of specific accident scenario. The addition of similar controls to the subject MOVs is not therefore a unique design where the criteria have to be developed specifically for the proposed change. The design methodology is known and proven.

Implementation of this modification will not affect the frequency of occurrence or consequences of an accident. Accidents and malfunctions of equipment resulting from valve failure have previously been evaluated and no new accidents or malfunctions are initiated. The fission product barrier (fuel clad) is not adversely affected, nor does the modification depart from a method of evaluation described in the UFSAR. Therefore, this modification may be implemented under the provisions of 10CFR50.59.