



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

July 29, 2016

Mr. B. Joel Burch
Vice President and General Manager
BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc.
P.O. Box 785
Lynchburg, VA 24505-0785

SUBJECT: BABCOCK AND WILCOX NUCLEAR OPERATIONS GROUP – NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 70-27/2016-
003

Dear Mr. Burch:

This refers to the inspections conducted from April 1 through June 30, 2016, at the BWXT Nuclear Operations Group (NOG), Inc., facility in Lynchburg, VA. The inspections were conducted to determine whether activities authorized under the license were conducted safely and in accordance with U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. The enclosed report presents the results of these inspections. The results were discussed with you and members of your staff at exit meetings held on May 19 and July 21, 2016, for this integrated inspection report.

During the inspections, the NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license, as they related to public health and safety, to confirm compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Areas examined during the inspections are identified in the enclosed report. Within these areas, the inspections consisted of selected examinations of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. Based on the results of these inspections, no violations were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), which is accessible from the NRC Website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>.

If you have any questions concerning these inspections, please contact me at 404-997-4555.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Eric C. Michel, Chief
Projects Branch 2
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-27
License No. SNM-42

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 70-27/2016-003
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc:
Joseph G. Henry
Chief Operating Officer
BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc.
2016 Mount Athos Road
Lynchburg, VA 24505

Christopher T. Terry, Manager
Licensing and Safety Analysis
BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc.
P.O. Box 785
Lynchburg, VA 24505-0785

Steve Harrison, Director
Division of Radiological Health
Department of Health
109 Governor Street, Room 730
Richmond, VA 23219

If you have any questions concerning these inspections, please contact me at 404-997-4555.

Sincerely,
/RA/

Eric C. Michel, Chief
Projects Branch 2
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-27
License No. SNM-42

Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 70-27/2016-003
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc:
Joseph G. Henry
Chief Operating Officer
BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc.
2016 Mount Athos Road
Lynchburg, VA 24505

Christopher T. Terry, Manager
Licensing and Safety Analysis
BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc.
P.O. Box 785
Lynchburg, VA 24505-0785

Steve Harrison, Director
Division of Radiological Health
Department of Health
109 Governor Street, Room 730
Richmond, VA 23219

☒ PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

☐ NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE

☐ SENSITIVE

☒ NON-SENSITIVE

ADAMS: ☒

ACCESSIONNUMBER: ML16211A129

☐ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE

☐ FORM 665 ATTACHED

OFFICE	RII:DFFI/PB2	RII:DFFI/SB	RII:DFFI/SB	RII:DFFI/SB	RII:DFFI/SB	RII:DFFI/SB	RII:DFFI/PB2	RII:DC
SIGNATURE	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/	/RA/
NAME	LCain	DAnderson	TSippel	NPeterka	JMunson	GGoff	PGlenn	NPitoniak
DATE	7/28 /2016	7/ 28 /2016	7/25 /2016	7/ 25 /2016	7/ 25 /2016	7/ 25 /2016	7/ 25 /2016	7/25 /2016
E-MAIL COPY	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO	YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DFFI\REPORTS\DRAFT INSPECTION REPORT FOLDER\BWXT
NOG\2016 FEEDERS\QT2 (IR 2016-003)\BWXT IR 2016-003 (PUBLIC) REV1.DOCX

Letter to Mr. B. Joel Burch from Eric C. Michel dated July 29, 2016

SUBJECT: BABCOCK AND WILCOX NUCLEAR OPERATIONS GROUP – NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 70-27/2016-
003

DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC

E. Michel, RII

L. Cain, RII

N. Pitoniak, RII

P. Glenn, RII

R. Johnson, NMSS

M. Baker, NMSS

T. Naquin, NMSS

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No: 70-27

License No: SNM-42

Report No: 70-27/2016-003

Licensee: BWXT

Facility: Nuclear Operations Group (NOG)

Location: Lynchburg, VA 24505

Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2016

Inspectors: L. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector, RII/DFFI/PB2
N. Peterka, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, RII/DFFI/PB2
D. Anderson, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, RII/DFFI/PB2
J. Munson, Fuel Facility Inspector, RII/DFFI/SB
T. Sippel, Fuel Facility Inspector, RII/DFFI/SB
G. Goff, Fuel Facility Inspector, RII/DFFI/PB2

Approved by: E. Michel, Chief
Projects Branch 2
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BWXT Nuclear Operations Group
NRC Integrated Inspection Report 70-27/2016-003
April 1 – June 30, 2016

Inspections were conducted by the senior resident inspector, acting senior resident inspectors, and regional staff during normal and back shifts in the areas of safety operations, radiological controls, and facility support. The inspectors performed a selective examination of licensee activities that were accomplished by direct observation of safety-significant activities and equipment, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of facility records.

Safety Operations

- The items relied on for safety (IROFS) reviewed during this period were properly maintained in order to perform their intended safety function in accordance with the license application and regulatory requirements. (Sections A.1 and A.2)
- For the areas reviewed, fire protection systems and area housekeeping were maintained in accordance with fire safety requirements for special nuclear material processing areas and storage areas. (Section A.3)
- The sampled elements of the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) program were properly implemented and maintained in order to assure that normal and credible abnormal conditions remained subcritical as required by license and regulatory requirements. Criticality analysis demonstrated double contingency and adequate control of NCS parameters. (Section A.4)

Radiological Controls

- The Radiation Protection program elements reviewed were implemented in accordance with the license and regulatory requirements. (Section B.1)

Facility Support

- The post maintenance testing, preventive maintenance and surveillance testing observed for IROFS and other safety controls were implemented in accordance with the license and applicable procedure requirements. (Sections C.1 and C.2)
- Reports for tracking and resolution of safety-related issues included corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Extent of condition and extent of cause reviews were conducted when required by the governing corrective action program procedure. (Section C.3)
- The sampled elements of the Plant Modifications Program were implemented in accordance with the license application and regulatory requirements. (Sections C.4 and C.5)

Attachment

Key Points of Contact
List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed
List of Inspection Procedures Used
Documents Reviewed

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

During the inspection period, routine fuel manufacturing operations and maintenance activities were conducted in the fuel processing areas and in the Research Test Reactors and Targets (RTRT) facility. Routine operations and maintenance activities were conducted in the Uranium Recovery (UR) facility.

A. Safety Operations

1. Plant Operations (Inspection Procedure (IP) 88135.02)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors performed routine tours of the fuel manufacturing areas housing special nuclear material (SNM), reviewed log sheets, and observed shift turnover exchanges in UR. The inspectors interviewed operators, front-line managers, maintenance mechanics, radiation protection (RP) staff, and process engineering personnel regarding issues with plant equipment and to verify the status of process operations.

During the inspection period, the inspectors interviewed operators, front-line managers, maintenance technicians, engineers, and RP technicians to verify that each of the individuals demonstrated adequate knowledge of the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) posting requirements, and the operations procedures associated with their assigned duties.

The inspectors observed operations in progress in the RTRT, Filler, Machine Shop, and UR areas throughout the inspection period. The inspectors verified that SNM processes and workstations observed during the walkdowns were operated in accordance with applicable procedures and NCS postings.

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

2. Safety System Walk-down (IP 88135.04)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors performed a walkdown of a safety-significant system involved with the processing of SNM. As part of the walkdown, inspectors reviewed the NCS postings associated with the manufacture of fuel elements. The inspectors verified that items relied on for safety (IROFS) were available and reliable to perform their intended functions when needed to comply with the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.

To determine if plant equipment was installed correctly, the inspectors reviewed relevant documentation for each system, as well as the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) / Safety Analysis Report (SAR) 15.25 for the furnace process recovery operations. During walkdowns, the inspectors verified the following as appropriate:

- Controls in place for potential criticality, chemical, and fire hazards
- Process vessel configurations maintained in accordance with Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations
- Correct valve position and material condition
- Electrical power availability
- Adequate lighting in and around equipment
- Hangers and supports correctly installed and functional

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

3. Fire Protection Quarterly (IP 88135.05)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

During plant tours, the inspectors verified that transient combustibles were being adequately controlled and minimized in Bays 1A through 10A and shop Bays 11-14 as required. The inspectors conducted fire safety tours of the Bays and reviewed the fire detection and suppression capabilities in those areas. The inspectors also reviewed the Pre-Fire Plans, both to inform the fire safety tours and to verify that the Pre-Fire Plans were up-to-date. The inspectors verified that housekeeping in the areas reviewed was sufficient to minimize the risk of fire as required.

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

4. Nuclear Criticality Safety (IP 88015)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's NCS program and analyses to assure the safety of fissile material operations and compliance with the license application and 10 CFR Part 70. The inspectors reviewed select NCS documents (listed in Section 4.0 of the Attachment), including new and revised NCS analyses, to determine whether criticality safety of risk-significant operations was assured through engineered and administrative controls with incorporation of both subcritical and safety margin.

The inspectors also reviewed the results of the most recent NCS Quarterly audit to assure that appropriate NCS-related issues and corrective actions were being identified, tracked, and resolved. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to a selection of recent internally-reported events identified in Section 4.0 of the Attachment. The inspectors interviewed licensee staff and observed that the events were investigated in accordance with internal procedures and that appropriate corrective actions were assigned and tracked in accordance with the approved methodologies in the License Application.

The inspectors verified that no changes to the licensee's validation report had been made since the last NCS inspection. Inspectors reviewed select portions of the validation report. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed whether the validation report bounded the use of various isotopes in the application as fixed neutron poisons.

The inspectors reviewed various aspects of the criticality accident alarm system, including testing and audibility records, to verify that the licensee was performing required surveillances and system maintenance in accordance with the License Application.

The inspectors performed plant walkdowns in the Pharmacy, Filler, Core Assembly, Pickling, and Waste Treatment Facility to determine whether risk-significant fissile material operations were being conducted safely and in accordance with regulatory requirements and license commitments. The inspectors interviewed operations staff and NCS engineers both before and during walk downs to verify that open communication routinely occurs between NCS engineers and operations staff. The inspectors verified that controls identified in NCS analyses were installed or implemented properly to ensure safety.

The inspectors accompanied a licensee NCS engineer on a walkdown of Bay 17 to verify that licensee NCS audits are being performed in accordance with license commitments. Additionally, the inspectors walked down and discussed NCS-related plant modifications, including modifications to fissile material transport carts.

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

B. Radiological Controls

1. Radiation Protection Quarterly (IP 88135)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors toured UR, RTRT, and Filler controlled areas to verify that radiological signs and postings accurately reflected radiological conditions within the posted areas. The inspectors observed plant personnel as they removed protective clothing at controlled area step-off pads to verify procedural compliance. The inspectors observed plant personnel as they performed various tasks in different areas of the facility to verify that the proper protective equipment was used to prevent contamination. The inspectors observed employees using the exit monitors in the UR, RTRT and Filler controlled area exits to verify that the monitors were being used as required.

The inspectors reviewed one radiological work permit (RWP) utilized in the RTRT controlled area. The inspectors verified that the RWP contained appropriate work instructions, were posted in the work areas for employees' review, and that workers signed the applicable RWP.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the Alpha Smear Sampling Weekly Reports to verify that the licensee's response and evaluation were conducted in accordance with license requirements and NRC regulations.

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

C. Facility Support

1. Post Maintenance Testing (IP 88135.19)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors observed post-maintenance testing per work order (WO) documentation to verify compliance with license requirements for maintenance. Specifically, the inspectors observed a post maintenance test for replacement, and leak testing, of columns; and sampling of cooling water for measurement of contamination in the UR area.

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

2. Surveillance Testing (IP 88135.22)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors observed preventive maintenance (PM) surveillance tests on the Hydrofluoric Acid (HF) Containment Leak Detection System in the UR area. Specifically, the inspectors observed a PM surveillance test on the low-level dissolver leak detector, as well as the trough dissolver leak detector, to verify that each of the preventive maintenance activities conducted met the acceptance criteria in the work order instructions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed three completed preventive maintenance work orders for surveillance test and inspection of safety-related systems to verify that the results confirmed the availability and reliability of any associated IROFS, and adhered to operating procedure requirements.

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

3. Management Organization and Controls (IP 88135)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed a sample of items entered into the licensee's corrective action (CA) system during the inspection period to ensure that items pertinent to safety, security, and non-conforming conditions were identified, investigated as necessary, and tracked to closure, as required. The inspectors verified that issues of high safety

significance were properly identified and reviewed for their apparent causes in accordance with applicable procedures. The inspectors verified that CAs to prevent recurrence were identified in the CA system and were reviewed and tracked to completion in accordance with the licensee's CA system implementing procedure, Quality Work Instruction (QWI) 14.1.1, Preventive/Corrective Action System.

The inspectors reviewed the RP Audits, Inspections 1st Quarter 2016, report to verify that deficiencies identified during the audits were addressed in the corrective action program as required.

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

4. Permanent Plant Modifications (IP 88135.17)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed a sample of risk significant plant modifications for compliance with the license application and requirements of 10 CFR 70. Specifically, the inspectors evaluated the impacts to associated IROFS and ISA accident sequences in the selected modifications. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Change Request (CR) documentation associated with the transition to a new security uninterruptable power supply (UPS). The inspectors conducted field walkdowns of portions of the modification to validate that the as-found plant configurations were in alignment with the CR documentation and to evaluate the material condition of any associated IROFS. In addition, the inspectors reviewed updates and changes to the ISA/SAR and procedures affected by the modifications, as applicable.

The inspectors reviewed the sampled CR packages for accuracy and adherence to the licensee's change management process QWI 5.1.12, "Change Management." The inspectors verified that applicable post-maintenance installation and testing requirements were identified in the CR documentation as required. The inspectors verified that the licensee identified and addressed any impacts to the ISA/SAR resulting from modifications.

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

5. Plant Modifications (IP 88070)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors interviewed three licensee managers and seven licensee engineers to verify that the licensee had established an effective configuration management program in accordance with license requirements to evaluate, implement, and track permanent and temporary modifications which could affect safety.

The inspectors verified that the licensee's work control program had provisions to ensure adequate pre-job planning and preparation of plant modification packages. The inspectors verified that the configuration management system had provisions to ensure that plant modifications did not degrade the performance capabilities of IROFS or other safety controls that are part of the safety design basis.

The inspectors reviewed a selection of plant modification packages (listed as Records in Section 4 of the Attachment) that were implemented since the last plant modification inspection. The inspectors reviewed these packages and interviewed licensee staff to verify that the change packages were prepared, reviewed, and completed in accordance with QWI 5.1.12, Change Management, Revision (Rev.) 28. Selected changes that involved more complex physical modifications (SER 13-036 and SER 13-042) were reviewed to verify that applicable post-maintenance installation and testing requirements were identified and performed prior to implementation of change packages. The inspectors reviewed design information to determine if testing set points used in post-maintenance testing associated with changes reflected the protection of safety limits while ensuring that no additional hazard was created by the test.

The inspectors verified that the licensee addressed baseline design criteria stipulated in 10 CFR 70.64 in the designs of plant modifications, as applicable. The inspectors verified that the licensee addressed the impacts of modifications to the safety analysis reports and other safety program information developed in accordance with 10 CFR 70.62. The qualification records of licensee managers involved in the configuration management process were reviewed to verify that they met the requirements of the license application. The inspectors also reviewed the completed 10 CFR 70.72 evaluations associated with changes to determine if the licensee adequately determined whether NRC pre-approval of the change was required.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of selected modifications to determine if they were installed in accordance with approved design documents such as drawings and technical reports. The inspectors reviewed training records to determine if operators received training on modifications to IROFS prior to implementation as required.

The inspectors reviewed the procedure for the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors also reviewed entries in the corrective action program to verify that issues related to CRs and the installation of facility changes were assigned appropriate corrective actions in accordance with licensee commitments and procedures.

b. Conclusion

No violations of significance were identified.

D. Other Areas**1. Follow-up on Previously Identified Issues**

- a. (CLOSED) Violation (VIO) 70-27/2016-002-01: Failure to Conduct Activities Involving Licensed Material in Accordance with Written and Approved Procedures Resulting in Fire Duct Event
- b. The inspectors verified that the licensee revised OP-0061556, Recovery Furnace Operation, Rev. 15, to provide additional guidance to verify that a carrier is removed from the cooling section of the furnace prior to initiating the loading sequence. In addition, the licensee updated the furnace workstation programmable logic controller (PLC) logic to use a sensor in the cooling section of the furnace. This sensor will verify if a carrier is located in the cooling section as well as prevent the loading of a new carrier if the sensor detects a carrier in the cooling section. The licensee conducted an evaluation to identify a pre-filter media suitable to withstanding temperatures in excess of 700°C, which was reviewed by inspectors. The inspectors verified that the licensee provided training regarding the updates to the procedure, PLC logic, and the use of filter media in the furnace to operators of the furnace. This item is considered closed.

E. Exit Meeting

On May 19, 2016 and July 21, 2016, inspectors presented the inspection results to D. Ward and members of the licensee staff. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. Proprietary information was discussed, but not included in the report.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>
T. Allen	Front Line Manager, Uranium Processing and Research Reactors
B.J. Burch	Vice President and General Manager
T. Cayton	UPRR Maintenance
K. Conway	Unit Manager, Radiation Protection
M. Edstrom	Fire Protection Engineer
D. Faidley	Unit Manager, Nuclear Criticality Safety
C. Goff	Manager, Statistics and Software Quality
R. Harvey	Front Line Manager for Wastewater Treatment
K. Hubbard	UPRR Maintenance
R. Johnson	Licensing Engineer
T. Lotz	Nuclear Engineer
T. Lowery	Senior Principle Engineer of Lifting and Handling
L. Miller	Front Line Manager, UPRR
R. Moore	Front Line Manager, UPRR
L. Ragland	Unit Manager, Uranium Processing and Research Reactors
D. Spangler	Section Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing
T. Stinson	NCS Engineer
S. Subosits	Licensing Engineer
C. Terry	Unit Manager, Licensing and Safety Analysis
M. Turek	UPRR Engineer
D. Ward	Dept. Manager, Environmental, Safety Health and Safeguards
L. Wetzel	Senior NCS Engineer
C. Yates	Section Manager, Uranium Processing and Research Reactors

2. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

70-27/2016-002-001	VIO	(Closed) Failure to conduct activities involving licensed material in accordance with written and approved procedures resulting in fire duct event
--------------------	-----	--

3. LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

88015	Nuclear Criticality Safety
88070	Plant Modifications
88135	Resident Inspection Program For Category I Fuel Cycle Facilities
88135.02	Plant Status
88135.04	ISA Implementation
88135.05	Fire Protection
88135.17	Permanent Plant Modifications
88135.19	Post Maintenance Testing
88135.22	Surveillance Testing

4. **DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

Records

NCS-2016-045, NCS Violation and Observation Summary – 1st Quarter 2016, dated April 29, 2016
 NCS-2015-136, NCS Safety Analysis Supporting SER 15-035 Phase 01- Moving VFF Components through Bay 4 (u), dated January 28, 2016
 NCS-2015-068, NCS Analysis for ANSTO Compacts and Plates per SER 15-009 Phase 1, dated February 11, 2016
 NCS-2016-021, NCS Analysis for U-MO HEU Ingot Receipt and Storage per SER 14-033 Phase 02, dated April 13, 2016
 NCS-2016-027, NCS Safety Analysis Supporting SER 16-002 Phase 01 – Double Tier Hanging Fixture Arrangement for IMD TDC Corrosion Fuel Elements (u), dated April 6, 2016
 NCS-2016-018, NCS Safety Analysis for Addition of 7kg Net weight / 2.5 L safety basis to AGR Compacting Facility Work Tables (CR-1045749) dated February 29, 2016
 NCS-2016-006, NCS Safety Analysis for Revision to Recovery Lining Enclosure NCS Posting and Associated SAR Updates (CA 201600084) (CR-1045526), dated January 26, 2016
 NCS-2016-041, NCS Safety Analysis Supporting CHG-00000225-MII-F-038 Revision (Rev.) 13 Update (u), dated April 19, 2016
 NCS-2016-051, Safety Concern Analysis for Degraded VFF Poison Fixture (CA-2016-00539)(u), dated May 19, 2016
 HS-2015-074, Industrial Health and Safety Technical Work Record, dated July 5, 2015
 Industrial Health and Safety SER Evaluation, Attachment 3, Rev. 002
 NCS-2013-130, Nuclear Criticality Safety Technical Work Record, dated October 9, 2013
 SAP 10006974 (maintenance record)
 Safety Evaluation Request (SER) 13-036, Phase 01
 SER 13-042, Phase 1
 SER 15-003, Phase 1
 SER 15-009, Phase 1

Change Requests (CRs)

CR 1045628-00, Transition to the New Security UPS
 CR 1045578-00, Replacing WS-401 Cooling Section Exhaust Pre-Filter Media
 CR 1045686-00, Remove Caustic Tank and Associated Plumbing in the Chemical Prep Room
 CR 1045610-00, Modify Recovery Furnace
 CR 1025626-00, New Tank for Void Volume Test at RTRT
 CR-1041281-00, Revise SAR 15.12 and Appendix,
 CR-1042976-00, GDJ 719/720 Planned Activities
 CR-1043867-00, Restart of Workstation 100 and Workstation 110 in SFF
 CR-1043931-00, Treat Production – Preliminary Safety Evaluation
 CR-1043937-00, Revise Accountability Transfer Cart Safety Basis
 CR-1044710-00, Updates to the Recovery Furnace SAR
 CR-1044068-00, Revise OP-1005350 to Add New NCS Requirements

Procedures

HS-OP-014, Rev. 04, Mt. Athos Site Pre-Fire Plan Review, dated November 10, 2015
OP 1043087

OP 0061556, Rev. 15

HS-OP-004, Attachment 1, Audit Summary Report, dated November 30, 2005, Rev. 2

QWI 14.1.1, Preventive/Corrective Action System, Rev. 31

HS-03-10, Control of Fire Protection System Impairments, Rev. 15

OP-1041746, Storage of Material in the CSF, Rev. 02

QWI 5.1.7, Safety Evaluation Requests, Rev. 30

QWI 5.1.12, Change Management, Rev. 28

QWI 5.1.14, Automated Systems/Programs Control, Rev. 26

Other

LMS 2016-001, RP Audits, Inspections, 1st Quarter 2016, dated April 26, 2016

RWP 16-0018, Rev. 00

Alpha Smear Sampling Weekly Reports (Recovery, UPRR-RTRT, WT-Waste Treatment)
weeks dated April 24, 2016, May 1, 2016, May 8, 2016

SAR 15.25, Furnace Process Recovery Operation, Rev. 36, dated October 19, 2015

NCS-TR-00007, Validation Report for SCALE 6.1 on Windows 7 Based PC's., Rev. 2,
dated August 20, 2014

N-517, 10 CFR 70.72, Change Evaluation Checklist, Rev. 9

NFPA 13, 2016

On-The-Job-Training (OJT) records for multiple technicians/operators

Organization Chart for Licensing and Safety Analysis

SER Priority Meeting Print-Out of SERs

Work Orders

WO 20199463

WO 20200628

WO 20199066

WO 20201128

WO 20201273

WO 20201412

Condition Reports Reviewed

CA 201501313

CA 201600441

CA 201501607

CA 201600550

CA 201501693

CA 201600423

CA 201501694

CA 201600490

CA 201501770

CA 201600523

CA 201600266

CA 201600083

CA 201600282

CA 201600478

CA 201600444

CA 201600605

CA 201600455

CA 201501845

CA 201600496

CA 201600277

CA 201600507

CA 201600365

CA 201600524

CA 201600562

CA 201600542

CA 201600013

CA 201600547

CA 201600539

CA 201600562

CA 201600129

CA 201600567

CA 201600315

CA 201600420
CA 201600572
CA 201600506

CA 201600408
CA 201600075

Condition Reports Written as a Result of the Inspection
CA 2016-00658