

Steven D. Capps Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station

Duke Energy

MG01VP I 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 27078

o: 980.875.4805

f: 980.875.4809

Steven.Capps@duke-energy.com

Serial No: MNS-16-057

July 22, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

10 CFR 50.73

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Unit 1

Docket No. 50-369

Licensee Event Report 369/2016-01, Revision 1 Nuclear Condition Report (NCR) 2013556

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 369/2016-01, Revision 1, regarding an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) rejectable flaw discovered on the MNS Unit 1 Chemical and Volume Control System (NV) charging piping.

This revision to LER 369/2016-01 supersedes the LER previously submitted on May 23, 2016. The cause analysis has been completed. Completion of the cause analysis has not affected the original reporting criteria, which was in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), a degradation of a principal safety barrier.

Additionally, the revision did not affect the significance of the event, which was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

There are no regulatory commitments associated with this LER.

Im Suider for

If questions arise regarding this LER, please contact George Murphy of Regulatory Affairs at 980-875-5715.

Sincerely,

Steven D. Capps

Attachment

IEZZ

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 22, 2016 Page 2

cc: Catherine Haney

Administrator, Region II

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave.

NE Suite 1200, 30303-1257

J. Zeiler

NRC Senior Resident Inspector

McGuire Nuclear Station

A. Hutto

NRC Replacement Senior Resident Inspector

McGuire Nuclear Station

Electronic copies:

G.E. Miller, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ed.Miller@nrc.gov

V. Sreenivas, Interim Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission V.Sreenivas@nrc.gov

NRC FORM 366 (02-2014)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections.

(See page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)						Branch (1-5 H53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.								
1. F	1. FACILITY NAME						2. DOCKET NUMBER			3	3. PAGE			
McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1							05000	05000- 369 1 OF					4	
4. T	4. TITLE											•	t	
Deg	gradec	l Condition	due to	Rejectable	Flaw o	n U1 Cha	rging	<u> Line</u>						
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DAT					DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED									
МО	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO	МО	DAY	YEAR		CILITY NAM	ME	DOCKET NUMBER		
03	22	2016		2016-01	1 _	07	22	2016		CILITY NAM	ME	DOCKET NUMBER		
			11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)											
9. OPERATING MODE Mode 5		20.2201(b) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i)			20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)			
10. POWER LEVEL		☐ 20. ☐ 20. ☐ 20.	2203(a)(2)(ii) 2203(a)(2)(iii) 2203(a)(2)(iv) 2203(a)(2)(v) 2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)			 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(a)(4) 73.71(a)(5) OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 		
					12. LIC	ENSEE CO	ATAC	CT FOR	TH	IIS LER				
FACILITY NAME George M. Murphy, Regulatory Affairs TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 980-875-5715									5					
		13.	COMP	LETE ONE LII	NE FOR E	ACH COM	PONE	ENT FAI	LUI	RE DESCRI	IBED II	N THIS I	REPORT	
CAUS	CAUSE SYSTEM		MANU- COMPONENT FACTURER		REPORTABLE TO EPIX			E_	SYSTEM CO		ONENT	MANU- FA CTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	
x	х СВ			PSP	X000	Υ		}						,
			UPPLE	MENTAL REI									1 DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X					NO		SUBMISSION DATE							
16.	On M ultras React with w	arch 22, 20 onic (UT) of tor Coolant veld 1NC1I ous examin	400 spa 016, w examir : Syste =-1374 ation (ces, i.e., approx hile Unit 1 w nation of the em (NC) colo	vas in er Chemic d leg cor ent exan	single-space and of cycle cal and Von firmed a nination re conclude	e (E0 olumo prev esults ed tha	written lir OC) ref e Cont riously s had s at the i	fuel rol ide sho ndi	ling outag System (N ntified circ wn that th ication no	e 1E0 NV), 0 cumfe le indi longe	Chargin rential cation	g Line to indication had cha	o the 1A on associated nged since the

Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI Code requirements. This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) as a degraded condition.

A specific cause for the condition could not be determined. A metallurgical examination concluded that the cause of the UT result could have been influenced by pre-existing welds associated with a legacy modification.

The affected NV piping on Unit 1 was replaced during refueling outage 1EOC24.

NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

EXPIRES: 01/31/2017

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	LER NUMBER		3. PAGE			
,		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER				
McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1	05000369	2016	- - 01 <u>-</u>	01	2_	OF	4	

17. NARRATIVE

BACKGROUND:

Applicable Energy Industry Identification [EIIS] system and component codes are enclosed within brackets. McGuire-specific system and component identifiers are contained within parentheses.

Chemical and Volume Control System [CB] (NV):

The NV system is designed to maintain required water inventory in the Reactor Coolant [AB] (NC) system; maintain seal-water injection flow to the reactor coolant pumps; control water chemistry conditions; and provide emergency core cooling (part of the system shares piping with the Safety Injection [BQ] (NI) system).

A circumferential indication on weld 1NC1F-1374 was reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A), "Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded." An Emergency Notification System report was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on March 22, 2016, at 2333 hours. A 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(A) licensee event report is also required due to this degraded condition and was submitted on May 23, 2016. This report supplements the May 23, 2016, report.

Weld 1NC1F-1374 is located on the 3 inch nominal diameter NV connection to the 27.5 inch inside diameter 1A NC cold leg piping. This weld has been installed in the plant since 1983 following the removal of thermal sleeves in the reactor coolant system. The circumferential indication is located near the connection to the NC cold leg piping.

The circumferential indication was originally identified during the previous 1EOC23 refueling outage. When originally identified, the weld met the requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI IWB 3514. The current 1EOC24 examination results had shown that the indication had changed since the previous 1EOC23 examination and concluded that the circumferential indication no longer met ASME Section XI Code requirements.

This weld was not originally scoped into the MRP-146, "Thermal Fatigue in Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines," program due to piping orientation characteristics. It was added to the MRP-146 examination scope as an extent of condition examination based on similarities in application to a previously identified MRP-146 indication on Unit 2 piping. The Unit 2 condition is documented in LER 370/2014-01, Revision 1, dated July 24, 2014. The examination of 1NC1F-1374 completed the extent of condition examinations. Under the MRP-146 program, this weld will continue to be inspected per industry guidance.

No significant structures, systems, or components were out of service at the time of discovery such that they contributed to the event.

NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) **CONTINUATION SHEET**

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 01/31/2017

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	3. PAG	PAGE			
,		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1	05000369	2016	- 01 -	01	3	OF	4

17. NARRATIVE

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On March 22, 2016, while Unit 1 was in refueling outage 1EOC24 (Mode 5), a manual ultrasonic (UT) examination of the [CB] NV branch line connected to the [AB] NC system cold leg piping confirmed a previously identified circumferential indication on weld 1NC1F-1374.

The UT techniques used during 1EOC24 on March 22, 2016, had shown that the circumferential indication had changed since the previous 1EOC23 examination and concluded that the indication no longer met American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI Code requirements.

The relevant sequence of events pertaining to the indication on weld 1NC1F-1374 is as follows:

09/28/2014 A circumferential indication was identified during 1EOC23 at 1NC1F-1374 during the

MRP-146 extent of condition UT examination. The circumferential indication was evaluated

as acceptable per ASME Section XI code requirements.

03/22/2016 A subsequent re-examination of 1NC1F-1374 during 1EOC24 showed that the

circumferential indication had changed and no longer met ASME Section XI code

requirements.

04/04/2016 The affected piping associated with weld 1NC1F-1374 was replaced during the 1EOC24

refueling outage.

CAUSAL FACTORS:

A specific cause for the condition could not be determined. The section of the pipe that contained the circumferential indication identified by the UT was removed for examination in the Duke Energy Metallurgical Lab to understand the cause of the circumferential indication. The metallurgical examination concluded that the cause of the UT result could have been influenced by the presence of existing weld artifacts. Although the metallurgical examination results indicated the presence of small indications, they were well within ASME XI code criteria and were not actively growing. The indications appeared to be the result of shrinkage of the welds associated with a legacy modification.

The indications examined in the metallurgical lab were not able to be opened to determine the presence of fatigue striations; however, the report did not show evidence of rapid growth as evidenced by blunted, oxide filled crack tips.

NRC FORM 366A (02-2014)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 01/31/2017

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6	LER NUMBER	3. PAGE			
]		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	,		
McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1	05000369	2016	- 01 -	01	4	OF	4

17. NARRATIVE

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate:

1. An ASME Code repair of the 1A Normal Charging Line containing the circumferential indication was completed during 1EOC24.

Planned:

1. The subject weld will be incorporated into the McGuire Augmented ISI Plan for UT inspection under the industry guidance of MRP-146.

SAFETY ANALYSIS:

The NV piping indication found on Unit 1 had no impact on public health and safety. A stress analysis concluded that despite the presence of the circumferential indication reported by the UT exam, the 3 inch nominal diameter NV piping nozzle would not have catastrophically failed if it had been exposed to design basis loadings. The analysis further concluded that the piping would not leak if it had been exposed to design basis loadings prior to replacement.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A review of the McGuire corrective action program was conducted to determine whether this was a recurring event. There have been two similar issues identified during the past five years that were associated with MRP-146 and thermal fatigue. The first issue is documented in LER 370/2014-01, dated July 24, 2014. The second one is documented in LER 369-2014-02, dated November 24, 2014.

The indication associated with weld 1NC1F-1374 on 1A Normal Charging Line that is discussed in this report was examined as part of the original Unit 2 issue extent of condition. Since this indication was examined as part of the extent of condition review stemming from the original McGuire Unit 2 piping weld issue, and since there were no failed corrective actions that could have prevented the event, the event documented in this LER is not considered recurring.