



JUL 15 2016

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Subject: St. Lucie Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389
Revised Technical Specifications for License Amendment Request
for Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)
Traveler TSTF-422, Revision 2, "Change in Technical
Specifications End States, (CE NPSD-1186)," Using the
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

References:

1. FPL Letter L-2015-182 dated August 31, 2015, "License Amendment Request for Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-422, Revision 2, 'Change in Technical Specifications End States, (CE NPSD-1186),' Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process," ADAMS Accession No. ML15084A141

In Reference 1 Florida Power & Light (FPL) submitted a Technical Specification (TS) license amendment request (LAR) that would utilize risk-informed requirements to modify selected Required Action End States.

Based on teleconferences between the Staff and FPL, FPL is submitting some revised TS markups and their corresponding word-processed TSs. The attachment contains the justification for the proposed changes. The revised TSs replace those provided in Reference 1.

The no significant hazards consideration determination within Reference 1 bounds the scope of these changes. If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Ken Frehafer at (772) 467-7748.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on **JUL 15 2016**

Sincerely,

Christopher R. Costanzo
Site Vice President
St. Lucie Plant

CRC/KWF

Attachment

cc: NRC Region II Administrator
St. Lucie Plant NRC Senior Resident Inspector

A001
NRR

Some of the original FPL-proposed TS changes were not consistent with the changes authorized by TSTF-422. Specifically:

1. One of the TSTF-422 assumptions was that the control room emergency ventilation system filter subsystem consists of two independent trains. Although the Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System has only one filter train, FPL applied the HOT SHUTDOWN end state in the original TS markups for TS 3.7.7.1.c. Because applying the HOT SHUTDOWN end state for loss of the Unit 1's CREVS single filter train could be considered non-conservative, FPL is withdrawing the originally proposed HOT SHUTDOWN end state proposal from TS 3/4.7.7.1 Action c.
2. FPL originally proposed a HOT SHUTDOWN end state for a Unit 2 de-energized AC instrument bus in TS 3/4.8.3 action b(1), even though this proposal had no counterpart in TSTF-422. Therefore, FPL is withdrawing the originally proposed HOT SHUTDOWN end state from TS 3/4.8.3 Action b(1).

FPL is providing replacement proposed markups and word processed TSs that address the above inconsistencies.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.7.1 The control room emergency ventilation system shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Two booster fans,
- b. Two isolation valves in each outside air intake duct,
- c. Two isolation valves in the toilet area air exhaust duct,
- d. One filter train,
- e. At least two air conditioning units, and
- f. Two isolation valves in the kitchen area exhaust duct.

NOTE

The control room envelope boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:

- a. With one booster fan inoperable, restore the inoperable fan to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in ~~COLD SHUTDOWN~~ within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one isolation valve per air duct inoperable, operation may continue provided the other isolation valve in the same duct is maintained closed; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in ~~COLD SHUTDOWN~~ within the following 30 hours.
- c. With the filter train inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary:
 - 1. Immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions, and
 - 2. Within 1 hour, verify LCO 3.4.8, "Specific Activity," is met, and
 - 3. Within 24 hours restore the filter train to OPERABLE status.With the above requirements not met, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and ~~COLD SHUTDOWN~~ within the following 30 hours.
- d. With only one air conditioning unit OPERABLE, restore at least two air conditioning units to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in ~~COLD SHUTDOWN~~ within the following 30 hours.

HOT SHUTDOWN
within the following
6 hours. LCO
3.0.4.a is not
applicable when
entering HOT
SHUTDOWN

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

ACTION:

- a. With one of the required trains of A.C. Emergency busses not fully energized, re-energize the train within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one A.C. Instrument Bus either not energized from its associated inverter, or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. Bus: (1) re-energize the A.C. Instrument Bus within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours and (2) re-energize the A.C. Instrument Bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- c. With one D.C. Bus not energized from its associated Battery Bank, re-energize the D.C. Bus from its associated Battery Bank within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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3.0.4.a is not
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entering HOT
SHUTDOWN

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.8.3.1 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.

PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.7.1 The control room emergency ventilation system shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. Two booster fans,
- b. Two isolation valves in each outside air intake duct,
- c. Two isolation valves in the toilet area air exhaust duct,
- d. One filter train,
- e. At least two air conditioning units, and
- f. Two isolation valves in the kitchen area exhaust duct.

NOTE

The control room envelope boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:

- a. With one booster fan inoperable, restore the inoperable fan to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
- b. With one isolation valve per air duct inoperable, operation may continue provided the other isolation valve in the same duct is maintained closed; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
- c. With the filter train inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable Control Room Envelope boundary:
 1. Immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions, and
 2. Within 1 hour, verify LCO 3.4.8, "Specific Activity," is met, and
 3. Within 24 hours restore the filter train to OPERABLE status.With the above requirements not met, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- d. With only one air conditioning unit OPERABLE, restore at least two air conditioning units to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

ACTION:

- a. With one of the required trains of A.C. Emergency busses not fully energized, re-energize the train within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- b. With one A.C. Instrument Bus either not energized from its associated inverter, or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. Bus: (1) re-energize the A.C. Instrument Bus within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours and (2) re-energize the A.C. Instrument Bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated D.C. Bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering HOT SHUTDOWN.
- c. With one D.C. Bus not energized from its associated Battery Bank, re-energize the D.C. Bus from its associated Battery Bank within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.8.3.1 The specified busses shall be determined energized in the required manner in accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the busses.