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 RECIP. NAME: O'REILLY, J.P. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

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SUBJECT: Forwards LER 80-024/03L-0.

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

August 29, 1980

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
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/80-24. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:scs
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavalley
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
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Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

Report Number: RO-269/80-24

Report Date: August 29, 1980

Occurrence Date: July 31, 1980

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Cable Controlling Automatic Initiation of the High Pressure Service Water Pumps Removed From Service Due to Construction Interference

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 1: 100% Full Power
Oconee 2: 59% Full Power
Oconee 3: 100% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

At 1537 hours on July 31, 1980, the cable which controls the automatic initiation of the High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) pumps was taken out of service in order to continue excavation of the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) cable trench. The cable was cut at a point near the northwest corner of the Hot Storage Building. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.17.2.1 and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

On July 10, 1980, during excavation of the SSF cable trench an existing conduit bank encased in concrete was discovered to cross the route of the SSF cable trench. In order to remove the concrete and conduit, the cable mark 1MC413, which provides automatic initiation to the HPSW upon low level of the elevated storage tank, and eight other cables had to be deenergized. On July 31, 1980 these cables were deenergized.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Because of personnel safety considerations to the construction personnel working on the SSF, this cable had to be removed from service. Due to the nature of the work involved, the amount of time that the cable was kept out of service was held to a minimum with minimal impact on the fire protection system to the station. Taking the cable out of service only inactivated the automatic initiation of the HPSW pumps. The HPSW system remained active and remote monitoring of the elevated storage tank level was still available and utilized. The availability of HPSW to the station was not compromised because the automatic initiation of the HPSW pumps were taken out of service. Thus, this incident is considered to be of no significance with respect to safe operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

Since the splicing of the cable mark 1MC413 was successfully accomplished, no further corrective action was necessary. As previously stated, cable mark 1MC413 and the other cables located in the conduit bank had to be taken out of service to safely complete the installation of the SSF cable trench.