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 FACIL:50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power Co.
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 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

DOCKET #
05000269

SUBJECT: LER 80-012/03L-0: on 800501, while at 75% full power, valve
 1FDW-310 inadvertently closed, isolating turbine driven EFW
 pump from once-through steam generator 1B. Caused by not
 identifying unit number to be closed. Personnel cautioned.

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NOTES: M. CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMENDS TO FSAR & CHANGES TO TECH SPECS

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| | HANAUER,S. | 1 | 1 | JORDAN,E./IE | 1 | 1 |
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JUN 6 1980

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/80-12

Report Date: May 29, 1980

Occurrence Date: May 1, 1980

Facility: Oconee 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Turbine-Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump
Isolated from Steam Generator 1B

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 73% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

At 0530 on May 1, 1980, valve 1FDW-310 in the discharge line from the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump (EFWP) to once-through steam generator 1B was found to be closed while Oconee 1 was operating at 73% full power. The valve was placed in its normal locked-open position, and the valve checklist and valve verification checklist for the EFW System were run to assure proper system alignment.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The turbine-driven EFWP was isolated from OTSG 1B as a result of the inadvertent closing of valve 1FDW-310. Valve 2FDW-310 was to have been closed to isolate OTSG 2B for leak testing while Oconee 2 was at cold shutdown. However, the personnel who closed valve 1FDW-310 had been told only to close valve FDW-310; the correct unit was not specified.

Analysis of Occurrence:

EFW flow to OTSG 1B was still available from motor-driven EFWP 1B with valve 1FDW-310 closed. In addition, both the turbine-driven EFWP and motor-driven EFWP 1A were available to OTSG 1A. The capacity of both motor-driven pumps or the turbine-driven pump is more than sufficient for decay heat removal. Proposed Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.4, which has not yet been issued but which has been committed to by Duke Power Company, permits one EFWP to be inoperable for up to 60 hours. Valve 1FDW-310 was opened and locked open approximately 16 hours after having been closed. This incident therefore constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and must be reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), although it was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action

Valve 1FDW-310 was locked open, and the valve verification checklist was run to assure proper system alignment. The procedure for OTSG leak testing has been revised to include a separate OTSG isolation valve checklist for each unit. The personnel involved in this incident have been counselled regarding identifying the proper unit when giving instructions for valve operations. In addition, operations personnel have been cautioned regarding the need to specify the unit number when communicating instructions to others.