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A9/4

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 FACIL: 50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power Co.
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 RECIP. NAME: RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

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SUBJECT: LER 80-006/03L-0: on 800306, during decay heat removal test, heat roval cooler 1B outlet valve 1LP-4 failed to open manually. Caused by limit switch being out of adjustment. Switch readjusted.

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NOTES: ~~M. CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMENDMENTS TO FSAR AND CHANGES TO TECH SPECS~~

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APR 9 1980

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/80-6

Report Date: April 4, 1980

Occurrence Date: March 6, 1980

Facility: Oconee 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: DHR Cooler Out of Service

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

At 1028 on March 6, 1980, decay heat removal (DHR) cooler 1B outlet valve LLP-14 failed to open during the DHR System Power-Operated Valves Annual Performance Test. Immediately before, the normally-open valve had been successfully cycled manually, but after being closed electrically to test its motor operator, the valve failed to reopen. The valve was manually opened by 1044 on March 6, reestablishing the flowpath through DHR cooler 1B. The valve's limit switch was found to be out of adjustment and was readjusted, and the valve was cycled to verify proper operation.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

In order to supply sufficient torque to move the valve off its seat, a valve position limit switch is provided to override the valve's torque switch as the valve begins to open. Because the limit switch was out of adjustment, the torque switch tripped before the torque was high enough to lift the valve off its seat. No cause for the limit switch to be out of adjustment could be determined. It is possible that thermal expansion resulting from varying operating temperatures caused the valve to seat at slightly different positions, necessitating readjustment of the limit switch.

Analysis of Occurrence:

During the period valve LLP-14 was closed, low pressure injection (LPI) train A was operable and fully capable of satisfying Engineered Safeguards and DHR requirements. In addition, valve LLP-14 was closed for only approximately 13 minutes, so LPI train B was returned to service well within the 24 hour period permitted by Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.3.2.b(2). However, since this incident constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, it must be reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), although it was considered to be of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The valve position limit switch was readjusted, and the valve was cycled to verify operability.

