

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

July 13, 1979

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, GA 30303


REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/79-17. This report is being submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications 6.2 and 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to have no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

SRL/sch

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control



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DUKE POWER COMPANY
Oconee Unit 1

Report Number: RO-269/79-17

Report Date: July 13, 1979

Occurrence Date: June 14, 1979

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 99% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

At 1340 on June 14, 1979, steam generator sample line penetration isolation valve FDW-108 failed to indicate closure when it was cycled during the performance of a stroke test. Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.6.3.b(2) permits continued operation with an inoperable containment isolation valve, provided that the penetration is isolated within four hours. Redundant isolation valve FDW-107 was locked in the closed position at approximately 1450 on June 14, well within the specified limits. On June 15, 1979, valve FDW-108 was manually cycled and was determined to be operating properly. Further investigation revealed that the valve operator limit switch was defective, giving a false indication of valve position. The limit switch was replaced, and the valve was cycled and declared operable at approximately 1100 on June 15.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Although valve FDW-108 operated properly during the performance test, its position was incorrectly indicated as a result of a defective limit switch. The failure of this type of valve has been observed on several previous occasions, and the valve appears to be unsuitable for long-term operation in such an environment.

Analysis of Occurrence:

In the unlikely event that containment isolation had been required, valve FDW-108 would have closed properly, although the defective limit switch might have given a faulty indication of its position. Isolation of the steam generator sample line would have been further assured by the closure of redundant valve FDW-107. In addition, the penetration was isolated by securing FDW-107 well within the limits of Technical Specification 3.6.3.b(2). However, the declared inoperability of valve FDW-108 constitutes operation of the unit in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation. This incident must therefore be reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), although it was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to close valve FDW-107 to ensure that the steam generator sample line would be isolated if required. The defective limit switch for valve FDW-108 was replaced, and the valve was cycled and declared to be operable. This valve and valve FDW-106, the equivalent isolation valve in the sample line for the other steam generator, will be replaced during the next Unit 1 refueling outage. These valves have already been replaced for Units 2 and 3, and no failures have been experienced thusfar.

