

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

February 2, 1979

TELEPHONE AREA 704
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2.1b(2) of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence
Report RO-269/79-2.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

SRL:scs
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

A002
S/11

7902060287

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/79-2

Report Date: February 2, 1979

Occurrence Date: January 3, 1979

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Inoperable Hydraulic Suppressor

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 95% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

On January 2, 1979, Hydraulic Suppressor 1-01A-1-1-0-401A-H43 was discovered to have rotated so that the reservoir was on the bottom. This suppressor is on the main steam line on the ground floor of the Turbine Building, and is used to dampen horizontal movement and does not support any weight. The suppressor was previously inspected December 2, 1978, and was operable at that time. On January 3, 1979, the suppressor was removed from service, functionally tested, declared operable, and reinstalled. The suppressor was returned to service within the requirements of Technical Specification 3.14.2, which specifies that a hydraulic suppressor be repaired or replaced within 72 hours of discovering its inoperability.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

No cause for the rotation of the cylinder has been determined. The design of the locking device used to prevent suppressor rotation will be reviewed to determine whether it should be improved or a new method utilized.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Upon visual inspection, the suppressor was identified as being inoperable. However, as a result of functional testing, the suppressor was determined to be operable. Therefore, it would have fulfilled its purpose in restraining pipe motion under dynamic loads during the period between the December 2, 1978 and January 2, 1979 inspections. In addition, since suppressor protection is required only during low probability events, Technical Specification 3.14.2 allows 72 hours to repair or replace an inoperable suppressor. The suppressor was tested to assure operability and returned to service well within this time period. Therefore, safe operation of the unit was not affected, and the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action:

The suppressor was removed from service, tested to assure operability, and reinstalled. The method for locking the suppressor will be reviewed to determine what changes, if any, need to be made. Additional corrective action will be taken, as appropriate.

7902060291

