

CENT FILES

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

October 4, 1978

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

RE: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/78-23.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *By [Signature]*

KRW:scs
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

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CCP

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report Number: RO-269/78-23

Report Date: October 4, 1978

Occurrence Date: September 19, 1978

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: BWST Level Instrumentation Out-of-Calibration

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Cold Shutdown/Refueling Outage

Description of Occurrence:

On September 18, 1978, during the performance of instrumentation procedure IP/1/A/0203/01A, it was determined that one of the two Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) level indication channels was out-of-calibration in the non-conservative direction. The channel involved provides the input for the analog computer monitor point, the statalarm in the control room and one indicator on the BWST level guage in the control room. A redundant channel provides input to a second indicator on the BWST level guage. The signal from the degraded channel is processed through pressure transmitter 1LT2A to all three outputs of the channel. This pressure was found to have a non-conservative error of from 1.5 to 2.4 feet. The signal to the computer is directed through pressure to voltage converter 1LT2B. The converter had a non-conservative error of from 0.3 to 0.63 feet. The arrangement of components allows the errors to add. Both the computer alarm and the statalarm (normal alarm set of 47 feet) would have initiated on actual level less than the 46 feet minimum level required by Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.3.1 (f). The level guage in the control room indicated both the erroneous level and the correct level. The channel was recalibrated.

Cause of Occurrence:

No apparent cause for the component malfunctions has been determined.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Throughout the occurrence an accurate level indication was available to operators in the control room. The inoperable channel would have caused both the statalarm and the computer point to have alarmed at a level less than that assumed to be available from the BWST for mitigation of postulated accidents. However, adequate conservatism and sufficient redundant sources of borated water were available from other sources. Both the concentrated Borated Acid Storage Tank (CBAST) and the Borated Water Mix Tank (BAMT) serve as alternate sources for borated water and have sufficient volume to make up for possible low BWST level. This occurrence did not endanger public health and safety.

Corrective Action:

Corrective action taken was to recalibrate those components causing the channel error.