

**Record of Review
Dispositions to Point Beach Internal Events PRA Facts and Observations (F&Os)**

Finding F&O	ACCEPTABLE TO STAFF VIA		
	Review of Plant Disposition (A/B/C)	RAI Response	
		Not Discussed in SE	Discussed in SE
IE-A1-01	A		
IE-B2-01	A		
IE-D3-01	A		
AS-B1-01	A		See PRA RAI 15 and PRA RAI 03 in Section 3.4.2.2 of the SE
AS-B3-01	A		
AS-B6-01	A		
AS-B7-01	C		
SC-A6-02	A		
SY-A21-01	A		
SY-B3-01	C		
HR-A3-01	A		
HR-D1-01		See PRA RAI-02.a. Acceptable to the NRC staff because the licensee explained that “[t]he mis-calibration error value of 5E-4 is not a screening value”, but rather a calculated value for a misalignment event using the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications (THERP).	
HR-G5-01	A		
DA-C7-01	A		
DA-C8-01	A		
DA-C10-01	A		
DA-C14-01	A		
DA-D1-01	A		
DA-D4-01	A		
QU-D1-01	A		
QU-D4-01	A		
QU-D7-01		See PRA RAI-02.f. Acceptable to the NRC staff because the licensee explained that review of risk significant basic events was performed and is documented in Section 4.0, "Importance Rankings" of the Internal Events Quantification Notebook.	
QU-E4-01	A		
QU-F5-01		See PRA RAI-02.b. Acceptable to the NRC staff because the licensee explained its process supporting quantification of CDF and LERF using	

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		<p>'flag files' "turns on and off" factors such as initiating events, modifications, and credited components. The licensee explained that this of this process description was added to the Internal Events PRA documentation.</p> <p>See PRA RAI-02.c. Acceptable to the NRC staff because the licensee explained that reference to LE-G5-01 was an editorial error and that there is no F&O LE-G5-01.</p>	
LE-B1-01		See PRA RAI-02.d and F&O disposition. Acceptable to the NRC staff because the licensee explained that though manual action to vent the reactor vessel was credited, repair is not credited in the internal or fire events PRA.	
LE-C2-02	A		
LE-C3-01	C		
LE-C9-01	C		
LE-D5-01	A		
LE-F1-01	A		
LE-F3-01		See PRA RAI-02.e. Acceptable to the NRC staff because the licensee identified 25 sources of LERF modeling uncertainty and described the impact of the treatment of this uncertainty (e.g., treated conservatively) on the Fire PRA.	
IFSO-A1-01	A		
IFSO-A5-01	A		
IFQU-A1-01	A		
IFQU-A6-01	A		
IFQU-A10-01	A		
IFQU-B3-01	A		
IFQU-A4-01	A		

A: For F&Os, the NRC staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. For Not Met or met at CC-I SRs, the NRC staff finds that the acceptability basis for the capability category of the SR as described by the licensee in the LAR provides confidence that the requirements of the SR have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the PRA quality with respect to the SR is acceptable for this application. Examples of acceptable Not Met and CC-I SRs are modeling methods that yield conservative FRE and change evaluation results.

B: For F&Os, the NRC staff finds that the disposition of the F&O as described by the licensee in the LAR and further clarified during the audit provides confidence that the issues raised by the F&O have been addressed

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<p>and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. For Not Met or met at CC-I SRs, the NRC staff finds that the acceptability basis for the capability category of the SR as described by the licensee in the LAR and further clarified during the audit provides confidence that requirements of the SR have been addressed and, if needed, the PRA has been modified, and therefore the PRA quality with respect to the SR is acceptable for this application. Examples of acceptable Not Met and CC-I SRs are modeling methods that yield conservative FRE and change evaluation results.</p> <p>C: For F&Os, the NRC staff finds that the resolution of the F&O, as described by the licensee in the LAR, would have a negligible effect on the evaluations relied upon to support fire risk evaluations and has no impact on the conclusions of the risk assessment and therefore the resolution of the F&O is acceptable for this application. Examples of such F&Os may be suggestions, as well as those F&Os that don't affect the fire PRA. Documentation issues may fall into this category as well. For Not Met or met at CC-I SRs, the NRC staff finds that the acceptability basis for the capability category of the SR, as described by the licensee in the LAR, would have a negligible effect on the evaluations relied upon to support fire risk evaluations and has no impact on the conclusions of the risk assessment and therefore the PRA quality with respect to the SR is acceptable for this application. Examples are those SRs that don't affect the fire PRA.</p>			