



UNITED STATES  
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 REGION II  
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900  
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos.: 50-269/95-04, 50-270/95-04 and 50-287/95-04

Licensee: Duke Power Company  
 422 South Church Street  
 Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47,  
 and DPR-55

Facility Name: Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3

Inspection Conducted: April 3-5, 1995

Inspector: W. J. Tobin 5/12/95  
 W. J. Tobin, Senior Safeguards Inspector Date Signed

Approved by: David R. McGuire 5/11/95  
 David R. McGuire, Chief Date Signed  
 Safeguards Section  
 Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch  
 Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope:

This special, announced Safeguards Inspection was conducted to review the licensee's discovery, on February 20, 1995, of unsecured drawings stamped as being Safeguards Information.

Results:

One violation was identified relative to drawings, stamped as Safeguards Information, being unsecured in the licensee's automatic data processing system. (95-04-01)

The inspector reviewed the drawing and concluded that the drawings were either not current or not "as built"; additionally they lacked the specificity and detail necessary to be considered Safeguards Information.

## REPORT DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

- \*D. Durham, Safeguards Information Coordinator
- \*R. Eller, Corporate Licensing Coordinator
- \*W. Foster, Safety Assessment Manager
- \*J. Hampton, Site Vice President
- \*B. Jones, Training Manager
- \*T. McQuarrie, Security Manager
- \*M. Patrick, Licensing Manager (Catawba)
- \*J. Peele, Station Manager
- \*M. Satterfield, Security Compliance Coordinator
- \*L. Shehan, Modifications Engineer
- \*J. Smith, Licensing Coordinator

#### U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- L. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector
- \*L. Keller, Resident Inspector

\*Denotes those present at the Exit Meeting

### 2. Protection of Safeguards information (81810)

On February 20, 1995, a licensee modification engineer, whose office is exterior to the protected area, discovered several drawings, which were stamped as being Safeguards Information (SGI), in an unprotected automated data processing system. The engineer was scrolling through a computerized list of drawings when he happened to notice one file which was identified with the alpha-numeric code indicating it was a security related drawing. Initially, he recovered 13 such drawings, and then, with the assistance of the Security Manager and representatives of the Corporate Information Technology group, several more files were extracted from the Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) system. Of the 29 identified files or "signatures," 18 specific drawings were recovered.

The licensee notified the Resident Inspector and the Region II office, as well as entered the event in the Safeguards Events Log on that day.

During this Special Inspection, the inspector interviewed persons knowledgeable about the event and reviewed the licensee's investigation (Security Incident Report) relative to this event. Independent of the licensee, the inspector evaluated the safeguards significance of the drawings. The inspector also reviewed Quality Assurance Audit No. SA-ONS-9501 dated January 16-26, 1995, which had included an audit on the Oconee Nuclear Stations (ONS) SGI program. This Audit had concluded that the licensee had taken acceptable corrective measures to

the Special Assessment of SGI, which was a result of the NRC's Enforcement Action in March, 1994. The Audit noted that the declassification of SGI was still ongoing until March 31, 1995.

Based upon the licensee's investigation, it appears that early in the 1980s the ONS was sending drawings, sketches, barrier studies and modification requests to the Corporate Offices to be added into the CAD system. A Priority 4 was assigned to these drawings indicating they were to be protected as security related (they were stamped as SGI), but, at some unknown time, in order to expedite their processing the Priority was changed to a Priority 1 - RUSH. Once having lost their Priority 4 classification the drawings were unprotected in the CAD system.

In July 1992, during the reorganization of the Corporate Offices, engineers being relocated to the nuclear sites had their drawings and files downloaded to their assigned sites. At that point, the drawings vacated the Corporate Offices CAD system and entered into the ONS CAD system, still in an unprotected environment.

The licensee's corrective action to the March 1994 Enforcement Action verified there were no SGI drawings in the Corporate Office CAD system, but the licensee did not realize the drawings had been downloaded into the ONS CAD system.

The inspector witnessed the engineer recreate his February 20th discovery. At the ONS there is one CAD server containing 8000 files or "signatures" which identify drawings. In order to access the ONS CAD, a personal password is necessary, as well as, the server must be equipped with the software package needed to access a "file path" which scrolls through the "signatures." There are 42 such servers at the ONS. Only two engineers have the need to know the "file path", one being the individual finding the February 20 event because he happened to see the alpha-numeric code of the "signature" and recalled it as being security related.

As a result of this discovery, the licensee immediately took the ONS CAD off-line to preclude possible unauthorized disclosures, additionally the McGuire and Catawba Stations were alerted to review their drawing retrieval systems. At the ONS the licensee did a "signature" search of over 11,000 CAD files and found no other SGI present.

The inspector reviewed each of the 18 specific drawings recovered from the ONS CAD; while all were stamped as being SGI, the inspector by review of the drawing concluded that the drawings were either not current or not "as built"; additionally they lacked the specificity and detail necessary to be considered SGI. In many cases the drawings did not reveal the presence of tamper alarms or randomly color coded wiring inside enclosures. Some drawings revealed information readily observable from the parking lot exterior to the protected area (i.e. the kind of intrusion alarm system). The drawings were of no SGI significance.

It is the licensee's intent to declassify these drawings during it's search for and review of other SGI documents.

In conclusion, the failure to retain these drawings in a secured automatic data processing system was identified as a violation (95-04-01) of 10 CFR 73.21(h) which permits Safeguards Information to be processed or produced on an automatic data processing (ADP) system, provided that the system is self-contained within the licensee's facility and requires the use of an entry code for access to stored information.

3. Exit Meeting

The Exit Meeting was held onsite on April 5, 1995, with those so noted in paragraph 1 in attendance. The licensee was advised of the inspector's findings, and, that Regional Managers would review these findings prior to a final determination. On April 19, 1994, the licensee's point of contact for corrective actions was informed of the one violation. No dissenting comments were voiced.