



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos.: 50-269/95-02, 50-270/95-02 and 50-287/95-02

Licensee: Duke Power Company
 422 South Church Street
 Charlotte, NC 28242-0001

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270 and 50-287

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55

Facility Name: Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3

Inspection Conducted: January 29, 1995 - February 25, 1995

Inspector: P. E. Harmon 3/21/95
 P. E. Harmon, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

- W. K. Poertner, Resident Inspector
- L. A. Keller, Resident Inspector
- P. G. Humphrey, Resident Inspector
- G. T. MacDonald, Reactor Inspector
- S. B. Rudisail, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: R. V. Crlenjak 3/21/95
 R. V. Crlenjak, Chief Date Signed
 Reactor Projects Branch 3

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, resident inspection was conducted in the areas of plant operations, maintenance and surveillance testing, onsite engineering, plant support, inspection of open items, and review of licensee event reports. Inspections were performed during normal and backshift hours and on weekends and holidays.

Results: No violations or deviations of NRC requirements were identified during this inspection period.

Plant Operations performance was satisfactory during the inspection period. System and area walkdowns by the NRC did not identify any deficiencies (paragraph 2).

Maintenance/Surveillance activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner during the inspection period. Discussed with licensee management was a potential coordination problem resulting in maintenance activities not beginning for approximately six hours after a low pressure injection pump was removed from service for a preventive maintenance lubrication (paragraph 3.a.(9)).

Engineering activities reviewed were conducted in a satisfactory manner during the inspection period. On February 6, 1995, a management meeting (30207) was conducted in the NRC Region II office to discuss concerns regarding the identification of safety-related equipment at Oconee. A summary of this meeting was issued on February 23, 1995. In addition, Keowee Hydro load rejection testing to collect data for turbine performance calculations was observed by the regional inspectors and the resident staff (paragraph 4.b.).

Plant Support activities were conducted in a satisfactory manner during the inspection period (paragraph 5).

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *B. Peele, Station Manager
- E. Burchfield, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- *D. Coyle, Systems Engineering Manager
- J. Davis, Engineering Manager
- T. Coutu, Operations Support Manager
- *W. Foster, Safety Assurance Manager
- *J. Hampton, Vice President, Oconee Site
- D. Hubbard, Superintendent, Instrument and Electrical (I&E)
- C. Little, Electrical Systems/Equipment Manager
- *J. Smith, Regulatory Compliance
- *G. Rothenberger, Operations Superintendent
- R. Sweigart, Work Control Superintendent

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and staff engineers.

*Attended exit interview.

2. Plant Operations (71707)

a. General

The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements, Technical Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs, shift turnover records, temporary modification log, and equipment removal and restoration records were reviewed routinely. Discussions were conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, instrument & electrical (I&E), and engineering personnel.

Activities within the control rooms were monitored on an almost daily basis. Inspections were conducted on day and night shifts, during weekdays and on weekends. Inspectors attended some shift changes to evaluate shift turnover performance. Actions observed were conducted as required by the licensee's Administrative Procedures. The complement of licensed personnel on each shift inspected met or exceeded the requirements of TS. Operators were responsive to plant annunciator alarms and were cognizant of plant conditions.

Plant tours were taken throughout the reporting period on a routine basis. During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security, equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.

b. Plant Status

All three units operated at or near full power throughout the inspection period.

c. 10 CFR 50.72 Notification Concerning Low Pressure Injection System

On January 31, 1995, the licensee made a 10 CFR 50.72 report regarding the discovery of a potential condition outside of design basis due to a past procedural requirement to split low pressure injection (LPI) header flows in the event of a postulated single failure of a low pressure injection pump during emergency core cooling system operation. Abnormal Procedure AP/1,2,3/A/1700/07, Loss of Low Pressure Injection System, directed that the LPI headers be cross connected and approximately 1500 gpm be established in each LPI header if only one LPI pump was operating following a loss of coolant accident. The licensee determined that splitting the flow from one LPI pump through both headers could have resulted in containment temperature and pressure exceeding the environmental qualification (EQ) envelope assuming worst case flow instrument inaccuracies. This determination was based on the fact that the flow transmitters measuring LPI flow are increasingly inaccurate as flow is decreased from the design value of 3000 gpm and that the combined instrument inaccuracies (assuming 1500 gpm down both LPI headers) could result in inadequate containment heat removal.

The licensee revised the Abnormal Procedure on December 27, 1994, to require that LPI flow not be split between headers during a loss of coolant accident. The licensee plans to submit a Licensee Event Report per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. The inspectors will continue to followup on this item through review of the LER.

d. 10 CFR 50.72 Notification Retraction Regarding Unreviewed Safety Question On The Main Steam System

On January 6, 1995, the licensee made a red phone call regarding a potential Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). The potential USQ involved a postulated accident that could result in the blowdown of both steam generators assuming a single failure. This report was categorized under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) as a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant. The report stated that the licensee would close certain valves common to both steam headers (i.e., MS-24 or MS-33 on the auxiliary steam supply) to prevent the postulated accident from occurring. The report also stated that the licensee viewed this as a conservative action and that they would continue to review additional information to determine if a USQ did exist.

Subsequent to this call, the licensee discovered several references (i.e. main steam line break analysis) which indicated

that the potential blowdown of both steam generators was reviewed and accepted by the NRC. The licensee retracted the 10 CFR 50.72 notification on February 8, 1995. The licensee stated that they would perform an engineering analysis to determine the safest configuration for the steam lines in question. The licensee also stated that except for periodic stroke tests and operational necessity, the steam headers would remain in their current configuration until the analysis was complete. The inspectors will continue to track this issue under Deviation 50-269,270,287/93-31-01.

Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory. No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Maintenance and Surveillance Testing (62703 and 61726)

- a. Maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed during the reporting period to verify that work was performed by qualified personnel and that approved procedures adequately described work that was not within the skill of the craft. Activities, procedures and work orders (WO) were examined to verify that proper authorization and clearance to begin work was given, cleanliness was maintained, exposure was controlled, equipment was properly returned to service, and limiting conditions for operation were met.

Maintenance activities observed or reviewed in whole or in part are as follows:

- (1) Investigate Jocassee Black Line Reading Zero (Work Order 95013973 Task 01)

On February 14 the inspectors observed activities to investigate a problem with the current indicator on the Jocassee Black line. The work order was written to determine the reason why the 'Y' phase amps were reading zero at the dispatcher area in Charlotte, North Carolina. As a result of the effort, a broken instrument lead was found and the work order was returned to the maintenance planner for planning the corrective maintenance activity to replace the broken instrument lead.

The work activity had been properly authorized and the work effort was determined to be acceptable. No discrepancies were noted.

- (2) Calibrate Reactor Protection System (RPS) Feedwater Pump Discharge Pressure Switches (Work Order 95005657 Task 02)

On February 8, 1995, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities during the calibration of the Unit 1 feedwater discharge pressure switch for Channel B. The effort was

performed in accordance with maintenance procedure, IP/O/A/0305/011, RPS Channel 'B' Feedwater Pumps And Main Turbine Trips Calibration. The procedure tests the main feedwater pumps and main turbine integrated trip strings for proper calibration and function. The procedure was performed in conjunction with maintenance procedures IP/O/A/0305/015, Nuclear Instrumentation RPS Removal From And Return To Service For Channels A,B,C and D, and IP/O/A/0305/016, Bailey Meter Cabinet Module Inspection And Cleaning.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

- (3) Install Control Battery Chargers 2CA, 2CB, And 2CS (Work Order 94074077 Task 02)

On February 8, 1995, the inspectors observed the installation of the new Unit 2 125V Vital Instrument and Control Battery Chargers. The work effort was performed per Nuclear Station Modification, NSM ON-22881/00, Part CL2. The modification was performed because the Unit 2 battery chargers were approximately 20 years old and had become obsolete, unreliable and difficult to maintain.

The Unit 2 125V Vital Instrument and Control Inverters had been replaced during the last refueling outage (U2EOC14), which was completed in November 1994. Although the inverters had to be replaced during the outage, the chargers could be replaced with the unit at power operation without taking the 125V system out of service.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

- (4) Replace Obsolete Motorola Pressure Transmitter (Work Order 95001288 Task 01)

On February 23, 1995, the inspectors reviewed the calibration of the Unit 1 pressure transmitter associated with the low pressure extraction steam "E" bleed. The transmitter, LPE PT 0083P, had been replaced and calibration was in progress per maintenance procedure IP/O/B/0289/002, Low Pressure Extraction "E" Bleed and Heater Shell Pressure.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

- (5) Unit 3 TDEFW Pump Start Pressure Switch Calibration (Work Order 95006075 Task 04)

On February 15, 1995, the inspectors observed the calibration of the 3A main feedwater pump discharge pressure switch FDWPS1009. This switch provides part of the logic for automatic turbine driven emergency feedwater pump start on low main feedwater pressure. The switch setpoint and tolerance are 770 psig and 762-778 psig, respectively. The as-found setpoint was 771 psig, which indicated proper operation.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

- (6) Unit 3 RPS Channel "B" Temperature Instrument Calibration (Work Order 95010208 Task 01)

On February 15, 1995, the inspectors observed the annual calibration of the Unit 3 RPS Channel "B" reactor coolant temperature instrumentation in accordance with procedure IP/O/A/0305/001F, Reactor Protective System Channel B RC Temperature Instrument Calibration. There are two resistance temperature detectors (RTD) on each hot leg. Each RTD provides a resistance signal to the RPS trip bistable associated with high reactor coolant system (RCS) outlet temperature and variable low RCS pressure, for its associated channel. The inspector noted that the technicians utilized an approved procedure, obtained the proper clearances to begin work, used calibrated instruments, and properly lifted/landed leads in association with this activity.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

- (7) 3C High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pump Oil Change (Work Order 95006882 Task 01)

On February 16, 1995, the inspectors observed the oil change of the 3C HPI Pump in accordance with procedure MP/O/A/1840/040, Pump - Miscellaneous Components - Lubrication - Oil Sampling - Oil Change. This was a routine oil change and did not indicate a problem with the existing oil. The inspectors verified that the replacement oil was Quality Assurance certified and equivalent to the existing oil. The inspectors noted that the technicians worked under an approved Radiation Work Permit (RWP) and that all dress out requirements were observed.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

- (8) Flush Hot Spot at Valve 1RV-94 (Work Order 95016249 Task 01)

On February 22, 1995, the inspectors observed work activities associated with the flush of valve 1RV-94 to reduce radiation levels in the general area of the valve. Valve 1RV-94 is an instrument root valve on the suction of the IC low pressure injection pump. This work activity was coordinated with the pump performance test and resulted in a reduction from approximately 1 rem contact to approximately 500 mrem contact.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

- (9) Perform Lubrication PM on 1A LPI Pump (Work Order 95010999)

On February 20, 1995, the inspectors observed work activities associated with the lubrication of the 1A low pressure injection pump. This work activity was accomplished in accordance with procedure MP/O-0/A/1840/040, Pumps - Miscellaneous Components - Lubrication. Work activities observed were satisfactory. The inspectors noted that operations removed the 1A low pressure injection pump from service at 4:58 a.m.; however, maintenance activities did not begin until 10:46 a.m. The work activity was relatively simple and the inspectors believe that the activity could have been better coordinated between operations and maintenance to reduce the time that the pump was out of service for maintenance activities. This matter was discussed with plant management.

- b. The inspectors observed surveillance activities to ensure they were conducted with approved procedures and in accordance with site directives. The inspectors reviewed surveillance performance, as well as system alignments and restorations. The inspectors assessed the licensee's disposition of any discrepancies which were identified during the surveillance.

Surveillance activities observed or reviewed in whole or in part are as follows:

- (1) Low Pressure Injection Pump Test - Recirculation, PT/2/A/0203/06A

On February 2, 1995, the inspectors observed the quarterly performance of the Unit 2 Low Pressure Injection Pump Test. The purpose of the test was to verify operability of the pumps and associated system equipment, as well as identify potential problems as early as possible. The test included stroking each pump discharge valve and a leak test of each check valve. The testing was in accordance with the

requirements of the licensee's Technical Specifications and Section XI of the ASME Code.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

- (2) 3A Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) Pump Test, PT/3/A/0600/13

On January 30, 1995, the inspectors observed the performance of the quarterly operability test of the 3A MDEFW Pump. The inspectors verified that pump suction pressure, discharge pressure, flow, and vibration data were within acceptance criteria and did not indicate any adverse trends.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

- (3) Low Pressure Injection Pump Test - Recirculation, PT/1/A/0203/06A

On February 22, 1995, the inspectors observed the performance of the quarterly ASME Section XI performance test of the 1C low pressure injection pump. The inspectors observed activities in progress and verified that the procedure acceptance criteria were met.

Work activities observed were accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and no discrepancies were noted.

Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory. No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Onsite Engineering (37551)

During the inspection period, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the onsite design and engineering processes by reviewing engineering evaluations, operability determinations, modification packages and other areas involving the Engineering Department.

a. Evaluation of Generic Communications Applicable to Oconee

As a result of the Keowee improvement project the licensee reviewed past NRC Generic Letters, Bulletins, Notices, Circulars, and the operating experience program logs to ensure that the items applicable to the Keowee Hydro Station had been addressed. A total of 502 items were identified for review. The Licensee review identified 37 items that were applicable to Keowee and required potential corrective actions. These 37 items were incorporated into the problem investigation process to ensure that appropriate corrective actions were taken to resolve the items.

The inspectors reviewed the items and verified that they had been incorporated into the corrective action program.

b. Keowee Hydro Unit Testing (61701)

The inspectors witnessed the Keowee Hydro Units 1 and 2 load rejection tests conducted on February 23, 1995. The tests were performed to collect data for Keowee hydro unit turbine performance calculations.

The tests were conducted in accordance with procedure TT/O/A/0620/05, Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station Keowee Hydro Load Rejection Test. The tests consisted of loading the Keowee Units in various load configurations and then initiating a complete load rejection via the emergency start signal from the Oconee Control Room to determine the transient response.

During each load rejection test the following data was obtained:

- Generator RPM during load rejection transient
- Gate position during load rejection transient
- Generator voltage and field current during load rejection transient
- Governor oil pressure and level at load rejection
- Generator power level (MW and MVAR) at load rejection
- Keowee lake level and operating tailrace level at load rejection
- Keowee intake water temperature

Data was obtained for the following load configurations:

Test	Unit	Load (MW)
1	1	60
2	1	75
3	1	90
4	2	60
5	2	75
6	Both	60
7	Both	70
8	Both	80

After increasing tailrace level the following load configurations were tested:

Test	Unit	Load (MW)
9	1	60
10	1	90
11	Both	70

The electrical design criteria, for Nuclear Station Modification NSM 52966 part B, for the emergency power transfer required that frequency be at 110% of normal and decreasing at 22 seconds. The inspectors reviewed the preliminary data and verified that the recovery times were less than 20 seconds.

The Keowee design incorporates a generator lockout at approximately 180 rpm. During test runs 3, 8, and 10 a generator normal lockout alarm occurred indicating that the generator exceeded 180 rpm. The peak rpm values observed during these runs were 185.4, 183.9 and 185.8, respectively.

The inspectors reviewed the procedure and found it adequate to conduct the test and obtain the necessary data. The licensee performed the testing within the allowed time of the Technical Specification. The inspectors attended the pre-test briefings and found that they adequately conveyed testing requirements, precautions and limitations, and individual responsibilities. The licensee will provide the calibration and instrument accuracy data with the test results package for NRC review.

Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory. No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Plant Support (71750 and 40500)

a. Fire Protection

The inspector reviewed the licensee's fire protection program (Site Directive SD-3.2.9, Reporting of Fire Protection Impairment) for ensuring adequate fire protection for the plant and associated equipment. Although Technical Specification requirements for fire protection were deleted, the licensee has documented specific commitments in their Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) Manual, Section 16.9. The plant and associated equipment committed to be maintained in the SLC has been included in the site directive and delineates the requirements for operability, surveillances for assuring operability, and compensatory measures that are to be executed when the system or portions of the system were impaired. The program includes both the Oconee Nuclear Station and the Keowee Hydro Station.

The inspector determined the program was adequate and found no areas where the policy had not been properly implemented.

b. Physical Protection

During this inspection, the inspectors toured the protected area and noted that the perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by erosion or disrepair. Isolation zones were maintained and were clear of objects which could shield or conceal an individual.

The inspectors observed that personnel and packages entering the protected area were searched either by special purpose detectors or by a physical patdown for firearms, explosives, and contraband. In addition, the processing and escorting of visitors was observed to be satisfactory.

c. Radiological Protection Program

Radiation protection control activities were observed and verified to be in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, as well as in compliance with regulatory requirements. These observations included:

- Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing
- Area postings and controls
- Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and contaminated areas
- Radiation Control Area (RCA) exiting practices
- Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respirator equipment

d. Licensee Self-Assessment

During the inspection period, the inspectors attended routine Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) meetings and reviewed specific Problem Investigation Reports (PIPs). PORC meetings are normally scheduled for a single session each week, but are also convened as emergent issues dictate. PIPs which were determined to be More Significant Events (MSEs) were reviewed by the inspectors when issued. Attended PORC meetings effectively addressed plant issues.

Within the areas reviewed, licensee activities were satisfactory. No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Inspection of Open Items (92901, 92902, and 92904)

The following open items were reviewed using licensee reports, inspection record review, and discussions with licensee personnel, as appropriate:

a. (Closed) Deviation 50-269/93-22-02, Failure to Calibrate Unit 1 Ground Detectors Annually

This item involved the failure to conduct an annual calibration on the Unit 1 ground detection circuitry. The Unit 1 ground detection circuitry was scheduled to be calibrated in September

1992, with a grace period for calibration ending May 21, 1993. In August 1993, the inspector identified that this required calibration had not been completed. The Unit 1 ground detection circuitry calibration was begun within the one-year time frame, but was not completed in its entirety due to intermittent grounds that could not be located. The commitment to perform this calibration annually was overlooked, because no means had been established to identify this as an NRC commitment item. The corrective actions included clearing grounds, calibration of the Unit 1 ground detector, and the establishment of Nuclear Site Directive NSD-703.13 which requires NRC commitments to be identified within procedures where applicable. IP/O/B/3000/24, 125 VDC Instrument and Control Battery System Trouble Alarms Calibration, was verified to be changed in accordance with NSD 703.13. Accordingly, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's actions were adequate to ensure that the ground detectors will be calibrated on an annual basis. This item is closed.

- b. (Closed) Violation 50-269,270,287/93-24-02, Failure to Perform Functional Test of Keowee Main Transformer Fire Protection System

This item involved a failure to adequately perform an annual functional test of the Keowee main transformer fire protection system. The procedure required that the Keowee fire pump be tested for operability and verified to deliver at least 1060 gpm at 54 psi discharge pressure. This test was required to be performed annually. The steps in the controlling procedure performed on April 30, 1992, had been marked N/A due to problems with a flow meter. Subsequent review by the inspectors determined that the last operability test had been performed on October 31, 1990. The inspectors identified this item on September 14, 1993.

The licensee performed a special test to verify the operability of the Keowee fire pump. The licensee revised Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.9.1, Fire Suppression Water System, to clarify that an annual performance test of the Keowee fire pump is required and revised SLC 16.9.7, Keowee Lake Level, to establish fire pump operability based on Keowee lake levels. The licensee also performed inspections of the fire pump, bypass check valve and strainer. The inspectors verified that the above corrective actions had been completed and reviewed the last pump performance test completed March 24, 1994. This item is closed.

- c. (Closed) Violation 50-269/93-03-01, Failure to Follow Procedures

During Unit 1 refueling activities in December 1992, refueling operators mispositioned two fuel assemblies. The licensee determined that both instances were caused by human error on the part of the refueling bridge trolley operators. The operators had failed to perform an adequate "self check" when positioning the bridge trolley.

The immediate corrective actions were to properly position the affected fuel assemblies. In addition, procedure OP/1,2,3/A/1502/07, Refueling Procedure, was revised to require independent verification of bridge and trolley position by an individual other than the operator. The inspector verified that the procedures had been changed and that refueling personnel had been trained on the new process of independent verification.

Subsequent Unit 2 and Unit 3 refuelings were successfully completed with no recurrence of mispositioned fuel assemblies. However, during the Unit 1 refueling in May of 1994, another violation of refueling procedures was identified involving two instances of mispositioned fuel assemblies (Violation 50-269/94-16-01). This violation resulted in the issuance of a civil penalty in the amount of \$15,000 (Severity Level IV). This civil penalty was assessed due to the recurring nature of the violation and the inadequacy of the corrective actions applied to the previous violations to prevent recurrence.

As the issue of recurring fuel assembly misposition events is being followed via Violation 50-269/94-16-01, Violation 50-269/93-03-01 is considered closed.

7. Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)

The below listed Licensee Event Report (LER) was reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The determination included: adequacy of description, compliance with TS and regulatory requirements, corrective actions taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of the event. The following LER was closed:

a. (Closed) LER 269/93-07, Design Deficiency Results In The Technical Inoperability Of The Alternate Reactor Coolant Makeup System

In May 1992, Unit 1 was shutdown due to excessive seal leakage on a reactor coolant pump (LER 269/92-09). Corrective action from this event included an evaluation of the parameters that affect the Reactor Coolant Makeup (RCMU) system operability. This evaluation determined that excessive reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakage could result in the inoperability of the RCMU system, and that leakage rate limits were not provided. Subsequently, a 4.5 gpm maximum acceptable RCP seal leakage rate was established by the licensee and an evaluation of maximum acceptable leakage was pursued with the RCP vendor (Westinghouse). On June 17, 1993, the Westinghouse calculated leakage rates were approved by the licensee. For Unit 1, the maximum allowed RCP seal leakage rates were: 1A1 RCP - 4.7 gpm; 1A2 RCP - 4.5 gpm, 1B1 RCP - 4.2 gpm; and 1B2 RCP - 4.7 gpm. The licensee initiated an investigation to determine if these limits had been exceeded in the past. The licensee determined that on several occasions RCP leakage existed in excess of these limits, and that on one occasion this leakage

existed in excess of the 7 days allowed by the TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LER 269/93-07). The inspectors determined that operations procedures were revised to reflect the newly calculated operating limits for the RCMU pumps, reactor coolant pumps, and RCS. The inspectors also determined that there were main control board annunciators that would alarm at a seal leakage rate of 4.2 gpm. This item is closed.

8. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 1, 1995, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings in the Summary and listed below. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Description and Reference</u>
Deviation 269/93-22-02	Closed	Failure to Calibrate Unit 1 Ground Detectors Annually (paragraph 6.a.).
Violation 269,270, 287/93-24-02	Closed	Failure to Perform Functional Test of Keowee Main Transformer Fire Protection System (paragraph 6.b.).
Violation 269/93-03-01	Closed	Failure to Follow Procedures (paragraph 6.c.).
LER 269/93-07	Closed	Design Deficiency Results in The Technical Inoperability of The Alternate Reactor Coolant Makeup System (paragraph 7.a.).