

CATEGORY 1

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ACCESSION NBR: 9703040117 DOC. DATE: 97/02/20 NOTARIZED: NO
 FACIL: 50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power Co.
 50-270 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power Co.
 50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co.

DOCKET #
 05000269
 05000270
 05000287

AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 FOSTER, W.W. Duke Power Co.
 HAMPTON, J.W. Duke Power Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 97-002-00: on 970124 reactor building cooling units
 technically inoperable occurred due to design deficiency.
 Engineering completed an evaluation. W/970220 ltr.

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 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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DUKE POWER

February 20, 1997

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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
Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station Unit
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287
Licensee Event Report 269/97-02
Problem Investigation Process No.: 2-097-0240

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report, 269/97-02, concerning the technical inoperability of the Reactor Building Cooling Units. Upon completion of the investigation, a Licensee Event Report supplement will be issued to fully identify the cause(s) and the corrective actions deemed appropriate to prevent recurrence.

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (V) (D). This event is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,


J. W. Hampton, Vice President
Oconee Nuclear Site

030101

IE22/1

Attachment

9703040117 970220
PDR ADOCK 05000269
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February 20, 1997
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xc:

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NRC Resident Inspector
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ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit One

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
05000 269

PAGE (3)
1 OF 1

TITLE (4)
Reactor Building Cooling Units Technically Inoperable Due To Design Deficiency

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
01	24	97	97	02	00	02	20	97	Oconee, Unit Two	05000 270
									Oconee, Unit Three	05000 287

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)																				
POWER LEVEL (10)	0	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.405(c)	50.36(c)(1)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v) (D)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)											
NAME W. W. Foster, Safety Assurance Manager									TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE (864) 885-3163		

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)				MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X	YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)			NO			03	20	97	

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On January 24, 1997, Units 1 and 2 were at Cold Shutdown and Unit 3 was in a refueling outage. Oconee Engineering had been evaluating the NRC Generic Letter 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions". As a part of this evaluation, Engineering has been performing detailed thermal-hydraulic analyses to determine if any portions of the Low Pressure Service Water System piping which serves the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCU) may be susceptible to water hammer. The thermal-hydraulic analysis determined that during certain design basis scenarios condensation induced water hammers associated with the non-safety related auxiliary cooling units could result in the safety related RBCUs being unable to perform their intended function. On January 24, 1997, at 1426 hours, the NRC was conservatively notified of this condition. On February 18, 1997, Engineering completed an evaluation and determined that, if the water hammer scenario had occurred during a design basis accident, then the safety related RBCUs would not have been capable of performing their intended function. The root cause and corrective actions will be addressed in the supplemental report.