

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8809070311 DOC. DATE: 88/08/29 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-269 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Duke Power Co. 05000269
 50-270 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Duke Power Co. 05000270
 50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co. 05000287

AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 TUCKER, H.B. Duke Power Co.
 RECIPIENT NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT: Provides info re ability for HPCI to meet 10CFR50.46 requirements, per 880819 telcon concerning Cycle II reload.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A001D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 0 SIZE: 2
 TITLE: OR Submittal: General Distribution

NOTES: AEOD/Ornstein: lcy. 05000269
 AEOD/Ornstein: lcy. 05000270
 AEOD/Ornstein: lcy. 05000287

	RECIPIENT		COPIES			RECIPIENT		COPIES	
	ID	CODE/NAME	LTTR	ENCL		ID	CODE/NAME	LTTR	ENCL
	PD2-3	LA	1	0		PD2-3	PD	5	5
	PASTIS,	H	1	1					
INTERNAL:	ACRS		6	6		ARM/DAF/LFMB		1	0
	NRR/DEST/ADS	7E	1	1		NRR/DEST/CEB	8H	1	1
	NRR/DEST/ESB	8D	1	1		NRR/DEST/MTB	9H	1	1
	NRR/DEST/RSB	8E	1	1		NRR/DOEA/TSB	11	1	1
	NRR/PMAS/ILRB12		1	1		NUDOCS-ABSTRACT		1	1
	OGC/HDS2		1	0		<u>REG FILE</u>	01	1	1
	RES/DSIR/EIB		1	1					
EXTERNAL:	LPDR		1	1		NRC PDR		1	1
	NSIC		1	1					

NOTES: 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 29 ENCL ~~26~~

R
I
D
S
/
A
D
D
S

R
I
D
S
/
A
D
D
S

Duke Power Company
P.O. Box 33198
Charlotte, N.C. 28242

HAL B. Tucker
Vice President
Nuclear Production
(704)373-4531



DUKE POWER

August 29, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287
Oconee 3 Cycle II Reload

In accordance with a commitment made in an August 19, 1988 conference call between the NRC staff and Duke Power, the following information is provided to assist the staff review of the Oconee Unit 3, Cycle II reload. During this call several questions were asked regarding the ability of the High Pressure Injection System (HPI) to meet the 10 CFR 50.46 requirement for maintaining long term cooling. These concerns originated from LER 269/88-06, which describes a design analysis that determined two problems:

- 1.) HPI pump net positive suction head (NPSH) was not assured with the HPI System aligned to take suction from the containment sump via the Low Pressure Injection System (LPI), i.e. the "piggyback mode",
- 2.) a single failure of switchgear TD was identified on Units 2 and 3 which would have prevented remote alignment of the piggyback mode.

The HPI pump NPSH problem was addressed by incorporating HPI pump throttling guidance when aligning for the piggyback mode in the station emergency procedures. This throttling guidance places an upper limit on HPI flow when required to assure adequate NPSH. This flow limit is higher than the flow assumed to be available in the design basis LOCA analysis, and therefore the design basis analysis is not impacted.

In the time frame since the original LER was submitted, additional review determined that the problem with the potential failure of switchgear TD was not the root cause for concern. Upon investigation of the electrical power supply to valves LP-15 and -16, which are opened to align the HPI pump suction to the LPI pump discharge, it was discovered that although the valves and associated motor operators are safety grade, the electrical power supply is not. Therefore, remote operation of these valves cannot be assured and local operator action may have been necessary to operate valves LP-15 and -16 as a backup. The emergency procedures assumed remote operability and did not allow sufficient time during the transfer to the sump before the borated water storage tank approached empty. The emergency

8809070311 880829
PDR ADOCK 05000287
P PDC


Acc 1
1/0

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
August 29, 1988
Page Two

procedure has since been revised to provide the operator approximately thirty minutes to locally open LP-15 and -16. In addition operator accessibility to these valves during a LOCA has also been confirmed.

The two identified deficiencies have been corrected by revising station procedures. The procedure changes ensure continuous HPI System operability following the post-LOCA transfer to the sump recirculation mode. Therefore, the FSAR conclusions regarding the acceptable performance of the Oconee ECCS following design basis LOCAs remain valid. Accordingly, Oconee 3 Cycle II meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46.

Very truly yours,



H. B. Tucker

PFG08.D1/lcc

cc: Helen Pastis
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dr. J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator, RII
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. P. H. Skinner
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station