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AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
TUCKER,H.B. Duke Power Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
DENTON,H.R. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director
STOLZ,J.F. Operating Reactors Branch 4

SUBJECT: Forwards plan by which NUREG-0737,Items II.B.3,II.F.1.3 & II.F.1-5 will be resolved.Post-accident sampling sys valve will be installed by Mar 1984.Confirmatory order dtd 830318 should be amended to reflect new info.

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

August 26, 1983

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4

Subject: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Sir:

My letters of August 15, 17, 1983 submitted to the NRC information relating to two items required by the Confirmatory Order concerning certain post-TMI actions dated March 18, 1983 which had not been implemented during the recent refueling outage. In fulfillment of a commitment made, please find attached a plan, including schedule, by which Duke will resolve and effectively implement these items. Also attached is additional information in follow-up to my letter of May 31, 1983 concerning the narrow range Reactor Building sump level monitor.

Duke requests that this Confirmatory Order be amended to reflect the new schedule for implementation of these three items at Oconee.

Very truly yours,

HAL B. TUCKER

Hal B. Tucker

RLG/php

Attachment

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Mr. J. C. Bryant
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station

Mr. John F. Suermann
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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TABLE 1
Oconee Nuclear Station
Revised Schedule for Implementation of TMI Items:

II.B.3 - Post-Accident Sampling System
II.F.1.3 - Reactor Building High Range Radiation Monitor
II.F.1.5 - Reactor Building Narrow Range Water Level

II.B.3 - Post-Accident Sampling System

Valves RC-162, -163 are not qualified for submerged operation. These valves are manufactured by Target Rock. Two existing spares at Oconee will be returned to Target Rock for modification/qualification as soon as contractural arrangements have been made. Similar valves have been previously modified and qualified and it is expected that there will be no problems in qualifying these valves. Plans are to have these valves returned in sufficient time to replace 2RC-162, -163 at Oconee 2. Two other valves on Oconee 2 made by Target Rock will be replaced with manual valves with reactor rods and all four of these valves will be returned to Target Rock for modification. These now qualified valves would then be returned to Duke to be available later this year for installation on the other two Oconee units.

Duke has also evaluated the alternative of procurement of new valves. No valves are available for replacement in the short term. Target Rock offers a lead-time of 42 weeks which is considerably later than the above valve modification plan.

Thus, the installation schedule becomes:

Unit 1 - First scheduled outage of sufficient duration following receipt of modified valves or 1985 refueling outage (∿3/85), whichever is earlier.

Unit 2 - First scheduled outage of sufficient duration following receipt of modified valves (∿10/83).

Unit 3 - First scheduled outage of sufficient duration following receipt of modified valves (1984 refueling outage ∿3/84).

II.F.1.3 - Reactor Building High Range Radiation Monitor

Repeated efforts to achieve reliable operation of the Victoreen hi-range radiation monitors in Oconee Unit 1 have been unsuccessful to date. The problem appears to be with the in-containment cabling system and connectors, including the containment penetrations. A number of attempts have been made in cleaning and reassembling the in-containment connectors and cable system. There was some success in reducing the leakage current which produced a low reading of approximately 3 R/hr on the radiation monitor. However, achieving and maintaining an accurate reading was unsuccessful. The monitors in Units 2, 3 are also not maintaining proper accuracy and will require investigating.

Duke is pursuing two efforts in parallel in an effort to resolve the problem.

The first involves wiring the system intended for Oconee Unit 2 in an area outside containment, utilizing as close as possible the same type of penetrations, cable, connectors. This will be done because trouble-shooting is very difficult in the Reactor Building environment. This task is expected to be complete by mid-October. If the design using the Victoreen monitor and existing penetration and connectors can be made operable, then the implementation schedule would become:

Unit 1 - First scheduled outage of sufficient duration following verification of operability of design or 1985 refueling outage (∿3/85), whichever is earlier.

Unit 2 - First scheduled outage of sufficient duration following verification of operability of design (∿10/83).

Unit 3 - First scheduled outage of sufficient duration following verification of operability of design (1984 refueling outage - ∿3/84).

In a parallel effort with the above, a second task is being pursued which would utilize a completely different vendor design. By starting now, new equipment could be delivered by April 1984. Thus, this implementation schedule would become:

Unit 1 - First scheduled outage of sufficient duration following receipt of new system or 1985 refueling outage (∿3/85), whichever is earlier.

Unit 2 - First scheduled outage of sufficient duration following receipt of new system or 1985 refueling outage (∿5/85), whichever is earlier.

Unit 3 - First scheduled outage of sufficient duration following receipt of new system or 1985 refueling outage (∿11/85), whichever is earlier.

Duke will be making the decision as to which plan to proceed on by October 14, 1983, following completion of trouble-shooting efforts.

II.F.1.5 - Reactor Building Narrow Range Water Level

Duke has been evaluating three systems as part of our follow-up actions to the qualification deficiency discussed in our letter of May 31, 1983. The first is a Barton D/P System which is presently in use at some nuclear stations, but appears to be having reliability problems. The second is a Rosemount D/P System which is still undergoing qualification testing. The third is a Fluid Components, Inc. (FCI) Level System which consists of a "thermal dispersion array" which detects the

presence of water at discrete points. Its only apparent drawback is that it provides level indication at discrete points versus continuously as required by NUREG-0737. Duke would like to discuss the systems under consideration, particularly the FCI system, with the Staff in the near future. If agreement can be reached on an acceptable system design, then the commitment previously made regarding installation, namely the first refueling outage after July 1, 1984 for each unit, appears achievable.