

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

February 19, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

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
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/81-1. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:pw
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report Number: RO-270/81-1

Report Date: February 19, 1981

Occurrence Date: January 20, 1981

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Non-Existant Flow of LPSW to "2A" HPI Pump
Motor Bearing Coolers

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: At approximately 0230 on January 20, 1981, it was discovered that there was no flow of Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) to the "2A" High Pressure Injection (HPI) pump. This lack of flow was found during the pre-start check for the "2A" HPI pump. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.3.1.c.2(b) and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The reason for the flow stoppage is not known at this time. Valve 2/TCV/ρ, the "2A" HPI temperature controller, will be cut out of the line. When this is done, it will be inspected to determine the reason for the flow stoppage.

Analysis of Occurrence: The line in which LPSW flow was stopped is the discharge from HPI pump "A" motor bearing cooling jacket. Flow must be maintained in order to keep a safe operating temperature for the HPI pump motor bearings. In case of failure of the temperature controller valve in this line there is a bypass line to maintain flow. The bypass was used, and the use of "2A" HPI pump was not lost. An evaluation of the discharge line and the temperature control valve will be made as soon as the valve is cut out of the line.

At the time it was found that there was no flow in the "2A" bearing cooler, pumps "2B" and "2C" were available for use. Therefore, the HPI system was not impaired. Also the use of "2A" was quickly regained when flow was restored. Thus, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation and the health and safety of the public were not effected.

Corrective Action: When lack of flow was encountered, valve 2/TCV/ρ was bypassed, and flow was restored. Future corrective action will be taken as deemed necessary after the cause for the flow stoppage has been determined. Additional information will be provided upon completion of the investigation.