

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING


422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

JAN 15 10:42
January 9, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303




Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/80-21. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

JLJ:scs
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report Number: RO-270/80-21

Report Date: January 9, 1981

Occurrence Date: December 10, 1980

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Automatic Start Circuitry For the Turbine
Driven Emergency Feedwater

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP

Description of Occurrence:

At 1530 hours on December 10, 1980, a relay in the start circuitry for the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (TDEFW) Auxiliary Oil Pump shorted which tripped the D. C. breaker supplying this circuitry. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per proposed Technical Specification 3.4.1(b) and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This incident was caused by the AR-15 relay coil shorting. When the EFWPT auxiliary oil pump motor overload alarm relay shorted, it tripped the D. C. breaker which supplied power to the start circuitry for this pump.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The relay which shorted was a Cutler-Hammer Type-M which has had a history of failure. This type of relay has been replaced in all of the plant safety-related systems. However, at the time the decision was made to replace these relays, the EFWPT Auxiliary Oil System was not considered safety-related. As a result, this relay was not replaced.

During the period of inoperability of the TDEFWP, both MDEFWP's were operable. The proposed Technical Specification permits the TDEFWP to be inoperable for a period of up to 60 hours. The TDEFWP was returned to service well within the 60-hour time period. Therefore, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The shorted relay was replaced with an improved Cutler-Hammer relay. Cutler-Hammer relays associated with the Auxiliary Oil Pump circuit will be replaced on all three units with the "improved" Cutler-Hammer type.