

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

October 20, 1980

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/80-16. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *By [Signature]*

JLJ:vr
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report Number: RO-270/80-16

Report Date: October 20, 1980

Occurrence Date: September 20, 1980

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Concentrated Boric Acid Storage Tank Pump
Declared Inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 2 - 85% FP

Description of Occurrence:

At 0715 hours on September 20, 1980, the Unit 2 Concentrated Boric Acid Storage Tank (CBAST) pump was declared inoperable. During operation of the CBAST pump, it was not evident that any water was entering the Letdown Storage Tank (LDST). The pump was removed from service for replacement of the pressure relief valve. The valve was replaced and the sump returned to service at 1803 on September 20, 1980. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode per Technical Specification 3.2.2 and is thus reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The failure of the CBAST pump was due to the failure of the pressure relief valve. A new pressure relief valve was installed, the head vented, and the stroke set. The exact cause for the failure of the pressure relief valve could not be determined.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The ability to achieve the necessary shutdown margin in the event of an accident is dependent on the ability of the unit to borate the primary system. The primary method for accomplishing this is the use of the CBAST pump. When the CBAST pump is inoperable, the system can be borated by using the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) to feed the high pressure injection pumps directly. The BWST was available while the CBAST pump was inoperable, thus insuring a means of safely shutting the unit down. Furthermore, the pump was restored to operability well within the 72 hours permitted by Technical Specification 3.2.2. Thus, this incident is considered to be of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to install a new pressure relief valve to replace the defective one. A station modification will be initiated to add an additional pump to the system and/or to replace the existing pump with a different type.