

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

July 10, 1980

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/80-7. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(5), which concerns the operability of a system required to cope with accidents analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

FTP:scs
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavallee
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center
P. O. Box 10412
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report Number: RO-270/80-7

Report Date: July 10, 1980

Occurrence Date: June 26, 1980

Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Penetration Room Ventilation System Inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 48% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

At 1407 on June 26, 1980, Unit 2 was at 48% full power when the humidity level in the Penetration Room was found to be above 70%. The Penetration Room Ventilation System (PRVS) was declared inoperable. This is contrary to Technical Specification 3.15, which requires that both PRVS trains be operable or that the unit be shutdown within 12 hours, and is therefore reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(5).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The high humidity in the Penetration Room was caused by a steam leak on check valve 2FDW-37 (flange leak). 2FDW-104 was also found to be leaking in the West Penetration Room but it did not seem to contribute to the high humidity. The humidity was approximately 80% when first discovered.

Analysis of Occurrence:

It has been observed that the PRVS filters can become saturated and clogged with water when the system is run under high humidity conditions. A high humidity limit for the PRVS was set at 70% per ANSI Standard N509, Section 4.0, and Oconee Nuclear Station's PRVS design. The PRVS fans were not running during this period and the flapper dampers installed on the filter housing inlets prevented moisture from migrating to the filters.

Based on the approximate 80% humidity level in this incident, the information obtained from past incidents of this occurrence, and the flapper dampers at the filter inlets, it was determined that the PRVS filters were not affected. Therefore, the PRVS (both trains) was declared operable when the humidity stabilized below 70%.

The PRVS is assumed to remove 45% of the iodine released as the result of a LOCA. In the case of a LOCA, it can be shown that the off-site doses without the PRVS would still be considerably below the guidelines of 10CFR 100. All other equipment required to cope with accidents analyzed in the FSAR was operable and available if needed. Therefore, this incident is not considered to be significant with respect to safe operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The leaking valve (2FDW-37) was repaired and portable fans were placed in the Penetration Room door to reduce the humidity. By 1537 hours, the humidity had been reduced to 48%. At 1730 hours, with the Penetration Room humidity stable at 50%, the portable fans were removed and the PRVS was declared operable, approximately three and a half hours after it was declared inoperable and well within the 12 hour limit permitted by Technical Specification 3.15.