

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

May 23, 1980

TELEPHONE: AREA 704  
373-4083


Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/80-2. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

  
William O. Parker, Jr.

SRL:scs  
Attachment

cc: Director  
Office of Management Information &  
Program Analysis  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Bill Lavalley  
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center  
P. O. Box 10412  
Palo Alto, California 94303

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DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE UNIT 2

Report Number: RO-270/80-2

Report Date: May 23, 1980

Occurrence Date: April 23, 1980

Facility: Oconee 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Declared Inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Cold Shutdown

Description of Occurrence:

On March 10 and 11, 1980 a visual inspection of inaccessible hydraulic shock suppressors for Oconee 2 was made while the unit was at cold shutdown. During the inspection, the oil reservoirs for three of the suppressors were discovered to be empty. Inspection records indicate that sufficient oil was added to one reservoir to bring the level to half full. From April 17 to April 23, 1980, the three suppressors were removed from service for functional testing. All three passed the functional test and were then repaired prior to reinstallation.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The suppressor manufacturer has indicated that the determination of the operability of a suppressor should be based on a functional test rather than visual inspection of the oil level. However, since oil was apparently added to the reservoir of one of the suppressors prior to performing the test, that suppressor was considered to be inoperable prior to March 10. The inspection procedure does not state that oil should be added to a suppressor. It is possible that no oil was added but that an error was made in transcribing the inspection information.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Since oil was apparently added to the reservoir of one suppressor, it cannot be shown conclusively that it was operable prior to March 5, when Oconee 2 was shut down for refueling. Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.14 requires that a unit be placed in cold shutdown if a suppressor is determined to be inoperable. The oil reservoir was empty when the functional test was successfully performed. Therefore, it is believed that the suppressor was operable prior to March 5. However, this incident constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and must therefore be reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), although it was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The personnel involved were counselled regarding the need for functional testing of a suppressor prior to taking corrective actions. The inspection procedure will be revised to specify that oil should not be added prior to performing a test. In addition, a formal training program for the inspection and testing of shock suppressors is being developed.