

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

January 14, 1980

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, GA 30303


Re: Oconee Unit 2
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/79-8. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

My letters of December 21, 1979, and January 7, 1980, addressed the delays involved in the preparation of this report.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

SRL/sch
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control



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DUKE POWER COMPANY
Oconee Unit 2

Report Numbers: RO-270/79-8

Report Date: January 14, 1980

Occurrence Date: November 21, 1979

Facility: Oconee 2, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Reactor Building Penetration Declared
Inoperable Due to Missing Pipe Hanger

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 99% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

On November 4, 1979, a pipe hanger was found to be missing from the quench tank vent line during the inspection required by IE Bulletin 79-14. As a result of an analysis of the line completed on November 21, 1979, its associated Reactor Building (RB) penetration and RB isolation valve 2GWD-13 were declared inoperable. Valve 2GWD-12, the motor-operated isolation valve inside containment, was closed and deactivated in order to assure containment integrity pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.6.3.b.2. The missing hanger was installed, and the penetration was declared operable by 1752 on November 21.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The penetration was declared inoperable due to a missing pipe hanger. The hanger was apparently never installed during the erection of the piping.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The affected penetration was isolated by closing and deactivating valve 2GWD-12 within the time allowed by Technical Specification 3.6.3.b.2. In the unlikely event that a rupture of the line had occurred prior to discovering the missing hanger, the penetration could have been isolated by closing valve 2GWD-12. However, this incident constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and must therefore be reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), although it was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The immediate correction action was to isolate the penetration by closing valve 2GWD-12. A hanger equivalent to the one which was missing was then installed, and the penetration was declared operable.