

DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

January 9, 1980

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, GA 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and 287

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-269/79-36. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *By [Signature]*

SRL/sch
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control



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DUKE POWER COMPANY
Oconee Nuclear Station

Report Number: RO-269/79-36

Report Date: January 9, 1980

Occurrence Date: December 10, 1979

Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: High Pressure Service Water Pump Inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 1 Refueling Shutdown
Oconee 2 99% Full Power
Oconee 3 99% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

At 1342 on December 10, 1979, during a routine inspection of the Turbine Building basement, water was observed to be leaking from the motor cooler casing drain for high pressure service water (HPSW) pump B. The pump was declared inoperable and removed from service. The leaks in the motor cooler were repaired, and the pump was returned to service by 1516 on December 11, 1979.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

HPSW pump B was declared inoperable due to leaking tubes in its motor cooler casing. These leaks, as well as similar leaks previously reported, are considered to be the result of erosion. Although the pump is operated very infrequently, lake water flows through the cooler constantly, allowing continuous erosion of the tubes.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Two redundant pumps are provided to supply HPSW flow for the fire suppression water system. During the period HPSW pump B was out of service, HPSW pump A was operable and capable of satisfying the fire protection safety requirements of the HPSW system. In addition, the cooler leakage was determined to have been sufficiently small such that operation of HPSW pump B would not have been adversely affected. Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.17.2.1 permits one HPSW pump to be removed from service for up to seven days, provided the redundant pump is operable. HPSW pump B was returned to service approximately 25 hours after it was declared inoperable, well within the time permitted. However, the removal of the pump from service constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and must therefore be reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2), although it was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

An attempt to repair the cooler without first removing it was unsuccessful, so the cooler was removed at approximately 1500 on December 10. On December 11, 1979, the leaking tubes were soldered, and the cooler was pressure-tested and reinstalled. However, another leak was discovered, and the cooler was removed again. The leaking tube was resoldered, and the cooler was tested and returned to service by 1516 on December 11. In order to diminish greatly the erosion, valves will be added to the cooling water supply lines for the HPSW pumps so that cooling flow is admitted only when the pumps are in service.