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 FACIL: 50-287 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Duke Power Co.  
 AUTH. NAME: LEWIS, S.R. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Duke Power Co.  
 RECIP. NAME: RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Region 2, Atlanta, Office of the Director

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SUBJECT: LER 80-002/03L-0: on 800201, during monthly 4160 V breaker operability test, breaker 3132T-5 startup breaker for main feeder bus number 2, failed to close. Caused by faulty resistor in relay. Resistor replaced.

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DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report Number: RO-287/80-2

Report Date: February 29, 1980

Occurrence Date: February 1, 1980

Facility: Oconee 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Main Feeder Bus No. 2 Not Available From Startup Transformers

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% Full Power

Description of Occurrence:

At 2042 on February 1, 1980, breaker 3B2T-5, the 4160 V startup breaker for Oconee 3 Main Feeder Bus (MFB) No. 2, failed to close during performance of the monthly 4160 V breaker operability test. Therefore, two startup transformers were not available to MFB No. 2 as required by Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.7.1(b). Repairs were initiated on February 2, and breaker 3B2T was made operable by 2008 that day.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

It was determined that the breaker would operate when the lead for the closing coil monitor relay was lifted. Therefore, the relay was removed from service, allowing the breaker to operate until the relay could be repaired. The relay was determined to be malfunctioning due to a faulty resistor.

Analysis of Occurrence:

During the period breaker 3B2T-5 was inoperable, MFB No. 2 could not be energized from the startup transformers. Power was available from transformers 3T and CT-4 to MFB No. 2. In addition, two startup transformers were available to redundant MFB No. 1 during the period breaker 3B2T-5 was inoperable. However, this incident must be reported pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.6.2.i.b(2), although it was of no significance with respect to safe operation, and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The closing coil monitor relay lead was lifted to allow breaker 3B2T-5 to operate. The faulty resistor in the relay was then replaced. Proper operation of breaker 3B2T-5 was then verified.

