

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:7904160171 DOC.DATE: 79/04/09 NOTARIZED: NO
 FACIL:50-287 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 3, DUKE POWER CO.
 AUTH.NAME: AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 LEWIS,S.R. DUKE POWER CO.
 RECIP.NAME: RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 REGION 2, ATLANTA, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

DOCKET #
 05000287

SUBJECT: LER 79-007/03L-0 ON 790310:CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE
 3FDW-104 ON SHELL DRAIN LINE FAILED TO CLOSE.CAUSED BY VALVE
 OPERATOR TORQUE SWITCH WHICH WAS SET TOO LOW.SETTING
 INCREASED & VALVE RETESTED & DECLARED OPERABLE.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A002S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR L ENCL L SIZE: 1+3
 TITLE: INCIDENT REPORTS

NOTES: M CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMOIS TO FSAR + CHANGES TO TECH SPECS.

ACTION:	RECIPIENT	COPIES		RECIPIENT	COPIES	
	ID CODE/NAME	LTR	ENCL		ID CODE/NAME	LTR
ACTION:	05 BC ORB 4	4	4			
INTERNAL:	01 REG FILE	1	1	02 NRC PDR	1	1
	09 I&E	2	2	11 MPA	3	3
	14 TA/EDO	1	1	15 NOVAK/KNIEL	1	1
	16 EEB	1	1	17 AD FOR ENGR	1	1
	18 PLANT SYS BR	1	1	19 I&C SYS BR	1	1
	20 AD PLANT SYS	1	1	21 AD SYS/PROJ	1	1
	22 REAC SAFT BR	1	1	23 ENGR BR	1	1
	24 KREGER	1	1	25 PWR SYS BR	1	1
	26 AD/SITE ANAL	1	1	27 OPERA LIC BR	1	1
	28 ACCIDENT ANALYS	1	1	29 AUX SYS BR	1	1
	E JORDAN/IE	1	1			
EXTERNAL:	03 LPDR	1	1	04 NSIC	1	1
	29 ACRS	16	16			

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report Number: RO-287/79-7

Report Date: April 9, 1979

Occurrence Date: March 10, 1979

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable in the Open Position

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit Heatup: 2150 PSIG
532°F

Description of Occurrence:

At 2232 on March 10, 1979, Unit 3 was returning to power when valve 3FDW-104, the motor operated containment isolation valve which is located outside the Reactor Building (RB) on the steam generator 3B shell drain line, was opened in order to allow blowdown of that steam generator. The valve opened to an intermediate position. Subsequently, when an attempt was made to reclose the valve, it failed to close. Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.6.1 requires that containment integrity be maintained whenever reactor coolant system temperature and pressure exceed 200°F and 300 PSIG, respectively, but continued operation was permitted according to Technical Specification 3.6.3.b(3), which requires that the affected penetration be isolated within four hours by closing a manual valve. At 0048 on March 11, 1979, valve 3FDW-104 was isolated by closing valve 3FDW-335, the manual isolation valve located inside the RB on the steam generator 3B shell drain line. These valves are normally closed during power operation, and are only opened to drain steam generator 3B while the unit is shut down. Therefore, although the failure of valve 3FDW-104 to close constituted operation of the unit in a degraded mode allowed by a limiting condition for operation, this incident was of no significance with respect to safe operation of the unit.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The valve appears to have failed to close because the valve operator torque switch was set too low. When the torque switch setting was increased from 2.5 to 3.0, the valve operated properly.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Valve 3FDW-104 is the motor operated containment isolation valve located outside the RB on the steam generator 3B shell drain line. The failure of this valve to close did not violate containment integrity, since the redundant manual valve inside the RB was operable and was closed well within the time required by Technical Specifications. Therefore, safe operation of the unit was not affected and the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

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Corrective Action:

Isolation of the steam generator 3B shell drain line was accomplished by closing the redundant manual isolation valve approximately two hours after valve 3FDW-104 was declared inoperable. Subsequent investigation of the valve resulted in the valve operator torque switch setting being increased from 2.5 to 3.0. The valve was retested and found to be operating properly. When the valve is tested during the next performance test, it will be observed closely for any binding or other problems, and should any problem be noted at that time, appropriate action will be taken.

EXHIBIT A

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONT

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

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PHONE: (704) 373-8285