REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:7901230272 DOC.DATE: 79/01/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-287 OCONEE #3, DUKE POWER CO. 05000287
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
LEWIS,J.R. DUKE POWER CO.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
**REG.2,ATLANTA,OFF.OF THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: LER 78-022/03L-0 on 781212:isolation valve 3FDW-106 on 3A OTSG sample line failed to close.Caused by valve inability to withstand necessary environ.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A002S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 2+2
TITLE: INCIDENT REPORTS

NOTES: M.CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMENDS TO FSAR & CHANGES TO TECH SPECS.

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR	COPIES ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR	COPIES ENCL
ACTION:	05 BC ORB#4	4	4			
INTERNAL:	01 REG FILE	1	1	02 NRC PDR	1	1
	09 I&E	2	2	11 MPA	3	3
	14 TA/EDO	1	1	15 NOVAK/KNIEL	1	1
	16 EEB	1	1	17 AD FOR ENGR	1	1
	18 PLANT SYS BR	1	1	19 I&C SYS BR	1	1
	20 AD PLANT SYS	1	1	21 AD SYS/PROJ	1	1
	22 REAC SAFT BR	1	1	23 ENGR BR	1	1
	24 COLLINS	0	0	24 KREGER	1	1
	25 PWR SYS BR	1	1	26 HOUSTON	0	0
	26 VOLLMER	1	1	E JORDAN/IE	1	1
EXTERNAL:	03 LPDR	1	1	04 NSIC	1	1
	27 ACRS	16	16			

JAN 25 1979

A04

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 43 ENCL 43

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report Number: RO-287/78-22

Report Date: January 15, 1979

Occurrence Date: December 16, 1978

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Valve 3FDW-106 Failed to Close

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: RCS Heatup, 300 psi, 200°F

Description of Occurrence:

On December 16, 1978, containment isolation valve 3FDW-106 failed to close under system pressure. Redundant valve 3FDW-105 was locked closed within four hours pursuant to Technical Specification 3.6.3 b(2). After repairing the stuck limit switch the valve was cycled and verified to be operable.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This type of valve failure on this and other identical valves has occurred on several previous occasions. Corrective actions suggested by the manufacturer have been unsuccessful in resolving the problem. The valves appear to be unsuitable for long-term operation in the system environment.

Analysis of Occurrence:

3FDW-106 is an isolation valve on the steam generator sample line. The failure of the valve did not violate containment integrity as the redundant valve was operable and would have performed its Engineered Safeguard function if necessary. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action:

The stuck limit switch was repaired and the valve was cycled to assure operability.

This failure is one of similar failures which have occurred at the Oconee Nuclear Station. The affected valves (FDW-106 and -108 have been replaced on Unit 2, and the valves on Units 1 and 3 will be replaced at their next scheduled refueling outages.

NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	SCNEE3 (2)	00-0000-00 (3)	4	1111 (4)		(5)
	LICENSEE CODE	LICENSE NUMBER		LICENSE TYPE	CAT	

CON'T

01	REPORT SOURCE L (6)	05000287 (7)	121678 (8)	011579 (9)		
		DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE		

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 At 0745 isolation valve 3FDW-106 on 3A OTSG sample line failed to close.
03 The redundant valve 3FDW-105 operated properly thereby maintaining contain-
04 ment integrity. Since containment integrity was not jeopardized, the health
05 and safety of the public were not endangered.
06
07
08

09	SYSTEM CODE HJ (11)	CAUSE CODE E (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE B (13)	COMPONENT CODE VALVEX (14)	COMP. SUBCODE F (15)	VALVE SUBCODE D (16)													
	(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR 78	—	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 022	/	OCCURRENCE CODE 03	REPORT TYPE L	—	REVISION NO. 0										
	ACTION TAKEN B (18)	FUTURE ACTION A (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21)	HOURS (22) 0000.0	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23)	NPRO-4 FORM SUB. Y (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER L (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER R340 (26)										

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The initial corrective action was repair of stuck limit switch and cycling
11 of valve. Similar failures have occurred on several occasions, indicating
12 that this valve cannot withstand the necessary environment. Therefore, the
13 valves (FDW-106 and -108) will be replaced with valves of appropriate design.
14

15	FACILITY STATUS C (28)	% POWER 000 (29)	OTHER STATUS (30) NA	METHOD OF DISCOVERY B (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Observation during routine sampling.														
16	ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA															
	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES																		
17	NUMBER 000 (37)	TYPE Z (38)	DESCRIPTION (39) NA																
	PERSONNEL INJURIES																		
18	NUMBER 000 (40)	DESCRIPTION (41) NA																	
	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY																		
19	TYPE Z (42)	DESCRIPTION (43) NA																	
	PUBLICITY																		
20	ISSUED N (44)	DESCRIPTION (45) NA																	

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER S. R. Lewis PHONE: (704) 373-8285

7901230272