OPSMPEm Resource

From: West, Stephanie
Sent: Monday, May 02, 2016 1:06 PM
To: OPSMNPEm Resource; OPSMPEm Resource
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NRC

OPA

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U.S. NRC Blog

Archive file prepared by NRC

The NRC Prepares for Advanced Reactor Designers to Come Knocking

posted on Tue, 01 Mar 2016 15:02:26 +0000

Jennifer Uhle nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Director, Office of New Reactors nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Today's conversations about powering civilization in the future often propose carbon-free energy sources. In addition to solar and wind, these conversations sometimes touch on advanced nuclear reactor designs. Designers have yet to submit any of these designs for NRC review, but we expect applications in the future and we're preparing for them. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:These technology approaches range from evolutions on proven technology (such as high-temperature gas reactors) to innovative concepts that would re-use the "waste" nuclear fuel from today's reactors. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:[caption id="attachment_6960" align="alignright" width="464"]

Jennifer Uhle, second from left, participates in the panel.[/caption] nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I recently took part in one of these discussions at the Third Way group's first Advanced Nuclear Summit and Showcase at the Newseum in Washington, D.C. The NRC contributed to the summit due to its focus – what can agencies and legislators in Washington do to support development of advanced nuclear designs? The NRC's only role is ensuring these designs meet stringent safety standards. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:My portion of the discussion involved the NRC's review of reactor designs to meet our mission of protecting public health and safety. As I told the audience, we carry out that work as efficiently as possible so that the NRC avoids becoming a roadblock to deployment of appropriate technologies. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC's looking ahead to potential applications for reactors cooled by something besides water. Our limited advanced reactor budget includes work to stay up to date on this "non-light water reactor (LWR)" technology development. Vendors are considering many non-LWR technologies for future licensing work. We're taking a technology-neutral approach to stay properly positioned to efficiently review whatever vendors submit. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The summit also attracted non-LWR designers, venture capitalists, the Department of Energy, national laboratories, industry groups, universities, media, and think tanks, such as the Clean Air Task Force. Members of Congress attended the summit to discuss proposed legislation related to nuclear power. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Advanced reactor designers told the audience they're targeting deployment in the 2020s to the 2030s, depending on where their designs are in development. The NRC's preparation for potential advanced reactor applications includes our ongoing partnership with the Department of Energy. DOE's support for research and design activities will help vendors gather the information they need for their design applications. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The next milestone in that partnership will be our second advanced non-light water reactor workshop, currently scheduled for June. This workshop will present DOE's strategies to support the development, and NRC's plans for efficient licensing of advanced reactors.

Comments

comment #1647707 posted on 2016-03-03 22:49:38 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1647484

> *Until you solve the problems with existing storage of nuclear waste*

Tell us, Donna, what are these "problems"? Divers swim in the spent-fuel pools to maintain them; do you seriously claim that there is any leakage problem with the fuel? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I wish that the NRC moderators would simply stop approving comments full of totally false claims and implications like yours. They are completely contradicted by information here at this very site and are a waste of everyone's time; the least our civil servants can do for us is refuse to publish them without corrections and waste the commenter's time alone. Instead, they act as language police. Pathetic. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *set higher standards for waste storage and for nuclear reactors, no work should be dedicated to new reactors.*

Ah, it's a ploy to get rid of the industry by constipating the regulatory process. Gotcha. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The fear-monger keeps telling what can only be called shameless lies: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *the NRC allows storage of nuclear waste in thin canisters that cannot be inspected, cannot be repaired, can crack and leak after 20 years*

NRC: "Tests on spent fuel and cask components after years in dry storage confirm that the systems are providing safe and secure storage." Obviously, inspections are being carried out. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC: "Issued Oconee renewal on May 29, 2009 for 40 years" Obviously not about to fail after 20 years. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"Estimates of the lifespan of dry cask storage have continued to grow. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has concluded that they are safe and effective for as long as 100 years." (Moderators, why aren't *you* doing this fact-checking? These are not matters of opinion, on which reasonable people can differ. These claims are nigh unto paranoid ravings.) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *with no early warning system prior to a radiation release and no plan in place to mitigate failure.*

There are no internal mechanisms for radiation release or failure, and the exterior is subject to visual inspection continuously. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *You allow reactor renewals even though you know the design life was 40 years*

The initial licensing period was 40 years, which was the expected time to amortize the construction loans. It has nothing to do with the expected life of the plant, which is determined by degradation of the non-replaceable components like the reactor pressure vessel. Core designs which limit neutron leakage to levels well below what was assumed during design have extended this far beyond that original, first-cut estimates. Areva has come up with cavitation peening, a method of reconditioning the surface of the reactor vessel by hammering it with collapsing bubbles. This closes surface cracks and places the surface in compression, preventing new cracks from forming. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If you actually cared for the environment, you'd weigh the CO2 emissions and environmental damage (clear-cutting old growth forests!) of the "alternatives" to nuclear power, and do your best to keep it operating until the carbon-free replacments were built, installed and running. Instead you spout fear-mongering nonsense about things that have never hurt anyone, some of which are physically impossible. You really do sound like a shill, wittingly or not, for the fossil-fuel industry.

comment #1647708 posted on 2016-03-03 22:59:35 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1647504

> My dear "stock", I must correct you. A 3400 MW(th) nuclear plant releases about as much fission energy every day as, not 3 15 kT bombs, but almost 470 of them. That's equivalent to about 1 every 3 minutes. What makes a 15 kT bomb so destructive isn't the amount of energy involved, but that it's released in a minuscule volume in a microsecond. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The fission products from this energy are neatly sealed up in Zircaloy tubes and are remarkably safe to have around compared to e.g. dumps full of coal ash. There's a bunch of canisters full of the stuff not all that far from me. My worries about it are exactly zero. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Moderator Note: Some verbiage removed to adhere to blog comment guidelines.

comment #1648109 posted on 2016-03-07 10:44:15 by Moderator in response to comment #1647882

> Decades of data show that normal operations at U.S. nuclear power plants contribute only a tiny fraction of even the average annual U.S. natural background radiation dose. The NRC fact sheet on the subject is located here: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/bio-effects-radiation.pdf nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Scott Burnell

comment #1647709 posted on 2016-03-03 23:24:45 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1647571

> *I would like to see those proponents providing evidence of their claims rather than just unsubstantiated hope and promises.*

There were the natural reactors at what is now Oklo, in Gabon, roughly 2 billion years ago. These reactors appear to have "operated" off and on for tens of thousands of years, and from what we can tell their fission products pretty much stayed put and did nothing. Life on earth was only unicellular but went on without a hitch. Is there anything specific you're worried about, or is this just the inchoate paranoia I've become so familiar with in my dealings with anti-nukes? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *Unsubstantiated hope and promises is what got us into this mess in the first place.*

Au contraire, the promises of coal, oil and natural gas were all too well substantiated. That's how they got into such widespread use... and how their well-understood consequences got to such huge magnitude. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Unlike carbon-based fuels, we have substantial evidence to prove that the fears of nuclear energy opponents have no substance to them. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *They will not eliminate all the waste, so a solution for the waste is still needed.*

We need to eliminate all the GHG emissions from our energy systems (and other things) in a rather short period of time, or risk massive climate disruption. Actually, we probably need to extract on the order of a trillion tons of CO2 from the atmosphere that's already there. What's YOUR solution to this waste problem? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The solution to the fission-product problem is simple: wait, and they go away by themselves. That's what "radioactive decay" is. Uranium, neptunium, plutonium, americium, curium... these are only "waste" if you don't build reactors to use them as fuel. Once you have turned them into fission products, you have extracted the vast majority of the potential energy in them and it can no longer be released in other ways. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Most fission products have half-lives of 30 years or less. If you made some strontium-90 or cesium-137 in the years of the Roman republic, they would be gone today save for barely-detectable, harmless traces. Lead formed from the natural decay of uranium is poisonous forever. Why are you so dead-set on having more lead in the world?

comment #1647882 posted on 2016-03-05 13:03:30 by

> Are current reactor daily releases of over 10 billion becquerels of unstable atoms per day per reactor causing low live birth rates in the united states ? tfr=1.9. World TFR=2.45 year 2014.

comment #1647504 posted on 2016-03-01 20:00:18 by stock

> It seems obvious that until the problem on nuclear waste is "solved" or at least decided, that it is just crazy to consider making additional radiation. Each reactor make the equivalent of 3 nuclear bombs of radiation PER DAY

comment #1647494 posted on 2016-03-01 18:12:56 by CaptD

> I agree with the above comment 100% nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Also RE: "our mission of protecting public health and safety" I would urge the NRC to quadruple the number of random inspections being done and have them done by a team of at least three inspectors from outside the NRC region that oversee's the nuclear reactor's operator. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If this had been NRC SOP, then the San Onofre multi-billion debacle probably would have never occurred. #SanOnofreGate The hashtag that will keep you up to date on the ongoing investigation into the multi-billion $ SCE-CPUC ripoff.

comment #1647569 posted on 2016-03-02 12:21:47 by Curtis Carr

> What some people don't realize is that advanced reactors are a large part of the solution to deal with existing spent nuclear fuel (aka "waste). Any calls to limit their licensing due to current nuclear waste inventory is counterintuitive. Let's dramatically decrease that "waste" by licensing reactors that can consume it as fuel.

comment #1647571 posted on 2016-03-02 13:04:11 by Donna Gilmore in response to comment #1647569

> Regarding comment "Advanced reactor promises of solutions to the waste": nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:1. They will not eliminate all the waste, so a solution for the waste is still needed. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:2. The "solution" is an unsubstantiated promise and there is evidence to the contrary that this will create more problems that it solves. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I would like to see those proponents providing evidence of their claims rather than just unsubstantiated hope and promises. Unsubstantiated hope and promises is what got us into this mess in the first place.

comment #1647586 posted on 2016-03-02 14:36:54 by Dan Williamson in response to comment #1647484

Absent all the caterwauling about Yucca Mountain and "Mobile Chernobyl," the storage situation would have been solved by now. So, which is it.....complain about the fix, or complain about the lack of a fix?? Intent on having our cake and eating it, too, are we?

comment #1647484 posted on 2016-03-01 14:06:32 by Donna Gilmore

Until you solve the problems with existing storage of nuclear waste and set higher standards for waste storage and for nuclear reactors, no work should be dedicated to new reactors. For example, the NRC allows storage of nuclear waste in thin canisters that cannot be inspected, cannot be repaired, can crack and leak after 20 years, with no early warning system prior to a radiation release and no plan in place to mitigate failure. You even allow empty spent fuel pools to be destroyed without another plan in place to mitigate failed canister. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:You allow reactor renewals even though you know the design life was 40 years and that that there are critical structures and components that cannot be inspected.

Throwback Thursday – The RIC, Circa 1990

posted on Thu, 03 Mar 2016 15:00:02 +0000


In this archival photo, then-Chairman Kenneth M. Carr provides his remarks to participants of the Second Annual Regulatory Information Conference at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. Carr, who spent five years on the Commission, died last year. The current Chairman Stephen Burns had served on his staff. Later this month, the NRC will be holding the 28th RIC in Rockville, Md. On-line registration is closed, but on-site registration is available. For more information, check out the NRC webpage on the conference.

Comments

comment #1647692 posted on 2016-03-03 13:51:08 by drbillcorcoran

How would he have handled the nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Electrical Engineers' Single Phase Fault 2.206 Petition nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:https://app.box.com/files/0/f/6776544878/1/f_55198436818 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This episode may well begin to unravel the deep-seated dysfunction at the NRC. There seems to be a shortfall in competence, integrity, compliance, and transparency. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It is so engrained that the insiders do not even see it. "It's what's for dinner." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It reminds me of the ways NRC handled the Peach Bottom Sleepy Hollow Slumber Party for Security Officers, the Davis-Besse Inspection Deferral, the Callaway Shutdown on Xenon, the Oconee-Jocassee Dam Vulnerability, the AIM Pipeline Non-existing Safety Analysis, and other issues raised out of the usual routes. (Which other ones pop to mind?) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Instead of using concerned individuals' lack of expertise in the Byzantine Briar Patch to block the addressing of concerns, the NRC should have an Office of Dissenters Resources that helps concerned individuals through the briar patch. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-

post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:There is a sad lack of leadership that is willing to stop the circle-the-wagons stiff-arming meetings and say, “What’s the right thing to do?” nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Who know what could be achieved if the NRC put as much effort into solving safety problems as they put into proving that they are not problems? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The archive of official emails, meeting minutes, and memoranda should tell much of the story. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Who can get the collection of records released? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What has been the leadership involvement of senior staff, ACRS, and the commissioners? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Is there anyone willing to step up to the plate and keep this fiasco from being even more of an embarrassment?

comment #1648152 posted on 2016-03-08 00:13:30 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1647710

> *Interestingly enough, Dr. Corcoran has been involved with the nuclear industry since its very inception.*

That's nice. It doesn't excuse his efforts to obscure what he's talking about. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I have since seen the substance of the complaint from other sources. It happens to be true that losing a phase of the power feed to a 3-phase motor causes problems for the motor, especially if it isn't properly shut down or re-powered (feeding a 3-φ motor from a 1-φ power supply and using a large capacitor bank to create the required phase shift for the missing phase is standard practice). The issue here is that most of the systems in use appear to only monitor 2 phases and would fail to detect an outage of the third. Since this is obviously not a mystery, retrofits to fix it should not be a very big issue. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I would like to see a list of problems caused by phase outages at nuclear plants in the past. I suspect that this list is very, very short.

comment #1647938 posted on 2016-03-06 08:43:41 by OHW in response to comment #1647710

> Interestingly enough, Dr. Corcoran has been involved with the nuclear industry since its very inception. He isn't necessarily "anti-nuke" just in favor of thorough and exhaustive regulation. With such an extensive background in root-cause-analysis and intrinsic understanding of the real challenges regarding the industry, Dr. Corcoran is probably one of the leading supporters of the nuclear industry by championing the strength of regulations and accountability. I agree with you that there are certain individuals who will criticize anything nuclear-related without grounds and, in doing so, stoke the flames of fear without due cause. I'm just saying that this person isn't one of them.

comment #1647710 posted on 2016-03-03 23:32:31 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1647692

> It's telling that you hide your "problem" for the nuclear industry behind a wall that requires a login. Why don't you put it in an open-access Google doc? Do you not want everyone knowing what's in it? (Frankly, if I was trying to incite fear I'd throw lots of irrelevant stuff like that up and claim that non-refutations proved that dangers existed. Not that that would ever have occurred to me, but I've seen it too many times from anti-nukes.)

comment #1647671 posted on 2016-03-03 10:33:34 by Reno Deano

> Mr. Carr tried to run the NRC as he did naval enlisted men! Did not have a clear understand of the abilities and professionalism of the men and women that worked in the NRC. Very lackluster career as head of the NRC in the 80's.

Your Opportunity to Observe the Commission in Action

posted on Mon, 07 Mar 2016 13:55:42 +0000

> *Eric Stahl nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Acting Public Affairs Officer* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Nuclear regulation is the public’s business. For that reason, the NRC considers public participation in its activities to be a cornerstone of strong, fair regulation of the nuclear industry. Yet many people are surprised to hear they can watch the Commission deliberate nuclear safety and security issues in person and see government in action. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:And others, who may be aware, are not sure how that works. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:To help the public understand what they can expect to see at Commission meetings, the agency

recently released an updated brochure: A Guide to O pen Commission Meetings. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The guide covers many aspects of the 50 or so public Commission meetings that take place each year at the NRC's headquarters in Rockville, Md. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:During these meetings, NRC staff and invited panelists brief the Commissioners on various topics of interest to the agency, stakeholders, and members of the public. The Commissioners question the presenters, often taking advocacy or opposition roles to stimulate conversation, and talk with one another as they consider the issues before them. To be clear, though, voting does not take place at these meetings. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:To find out about upcoming meetings, you can check the schedule for the next six weeks on the NRC's website or in the Federal Register. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If you are unable to attend in person, most open Commission meetings can be viewed live through the NRC website. Videos and transcripts of these meetings are also archived for later viewing. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:While most Commission meetings are public, there are a few exceptions, which are specified in the Sunshine Act. The NRC generally will close meetings when the Commission discusses matters such as security or confidential legal, personnel, personal or proprietary information. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:There are also "rules of the road" for attending Commission meetings. Not surprisingly, any actions that disrupt the meeting are not acceptable. The public is permitted to bring in small signs, but cannot wave them around during the meeting. Eating, drinking, or smoking are also not allowed in the Commission Hearing Room. For more details, check out the brochure. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We hope to see you at an upcoming Commission meeting. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Comments

comment #1648810 posted on 2016-03-14 08:24:03 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1648119

> Dysfunctional Loyalty nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Refinemen2 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:March 14, 2016 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Submitting a complaint as an outsider is often viewed as equivalent to ratting on the company to a federal investigator and is often viewed as disloyalty. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-

03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In the organizations that I have worked in, any utterance accessible to an outsider that could be seen as criticism of the organization has been considered to be disloyalty. People's intuition tells them that disloyalty is an infraction of the organizational culture. (Fast brain) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Then they look around for a policy or other official edict that backs up their intuition. (Slow brain) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This is so engrained in the culture that it isn't seen unless it is specifically brought up. (The fish doesn't see the water.) This applies in organizations as diverse as the FBI, the nuclear industry, and international religious organizations. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This is a chilling effect that is hard to come to grips with. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:One could make a case that dysfunctional loyalty was a factor in most, if not all, recent organizational fiascos. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This could include Flint Water Contamination, Fukushima, Macondo, SONGS, Crystal River, ANO, Ft. Calhoun, DVA, the ACA Rollout, VW Dieselgate, child sexual abuse scandals, and the GM Ignition Switch fiasco. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Dysfunctional loyalty is a mortal threat to transparency and self-assessment. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:One of the reasons that Senator Joseph McCarthy was so repugnant could have been that there is a little dysfunctional loyalty in every righteous heart. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Watch for how dysfunctional loyalty plays out in the 2016 Presidential Election run-up. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/nation-world/national/article65524802.html

comment #1648125 posted on 2016-03-07 14:11:56 by Donna Gilmore

More important than the Commission meetings are the more technical public meetings where the NRC and nuclear industry discuss the current unresolved problems. Find topics and schedule here:http://meetings.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This is how I learned that the spent fuel dry storage canisters are subject to short-term cracking and could leak in as little as 16 years after a crack starts. No one knows when a crack will start, but a two-year old Diablo Canyon canister was found to have all the conditions for cracking. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC and nuclear industry have no current solution for this. The canisters cannot be inspected or repaired and there is no early warning system prior to a radiation release. Learn more at SanOnofreSafety.org, including video of Holtec canister vendor stating that even if you could find a crack and attempt to repair it, in the face of millions of curies of radiation being released into the environment, it's not feasible to repair without introducing another condition for cracking.

comment #1648119 posted on 2016-03-07 12:42:48 by CaptD

Providing open meetings is one thing but actually giving equal weight to what is presented by BOTH industry and independent parties is quite another. IMO, the NRC has reduced its responsiveness to the public since Chairman Allison Macfarlane left and is now doing little more than making it easier for the Nuclear Industry to avoid disclosing anything about their operations, even when it has to do with safety. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC Electrical Engineers' Single Phase Fault 2.206 Petition mentioned above, the white paper providing the NRC staff's assessment of the appropriateness of 10 CFR 50.59 for substantial modification to licensee facilities and the failure of the NRC to provide the root cause of the San Onofre RSG failures are three recent examples of how the NRC has let the public down, while at the same time covering for itself and those it "regulates."

comment #1648110 posted on 2016-03-07 10:57:14 by drbillcorcoran

It would be interesting to hear the commissioners address nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC Electrical Engineers' Single Phase Fault 2.206 Petition nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:https://app.box.com/files/0/f/6776544878/1/f_55198436818 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This episode may well begin to unravel the deep-seated dysfunction at the NRC. There seems to be a shortfall in competence, integrity, compliance, and transparency. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It is so engrained that the insiders do not even see it. "It's what's for dinner." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26

\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It reminds me of the ways NRC handled the Peach Bottom Sleepy Hollow Slumber Party for Security Officers, the Davis-Besse Inspection Deferral, the Callaway Shutdown on Xenon, the Oconee-Jocassee Dam Vulnerability, the AIM Pipeline Non-existing Safety Analysis, and other issues raised out of the usual routes. (Which other ones pop to mind?) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Instead of using concerned individuals' lack of expertise in the Byzantine Briar Patch to block the addressing of concerns, the NRC should have an Office of Dissenters Resources that helps concerned individuals through the briar patch. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:There is a sad lack of leadership that is willing to stop the circle-the-wagons stiff-arming meetings and say, "What's the right thing to do?" nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Who know what could be achieved if the NRC put as much effort into solving safety problems as they put into proving that they are not problems? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The archive of official emails, meeting minutes, and memoranda should tell much of the story. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Who can get the collection of records released? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What has been the leadership involvement of senior staff, ACRS, and the commissioners? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Is there anyone willing to step up to the plate and keep this fiasco from being even more of an embarrassment? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The petition stated (in part): nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"At Byron, a failure to design the electric power system's protection scheme to sense the loss of a single phase between the transmission network and' the onsite power distribution system resulted in unbalanced voltage, at both engineered safety features. (ESF) buses (degraded offsite power system), trip of several safety-related pieces of equipment and the unavailability of nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:the onsite electric power system." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Some of the unanswered questions are: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions that resulted in this design failure? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: What are the conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions that resulted in this issue not being surfaced at the pre-license stage? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions that resulted in this issue not being resolved through the station corrective action program after it was first discovered? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Since the petition indicates that the probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) was grossly optimistic, what are the conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions that resulted in the grossly optimistic PRA? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the other unanswered questions? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What can be done about it: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: Individuals may contact their senators/ representatives to recommend Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation of potential NRC internal noncompliance, bullying, fraud, waste, and mismanagement related to this episode.

Making Recent Safety Enhancements Part of the NRC Routine

posted on Fri, 11 Mar 2016 16:36:10 +0000

Stephen G. Burns nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: *Chairman* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC has made great strides to enhance U.S. nuclear power plants' already robust safety measures in the five years since the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. We took swift action after the accident in 2011, ordering a variety of upgrades to plant safety. Now we're to the point of incorporating this work into our ongoing inspection and oversight processes. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-

2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:[caption id="attachment_6977" align="alignright" width="423"]  NRC Chairman Stephen Burns (right) stands with Jim Meister, Exelon's Vice President for Operations Support, near new portable equipment at the Braidwood nuclear plant.[/caption] nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:A key lesson from the accident was that plants must be prepared for events not contemplated when they were designed and constructed. Plants' strategies to address external events must be flexible enough to deal with variety of circumstances. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Substantial progress has been made towards completing NRC-directed upgrades to address this lesson. Plants are far better prepared for severe events now than they were in 2011. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:About half of U.S. commercial reactors have completed integrating portable pumps, generators and other resources and procedures to maintain key safety functions. By the end of the year we expect every U.S. plant to have the physical resources. Almost all the plants will have all their procedures available, and the rest will have most procedures ready to go. The industry also has two national rapid response centers up and running in Phoenix and Memphis with portable equipment that can be dispatched within 24 hours to anywhere in the country if additional help is needed. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:More than three quarters of the plants have completed installing equipment to better monitor their spent fuel pools, and we expect every U.S. plant to finish that work by the end of the year. The bulk of the remaining safety-significant work should be done in 2017. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I've personally been to nearly a dozen plants since becoming Chairman and have seen first-hand the work that has been done at these sites. The operators of the plants have taken this work very seriously and the amount of equipment purchased and plant modifications made is quite impressive. Equally impressive is the thoroughness reflected in the procedures and training developed to make sure their people are ready and able to spring into action should the worst happen. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC's requests for U.S. plants to re-examine earthquakes and flooding hazards are also bearing fruit. Every plant has updated its understanding of potential earthquakes at its site. A quarter of the plants have finished their earthquake-related work. The rest are looking at whether their new quake hazard affects risks to a plant's ability to safely shut down. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:While improving flooding hazard information has proven more complex, more than half of the plants have updated their understanding of flooding sources. All the plants will continue examining any risk changes due to revised flooding estimates. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Our next step is to inspect the work that's been done and to ensure the plants maintain all of that progress. We're adapting our inspections and other processes to cover these enhancements. We've given our Resident Inspectors the handbook for the first of these inspections, in this case looking at the newly integrated portable equipment and resources. The first of those checks was done a few days ago. We're also updating our assessment process for inspection findings to cover the post-Fukushima upgrades. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Moving examination of these upgrades into our everyday oversight ensures we – and the plants – are vigilant in maintaining this important progress. Our onsite inspectors will keep a constant eye on these upgrades, with help as needed from our regional and headquarters staff. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC has met the challenges raised by the Fukushima accident promptly while maintaining day-to-day safe plant operations. We'll work hard every day to make certain plants also stay focused on maintaining the progress we've made.

Comments

comment #1648839 posted on 2016-03-14 15:17:52 by Moderator in response to comment #1648560

Post-Fukushima enhancements are easily inspected, since new connections or new equipment must be in accessible areas. The meeting you reference was discussing how to improve the already significant requirements of license renewal aging management programs. The programs handle issues such as buried piping through excavating typical portions of buried steel piping to gain insight into the condition of the remainder of the piping. Several plant areas are covered by in-service inspection programs (based on ASME Code Subsections IWE and IWL, and related NRC regulations), which "shall evaluate the acceptability of inaccessible areas when conditions exist in accessible areas that could indicate … degradation." Structural aging management programs therefore use conditions found in accessible areas to determine the need for managing degradation in inaccessible areas. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Scott Burnell

comment #1649143 posted on 2016-03-17 06:02:47 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1649051

• Dysfunctional Priorities nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that the competent investigation of every harmful event reveals that the causation of the harm includes the dysfunctional prioritization of something conflicting with integrity / compliance/quality/ safety / security by multiple individuals, entities, groups, and organizations. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:These include regulatory agencies, oversight agencies, auditing entities, trade organizations, professional societies, standards making bodies, labor organizations, governmental/ industrial/ commercial entities, investors, securities rating agencies, management, facilities, vessels, and individual contributors. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"Incentives undermine ethical motives." Economist Samuel Stebbins Bowles nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"The main thing is to keep the main thing the main thing."-Stephen R. Covey nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"When you're up to your navel in alligators it's hard to remember that you were sent in to drain the swamp"-An old engineering saying. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Caution: The existence of each dysfunctional priority resulted from deeper harmful underlying conditions, behaviors, actions, and/or inactions and thus is usually not a "root cause." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: The desire to avoid regulatory review cost Southern California Edison and/or its customers $2 billion or more and embarrassed the already under fire regulators.

comment #1648913 posted on 2016-03-15 08:49:06 by Moderator in response to comment #1648881

We have emailed you the content from your previous blog comment, which was not posted per the blog comment guidelines related to personal attacks. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Moderator

comment #1648916 posted on 2016-03-15 09:26:20 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1648881

For all online commenters: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Do yourself a favor by composing off-line. Try a word processor or text editor. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Edit and save before you paste your comment into the blog. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:OBTW: You don't advance your cause by making vast accusations and allegations based on half vast homework.

comment #1648736 posted on 2016-03-13 17:47:31 by in response to comment #1648557

Scott — Another issue all together is that Operators have and still can use the 50.59 process to bypass the public scrutiny which makes these generating stations much less safe as San Onofre proved, since SCE created a multi-billion dollar engineering debacle that their State regulator says the ratepayers should be responsible for. The NRC self review of the 50.59 process was just plain white-washing and/or CYA depending on your point of view, since the operator SCE never even got fined for what they did, destroying 4 almost new replacement steam generators nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Upon inspection after the leak occurred, both replacement steam generators in Unit 2 and in Unit 3 were found to have had more tube damage than the rest of the entire US Nuclear Reactor "Fleet" combined*, yet SCE did not even have a clue that anything was amiss in either Unit 3 or Unit 2, until the leak occurred. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Left unsaid is that SCE also ran Unit 3 over its NRC approved "redline" limitations (to generate more steam/profits) because they thought it was built better, which is what caused the leak that ultimately brought down both Unit 2 and Unit 3. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This makes what happened very SCARY, if you know anything about Nuclear Reactors and their Steam Generators. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-

30.status-publish.001.xml:In non-engineering speak, San Onofre could have had a double meltdown (like Fukushima's triple meltdown) if a major earthquake had occurred while Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at full power, if more than a few of the tubes failed that were in the four steam generators (which each had 9,727 tubes inside them). Multiple tube failures could have easily resulted in uncovering the reactor core of Unit 2 and/or Unit 3 in a matter of minutes, no matter what those in the control room tried to do to prevent it, especially since the two reactors are so close together physically! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:* http://sanonofresafety.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/steamgeneratortubesplugged1.pdf

comment #1648742 posted on 2016-03-13 20:50:59 by Patricia Borchmann

> The extensive NRC accomplishments identified by NRC Chairman Burns in this report appear large, but the list is inconsistent with 5-year Anniversary of Fukishima reports also recently released by notable independent nuclear experts outside the industry, including Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), Beyond Nuclear, and NIRS. Reports by credible independent experts generally differ drastically from conclusions drawn by Chairman Burns, about performance capabilities of nuclear reactors in United States, and emergency preparedness based on "post- Fukishima Lessons Learned" analysis and major investment in equipment upgrades, and planning sequences for completion on issues where additional data is necessary (i.e., flooding, and seismic risks). nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Viewers are encouraged to review reports prepared by the specific groups by visiting websites for those organizations. To briefly summarize, reports prepared by independent experts generally found that "Five (5) Years After Fukishima, U.S. Nuclear Safety Upgrades Lagging" (Huffington Post, published 03 10 16). nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Excerpts from that article indicated the following: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"NRC set up a task force to analyze what happend at Fukishima and assess how to make U.S. reactors safer. In July 2011, the task force offered a dozen specific recommendations to help saeguard US nuclear plants in the event of a Fukishima-scale accident. Unfortunately NRC has since rejected or significantly weakened many of those recommendations and has yet to fully implement the reforms it did adopt, according to Union of Concerned Scientists report. UCS also found the agency abdicated its responsibility as nations nuclear watchdog by allowing the industry to routinely rely on voluntary guidelines, which are by their very nature, unenforceable. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Although the NRC and nuclear industry have devoted considerable resources to address post-Fukishima task force recommendations, they haven't done all they should to protect the public from a similar disaster. If NRC is serious about protecting the public and plant workers, it should reconsider a number of recommendations it scrapped under pressure from the industry and its supporters in Congress". The Huffington Post article contains additional sections outlining "Half-baked reforms", reliance on NRC's vaguely worded "backfit" rule to reject many other recommended post-Fukishima upgrades, "Letting the Industry Make the Rules", and "Saying No to Filtered Vents". . nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Besides myself, there are millions of other public Stakeholders who live in communities surrounding nearly 100 reactors in United States who are extremely disturbed and dissatisfied by the failure by the nation's only regulatory agency with authority to fully develop and apply regulations necessary to protect public health and safety to perform that duty. The NRC Commissions decisions to forego many meaningful safety recommendations by that task force was irresponsible, and reckless. The FLEX Program investments to stage emergency equipment at two locations in U.S. is not nearly adequate to protect vulnerable stakeholders during emergency events, especially if concurrent events threatened reactors in multiple locations where flooding risks and seismic risks have increased dramatically during recent years, due to climate change, fracking practices by oil and gas industry, or countless other threats where reactors are unequipped, and plant operators are not sufficiently prepared, trained, or equipped to respond. These concerns are not new. In fact, many active stakeholders were actively involved years ago during earlier public review of the Fukishima White Paper in draft forms, and prepared credible comments/concerns which were dismissed. Many of these active stakeholders are still extremely dissatisfied, and disturbed by comments just released by NRC Chairman Burns, regarding the current status of emergency preparedness at United States reactors, and to say I am still skeptical is an enormous understatement. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Besides the recent 2.206 Petition filed by seven (7) of NRC's own engineers, the credible concerns of the same experts outside the industry have been routinely dismissed, or marginalized without sufficient evidence that significant safety margin degradations have not resulted.

comment #1648879 posted on 2016-03-14 23:51:00 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1648742

> *the list is inconsistent with 5-year Anniversary of Fukishima reports also recently released by notable independent nuclear experts outside the industry, including Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), Beyond Nuclear, and NIRS.*

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:You're asking us to believe that it's just a coincidence that all of these organizations are (a) rabidly anti-nuclear and (b) probably financed by fossil-associated donors and their foundations. In other words, they are not independent at all; they are fronts for the competition. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *Reports by credible independent experts generally differ drastically from conclusions drawn by Chairman Burns*

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Reports by credible independent experts say there will be no discernable health consequences from the Fukushima radiation releases, among other conclusions. Meanwhile, emissions from fossil plants kill hundreds of thousands and climate change threatens billions. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Radiophobia has a large death toll in Japan alone; 2911 deaths in Fukushima prefecture came from the evacuation, compared to 1603 from the quake and tsunami. The radiation was harmless, but the phobia killed. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Besides myself, there are millions of other public Stakeholders who live in communities surrounding nearly 100 reactors in United States who are extremely disturbed and dissatisfied by the failure by the nation's only regulatory agency with authority to fully develop and apply regulations necessary to protect public health and safety to perform that duty.

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I am also a public stakeholder, and I find that the NRC has erred in the opposite direction: it has been over-zealous, exerting ever-tightening scrutiny over harmless things while ignoring gross dangers to the public from the energy sources that nuclear power displaces. Poisonous frac water, airborne toxic leaks and natural gas explosions are just a few of the threats that nuclear power helps to reduce. The NRC does not weigh these diminished threats in its evaluations, and continues to use the linear no-threshold (LNT) model in its assessment of radiation risks. This is now known to be an abuse of risk assessment. If LNT was remotely correct, the populations of Ramsar, Kerala and Guarapari would have massive excesses of cancers. They have anything but. Replacement of LNT with a proper threshold risk model would both make nuclear plants cheaper to run and minimize the impact of phobias on public policy. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Besides the recent 2.206 Petition filed by seven (7) of NRC's own engineers

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Yes, about that. The industry has been backfitting its systems for some time already (one engineer's story part 1, part 2). What the NRC engineers are doing is elevating the priority of the rule-making, so everything is set down properly. The safety work will be done regardless. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

the credible concerns of the same experts outside the industry have been routinely dismissed, or marginalized without sufficient evidence that significant safety margin degradations have not resulted.

The safety concerns of climate scientists and air-quality experts have been marginalized and dismissed since no later than 1958... oh, wait, make that 1956. Had the post-TMI anti-nuclear paranoia been properly ignored and the projected replacement of coal-fired electricity by nuclear actually gone ahead, we would have neither the climate threat nor the air pollution which the new air-toxics regulations are finally addressing. All of the mortality and morbidity in the mean time is your responsibility; you have blood on your hands.

comment #1649051 posted on 2016-03-16 11:05:06 by David Andersen

> Anonymous: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:1) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Upon inspection after the leak occurred, both replacement steam generators in Unit 2 and in Unit 3 were found to have had more tube damage than the rest of the entire US Nuclear Reactor "Fleet" combined*, yet SCE did not even have a clue that anything was amiss in either Unit 3 or Unit 2, until the leak occurred. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:1 My Response) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:SCE identified the leakage while it was still far below the Technical Specification limit and chose to conservatively shut down to investigate the leakage. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:2) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Left unsaid is that SCE also ran Unit 3 over its NRC approved "redline" limitations (to generate more steam/profits) because they thought it was built better, which is what caused the leak that ultimately brought down both Unit 2 and Unit 3. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:2 my response) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Not sure what you mean by NRC approved "Redline" limit, but I assume that you are implying that they were exceeding Licensed Thermal Power. Though I don't know for sure, but speaking as a previously licensed senior reactor operator I doubt that the operators would operate the plant in such a manner. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:3) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This makes what happened very SCARY, if you know anything about Nuclear Reactors and their Steam Generators. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:3 my response) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I know a great deal about Nuclear reactors, and while what happened was unfortunate I will emphasize that the operators took conservative actions to shut the plants down upon discovery of the leakage. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:3) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In non-engineering speak, San Onofre could have had a double meltdown (like Fukushima's triple meltdown) if a major earthquake had occurred while Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at full power, if more than a few of the tubes failed that were in the four steam generators (which each had 9,727 tubes inside them). Multiple tube failures could have easily resulted in uncovering the reactor core of Unit 2 and/or Unit 3 in a matter of minutes, no matter what those in the control room tried to do to prevent it, especially since the two reactors are so close together physically! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:3 my response nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In non-engineering speak, nonsense! The Emergency Core Cooling System is fully capable of maintain the core cooling in the event of multiple tube failures. Operators receive a great deal of training on combating just such occurrences. The reactors being located close together has no bearing on their ability to handle a steam generator tube failure.

comment #1648560 posted on 2016-03-11 16:17:05 by Donna Gilmore in response to comment #1648557

> Who or what is the source of the information in your reply? I recently listened to an NRC technical meeting regarding reactor aging management where they were discussing how they might be able to deal with critical areas they cannot inspect. One idea discussed was to consider assuming if the portion they could see looks good, then just assume the part they cannot see is good. Suggest you start attending the aging management technical meetings on both reactors and spent fuel dry storage. You will learn that aging management wasn't built into the design of either and there are numerous unresolved issues.

comment #1648881 posted on 2016-03-15 00:47:52 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1648551

> Shame on the moderators for deleting my previous rebuttal to this nonsense. I failed to save it to repost. I will not make that mistake again. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

03/11/11 Fukushima is still a Japanese Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster.

The estimate is $80 billion ($20 for cleanup, $60 for [un-necessary, damaging and useless] evacuations) which is dwarfed by the bill for replacement fossil fuels (on the order of the difference between the previous $50 billion trade surplus and the recent $150 trade deficit... per year). nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:All of these reactions, over an industrial accident that has produced no demonstrable permanent harm to anyone. This is paranoia. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Don't Pollute the Pacific with Japanese ☢Waste

Presumably, you mean releasing the metal-stripped water from the plant basements to the Pacific. The only thing above background levels left in this water is tritium. Tritium is essentially harmless except at very high levels. All the stored Fukushima water could be dumped into the oceans without any detectable effects. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:There are people who simply cannot accept that there won't be anything harmful from this. When a Canadian researcher concluded that the levels reaching North America would be trivial and harmless, anti-nuclear activists targeted him with death threats. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Why is the NRC not speaking out about what is happening?

First, something must be happening. If you won't believe the people who tell you there isn't, you are somewhere between deluded and paranoid. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Paranoids need to be sent to mental-health treatment. There is no other remedy; a non-existent threat has no response.

comment #1648544 posted on 2016-03-11 11:51:22 by Donna Gilmore

> The NRC staff states there are critical areas of structures and components that cannot be inspected due to inaccessibility. These reactors were engineered for a 40-year lifespan. How can you possibly ensure safe relicensing when you cannot even inspect critical areas of structures and components that are aging and may likely be degrading?

comment #1648550 posted on 2016-03-11 12:27:55 by drbillcorcoran

> The Fukushima Investigation is Far From Over nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We still do not have a chronological list of the missed opportunities and the harmfully dysfunctional conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions together with their impacts on the harmful results. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What individuals and organizations advised TEPCO to address the safety shortcomings that resulted in the explosions and meltdowns? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What individuals and organizations advised NISA to require TEPCO to address the safety shortcomings that resulted in the explosions and meltdowns? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What individuals and organizations had obvious opportunities to have advised TEPCO to address the safety shortcomings that resulted in the explosions and meltdowns, but did not? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What individuals and organizations had obvious opportunities to have advised NISA to require TEPCO to address the safety shortcomings that resulted in the explosions and meltdowns, but did not? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:After the tsunami what opportunities were there to have prevented the explosions and meltdowns? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How

come Fukushima was apparently designed for the right earthquake, but not for the tsunami that was known to be one of the earthquake's certain consequences? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Of all of the upgrades that were necessary after Fukushima, which ones were not necessary before Fukushima? How come? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:There is a group compiling the unanswered questions. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:You may join by sending an email to nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: rcsotp_20_fukushima_ltbl_-subscribe@yahoogroups.com

comment #1648551 posted on 2016-03-11 12:53:24 by CaptD

03/11/11 Fukushima is still a Japanese Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Don't Pollute the Pacific with Japanese ☢Waste nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Why is the NRC not speaking out about what is happening?

comment #1648557 posted on 2016-03-11 13:53:27 by Moderator in response to comment #1648544

Some portions of nuclear power plants, “inaccessible” only because the reactor is operating, are inspected when the reactor is shut off. All areas of the plant, however, are appropriately inspected and maintained to ensure they comply with NRC regulations. Plants are engineered to meet stringent requirements, not for a particular timespan. Any plant applying for a renewed license must satisfy the NRC that the plant can detect and safely account for the aging of systems not already covered by NRC maintenance requirements. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Scott Burnell

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Inspector General Audit Looks at NRC’s Employee Card Access System

posted on Mon, 14 Mar 2016 13:42:00 +0000

*Stephen D. Dingbaum nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Assistant Inspector General for Audit*s nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

An Office of the Inspector General audit of the NRC’s Personal Identity Verification card access system is now available. The audit set out to determine whether the NRC’s PIV card access system met its operational requirements, and to assess the effectiveness of coordination among offices with a role in securing NRC’s physical access. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The PIV card is an ID card issued by a federal agency. It contains information unique to each employee and contractor. The card’s main function is to protect and to strengthen the security of personnel information and physical access to secured areas. The NRC uses the card to control access at its headquarters and regional offices. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The OIG found that the agency’s PIV card access system met its requirements, and there is some coordination among offices with a role in securing NRC’s physical access. However, opportunities exist to strengthen processes to ensure more PIV cards are retrieved when employees leave service. Opportunities also exist to establish a uniform and effective way for security officials to be notified of changes to contractor and employee access for restricted areas. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The audit found that PIV cards for terminated contractors and employees are not always retrieved, and that retrieval procedures have not been established. The OIG identified that of 1,452 terminated PIV cards over a 22-month period (January 2014 through November 2015), about one third were not collected from the personnel. As a result, there is a risk of unauthorized physical access to NRC and other federal facilities. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-

01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In addition, the OIG found, the NRC is not always notified of changes in staff/contractor access rights for restricted areas. Consequently, the potential exists for unauthorized access into a restricted area by personnel who should no longer have access. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The report makes seven recommendations to improve the system, reduce physical security risk across the agency, and ensure continued compliance with federal regulations and guidance. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC management stated their general agreement with the audit findings and recommendations. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Comments

comment #1648851 posted on 2016-03-14 18:33:42 by CaptD

> Mr. Dingbaum — Instead of spending big bucks on the OIG audit (what did it cost anyway?), why not charge every contractor $2500 per card which will be 100% refunded IF the card is surrendered at the proper time, with $100 per day penalty if it is not. You can be sure that almost everyone would then "do the right thing".

comment #1648862 posted on 2016-03-14 19:46:52 by steamshovel2002

> The OIG mostly answers to a Republican/Teabagger extremist Congress. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Mike Mulligan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Hinsdale, NH

comment #1648822 posted on 2016-03-14 10:28:03 by Public Pit Bull

> Sorry NRC but what a waste of our taxpayer dollars! You have nothing more important on your platter than this to audit?! If you want to look at access why don't you look harder at access to our nuclear power plants, or our vulnerable spent fuel pools scattered across our country, many in the backyard of highly-populated areas?! Or perhaps access to the many dams upstream from these vital potential terrorist targets. And while you are there note just how vulnerable these dams are to anyone with or without authorized access. NRC, try focusing on your stated mission of protecting the health and safety of the public for a change!

comment #1648818 posted on 2016-03-14 09:48:36 by Nikohl Vandel

> Go get them Inspector General! Their casualness is sometimes super scary!

comment #1648825 posted on 2016-03-14 10:33:48 by drbillcorcoran

> • Barrier Insufficiency nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that whenever harm occurs it is certain that there were no effective barriers to protect the item harmed from the hazards that resulted in the harm as it occurred. For advocates and aficionados of the Swiss Cheese Model , an inescapable fact is that when harm occurs every slice of cheese either had a crucial hole in it or the slice did not exist. Corrective/ preventative actions, when effective, involve improvements in barriers and/or measures to reduce reliance on inherently weak barriers. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: If any slice of cheese had been American, not Swiss, the accident would not have happened. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:“It was as if the pitcher kicked the soft bunt past the shortstop to guarantee a triple.”-A hand-wringing manager

comment #1649864 posted on 2016-03-24 09:49:17 by Nicholas Fagan

> If you don't retrieve the badge that's okay just deactivate it.

Under Cover of Night: An Irradiator Moves 2.5 Miles

posted on Wed, 16 Mar 2016 17:18:35 +0000

> *Victor Dricks* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: *Senior Public Affairs Officer* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: *Region IV* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:On Super Bowl Sunday, while millions of Americans were gathered in front of their television sets, two NRC employees were en route to Anchorage, Alaska, as part of the agency’s mission to ensure the security and safety of irradiators. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-

2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Under controlled conditions, large commercial irradiators in the U.S. use gamma rays to kill germs and insects in food products and containers. But the smaller irradiators -- about the size of a mini refrigerator -- are used in lab settings for sterilizing medical supplies and products. They have their own built-in shielding. Material to be irradiated is placed in a small canister which rotates, exposing the material to radiation. The process leaves no radioactive residue behind, and the devices have been used safely by workers for more than four decades in the United States. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:[caption id="attachment_6986" align="alignright" width="439"]

Moving the small irradiator took a big, coordinated effort.[/caption] nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Because all irradiators contain sealed sources of radioactive materials that could be of interest to terrorists wanting to make a “dirty bomb,” the NRC has very rigorous security requirements governing their use. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC team was onsite to monitor preparations to move a small irradiator from its existing location to a new facility about 2.5 miles away. But that short trip involved months of planning and tight coordination between the licensed owner, the NRC and local law enforcement agencies. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:All irradiator operators must have a license from the NRC or an Agreement State before they can obtain a sealed source containing radioactive materials. Since Alaska is not an Agreement State, their lab-sized, self-shielded irradiator was subject to NRC licensing and oversight. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Before the irradiator was moved, the NRC team conducted a thorough inspection of the new facility to ensure security was adequate and procedures were in place for handling a variety of emergencies. James Thompson, Region IV Senior Health Physicist, and Brooke Smith, an acting branch chief in the Region’s Division of Nuclear Materials & Safety, spent several days reviewing company records and operations, worker training programs and maintenance procedures to ensure compliance with NRC regulations. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Late in the evening on February 10, Anchorage police began cordoning off streets along the route the irradiator would take to its new home. Shortly after 1 a.m., a special truck carrying the irradiator rolled out of a building under the watchful eyes of dozens of local enforcement agents and a SWAT team. The truck had special security features required for the movement of large quantities of radioactive material, per U.S. Department of Transportation requirements. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The tight security, the cover of darkness and the “cloak of secrecy” approach was more than a bit out of the ordinary for the NRC inspectors. But the journey proved uneventful – which was the ending to the story everyone was working toward.

Comments

comment #1649067 posted on 2016-03-16 13:48:46 by jean staton

> I applaud the safety measures taken with the irradiator and all radioactive material. I am the Corporate RSO for Industrial Nuclear Co. which we manufacture and ship radioactive material. I'll give you a laugh for today - We received some bulk material and Custom Critical sent me pictures of the two drivers and I thought they were both men but one had a feminine name so I called Custom Critical and said no, one of the drivers was female. A very nice lady but that picture sure made me wonder. Anyway thanks for maintaining safety and security.

comment #1649068 posted on 2016-03-16 13:53:13 by CaptD

> Nice move NRC...

comment #1649124 posted on 2016-03-16 23:54:19 by Paul Dickman

> I wish that you had also pointed out that these irradiators are an absolutely essential part of sterilizing blood and instruments used in millions of operations every year. I appreciate the "cloak and dagger" tone of the story to make it interesting but the Red Cross states there are nearly 21 million

units of blood transfused each year in the U.S. and it is being kept safe because of these irradiatiors. These are not dirty bombs but an essential part providing for public health world wide.

comment #1649209 posted on 2016-03-18 10:08:05 by steamshovel2002

You guys better knock off talking about unimportant happyland events like moving irradiators in Alaska. You need to start talking about the mindboggling enormous decline in Gallup's public favorability with nuclear power within the last year and beginning in 2010. Most starling of all, your BFF the Republicans, the one year decline in their favorability to you is the most pronounced in a bad direction of the lot? They don't poll the latest political affiliation of them all, the independents? How do you think they went? How are the politicians going to use this information to their advantage? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How are the industry and NRC employees going to take advantage of this trend? Some say it is already beginning with the internal disagreements...The Arkansas Nuclear One "one" and the NRC "seven"? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What kind of stampede event will it take to turn the rest of the good Americans away from your Industry? Is your risk significant system really going to protect you from this? You are fixated on the broken campaign contribution "risk determination system" as your ship is sinking? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Guys, here comes the great re-regulations??? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:My evaluation on the Gallup poll? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: "Dems and Repubs: Drastic Decline of Favorability with Nuclear Power During Last Year" nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2016/03/dems-and-repubs-drastic-decline-of.html nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Mike Mulligan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Hinsdale, NH

comment #1649212 posted on 2016-03-18 11:07:32 by steamshovel2002

My apologies: Gallup did poll the independents. Their decline of approval was much lower than the Dems and Republicans. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Thanks for approving this. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Mike Mulligan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Hinsdale, NH

Throwback Tuesday -- The Difference Of A Few Decades

posted on Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:53:21 +0000

In March 1991, the NRC's Operations Center was located in the Maryland National Bank Building, in Bethesda, Md., even though the first building of the new, soon-to-be consolidated NRC headquarters complex was occupied in Rockville, Md. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In this photo, then-director of the Division of Safety Systems Analysis, Brian Sheron, briefs the Executive Team during an exercise with the St. Lucie nuclear power plant, in Florida. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:At the head of the table (lower left) is Commissioner Ken Rogers, who is joined by a number of high-ranking NRC officials from various offices. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Fast forward to today. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:


Now, the NRC's Operations Center is a modern facility using the latest technologies. During this emergency preparedness exercise with the Fermi nuclear power plant, held in April 2014, the Executive Team gets briefings over webcam, while monitoring information on laptops and keeping an eye on the content of simulated social media. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In this exercise, the Executive Team was headed by then-Commissioner George Apostolakis, center, seated. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:For more about the NRC's emergency preparedness activities, visit the agency's webpage. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Comments

comment #1649801 posted on 2016-03-23 16:56:04 by CaptD

> I wonder if the NRC would release its webcam data from the 3/11/11 Fukushima triple meltdown? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I have seen some of the emails released* and believe that the webcam data would offer yet another perspective of how the NRC reacts to a real nuclear emergency. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:* Here is a great listing of internal NRC emails that give a sense of what was being discussed immediately after 3/11/11 occurred: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11175A278.pdf nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Note: It takes a while to load, but it is worth studying and/or saving to disc.

comment #1649862 posted on 2016-03-24 09:42:15 by Moderator in response to comment #1649801

> The Japanese government and TEPCO would be the holders of any video footage that might exist from the accident site. The NRC's records from that time are the Operations Center transcripts and e-mails released through FOIA requests. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Scott Burnell

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A Chilling Effect is Not Cool

posted on Thu, 24 Mar 2016 18:30:45 +0000

Roger Hannah nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Senior Public Affairs Officer nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Region II nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC Region II office issued a "chilling effect" letter to the Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar nuclear plant this week, but what exactly does that mean? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The "chilling" has nothing to do with weather, but rather refers to a workplace environment where employees may be hesitant to raise safety concerns for fear of retaliation or

because previously raised concerns were not adequately addressed. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

In the Watts Bar case and several others before it, the NRC identified situations where some employees told the NRC they might be reluctant to talk to their supervisors, managers or even the NRC about safety issues because they were afraid of potential effects on their jobs. At Watts Bar, these concerns arose in the operations department, but the NRC takes those concerns very seriously whether they are isolated or more widespread. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:When the NRC issues a "chilling effect" letter to a nuclear plant or any other licensed facility, it is designed to ensure that those organizations are taking appropriate actions to foster a workplace environment that encourages workers at all levels to raise safety concerns without the fear of retaliation and management to promptly and effectively address the concerns. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC met with TVA officials March 22 to discuss the work environment concerns and the letter issued the following day simply puts into writing the expectations that the NRC has for TVA to address the concerns at the Watts Bar plant. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:TVA officials are being asked to provide a plan that describes how work environment issues at the Watts Bar plant will be addressed and then attend another public meeting to discuss both that plan and how the NRC will monitor and inspect any corrective actions. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC is confident that most workers at the Watts Bar plant and throughout the nuclear industry feel safe in raising safety concerns within their own organizations or directly to the NRC. That ability is an important supplement to the NRC inspection program in ensuring the safety of the facilities the agency regulates. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Any attempt to influence that ability will not be tolerated by the NRC and there are other similar letters in the past showing just how uncool the NRC finds any workplace chilling effect. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Comments

comment #1649876 posted on 2016-03-24 15:33:49 by Terry Price

> This also happened during final construction / licensing for WBN 1 and Sequoyah 1 & 2 Restart in the mid 1980's. Besides, dismissing a federal employee or contractor as TVA employees and contractors are... it near impossible as they are a protected arrogant culture. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Makes the high INPO rating trivial. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:takes employees to tell the NRC that Site management is not of the caliber of technical conscience they are purported to be. Seems the NRC has a weakness in performance monitoring.

comment #1649877 posted on 2016-03-24 15:36:13 by Len Skoblar

> I have experienced a similar chilled environment but the company is not yet a licensee. They are in the middle of designing a first-of-a-kind nuke, and their attitude is the NRC's rules don't apply to them yet.

comment #1650272 posted on 2016-03-29 09:32:38 by steamshovel2002

> Dr. Bill, nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What about the ANO stator drop risk determination difference of professional opinion? One inspector thought according to the rules, a violation level should be a green level instead of a yellow violation level. This inspector seems to be fixated on what the rules said, other than special situations. The NRC said according to their rules he's right, because the reactor level was so high when the accident began? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-

post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:My take on it is the risk determination rules and procedures are so hyper technical and complicated the agency can spin any violation level they want. Nobody outside the industry can understand what a violation level is based on. It is as bad as no rules? No one can understand the rules. Most of the determinations isn't science or engineering, it's just ultra-technical governmental people making secret assumptions and it undermines safety culture at most plants. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Risk determination is the foundation the whole industry is built upon. Inadequate risk determination level with the NRC Seven is the foundation of the 2.206 complaint. Should you always follow bad rules or laws? I wouldn't be surprised if internal risk determinations is behind Watts Bar. Faulty risk determination is the fruit that brought us Fukushima? An infinite amount of add on expensive safety systems and deregulation guilds won't protect you from the big one if the risk determination system is broken...inadequate behavior changing system. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Why didn't the NRC's risk determination system predict the open short problem and make people do the right thing before it challenged a plant? Anticipated the shortcoming?The risk determination system is a check valve, benefits only going in one direction. Why didn't the risk determination system work at San Onofre, ANO, Pilgrim and my favorite baby River Bend. Why do we have to see a accident before we then assume the NRC risk determination system works without evidence to set the violation level? Because Congress said so? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Whistleblowing is just attention getting. Is he being straight up being fixated on following the rules or is he in his special way bringing to light bigger problems at ANO? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The risk significant determination system is built on corporate campaign contributions and their lawyers. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What do you make of this new ANO story? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML16061A362\ nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: DPO Case File for DPO-2015-001 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"The following pdf represents a collection of documents associated with the submittal and nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:disposition of a differing professional opinion (DPO) from an NRC employee involving concerns nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:about the significance determination of a Yellow finding issued to Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:on June 23, 2014" nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Thanks, nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Mike Mulligan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Hinsdale, NH

comment #1650181 posted on 2016-03-28 11:33:21 by drbillcorcoran

• Leadership and Chilling Effects nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that unless leaders reliably and relentlessly report nonconformities their leadership by example is creating a chilling effect. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: The way to succeed in any organization is to get your job done in the situation you are in, not to fix the organization and then get your job done. Thus, the upwardly mobile tend to put systemic corrective action on the back burner. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Many nonconformities are, when surfaced, budget busters and schedule busters, hence they are bonus busters. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: One of the top principles of human behavioral technology is that people do what they see others do. This is especially compelling when the others are successful, admired, and it positions of authority.

comment #1650182 posted on 2016-03-28 11:34:40 by drbillcorcoran

How much money has the current CEL cost TVA just for NRC inspection hours?

comment #1650283 posted on 2016-03-29 12:16:47 by CaptD in response to comment #1649924

NRC Office of Enforcement nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I personally know of people that that followed your procedures and NOTHING happened! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How about posting the numbers of reported infractions by year and the number/types of penalties that resulted from them? For this NRC system to "work" there should be some significant number of findings that result in workplace changes. If that is not happening, then the entire NRC Policy is suspect, since it is not accomplishing what it is designed to do, which is make reactors safer for all

and especially for those working on them, not just insulating Operators from having to deal with regulations that they feel don't apply to them. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Here is a great example: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:SCE the operator of San Onofre received a White finding with no penalty (lap on the wrist) for installing 4 Replacement Steam Generators (RSGs) that failed almost immediately causing a radioactive leak, which put all of southern California at risk. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC failed the publics trust by never completing their own investigations (even thought the NRC itself said that the damage was unprecedented): nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:1) Not fining SCE, for making a mockery of the NRC 50.59 like-for-like exchange process, (which itself was later reviewed and was decided by the NRC, that few if any changes were warranted). nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:2) SCE's failure to provide the required analytical documentation proving the RSGs were safe. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:3) The NRC buried internal reports that were critical about what happened until it was announced that San Onofre was to be decommissioned, instead of providing them for public distribution in a timely manner. This was especially important since the critical report was delivered to the NRC BEFORE the NRC Region IV AIT report was published (which had no mention of the findings in the critical report) since it was written to support the claims in SCE biased Root Cause. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:4) Not demanding a completed root cause investigation, since SCE's root cause was based on faulty data, instead of the actual operational data of Unit 3 vs Unit 2. This was done to protect SCE and cover up the NRC role in the RSG debacle. The entire nuclear industry loses because they cannot apply what caused the RSGs to fail at San Onofre, which puts the US nuclear fleet at risk.

comment #1650285 posted on 2016-03-29 13:11:00 by Moderator in response to comment #1650283

Office of Enforcement annual reports can be found here: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/annual-rpts/ nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Moderator

comment #1650364 posted on 2016-03-30 10:19:19 by drbillcorcoran

Saving Taxpayer Dollars: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:At a government nuclear facility, management became concerned about potential taxpayer outrage over paying workers who were not working. Management renegotiated the labor contract to provide that if work stopped workers would be sent home without pay. Result: No more workers expressed safety concerns that would result in work stoppages. Chilling effect.

comment #1650385 posted on 2016-03-30 12:52:06 by Moderator in response to comment #1650182

The staff believes about 100 billable hours of staff time went into assessing and issuing the CEL. Those hours, plus any ongoing and future inspection hours related to the CEL, will be included in the appropriate quarterly fees for the Watts Bar site. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Alan Blamey nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Reactor Projects Branch Chief/Region II

comment #1650389 posted on 2016-03-30 12:59:02 by drbillcorcoran

Not Clogging the Corrective Action Program (CAP): nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:At a large meeting the CAP Manager mentioned that resources were being wasted processing adverse condition reports (ACRs) on items that were already in the system. Since the workers could not easily tell what was or was not in the system they stopped writing ACRs when they were in doubt. Chilling Effect.

comment #1650388 posted on 2016-03-30 12:58:28 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1650385

Thanks ever so much. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It's money well spent for the licensee.

comment #1649881 posted on 2016-03-24 16:20:25 by steamshovel2002

It doesn’t go past me Columbia and Watts Bar chilled environment occurred in 2015. Is it just a coincidence both these happened in 2015? No doubt Columbia nuclear plant should get a chilled environment NRC inspection. So the Columbia whistleblowers went to the news media, while the Watts Bar whistleblower senior reactor operators went to the NRC (Allegation)? I wonder, according to the whistleblowers, does the NRC chilled environment inspection or news media get more corrective action within the plant? I’ll tell you what, it grinds through the gears a lot faster with the unproved public disclosure of problems and the resultant corporate lawyer internal investigation? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I remember when I was a whistleblower at Vermont Yankee in 1992. Vermont Yankee was getting straight “A plus” grades from the NRC. The troops at my plant seen a drastic decline in safety and performance at the plant. So I wrote a letter to the governor and then accused her of sitting on my safety concerns. I remember as my issues were getting explained in the papers, the NRC stated that VY got very good grades at the plant for many years. It was one of the best operating plants in the USA. Then months later, as I was under a deepening cloud, the senior resident inspector approached me while I was in the plant. He wanted to thank me for my efforts. He said the agency couldn’t see the beginning of

the decline in the performance of the plant, as you disclosed your problem. He said now, the NRC could clearly see the decline. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:My blog: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2016/03/march-23-2016-mr.html nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"Junk Nuclear Plant Safety Culture: Why did Columbia and Watts Bar Emerge in 2015" nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It is noted the first stage Columba whistleblower internal corporate lawyer investigation stated "There has been a decline in performance at Energy Northwest's nuclear power plant near Richland, the Columbia Generating Station…".The NRC's 2015 assessment of Columbia notes no such decline in performance. Why is there so much daylight between the Columbia's internal whistleblower investigation and the NRC current annual assessment? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Personally I think the term "chilled environment" (impaired safety culture) is misnamed through campaign contributions. Davis Besse hole in the head is a chilled environment that got away from everyone. Safety culture should be another safety limit: "A restriction or range placed upon important process variables that are necessary to reasonably protect the integrity of the physical barriers that guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity." So any detectable so called chilled environment is a violation of a safety limit and requires an immediate plant shutdown. Especially seen and perceived by many people? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:You know, another one of these societal deterrence tools. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Mike Mulligan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Hinsdale, NH

comment #1650174 posted on 2016-03-28 08:36:09 by 1948billhawkins

Laud your and NRC efforts what about Region IV and San Onofre worst record and zero action from IV

comment #1650177 posted on 2016-03-28 09:52:30 by drbillcorcoran

The way to succeed in any organization is to get your job done in the situation you are in, not to fix the organization and then get your job done. Thus, the upwardly mobile tend to put systemic corrective action on the back burner. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The upwardly mobile take incompetence, lack of integrity, noncompliance, and lack of transparency as features of the landscape. Leadership by example is a chilling effect when the leaders do not report the nonconformities they know about.

comment #1650025 posted on 2016-03-26 06:27:30 by Art

Not sure what the details are. I am sure our plant leaders are going to include this in training and seminars! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It would be interesting to see the true weight this carries through the next days to come in the routines of the NRC and the nations nuclear power industry.

comment #1650032 posted on 2016-03-26 08:33:17 by drbillcorcoran

When the NRC surfaces chilling effects it is prima facie evidence that the following were fatally flawed in this regard: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Licensee self-assessment nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Licensee problem identification and resolution nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Licensee QA nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Licensee On-site Safety Review Committee nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Licensee Off-site Safety Review Committee nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:INPO nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Benchmarking nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Previous NRC inspections nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Follow up on previous chilling effect instances nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Which of the above don't need fixing? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The Cockroach Principle applies: If you see one cockroach in the middle of the kitchen you can be sure that there are thirty under the fridge. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The Kitty Litter Principle applies: If you dig under the surface you'll find the lumps.

comment #1652273 posted on 2016-04-20 08:31:48 by drbillcorcoran

A nuclear power plant sleaze incident anywhere is a nuclear plant sleaze incident everywhere. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://www.thelocal.de/20160415/safety-checks-faked-at-two-nuclear-plants nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What were the chilling effects that motivated the falsification? What were the chilling effects that kept the falsification from being surfaced earlier? It is hard to imagine that no one knew about it? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Is it time for IAEA, NRC, INPO, and NEI to commit openly to integrity being an essential trait of the good safety culture? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Integrity: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Integrity is achieved when individuals, groups, and organizations do not falsify, fabricate, mislead, misrepresent, turn a blind eye, plagiarize, obfuscate, or otherwise deceive and do not tolerate those who do. Integrity is achieved by owning up to shortfalls. The integrity of individuals reflects the integrity of their leaders.

comment #1652172 posted on 2016-04-19 10:24:47 by drbillcorcoran

San Onofre Killed by Cleverness and Silence nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC gave Southern California Edison (SCE) enough rope under 10CFR 50.59 and stood by innocently while SCE and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) hung themselves. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Who at NRC, INPO, SCE, and MHI knew that 50.59 was being abused, misused, violated, and/or misinterpreted and did nothing? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Jefferson said that the only thing needed for evil men to succeed is for good men to do nothing. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Perhaps it is equally valid to observe that the only thing needed for incompetent people to prevail is for competent people to do nothing. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Nassim Nicholas Taleb said, "If you see fraud and do not say "fraud" you are a fraud." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Jon Stewart said, "If you smell something, say something." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In the fire service they advocate, "If you see anything dumb, dangerous, or different, report it." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This multi-billion dollar fiasco could have been prevented by competence, integrity, compliance, or transparency by SCE, MHI, INPO, or NRC acting independently alone. This is frightening by itself. It bodes ill for the future of nuclear power technology, the safety of which is in the hands of organizations like the ones involved in the self-inflicted mortal wounds at San Onofre Units 2 and 3. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What were the chilling effects that kept trained, knowledgeable, observant, thoughtful people from speaking up?

comment #1649924 posted on 2016-03-25 10:22:17 by Moderator in response to comment #1649877

In May of 1996 the NRC issued the Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry To Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation; Policy Statement. This is what is commonly known as the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) policy statement. The NRC's SCWE Policy Statement applies to licensees, holders of certificates of compliance, applicants for a license, and contractors/subcontractors of any licensee, applicant or certificate holder, including those with a QA Program required by NRC regulations such as vendors. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The applicability of the policy statement is not limited to license holders. Simply put, the policy statement is applicable to any facility or entity subject to NRC authority. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If anyone has SCWE concerns at a site, and is not sure if the applicability of the policy, we encourage you to contact us via phone at (800) 368-5642, email us at NRC.Allegation@nrc.gov. For more information visit the NRC's website http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/safety-concern.html. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC Office of Enforcement

comment #1649963 posted on 2016-03-25 17:39:14 by CaptD

The NRC is trying to put a happy face on a very serious problem, since all nuclear workers know that if they become a whistle blower their career is finished in most cases. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-

post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC has even shared what employees have thought were privileged documents with the NRC only to later find out that their supervisors also knew about them and their author! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC would be well advised to fine Employers $1 million for each offense, that way employers would be far more careful and we would have a much safer nuclear industry!

comment #1649928 posted on 2016-03-25 10:41:10 by Garry Morgan in response to comment #1649876

. There may be relevant material relating to the TVA or the NRC in regards to Watts Bar employees reporting of safety issues. INPO and WANO reports are restricted as proprietary information, in this case an excuse to hide safety related information such as occurred in the TVA Browns Ferry case about failure to repair faulty valves, July 2010 INPO Report on TVA's Brown's Ferry. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:INPO may have identified short comings in the safety arena at Watts Bar, however we will never know because the reports are hidden from public view or review. SHAME on all involved for not publishing all safety related information in INPO or WANO reports.

comment #1649941 posted on 2016-03-25 14:36:48 by drbillcorcoran

• Involvement of Chilling Effects nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that when insiders did not report and/or act upon wrongfully harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions the insiders knowing about them were deterred by chilling effects. These chilling effects are part of the indirect causation. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Chilling effects are contrary to “measures to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected .” nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Chilling effects undermine programs for problem identification and resolution. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:“The nail that sticks up is hammered down.”-Japanese wisdom nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: No one ever made Admiral by ratting on the Navy. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: A snitch in time saves nine. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:“What happens on shift stays on shift.”-Typical workplace Omertà nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:• Involvement of Authority nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions were what they were because those in authority wanted them that way, tolerated their being that way, or didn’t know that they were that way. This applies from the work location to the top governance. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Situational awareness is a prerequisite for accountability. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:“What is permitted is promoted.”- Unknown (for now) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: This has yet to be addressed for Fukushima.

comment #1650101 posted on 2016-03-27 06:46:45 by drbillcorcoran

Who has links to the root cause analyses of this chilling effect instance and/or other instances of chilling effects? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the harmful conditions, behaviors, actions,and/or inactions that result in chilling effects? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the other harmful condones, behaviors, actions, and/or inactions that were left unreported due to chilling effects?

comment #1650741 posted on 2016-04-03 16:29:39 by drbillcorcoran

Does anyone know the evidentiary basis for the following quotation from the basic NRV blog above? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"The NRC is confident that most workers at the Watts Bar plant and throughout the nuclear industry feel safe in raising safety concerns within their own organizations or directly to the NRC. That ability is an important supplement to the NRC inspection program in

ensuring the safety of the facilities the agency regulates." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What would President Reagan have said? "Trust but verify!" nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:• Mistaken Trust/ Confidence nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that the competent investigation of every harmful event reveals that the causation of the harm includes the mistaken/ naïve/ unwarranted/ gullible/ imprudent trust and confidence in one or more erroneous/ untrustworthy theories, assumptions, standards, devices , procedures, processes, programs, people, institutions , agencies, contractors , and/or conditions. The functional alternatives include monitoring, curiosity, skepticism, and the “questioning attitude.” nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:“You get what you inspect; not what you expect.”-An old U.S. Navy proverb; nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: “Trust but verify.”-Quoted by President Ronald Reagan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:“A sucker is born every day.”-Attributed to P. T. Barnum nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: The causation of the 2008 Financial Crisis involved, in part, the mistaken trust in the ratings of bond rating agencies even though they were known to have obvious conflicts of interest.

comment #1650730 posted on 2016-04-03 13:37:19 by drbillcorcoran

Chilling effects can be of great variety, including blatant illegalities, intended insinuations, and honest miscommunications. The sole common attribute of all chilling effects is that each results in a person not reporting a harmful condition, behavior, action, or inaction.

TMI – March 28, 1979

posted on Mon, 28 Mar 2016 18:03:50 +0000

The Three Mile Island Unit 2 reactor, near Middletown, Pa., partially melted down on March 28, 1979. It was the most serious accident in U.S. commercial nuclear power plant operating history. Its aftermath brought about sweeping changes involving emergency response planning, reactor operator training, human factors engineering, radiation protection, and many other areas of nuclear power plant operations. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:All of these changes significantly enhanced U.S. reactor safety. The full story is available here.

Comments

comment #1650278 posted on 2016-03-29 11:29:41 by CaptD

Yes, TMI was a wakeup call for both the nuclear Industry and the NRC that regulates them. But as we have seen, five years after Fukushima, the nuclear industry has effectively put the NRC back to sleep, thanks to ever more donations to Congress and the President. Now not only has

Congress's oversight of the NRC reduce their effectiveness, but even more R&D money is being spent on new reactors. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Since Fukushima proved that Nature can destroy any land based nuclear reactor and or its Spent Fuel Pool, any place anytime 24/7 we are now really just waiting for the next BAD thing to occur. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Also as the nuclear near miss at San Onofre, CA pointed out, even the NRC is now doing its best to downplay any engineering debacles that occur because they not only make the Operator/Nuclear Industry look bad but also the NRC who is supposed to be regulating them! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:#SanOnofreGate The ongoing investigation into the multi-billion $ SCE-CPUC ripoff.

comment #1650196 posted on 2016-03-28 15:09:20 by Public Pit Bull

No disputing the fact that many improvements were made to improve safety at all nuclear power plants. Important changes were made to both prevent a similar accident in the future and to better mitigate an accident should it occur. That's why it is so shocking and sad to see the NRC in bed with the nuclear industry in response to the devastating nuclear accident just a few years ago in Japan. Get this, the industry talked the NRC out of any actions to "prevent" a similar Fukushima accident here. Only actions to better mitigate a similar accident in the US, when it occurs, were considered. Also, even though are over 30 nuclear plants in the US that are identical to those damaged in Japan, filtered hardened vents now installed on those Japanese plants, were not required to be installed on identical US nuke plants. Today's NRC is completely in the pocket of those they are supposed to regulate. It is not public safety first with the NRC, it is preserving the viability of the nuclear industry, at any cost, that is now job one!

comment #1650284 posted on 2016-03-29 12:22:37 by Erica Gray

No Confidence! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident – 37 Years Later nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Historical Audio - First-Person Accounts nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Official Errors – Mutations and Deaths – Lack of Accountability nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://nuclearhotseat.com/2016/03/29/nuclear-hotseat-249-three-mile-island-37th-anniversary-special-eric-epstein-of-tmi-alert/

comment #1650291 posted on 2016-03-29 14:11:51 by Libbe

In case you've forgotten the reality of what happened at TMI, here's a one-hour audio program to mark the 37th anniversary of the nuclear accident, including archival audio, interviews, and an analysis of ongoing health problems that correlate to the radiation release plumes: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Nuclear Hotseat #249 - Three Mile Island nuclear accident Anniversary SPECIAL – the inside story on 1st US commercial nuke reactor meltdown 37 years ago and its ongoing aftermath. Featuring: Eric Epstein of TMI Alert, Arnie Gundersen of Fairewinds, former NCR commissioner Peter Bradford, Middletown resident Mary Stamos, clips of media coverage from Walter Cronkite and the not-yet-coopted mainstream media. bit.ly/1pGEe5b

comment #1650228 posted on 2016-03-28 23:19:45 by Patricia Borchmann

Me, and millions of other public stakeholders in U.S. have already been burned many times over by all the incremental reductions in safety margins which NRC has allowed during the 4 decades since 1979. So whatever the 'lessons learned' from Fukishima were, most average citizens in America didn't ever see the extreme investment and plant upgrades that NRC and utility CEO's brag about .... (like the new filtered hardened vents) because our regulatory agency backed down to industry complaints about costs and hardships caused by regulatory overreach. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Translates to NRC actions based on decision making metrics applied at NRC, to protect utility/industry profit margins more than public safety margins. Public stakeholders are not stupid, and do not 'buy the industry party line' any more.

comment #1650257 posted on 2016-03-29 05:17:03 by Joe

Are you kidding me we still have that mess at nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:San Onofre

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Keeping Reactor Electric Systems in Phase

posted on Wed, 30 Mar 2016 12:26:00 +0000

Jake Zimmerman nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Electrical Engineering Branch Chief nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Nuclear power plants generate electricity, but their systems need power from the grid to operate. That electricity is delivered through three lines, or “phases.” If one phase is lost, or “open,” that can challenge a plant’s ability to safely shut down. The NRC and U.S. nuclear power plants are working to ensure “open phase conditions” are resolved safely. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-

30.status-publish.001.xml:Losing one or two phases coming from the grid to a transformer can unbalance the voltage on the side of the transformer connected to plant safety equipment. Voltage problems can automatically trigger the plant to disconnect from the affected power line, but sometimes they don't. In that case, the plant's safety systems might not get switched to backup power sources and may lack enough power to function properly. An "open phase" can happen at all but one U.S. commercial reactor (Seabrook). nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The issue got our attention in 2012, when the Byron plant in Illinois shut down safely after an "open phase" event. The plant didn't automatically switch from the affected power line, but control room operators diagnosed the problem in eight minutes and manually swapped power sources. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC examined the issue and determined a handful of plants had dealt with open phase situations that never challenged plant safety. The agency's response included sending all U.S. nuclear power plants a Bulletin to confirm they could meet electric power system requirements. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Every affected U.S. nuclear power plant has temporary measures in place to reduce the risk associated with an open phase condition. These measures include ensuring control room operators are aware of the issue and are trained to respond, and modifying power source switching procedures to ensure plants have emergency power if needed. The NRC staff reviewed and agreed with the temporary measures, and regional inspectors plan to inspect the measures. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The nuclear industry's proposed permanent fix would provide alarms to alert operators to the issue and start an automatic swap of power sources. The NRC staff has laid out four goals that plants should meet when they install the proposed fix. We've also developed objective guidelines for our reviewers to consider when examining the plants' implementation, which the NRC expects will be done by January 2019. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC recently received an enforcement petition on the open phase condition. The petitioners asked the NRC to require either immediate corrective actions or shutdown of operating nuclear power plants. While the agency concluded the plants' temporary measures eliminate the need for additional immediate action, the petition was accepted for further review.

Comments

comment #1651029 posted on 2016-04-06 10:14:15 by Half-TruthSlayer in response to comment #1651007

> You cannot fix stupid or nuclear power plants. It is just like trying to sugar-coat...! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Moderator Note: Some verbiage removed to adhere to blog comment guidelines.

comment #1650365 posted on 2016-03-30 10:19:21 by Garry Morgan

> This is a long standing issue identified by your staff, which some of them had to go public in order to bring attention to the 'open phase' issue. It appears, NRC officials at the executive level have decided to support the nuclear industry instead of public safety. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Contradictions? - Quote - "The NRC examined the issue and determined a handful of plants had dealt with open phase situations that never challenged plant safety." But, before that you say, referring to 'open phase condition' issues, "...the plant's safety systems might not get switched to backup power sources and may lack enough power to function properly." Seven engineers within the NRC decided to take action

because the open phase condition was not being given the necessary emphasis for 4 years, thus compromising public safety. That is a serious issue of which executive decision making at the NRC seems to have become compromised. Now the issue is attempting to be downplayed as evidenced by the lack of complete information within this article. It is appreciated that the NRC is allowing public input on this issue. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The problem - "This paper discussed that how and why standard or traditional protection elements cannot always detect an open phase in transformers..." http://www.cce.umn.edu/documents/cpe-conferences/mipsycon-papers/2013/openphaseconditionsintransformersanalysisandprotectionalgorithm.pdf nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Questions and a resolution via devices and equipment? - Description of damage that may occur to electrical components in an open phase condition. http://www.elongo.com/pdfs/voltages.PDF Questions - Have "special sensing devices" been installed on all components where an 'open phase' condition would compromise the safe operation of a nuclear facility? Have "automatic voltage regulators" been installed on all critical components? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC's failure to correct a long standing 'open phase' problem and executive staff covering up the problem is indicative of an upper echelon Human Reliability failure of our nuclear regulator. Bravo to the 7 who came forward and shame on those officials who have ignored this long standing problem.

comment #1650366 posted on 2016-03-30 10:24:03 by Public Pit Bull

Yet another of a seemingly endless number of threats to nuclear plant & public safety. This industry is well over a half century old & still new threats to safety are revealed all the time! The only "phase" the NRC should be looking at is "phasing" themselves out of business!

comment #1650367 posted on 2016-03-30 10:27:33 by mjd

Mr. Jake Zimmerman, nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Your reference cited here (ML14120A203) has this statement: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"The staff determined that a design-basis event concurrent with an OPC would likely have resulted in the plant exceeding criteria specified in 10 CFR50.46, “Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-water nuclear power reactors.”" nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I have a straight forward question. How exactly did you "determine" this event would "likely" exceed the requirements of 10CRF50.46? Did you actually run the Safety Analysis transient using the actual known conditions at Byron2 at the time of the event, or are you guessing based on the science fiction world of Safety Analysis transients? I don't even like the use of the word "likely." This is not something that needs a guess, run it with ACTUAL known conditions at Byron2 at the time of the event. Then make a simple English statement (clear communications) about "the actual analysis shows, using known plant conditions at the time of the event...Does it or doesn't it show exceeding the requirements of 10CFR50.46"? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I understand Safety Analysis transients, and why they are run. They can use input assumptions that can be actual mutually exclusive conditions, forcing conservative inputs all in the worst direction all at the same time. But those results may have nothing to do with the results of an analysis of the actual plant event using actual plant conditions at the time of the event. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:My issue is not about whether the OPC condition should be fixed or not; it should as it might put an operating team in a challenging position. My issue is about a "perception" created by the above quote. The LER Supplement for the above Byron2 event states the OPC condition combined with a DBA (LOCA) would have cleared the ESF buses on UV and started the EDGs, but with only about a 1 minute time delay (over the delay assumed in Safety Analysis). nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:So is this an actual real problem, with respect to the Acceptance Criteria of 10CFR50.46, or an imaginary problem? It is quite a statement to claim this is a real 10CRF50.46 problem, without understanding how this conclusion was reached.

comment #1650390 posted on 2016-03-30 13:16:25 by William Maurer

The NRC, FEMA, MEMA and the owners of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, MA have known about Pilgrim's switch yard vulnerability to ground fault during severe winter weather conditions (Nor'easters, blizzards, ice storms, etc) yet allowed the plant to roll the dice in the face of NOAA Blizzard warnings gambling with public safety knowing that evacuation would be impossible (sometimes for days) during these kind of winter storms. Since the Blizzard of "78" Pilgrim's switch yard has "flashed over" and ground faulted eight times and gone uncorrected. It was only public pressure after Nor'easter/Blizzard Juno January 27, 2015 switch yard failure accompanied by multiple additional safety equipment failures during the Scram that the owner/operator, the NRC and MEMA initiated preemptive precautionary shutdowns (all be it discretionary) in advance of NOAA winter weather warnings for the Plymouth, MA area. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:To me this speaks to NRC safety culture features that include negligence, willful misconduct, and reckless gambling with public safety. These suspicions are only strengthened by how this phase loss design oversight and weakness was only acknowledged by the NRC due to a 2.206 petition filed by seven NRC employees as citizens because their concerns expressed in the professional workplace were being systemically ignored by the NRC.

comment #1650514 posted on 2016-04-01 00:30:13 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1650457

I too once thought that nuclear power was safe.

You were right the first time.

comment #1650917 posted on 2016-04-05 11:45:22 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1650587

http://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/policy-digests/nrc-staff-raises-alarm-widespread-nuclear-plant-design-flaw

comment #1650605 posted on 2016-04-01 19:33:29 by Half-TruthSlayer in response to comment #1650457

> Sorry, I was wrong EP. Even us trolls can make a mistake. Besides a wise man can change his mind, a fool never!

comment #1651331 posted on 2016-04-09 14:29:38 by drbillcorcoran

> An inescapable fact is that when a design flaw is revealed by an actual event there are corresponding flaws in the design processes, the design review processes, and, usually, other processes that were expected to have prevented and/or revealed the flaw. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: The Open Phase Fault episode reveals fundamental weaknesses in the nuclear power design and licensing processes. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Fixing a design flaw is just one step in fixing what is unacceptable.

comment #1651198 posted on 2016-04-07 21:28:08 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1650949

I would greatly appreciate an answer from the moderator or any member: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:[Moderator note: Some verbiage here was removed to adhere to our comment policy.] nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *What were the harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and/or inactions that resulted in there being a serious flaw in every design basis, every safety analysis report, every regulatory review, and every probabilistic safety analysis that were left to be revealed by actual events?*

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Speaking as an electrical engineer, I will bet that the possibility of a broken wire that does not reach the ground and cause a ground fault was considered to be very rare. The fact that the equipment continued to run during this open-phase condition, albeit at degraded performance, suggests that the designers were almost correct in dismissing it. Speaking as a double-E, I would not be surprised if the proper configuration of phase-shifting capacitors could step in for the open phase (which would have to be properly breaker-isolated first) and allow equipment to run at full capacity on the remaining two phases. This is how 3φ power is generated from 1φ sources for e.g. small machine shops. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:One fact you're doing your best to bury through obfuscation is that the entire industry has been aware of this problem for years now and is designing the fixes. Operators are also very much aware of it and how to respond to it if they detect it. Last, the worst possible outcome of an undetected problem was on the order of a fraction of a TMI, which had exactly zero fatalities and zero injuries. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Another fact that you're trying to bury is that any shutdown of nuclear plants immediately increases the demand for natural gas, which is about as damaging as coal through GHG emissions and has substantial damaging health effects through leakage of toxics. The Aliso Canyon fiasco has caused more harm to human health than the entire commercial power industry of the USA. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

comment #1651196 posted on 2016-04-07 21:01:19 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1651059

> Let's apply the same vague, FUD-derived criteria to "renewables" (specifically, wind and solar) as a "fix" for GHG emissions and criteria pollutants. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:ONE: Fix the problem (of inability to provide reliable power without nearly 100% fossil-fired backup). nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This is the termination condition. Nobody has done so, nobody has a serious proposal to demonstrate the capability, and the energy cost of the batteries and such required to do it *even in theory* suggest that it is impossible. Ergo, "renewables" almost certainly cannot solve the problem and no "plan" based on them should be taken the least bit seriously. Further, given the utmost seriousness of the problem, no proven solution should be taken off the table. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:But taking that solution off the table is the FIRST thing on your agenda.

comment #1651195 posted on 2016-04-07 20:53:17 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1651158

> ...there was one US BWR that already had such conditions taken care of in its design and operational specs. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Moderator Note: Some verbiage was removed to adhere to the comment policy.

comment #1651161 posted on 2016-04-07 10:20:05 by Half-TruthSlayer in response to comment #1651104

> No doubt what you say is true. Radiation is a silent killer much worse than CO. Those that are not educated do fear it. But I was raised on it, Rickover's nuclear power program + over 30 years in a commercial nuke plant, & I fear it as well. There is just no such thing as a safe nuke.

comment #1651158 posted on 2016-04-07 09:49:09 by drbillcorcoran

> The Open Phase Condition as revealed by actual events points to fundamental flaws in the NRC license application review process affecting the integrity of all light water reactor licenses. What is being done to investigate this?

comment #1651245 posted on 2016-04-08 10:31:29 by NRC in response to comment #1651196

> Please keep in mind our guidelines specify that comments must be related to the post on which they are submitted. This comment is straying away from the topic. You can use the open forum for further discussion of this matter. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC Moderator

comment #1651234 posted on 2016-04-08 09:10:29 by eknuckle in response to comment #1650365

> Gary - Thank you for the substantive technical background information so that the rest of us can better understand the issue rather than relying on opinion.

comment #1651467 posted on 2016-04-11 11:19:52 by drbillcorcoran

> What is the increase in Core Damage Frequency (CDF) for a plant vulnerable to Open Phase Fault as compared to a similar plant that is not vulnerable?

comment #1650942 posted on 2016-04-05 16:12:35 by drbillcorcoran

> One of the most important lessons to be learned is that there was a serious flaw in every design basis, every safety analysis report, every regulatory review, and every probabilistic safety analysis and it was revealed by actual events. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the other flaws? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Can we find them before the events?

comment #1650949 posted on 2016-04-05 16:45:29 by drbillcorcoran

> I would greatly appreciate an answer from the moderator or any member: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What were the harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and/or inactions that resulted in there being a serious flaw in every design basis, every safety analysis report, every regulatory review, and every probabilistic safety analysis that were left to be revealed by actual events?

comment #1651649 posted on 2016-04-13 14:15:35 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1651195

> *Which one?*

The one hiddencamper works at: "For my plant, this was easy, because we are one of the few who actually have the ability to detect when this condition occurs." This was all in references given to you previously. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *How come?*

Go ask him, he's the subject-matter expert. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *Did this one know it was the first?*

Go ask him. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> *How come no others got it right?*

That's been quite adequately detailed in text that I've seen referenced here but you aren't reading closely enough: it was an underestimation of the event likelihood and magnitude of consequences. Now that operators are watching for this problem in particular the likelihood of any adverse consequences are about nil. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Compared to the certainty and magnitude of consequences from the fossil backups required for "alternative energy", we should be welcoming a Three Mile Island every decade as a very tolerable price to avoid them.

comment #1651059 posted on 2016-04-06 15:00:41 by drbillcorcoran

> If there were a good safety culture what would be fixed? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:ONE: Fix the problem. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:TWO: Fix the extents of the problem. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:THREE: Fix the systems involved in creating the problem. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:FOUR: Fix the systems that should have identified the problem earlier. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-

13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:FIVE: Fix the harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions that resulted in the nature, the magnitude, the location, and the timing of the problem. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:SIX: Fix the harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions that resulted in the nature, the magnitude, and the timing of the system problems. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:SEVEN: Fix the extents of those harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:EIGHT: Fix the other harmful effects of the systems problems. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What has been fixed?

comment #1651104 posted on 2016-04-06 23:04:38 by Christian Morales in response to comment #1650587

Because most of the people are not educated for the structure of Nuclear Power Plant. How process works? How safe it is? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The worst most of them are always rely on media not by research.

comment #1650587 posted on 2016-04-01 14:01:55 by Engineer-Poet

The hysterical claims here show that this forum is primarily used by anti-nuclear propagandists to spread their FUD to a naïve public. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Look at it. The last time this came up on the NRC blog, I posted links to an insider's view of the issue which shows that the industry has already put measures in place well ahead of the rule-making process (part 1, part 2), and there is no danger to plants any more, let alone the public. (The industry wants to keep unnecessary expenses down, and equipment that breaks due to undetected open-phase conditions is certainly one of those.) Most of what's going on now is getting experience with the new systems so they can be calibrated correctly and the NRC's rulemaking finalized so everyone can certify compliance. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:ALL of the FUD was refuted the last time around, but what do you see if you come here today? "NRC's failure to correct a long standing 'open phase' problem"! "Seven engineers within the NRC decided to take action because the open phase condition was not being given the necessary emphasis for 4 years, thus compromising public safety."! "To me this speaks to NRC safety culture features that include negligence, willful misconduct, and reckless gambling with public safety."! Everything that refuted the propaganda narrative fell on deaf ears; the propagandists are completely shameless. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I submit that IT IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST for the NRC to operate a forum which is primarily used to spread disinformation about its particular area of expertise, disinformation which in most cases is completely contradicted by authoritative sources on this very NRC site. Moderators should either not approve such propaganda, or attach notes to it stating that it is in error (preferably with links to authoritative sources).

comment #1650457 posted on 2016-03-31 08:59:25 by Public Pit Bull in response to comment #1650397

Dear Anonymous, nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I too once thought that nuclear power was safe. But I have believed for some time now that the term "safe nuke" is an oxymoron like "limited nuclear war" or "congressional wisdom". Bitter experience & lax regulation has completely changed my mind. Thankfully nukes are becoming a thing of the past because they are just too expensive to build, operate, or maintain. They can no longer compete in the energy marketplace. In fact the NRC needs to be renamed the Nuclear Retirement Commission.

comment #1650397 posted on 2016-03-30 15:39:36 by

Safe nuclear power can bring prosperity peace modernization education to the world these tools can be used to combat terrorism poverty and help promote environment and good health

comment #1650395 posted on 2016-03-30 14:34:20 by Public Pit Bull in response to comment #1650390

Excellent comments all. Shameful performance by an agency that is no longer our watchdog but a lapdog for the nuclear industry.

comment #1651007 posted on 2016-04-06 05:35:19 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1650949

"Fix it and move on" is not good nuclear safety culture. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It is more pruning the poison ivy.

comment #1651324 posted on 2016-04-09 13:06:27 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1651195

Engineer-Poet, nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Which one? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How come? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Did this one know it was the first? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How come no others got it right?

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Perhaps there's a great story behind this.

comment #1651326 posted on 2016-04-09 13:11:55 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1650587

It is not in the public interest to have design flaws manifested by real events. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In a good safety culture design flaws are revealed by design reviews or by testing. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Positive control is when what happens is what is supposed to happen and that's all that happens.

comment #1651316 posted on 2016-04-09 10:19:33 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1651198

I am not for shutting the plants down. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I am for the following: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:ONE: Fix the problem. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:TWO: Fix the extents of the problem. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:THREE: Fix the systems involved in creating the problem. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:FOUR: Fix the systems that should have identified the problem earlier. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:FIVE: Fix the harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions that resulted in the nature, the magnitude, the location, and the timing of the problem. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:SIX: Fix the harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions that resulted in the nature, the magnitude, the location, and the timing of the system problems. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:SEVEN: Fix the extents of those harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:EIGHT: Fix the other harmful effects of the systems problems.

Dry Cask 101: Making Sure They'll Hold Up

posted on Thu, 07 Apr 2016 18:48:14 +0000

Steven Everard nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: *Structural Engineer* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Evaluating the structure of a spent fuel storage cask is a key part of our licensing process. In its application, the cask designer must provide an evaluation that shows the system will be strong and stable enough to resist loads that may be placed on it. NRC structural and materials engineers scrutinize this evaluation to make sure the design meets our regulatory requirements. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In an application, casks designers must provide evidence the cask system will: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

- Maintain confinement of the spent nuclear fuel nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:
- Maintain the fuel in a subcritical condition nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:
- Provide radiation shielding nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:
- Maintain the ability to retrieve or recover the fuel if necessary nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In our structural review, we make sure the system can perform those functions even after experiencing a load, such as if the cask were dropped. We look at the structural design and analysis of the system under all credible loads for normal conditions—that is, planned operations and environmental conditions that can be expected to occur often during storage. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We also look at off-normal conditions, accidents and natural phenomenon events. "Off-normal" describes the maximum conditions that can be expected to from time-to-time, but not regularly. An example is the highest pushing or pulling force on a horizontal canister when it is being placed inside the storage overpack. Accident conditions and natural phenomenon include a dropped cask, earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding and any other credible accident or environmental condition that could affect the structural integrity of the system. These requirements are outlined in 10 CFR Part 72. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The structural review looks at whether the cask designer evaluated the proper loading conditions. It will also ensure the designer evaluated the system's response to those loads accurately and completely. The reviewers must verify whether the resulting stresses in the material meet the acceptance criteria in the appropriate code. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:As we explained in an earlier post, codes and standards are guidelines typically developed over many years of experience and through industry-wide and government agreement. Some of the more common codes an applicant may use come from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Concrete Institute, the American Institute of Steel Construction and the American Welding Society. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Not all loads are likely to occur at one time, but some might occur together. So we look at several different combinations of loads that can be expected at the same time. These include dead loads (which come just from the weight of the material), live loads, (which come from the movement of the system or people and things near it), and environmental loads (including snow, ice, wind, temperature and seismic). For example, the cask could experience a dead load, live load, snow load and wind load together. But it is not reasonable to expect the cask to be in a snow storm, a tornado and an earthquake at the same time. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:These cases are analyzed to determine the stresses placed on the material used to construct the cask system. This analysis may be completed by either hand calculations or by a computer model. Typically, we only look at the maximum stresses in the different materials—since lesser stresses would not be as challenging to the system. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The maximum stresses from the analysis are compared to the allowable stresses from the appropriate code to determine a margin of safety. These design margins are typically large. This is because designs must be robust enough to withstand the accident scenarios. To be conservative, we and the designers overestimate loads and underestimate material strength. Doing this adds conservatisms and enhances our assurance that the design is adequate.

Comments

comment #1651708 posted on 2016-04-14 06:58:58 by Anonymous in response to comment #1651329

> The response given has been the Staff's long standing position; however, as of 2010, articles published at conferences and additional testing (confirmatory) done by the staff overseas has shown that the position established in ISG-11 and NUREG-1536 may not be conservative and may need to be revisited. The fundamental issue is not one of safety, but one of compliance since fuel placed in a dry cask in one state, may not be the same state the fuel is in, if the cask were reopened in the future for removal purposes. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This fundamental understanding of mechanisms may also impact operational burn-up limits besides the simple compliance issues of what occurs to the fuel if embrittled during the drying process.

comment #1651261 posted on 2016-04-08 15:03:20 by CaptD in response to comment #1651248

> DrG — You comment is off-base since the NRC Region IV AIT report, both the SCE and the MHI Root Cause reports had serious flaws since they listed the operating conditions of both Unit 2 and Unit 3 as being the same when intact they were quite different (which is why Unit 3 RSG's suffered IPFEI and Unit 2 RSG's did not). All 4 almost new RSGs were damaged because of their flawed unsafe design, yet the NRC never fined SCE, because to do so would have also implicated NRC Region IV for their 50.59 approval, when it is now obvious that they did not have a clue what they were approving. This is why the NRC IG's report was just yet another coverup that has made #SanOnofreGate the multi-billion $ SCE-CPUC ripoff that it is. The above decisions are now being challenge in the NRC system and hopefully soon the nuclear industry will get a chance to learn what the correct Root Cause was, not the CYA Root Cause that SCE submitted to hide its engineering debacle. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:You want more proof, read the Independent Consultants Report (done by Beckman Associates for the Chairman of the NRC (which was submitted to the NRC about a week before the Region IV AIT report was made public). It was highly critical for the above name reports and for that reason (IMO) it was not released to the general public until AFTER the decommissioning of San Onofre was announced by SCE. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It is important to note that SCE's operators never had any idea that all four of the new RSGs were destroying themselves, until the Unit 3 RSG started leaking! This placed all of southern California at risk because RSG tube failure(s) can result in leakage of radioactive core coolant into the environment or much worse, even a meltdown of the reactor core itself, if there is a cascade of tube failures. Animation of RSG tube failures. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-

02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The discovery of the extent of the RSG damage was made during the required inspections after the radioactive leakage. Comparatively, even though SCE operated the Unit 2 RSGs within their functional/testing limitations, they only lasted about twice as long as the Unit 3 RSG's due to their design! The NRC said that the damage to all 4 of the RSGs was "unprecedented," since the damage to the Unit 2 and Unit 3 RSG's had more damage that all the rest of the US nuclear fleet combined! http://sanonofresafety.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/steamgeneratortubesplugged1.pdf

comment #1651267 posted on 2016-04-08 16:43:04 by

From the NRC Moderator: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Please use the Open Forum post for any further discussion about San Onofre steam generators or anything else unrelated to the topic of this blog post.

comment #1651329 posted on 2016-04-09 13:47:02 by Anonymous

Has the Staff (NRC) reach a conclusion about the embrittlement of fuel cladding during the drying process of putting fuel into the dry cask?

comment #1651182 posted on 2016-04-07 17:00:43 by NRC in response to comment #1651179

Thank you. We have corrected the blog post. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC Moderator

comment #1651184 posted on 2016-04-07 17:39:04 by Gary Headrick

Was the NRC being conservative when they approved the computer modeling done on the steam generators that failed at San Onofre? What if you are wrong again when it comes to safe storage containers? Do you have a realistic plan to implement if canisters begin leaking before they can be relocated, or do you excuse yourself by claiming it is too unlikely to take into consideration? These are serious questions that need to be answered. We can't afford to make mistakes with so much at stake. Please don't assume everything will go as planned. We know from several examples, especially from this industry, that they don't.

comment #1651179 posted on 2016-04-07 16:14:12 by

It's actually the American Concrete Institute, not the American Concrete Association (about 5th paragraph down).

comment #1651248 posted on 2016-04-08 11:13:33 by drgenenelson in response to comment #1651184

Creative fearmongering to attempt to create an equivalence between a system designed to move massive amounts of energy between a primary and secondary loop of a PWR - and the dry cask storage system. Dry casks need to passively dissipate a small amount of heat energy while maintaining structural integrity. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Post-closure design reviews of the SONGS replacement steam generators indicate that the design changes implemented by the SONGS owners in conjunction with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries should have triggered the additional oversight of the License Amendment Review (LAR) process. For example, see;"NRC Oversight of Licensee's Use of 10 CFR 50.59 Process To Replace SONGS' Steam Generators (OIG Case NO. 13-006)" - the October 2, 2014 report from the NRC Office of the Inspector General.

comment #1651643 posted on 2016-04-13 13:44:32 by Moderator in response to comment #1651329

Interim Staff Guidance (ISG)-11 and NURGEG-1536 provide guidance on this subject. During loading operations for all spent fuel, the maximum fuel cladding temperature should not exceed 400 degrees Celsius and the number of thermal cycles (repeated heatup/and cooldown) should be limited to 10. A thermal cycle is defined as a temperature change of over 65 degrees Celsius. If these parameters are met, the NRC staff believes that this will provide reasonable assurance that embrittlement will not prevent the spent fuel from being safely stored in the configuration analyzed in the application. The NRC currently is sponsoring confirmatory research on this phenomenon at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Steve Everard

comment #1651655 posted on 2016-04-13 15:19:14 by Anonymous in response to comment #1651643

When will the confirmatory research be completed and will it be available to the public or will it be treated as propriatery and does it address all cladding materials (i.e., Zirc-2, Zirc-4, ZIRLO, M5, MDA, etc.)?

comment #1651209 posted on 2016-04-08 01:50:50 by drgenenelson

I hope that a future installment of "Dry Cask 101" will help readers to understand the robust construction of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) such as the one at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP.) I hope that you will describe the robustness of the completed Holtec International HI-STORM storage casks bolted with massive bolts to an 8 foot thick pad of concrete located directly underneath the 500 kV power transmission lines leading from the facility, among other attributes of the DCPP ISFSI

comment #1651818 posted on 2016-04-15 10:56:12 by Anonymous

If it is structural stability is the main objective that the agency is trying to demonstrate and reassuring, staff ought to come out candid in accepting or denying if Mineral VA earth quake did not do anything, except shifting the position of the cask. Just a thought.

NRC Oversight at Pilgrim Plant Entering a New Phase

posted on Mon, 04 Apr 2016 17:30:43 +0000

Neil Sheehan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: *Public Affairs Officer* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: *Region I* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:One phase down but more to go. We're referring here to the multiple steps involved in the NRC's heightened oversight of the Pilgrim nuclear power plant. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

In January, an NRC team completed Phase "A" of the multi-step inspection process required for plants that end up in Column 4 of the agency's Action Matrix. Pilgrim received that designation last September based on earlier performance issues. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This first inspection examined various aspects of the Plymouth, Mass., plant's corrective action program, which is in place to ensure that problems, once identified, are fixed on a timely basis according to their safety importance. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Our report on that review noted the identification on one inspection finding of very low safety significance involving a failure to adequately correct water leakage from the core spray system. Otherwise, the inspectors determined that there were no longstanding risk-significant issues in the program that were not addressed or assigned appropriate corrective actions and due dates. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Beginning today, the Phase "B" review will get under way at the facility. This inspection will focus additional attention on the corrective action program but with emphasis on its effectiveness more recently, specifically since the plant began undergoing increased scrutiny last summer. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:As was the case with the first phase, the results will be documented in a report due out within 45 days after the assessment has been formally concluded, or exited. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The most comprehensive phase of this process (known in NRC terms as a 95003 inspection) will take place later this year or in early 2017. It will zero in on areas that will include human performance, equipment reliability and the quality of plant procedures, as well as the site's safety culture, or the willingness of employees to freely and openly raise safety concerns. The corrective action program will also receive another look. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In the meantime, the NRC will be updating the public on Pilgrim's performance during 2015 at a meeting scheduled for Wednesday, April 13, in Plymouth. We'll also be taking questions, including those pertaining to our additional oversight of the plant. Further details will be available soon in a meeting notice to be posted on the agency's website. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:More information on NRC oversight activities at Pilgrim can be found on our webpage devoted to the subject.

Comments

comment #1651030 posted on 2016-04-06 10:36:20 by steamshovel2002

> So how is the notoriously defective 2 stage SRVs doing at Pilgrim? Any showing signs of leakage yet…one only wonders what the setpoint lift inaccuracy will be? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This is how Pilgrim should have went in 2013 with a SRV special investigation at Hatch today. Basically Hatch pulled a Pilgrim. They put new 3 stage SRVs and they didn't even get though their first operational cycle without grave SRV reliability problems. Hatch has been jumping between defective and unreliable 2 and 3 stage SRVs like jumping grasshoppers. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:According to the very nice senior resident who spent all the time I needed with him, the

NRC all but ruled out test stand damage. He is the guy going to collect all the component and industry information on the three stage SRV for the special inspection. I reminded him of a 2011 LER talking about, before one cycle was completed, after two shutdowns to repair leaking and defective 3 stage SRVs, they yanked the unreliable and unsafe 3 stage and replace it with the 2 stage. I get it with your guys, everything is always safe. I guess they operated for a few cycle with the old 2 stage, then reinstalled the unreliable and unsafe 3 stage, then some valves mysteriously failed the second (or third time). Pilgrim and Hatch have identical 2 and 3 stage SRVs. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I was listening to my River Bend's triple-header special inspection meeting the other day with Entergy talking about coming back to engineering rigor and organizational excellence…does the disgraceful testing and operational history of Hatch's SRVs remind you of anything "Excellence"??? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Just saying, the NRC discovered SRV mis-operation in early 2015 leading to the Pilgrim downgrade over unreliable and unsafe 3 stage SRVs …basically the same as Hatch's mis-operation today. Why the difference; Pilgrim yanked all their 3 stage SRVs during their 2015 special inspection (just like Hatch in 2011), why has Hatch Unit 1 been allowed to restart with their defective three stage SRVs after their valve failure? Why are Hatch 1 and 2 operating with defective 3 stage SRVs today? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I though the NRC was going to put up a blog page about the problems with SRVs, PORVs and MSSVs reliability and testing issues for me. Believe me, we are wondering if Indian Point will submit a LER on MSSV testing failures this outage. That is a insider joke? The lack of current information notices about these important valves is very troubling. Don't even get me laughing about the solution to this problem was to put in cheap stellite disc and platinum pilot disc coatings, but test failures only worsen with each new quick fix. . It just shows you of the lack of basic engineering understanding that is going on with these safety components. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Look at how they are chasing their tails; uncoated 2 stage, then stellite pilot disc, then platinum coated pilot disc, then to the 3 stage (massive reliability problems), back to the 2 stage (massive reliability and safety issues), back to the 3 stage, then special inspection on valve failures. In Pilgrim's case, stuck in the 2 stage until permanent shutdown. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: My blog: Junk Plant Hatch Unit 2 2015 SRV testing report nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2016/04/junk-plant-hatch-unit-2-2015-srv.html nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Throwback Wednesday: What model SRV valves (either2 or 3 stage) was first put into these plants when new? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Mike Mulligan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Hinsdale, NH

comment #1650832 posted on 2016-04-04 16:21:23 by Nikohl Vandel

Oh, this one probably should just be shut down. These old plants really need to be closed for our safety.

comment #1650916 posted on 2016-04-05 11:37:14 by drbillcorcoran

• Perceived Benefit from Dysfunctionality nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that the causation of the persistence of the dysfunctionality of the generally accepted, ordinary, normal, and usual business practices of the organizations is that there is sufficient perceived benefit from them to deter their identification and correction . nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"When ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be wise."-The Poet Thomas Gray nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Before the 2008 Financial Crisis it was an open secret that the bond rating agencies had severe conflicts of interest that were skewing their bond ratings.

comment #1650913 posted on 2016-04-05 11:19:37 by drbillcorcoran

• Involvement of Business Practices nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that the causation of harm, including harmful conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions, includes the dysfunctionality of the generally accepted, ordinary, normal, and usual business practices of the organizations involved, including oversight, auditing, and regulatory entities . nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: When standard operating procedure is normalization of deviance the occurrence of disaster is not a random event. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: When something works it is used in more and more challenging applications until it is involved in disaster. This can be called "The Universalized Peter Principle ." The current dysfunctionally widespread use of antibiotics is a painful example .

comment #1651246 posted on 2016-04-08 10:43:18 by steamshovel2002

J. Wellington Wimpy: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"I'll gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today".

comment #1651189 posted on 2016-04-07 19:53:08 by drbillcorcoran

Rod, nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The dysfunctional parts of the culture persist through multiple management changeouts, but the good safety culture needs constant reinforcement.

comment #1651174 posted on 2016-04-07 15:02:32 by rodadams2013 in response to comment #1651170

I note from the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix page that Pilgrim's movement to column 4 resulted from a single White finding in Q3 of 2013, another in Q4 of 2013 and a third in Q1 of 2015. How long do findings continue to count towards "repetitive?" An awful lot changes at a power plant operating ~ 7000 hours per year over the course of 3 years.

comment #1651181 posted on 2016-04-07 16:50:59 by NRC in response to comment #1651171

This discussion has strayed from the original blog post content. Further discussion will need to be posted to the Open Forum section.

comment #1651173 posted on 2016-04-07 14:50:38 by rodadams2013 in response to comment #1651170

Neil: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Thank you, but that does not actually answer my question. This might be an understanding between the regulator and the ever compliant industry, but how does it affect other people with a stake in the matter? Does the system improve safety? Does it help our necessary efforts to battle climate change? Does it improve performance to beat up operators to the point where they decide to give up and shut down? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC may be independent, but its job is to regulate "the Nation's civilian use of radioactive materials to protect public health and safety, promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Pushing nuclear plants into a shutdown decision based on a few events that had little or no impact on safety doesn't help fulfill any of those mission areas. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Nuclear energy regulation isn't supposed to push for ever higher levels of polished cannon balls or improvements in clearing an ever-rising subjective performance bar that is already well above adequate protection.

comment #1651171 posted on 2016-04-07 14:37:10 by rodadams2013 in response to comment #1651166

@steamshovel2002 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Sure, the public perception of nuclear is in the toilet. That is a big concern of mine, but part of the explanation for that polling result was the intense propaganda effort to tell people that they should be VERY afraid of nuclear because of Fukushima. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:That event did not release harmful quantities of radiation and did not harm a single member of the public. Despite all of the hyped stories of operator heroism -- I'm not criticizing their professional dedication -- even the operators were not in any danger if they simply followed a few precautions that are a part of their basic training programs. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It's no mystery to me why the public worries about nuclear because of the Fukushima Frenzy. It's also not surprising that the same public comfortably continues to accept the hazards of hydrocarbons despite the dozens of fires and massive pollution releases at places like the Cosmo refinery in Chiba. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:That earthquake stimulated inferno burned for ten solid days before being brought under control. The only "coverage" I saw of it came as the background video being played as one of the network news readers described the "horrors" of the slowly developing situation at Fukushima Daiichi. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:When people are told that they should be afraid of something, some of them listen and seek additional layers of protection even when the source of the fear stories was inventing the risk. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The nuclear industry and its regulator have not done a very good job of reminding the public how well the plants normally operate, how beneficial their clean power is compared to the functional alternatives, and how small the issues that have been blown out of proportion really are. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:[Moderator Note: Some verbiage was removed here to adhere to the comment policy.] nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I know you express pride in your accomplishments, but I see it quite differently. Destruction is so much easier than constructive engagement that leads to solid, measurable improvements. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26

\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: [Moderator Note: Some verbiage has been removed to adhere to blog comment policy.] nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Rod Adams nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Publisher, Atomic Insights nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

comment #1651170 posted on 2016-04-07 14:14:41 by NRC in response to comment #1651133

Mr. Adams: Our current Reactor Oversight Process has been in place since the spring of 2000. It is well understood by plant owners what the corresponding level of NRC oversight will be if violations are identified and/or performance indicators are exceeded that result in a facility's shift to a different column of the agency's Action Matrix. Pilgrim moved to Column 4 of the Action Matrix last September based on several "white" inspection findings that had been identified. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:More information on NRC oversight activities at Pilgrim can be found on our webpage devoted to the subject. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Neil Sheehan

comment #1651166 posted on 2016-04-07 12:50:14 by steamshovel2002

Rod, nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Basically in a 2013 2.06 I scripted the results of the 2015 Pilgrim Special inspection. I anticipated the final outcome of the defective 3 stage SRVS. Everything I said in the 2013 2.206 was proven in the 2015 special inspection. They first put in the 3 stage SRVs in 2011, within two weeks of first heatup, one began leaking. And they all leaked and leaked, misoperated, and down powered for the next 3 years over SRVs. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The most damning event was on the approach Storm Juno- I was the first one in the USA who predicted a very infrequent LOOP on the approach of this Nor'easter, then the LOOP happened. Don't even get me talking about the unreported loss and degradation of the meteorological towers over many years. The organizational deep instincts to not disclose the bad news or emediately fix the safety components. I'll make the case Pilgrim's LOOP rate is 17 times worst as the standard LOOP rate inputted into all risk calculation nationwide. The NRC prematurely released the special inspection (the day before the storm struck- ML15026A069), where they spent a lot of print in the inspection report explaining why the switchyard was not designed for the expected climate. The agency anticipated the certain approaching LOOP, the premature release was an attempt to mitigate the agency's damage to their reputation when the LOOP occurred. So everyone essentially paper whipped the heck of this plant's safety vulnerability, then failed to prevent the next LOOP. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Basically two SRVs failed to open or shut on this LOOP,I think the NRC discover on two sequential LOOPs (2013 and 2015), Entergy failed to detect it and report on it. In the inspection with NRC looking over Pilgrim documents, they picked up the failed to operate when called. This all ruined the reputation of Entergy and the NRC. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Basically throughout our history, the genesis of over-regulation has always emerged from regulatory embarrassment. The plant, sector or business going wild on us, damaging the reputation of the federal regulator and our perfectly beautiful government. Then the sector or plant begins a fight for survival…over regulation is always a part of survival. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:You guys better be careful with the most recent Gallup poll. It identified a historic decline of public approval with Nuclear Power. And the Republicans had the most precipitous decline of public approval compared to the Democrats.

comment #1651164 posted on 2016-04-07 11:34:22 by rodadams2013 in response to comment #1651156

To the moderator: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If you follow drbillcorcoran's advice, that would be great. In addition you might answer a question stimulated by that response. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If "the worst plant not getting a punitive inspection" still provides adequate protection to the public by not having any events that impose any risk of public harm or qualify specific violations of license conditions, is there an unwritten rule requiring the "worst" of a well-run and operated fleet to receive a financial penalty that is more severe than the actual dollar amount of a large fine? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I realize that some people are not reassured by the word "adequate," but the standards imposed to achieve that judgement by the NRC are quite high.

comment #1651156 posted on 2016-04-07 09:22:54 by drbillcorcoran

To the Moderator, nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:A good way to answer Rod's excellent question would be to provide a chronological listing of the harmful events, NRC findings, and self-reported conditions adverse to quality safety at Pilgrim and at the worst plant not

getting a punitive inspection. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:OBTW: It is an inescapable fact that an NRC Inspection is a way to impose additional costs and resource loads on a licensee without enforcement action. This is because the licensee bears the costs of the inspection and has to expend resources preparing for it and hosting the inspection team.

comment #1651133 posted on 2016-04-07 04:07:15 by rodadams2013

Neil: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Can you please help me understand what Pilgrim did to deserve this exceedingly expensive "penalty box" treatment? The answer may require you to work your way up the chain of command for an answer, but please try to do so. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I realize that the NRC carefully avoids taking its imposed costs into consideration during decision making, but I still fail to understand how a small number of unrelated, minor issues add up to the need for heightened attention that causes a plant owner to spend tens of millions of dollars in extra contract labor and overtime. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Is it that all the remaining plants in the US are performing so well that expectations of unattainable perfection have shifted even higher? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Unless your organization is completely isolated from reality, I'm sure that you are aware of the following facts: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:- Even without the heightened attention from headquarters, every nuclear plant has at least two on site inspectors. No other industrial facility in the US has such close inspection by its regulator, even those with far more risk of harming the public. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:- Each of our operating nuclear power plants avoid the production of millions of tons of CO2 each year compared to the fossil fuel that would need to be consumed to replace their power output nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:- Natural gas prices lower than any seen in the past 20 years as a result of a massive drilling campaign and an historically warm winter have reduced the sales price of the electricity nuclear plants produce. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:- That loss of revenue puts plants in a situation of tight profit margins or even financial losses. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:- Added costs that do not marginally improve safety may flip the plant into the loss column and result in pressure to close a facility that is still safely and reliably producing emission free electricity. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:- Closure decisions are permanent. The clean output will be lost for at least the 10-15 years required to plan and build a replacement facility. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:- That invariably makes it even harder to address climate change, which may be a distant threat, but it is quite real for those of us with children or grandchildren to protect. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Rod Adams nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Publisher, Atomic Insights

comment #1651254 posted on 2016-04-08 12:34:25 by drbillcorcoran

• Insufficient Transparency nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that harmful conditions were not discovered earlier because they were not sufficiently transparent at the times they were not discovered . Harmful conditions were not discovered earlier because they were not sufficiently transparent to any of the people who missed the opportunities for discovering them . nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Transparency makes it easy to see what's wrong. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Transparency makes it hard to conceal what's wrong. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:"Transparency is the best deodorant."-Unknown (for now) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Those who keep their cards too close to the vest forget what is in their hand. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Transparency is the mortal enemy of deception, fraud, waste, incompetence, cronyism, wrongdoing, and sometimes even stupidity.

comment #1651237 posted on 2016-04-08 09:15:07 by NRC in response to comment #1651174

Mr. Adams: Our webpage devoted to our increased oversight activities at Pilgrim explains what will happen going forward. Essentially, the plant's change in status triggered a review governed by Inspection Procedure 95003. I won't try to summarize all of the steps involved here; they are detailed on the webpage. But suffice it to say, Pilgrim will continue to receive additional scrutiny until that process has been completed.

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Neil Sheehan

comment #1651596 posted on 2016-04-13 04:46:34 by pradeepkumar

Nuclear Plant is becoming one of the most trusted sources of electricity these days. Also it plays an important role in huge and mass power generation. But the Government should ensure it is completely safe and protected against any hazards or mishappenings.

comment #1651006 posted on 2016-04-06 05:24:39 by drbillcorcoran

• Leadership and Chilling Effects nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:An inescapable fact is that unless leaders reliably and relentlessly report nonconformities their leadership by example is creating a chilling effect. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: The way to succeed in any organization is to get your job done in the situation you are in, not to fix the organization and then get your job done. Thus, the upwardly mobile tend to put systemic corrective action on the back burner. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Many nonconformities are, when surfaced, budget busters and schedule busters, hence they are bonus busters. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: One of the top principles of human behavioral technology is that people do what they see others do. This is especially compelling when the others are successful, admired, and it positions of authority. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Observation: Leadership by example is a chilling effect when the leaders do not report the nonconformities that their subordinates know that they know about. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Adage: “Those who get the picture take a picture.”

comment #1651629 posted on 2016-04-13 11:57:17 by

There has been a shocking collapse in the NEISO market. We haven’t seen it go deep in the residential rates yet. There is zero chance Pilgrim is profitable. I’ll bet you 30% of the electric power producers in NE aren’t profitable either. The NEISO is under investigation for corrupt and unfair rates. How can we have a stable electric system with this? This is the snap-back for collusion to keep rates high for years. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2016/04/2016_03_monthly_market_report.pdf nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Operations Report nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:March 2016 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Market Analysis and Settlements nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:APRIL 11, 2016 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Day-ahead and real-time LMPs at the New England Hub averaged $20.63/MWh and $17.20/MWh, respectively, during March 2016. Day-ahead and real-time prices at the Hub and in the Load Zones averaged 30-38% lower than February 2016 averages. In the aggregate, March 2016 day-ahead and real-time LMPs were approximately 69% lower during March 2016 than during March 2015. Average natural gas prices were 76% below the prior year’s average prices, while residual fuel prices were down 48% from a year ago.

REFRESH: Jefferson Proving Ground – The NRC’s Role

posted on Wed, 13 Apr 2016 19:39:10 +0000

Jim Smith nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Health Physicist nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Materials Decommissioning Branch
nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Most people think of nuclear reactors when they think of the NRC. Some may think of nuclear medicine or uranium. Many would be surprised to know we are also involved in regulating radioactive materials at U.S.

military sites. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Although nuclear weapons are completely outside our purview, some military sites need an NRC license to possess and use certain nuclear materials. For example, the Army has a license to possess depleted uranium (DU) at a site in Indiana called Jefferson Proving Ground. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We wrote previously about the Army's September 2014 plan to decommission that site. It asked the NRC to terminate the license, with certain access restrictions as allowed under our regulations. The NRC sent the Army a number of questions on the proposal. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In an April letter, the Army said it now believes the environmental and occupational risks of decommissioning outweigh the benefits. So instead of decommissioning and releasing the site for restricted use, the Army envisions keeping its license, at least for now, along with the security and surveillance requirements currently in place. The Army will follow up with a justification for its request for an exemption from the NRC's "timeliness rule." This rule requires licensees to notify the NRC within 60 days of permanently ceasing activities at a licensed site and either begin decommissioning or submit a decommissioning plan within 12 months. Rather than decommissioning the site, the Army now is proposing to maintain its license for possession of the depleted uranium penetrators dispersed across the impact area of the site. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The Army began using the 56,000-acre site in 1941 to test fire all sorts of munitions. The Army fired more than 24 million rounds before testing came to an end in 1994 and the installation closed in 1995 as a result of the Base Realignment and Closure Act. Today, the Army still owns about 51,000 acres of the original site, but nearly all of that is managed as a wildlife refuge. The Indiana Air National Guard uses another part of the site as an air-to-ground bombing training range. The 51,000-acre area contains unexploded ordnance —explosive munitions that could still go off—and live detonators, primers and fuzes, and can't ever be used for farming, housing or commerce. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In the early 1980's, the NRC got involved with the site when the Army wanted to test DU rounds there. The DU in these rounds is able to penetrate the armor on a tank. Over a 10-year period, the Army fired about 220,000 pounds of DU projectiles into a 2,080-acre area known as the DU Impact Area, which lies within the 51,000 acres with unexploded ordnance. The Army still has its NRC license for the DU and now wants to maintain the DU Impact Area as it currently exists. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

So what is DU? Natural uranium is made up of three "isotopes." These are forms with different numbers of neutrons and distinct physical and radiological properties: U-234, U-235 and U-238. "Depleted" uranium is actually a byproduct of the process used to enrich the percentage of U-235 to make nuclear fuel. DU therefore contains less U-235 than natural uranium, increasing the percentage of U-238. Only slightly radioactive, DU may be toxic to the kidneys and other organs if ingested, such as by inhaling dust. Possessing it in any significant quantity requires an NRC license.

About 162,000 pounds of DU remain in the DU Impact Area. There is also a high density of unexploded ordnance in this area. The Army proposes to leave the DU and unexploded ordnance in place because cleanup would be very dangerous and very expensive. To keep people out of the Jefferson Proving Ground site, the Army will keep the current access barriers—including a perimeter fence with padlocked gates and security warning signs—as well as legal and administrative controls. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We expect to have public conversations with the Army as it develops its justification for continued licensed possession of the depleted uranium. These discussions will either be in the form of in-person meetings or teleconferences. Either way, we will announce them ahead of time on our public meeting website. The public will be able to ask questions of the NRC. The Army may, but is not required to, answer questions from the public. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:REFRESH is an occasional series where we revisit or update previous posts. This first ran in December 2014.

Comments

comment #1651750 posted on 2016-04-14 16:31:39 by Engineer-Poet

> What sort of radiological or military threat does dispersed and effectively unrecoverable DU pose, that justifies the expense of having to license areas where it is sitting and doing nothing (save its natural decay into lead)?

comment #1651751 posted on 2016-04-14 16:59:32 by Moderator in response to comment #1651750

> The NRC's legislative mandate includes allowing the possession and use of radioactive materials while protecting public health and safety and the environment. The U.S. Army possesses licensable quantities of depleted uranium at these sites. To fulfill our legislative mandate, we have licensed the Army for possession of the material. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26

\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Questions about military threats would need to be directed to the military.

comment #1651780 posted on 2016-04-14 22:59:41 by Engineer-Poet in response to comment #1651751

Why does depleted uranium count as "radioactive material", and potassium chloride water-softener salt (roughly as active per unit mass) not count?

comment #1651661 posted on 2016-04-13 16:15:56 by CaptD

This is just one of the huge Military areas in the USA that is off limits to the public because it has already been contaminated by radioactivity of one form or another. These areas could easily be used to store nuclear waste from nuclear reactors at a price much less than what a massive storage facility (similar to Yucca Mountain) might cost. The NRC should be doing studies to determine where the largest already secured areas are and how they might be used to safeguard our nuclear waste for periods of 100 years, since after 100 years, technology will have been developed that is unknown today. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:### nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC Low Cost Nuclear Waste Suggestion: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Here is my low cost solution for all that nuclear waste that we will have to deal with as Solar (of all flavors) become our Energy KING: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I've already suggested that the NRC offer a Million Dollar Prize for the best way to "solve" the nuclear waste storage problem" for the next 50 years, so please consider this idea as my "low cost" solution to America's "long term" radioactive waste storage problem: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Make use of our Military Testing Bases and or our MOA's (Military Operation Area's) out west, which are really huge tracts of land (think tens of thousands of acres) used ONLY by the military and already secured by them 24/7! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Placing these very large (heavy) concrete casks in a poke-a-dot pattern will allow for at least 50 to 100 years of storage, safe from everything except a War, (in which case every reactor is just as vulnerable) and then revisit the storage problem then; at which time, probably a future solution will allow for an even better, lower cost "final solution"… nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Because these casks would be very large and all look alike nobody would know what was in any one of them, which would be yet another level of security for the casks containing even higher levels of nuclear waste! An ideal outside coating for these casks would be similar to the spray-on "bed liner" used for pickup trucks that not only prevents rusting and or damage for the life of the vehicle but would also seal the casks to prevent leakage of any kind! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Hopefully these casts would be similar in size to a large shipping container so that existing material handling equipment could be used to load, unload and or move them about without "inventing" a mega hauler vehicle. By keeping the "footprint" of these casks similar to a large 40 foot container, the stacking and or placement of them might also be semi or fully automated which would not only save money but again keep the exact location of any specific cask secret! The monitoring of these casks 24/7/365 could even be done via satellite since these casks are similar in size to rocket launchers which are easily seen from space. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In another 50 to 100 years, storage technology will be such that, yet another lower cost solution for all this waste will be found, and then it can be considered verses continuing to using the above storage plan... Perhaps sometime In the future, a safe low cost solution like lifting it all into space via a space elevator* and then shoving it in an orbit that will send it into the SUN for final recycling will present itself... nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:BTW: Area 51 (which does now actually exist officially) contains huge tracts of land that has already been used as a nuclear testing site (and is still contaminated and is now off limits to all but a few forever) which would allow all this material to effectively disappear... nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:* The Space Elevator Project is something that the NRC should help fund ASAP, because it represents the best way to actually eliminate storing nuclear waste on Earth!

comment #1651670 posted on 2016-04-13 18:08:14 by Public Pit Bull in response to comment #1651661

As soon as I saw this NRC blog on the Jefferson Proving Ground I was hoping that Capt D would respond & he did so, so well! Speaking of "proving grounds" I hope that soon the NRC will actually "prove" to all Americans that they are really serious about public safety & that they will finally do the right thing. That is of course to get all this dangerous nuclear ... out of our backyards. What gets me the most is that the NRC washes their hands of any responsibility for doing just that. They are waiting for others, our President, our Congress, the DOE, and God knows who else to act. Yet the NRC is that same agency who continues to license & extend the licenses of nuke plants, all the while allowing all this nuke ...(I mean waste) to continue to pile up at over 90 sites all over the US. And the vast majority of it sits close to large population centers. How sad & tragic! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Moderator Note: (...) Verbiage was removed to adhere to blog comment guidelines.

Progress Toward a Right-Sized, Agile Nuclear Regulator

posted on Fri, 15 Apr 2016 17:12:10 +0000

Victor M. McCree nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:*Executive Director for Operations* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC has begun "re-baselining" the agency's workload, shedding, deferring or reducing resources. This is a crucial step in Project Aim, our effort to transform the NRC into a more agile, effective and efficient organization poised to meet the challenges of the future. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The Commission has decided on the staff's recommendations of activities that can be eliminated or de-prioritized without compromising our important safety mission. Re-baselining reductions total about $48.97 million and will reduce the workforce by about 185.3 full-time equivalent (FTE) over the next two years. We are confident we can implement the majority of these reductions by the end of September, allowing us to achieve significant savings in fiscal year 2017. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We can implement re-baselining without impacting our important safety and security mission and without affecting our ability to demonstrate organizational values and principles of good regulation. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Every office, division and branch within the NRC will be affected by re-baselining, directly or indirectly. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What will all this mean for our licensees and other external stakeholders? We will no longer conduct mid-cycle reviews under the Reactor Oversight Process. Procedures and guidance may not be updated as often, and the updates may take longer. Materials licenses will be renewed every 15 years instead of every 10. As our budget shrinks, fees assessed to licensees should go down as well. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:While we remain committed to be open and transparent, some public meetings traditionally held near nuclear facilities will instead be handled by webinars or GoToMeeting. And if you call the NRC after work hours, you may end up talking to an answering machine rather than an operator, as we cut back on contractor expenses. The emergency operations center will continue to be staffed 24 hours a day. We will also be reducing travel and training support for our Agreement State and tribal government partners. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Re-baselining is the beginning, not the end, of the NRC's Project Aim transformation to be better positioned to meet the challenges ahead. We will continue to look for more ways to increase efficiency. As part of this effort, the staff on March 18 presented the Commission a list of longer-term efficiencies that will bring additional benefits now and in the future, as well as a projection of changes in the agency workload through FY 2020. Additional proposals will be sent to the Commission in the spring, including potential reductions to the agency's drug testing program and current security clearance requirements, and the evaluation of merging the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the Office of New Reactors nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Rest assured: As we carry out these important changes, we remain focused on our mission of regulating the civilian uses of radioactive material while protecting public health, safety, the environment and the nation's security.

Comments

comment #1652264 posted on 2016-04-20 07:19:03 by Bryan Chesebrough

> This is a long needed and long awaited beginning. Nuclear power has demonstrated over the last 60 years that it has caused the fewest deaths per Terrawatt Hours of power produced than any other energy source. The NRC should be carefully examining the suggestions of the Nuclear Innovation Alliance in its restructuring. Advanced (GEN IV) Nuclear Reactors hold the promise of utilizing the most energy dense elements on the periodic table in a safe and carbon-free manor. Thankfully there are leaders in Congress from both parties that are sponsoring legislation aimed at facilitating this restructure through the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Modernization Act (NERMA).

comment #1652278 posted on 2016-04-20 09:42:33 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1652264

> Is it time for IAEA, NRC, INPO, and NEI to commit openly to integrity being an essential trait of the good safety culture? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Integrity: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Integrity is achieved when individuals, groups, and organizations do not falsify, fabricate, mislead, misrepresent, turn a blind eye, plagiarize, obfuscate, or otherwise deceive and do not tolerate those who do. Integrity is achieved by owning up to shortfalls. The integrity of individuals reflects the integrity of their leaders.

comment #1652169 posted on 2016-04-19 09:17:18 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1651860

> NRC gave SCE enough rope under 50.59 and stood by innocently while SCE and MHI hung themselves. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Who at NRC, INPO, SCE, and MHI knew that 50.59 was being abuses, misused, violated, and/or misinterpreted and did

nothing? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Jefferson said that the only thing needed for evil men to succeed is for good men to do nothing. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Nassim Nicholas Taleb said, "If you see fraud and do not say "fraud" you are a fraud." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Jon Stewart said, "If you smell something, say something." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In the fire service they advocate, "If you see anything dumb, dangerous, or different, report it."

comment #1651860 posted on 2016-04-15 21:53:41 by 1948billhawkins

If INPO 3 or 4 Utilities like SCE do their job correctly, do not violate NRC Rules, do not compromise public safety and get away with it, NRC does not to need to perform so many inspections or need a large staff. NRC should act like DMV. When NRC catches utilities breaking rules, NRC should impose heavy fines for minor violations and jail time for severe violations. SONGS is a perfect example.It is never too late, NRC can force SONGS to release Units 2 & 3 operational data and send the offenders to jail. I am surprised that NRC is not defending itself when SCE Attorney says NRC did not use the actual operational data per Elmo Collins Directive but made some assumptions to derive some imaginary results (To suit SCE). SCE has made a fool of NRC all these years like CPUC and brought shame on NRC. When will NRC Learn?

comment #1651877 posted on 2016-04-16 06:08:47 by

This is jiberish nonsense !!!! It will truely expose the country and excellerate the inevitable nuclear holicost ☹

comment #1651878 posted on 2016-04-16 06:11:06 by Joe in response to comment #1651825

Totally agree with Mr Hoffman

comment #1651834 posted on 2016-04-15 18:41:38 by Anonymous

“Re-baselining” is indeed a great concept and it was longtime coming at the agency. For, almost 1/3 of the work force are already “dead wood” and consists of senior management (SLS) types, who have been truly draining the budget what with the unconscionable perks that they have been generously giving themselves (10 percent of staffs vs 90 percent senior management’s out of a 5 million bonus pool – seriously!!!). But don’t cut the FTEs of hard core devoted employee talent pool that has been carrying the burden of work load, while, the right wing lobby groups in consort with the utilities who constantly were cutting corners on safety (case in point - the very many guidance improvements that emerged from the JLD task force and in development of Risk informed licensing regulations). I sincerely hope and assume that I am right in that, the management, staff, and the Commission collectively did a sincere “soul searching” before green lighting implementing the reduction- in-force (RIF). If not, that is “unconscionable” when the industry is one the brink of entering an aging nuclear fleet, past its prime what with all the uprated power beyond its original design capacities. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Otherwise, the Citizens ought to seriously consider living at 2 X EPZ distances.

comment #1651825 posted on 2016-04-15 13:55:58 by acehoffman

This is undoubtedly due to loss of NRC income as reactors have closed and will continue to close, since such a hefty portion of NRC's budget comes from the licensees. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:But the claim that safety will not be impacted is bizarre and cannot possibly be true. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC is reducing oversight: Extending/cutting inspection periods, cutting services, etc., and ALSO cutting fees to licensees? Both? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How about RAISING fees so that inspections and other services actually go UP as reactors age and become more prone to aging failures, but fewer reactors have to share the burden of costs? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How about increasing security as new threats emerge: Suicidal terrorists, Internet hackers, fake/poorly manufactured hardware components, newly discovered design errors, and last but not least, insiders going crazy... All these threats were unrecognized just a few years ago, along with newly recognized threats from Mother Nature, threats that still have been deemed "beyond design basis accidents" -- but that no longer means "they can't possibly happen" -- not after Fukushima. Now they are considered, briefly, and then ignored as "rare" events, with no idea what "rare" really means -- but admitting there's no way to deal with those events if they do happen. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In today's world, that's not good enough. There are alternative power sources without the accompanying risk envelope, let alone the mess of waste left behind, a huge and growing problem still completely unsolved by NRC or anyone else. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The licensees and the NRC are slow to recognize the world as it exists today. In short, nobody is watching out for icebergs on the Titanic of nuclear power. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:But now, you want to slow

down everything you do, our ONLY safety agency against the greatest threat to the American way of life that exists in our world today? When you're already not doing your job (which is to oversee the permanent closure of all nuclear power plants)?

NRC Talks Research in Tennessee

posted on Tue, 19 Apr 2016 15:15:07 +0000

Salman Haq nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Reactor Engineer nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We recently issued the draft report summarizing detailed research and analyses into what might happen during an accident at a nuclear power plant. Tomorrow, we'll head to the third plant we analyzed, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, to discuss the results with the surrounding communities. The plant is located in Soddy-Daisy, Tenn. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:



The project, called the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses, or SOARCA, looked at potential situations that could disable a reactor's normal safety systems. The project used powerful computer programs to predict the plants' behavior based on decades of real-world experiments into issues such as how reactor fuel responds during the extreme temperatures expected during these accidents. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:SOARCA then plugged up-to-date information about the plants into the programs and examined how a potential accident might unfold. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We found that safety equipment the NRC required after the 9/11 attacks, or additional equipment that industry voluntarily added following the Fukushima event, if used according to plan, would help prevent or mitigate a reactor accident. Even for the most severe accidents the research came to three basic conclusions: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

> nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

- Accidents occur more slowly than we originally thought; nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:
- Accidents release less radioactive material than we originally thought; and nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:
- The emergency plans every U.S. reactor has in place can help keep people safe. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The project came to some more specific conclusions about accident effects around the three plants, Surry (southeast of Richmond, Va.), Peach Bottom (southeast of Lancaster, Pa.), and Sequoyah. For example, the slowly developing nature of the accidents and the existing emergency plans would help keep people safe, even during uncontrolled accidents. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Some of the NRC staff involved in SOARCA discussed the Sequoyah project on April 20, at the TVA Sequoyah Nuclear Training Building. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If you have comments on the draft report, you have until May 12, 2016 to send them in. The best way to comment is through regulations.gov, using Docket ID NRC-2016-0074. You can also mail comments (referencing the Docket ID) to Cindy

Bladey, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: OWFN-12-H08, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If you submit comments in writing or in electronic form, they will be posted on the NRC website and on regulations.gov. The NRC will not edit or remove any identifying or contact information; please don't include any information you wish to keep private. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We've also developed a public communications brochure to help explain the SOARCA project to a wider audience of stakeholders using plain language and more illustrations.

Comments

Preparing for Advanced Reactors

posted on Thu, 21 Apr 2016 14:27:15 +0000

Deborah Jackson nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Deputy Director nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Division of Engineering Infrastructure and Advanced Reactors nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Before a company gets down to the nuts and bolts of a reactor design, it has to consider the big picture of protecting the public. The NRC lays out this mandate through a combination of regulatory requirements and guidance. "General Design Criteria," or GDC are a key part of the regulatory requirements. We're at the point where public input will help us develop Advanced Reactor Design Criteria (ARDC) for tomorrow's reactors. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The current criteria cover concepts such as protecting against severe natural events and putting multiple barriers between radioactive material and the environment. Designers and operators use that basis for designing, fabricating, building, testing, and operating a reactor's safety-related equipment. Companies are now considering designs that depart from cooling reactors with water, so the NRC is moving towards properly adapting the GDC. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We've been working with the Department of Energy on this since 2013. Our initiative has examined where today's GDC could apply to advanced designs, and where new or revised criteria make sense. A DOE report from late 2014 (parts one and two) laid out Advanced Reactor Design Criteria, which could fill the GDC role for non-light-water-cooled reactors. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The DOE set out both criteria independent of any specific technology, and specific criteria for reactors cooled by liquid sodium or an inert gas. These ARDC will not be binding requirements. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC picked up the ball by considering existing information on advanced designs, and we've asked DOE additional questions while developing draft regulatory guidance on the ARDC. This is the first step in strategically preparing for the review of non-light-water reactor applications. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The preliminary draft of the ARDC will provide stakeholder insight into the NRC staff's current views on how the GDC could be interpreted to address non-light-water reactor design features. Ultimately, a risk-informed, performance based advanced non-light water reactor regulatory framework is envisioned. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:A specific question we're looking at involves whether NRCs generic criteria are broad enough to cover the spectrum of designs being considered. We're also asking whether the proposed criteria appropriately address some new concepts described in DOE's documents. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Public comments, which can also be sent to AdvancedRxDCComments.Resource@nrc.gov, will be accepted through June 8. After we address these initial public comments, a draft regulatory guide will be developed and published in the *Federal Register* for public comment.

Comments

comment #1652446 posted on 2016-04-21 20:06:33 by Anonymous

> Advanced reactor "concepts" as they are called here in the U.S. (were old and proven concepts capable of generating green power and were laudable for the passive safe shut down abilities that were proven in Europe as early as in 1970s, such as the Pebble Bed Reactors.) And that is where they will remain in U.S. un-licensed and exist in name sake, to justify their existence and supporting pay checks for a branch or a Division of licensing at the NRC. In our life time, here in the U.S., we are not going to see any of these sprouts taking root in the in this bureaucratic regulatory environment.

Chernobyl – Thirty Years Ago Today

posted on Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:31:59 +0000

On April 26, 1986, a sudden surge of power during a reactor systems test destroyed Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the former Soviet Union. The accident and the fire that followed released massive amounts of radioactive material into the environment. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:So starts the NRC backgrounder on accident. Today, exactly three decades later, it's still an event worth recalling. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Last year, NRC Commissioner William Ostendorff and several NRC staffers, (photo above right) visited the site and saw the progress for containment and decommissioning first hand. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Said Commissioner Ostendorff of his visit: "I was struck by the impact of this tragic accident in 1986, especially by the visit to the abandoned city of Pripyat. I saw first-hand the detailed work underway to



more permanently contain the damaged reactor for coming generations. I am grateful for the international support to fund the construction of the New Safe Confinement structure." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The New Safe Confinement construction site can be seen in the photo to the left. The Commissioner's visit included the construction site for the Dry Type Storage facility. The final completion date for this project is 2064. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:As part of their tour, the Commissioner and NRC staff visited the abandoned city of Pripyat, home to an amusement park originally scheduled to open one week after the accident. (see photo below right) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-

01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:After the accident, officials closed off the area within 18 miles of the plant, except for those with official business at the plant and those people dealing with the consequences of the accident and operating the undamaged reactors. The Soviet (and later on, Russian) government evacuated about 115,000 people from the most heavily contaminated areas in 1986, and another 220,000 people in subsequent years. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:For more information on the accident, check out this blog post or take a look at this video. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Comments

comment #1652958 posted on 2016-04-26 13:10:35 by steamshovel2002

> He is a case where a nuclear plant meltdown was unbelievably positive for the world at large. It got rid of a despotic regime that somehow got disconnected from the truth. It vastly liberated more citizens of the planet than got harmed or hurt in the accident. Did you ever fight in the cold war?

nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:***Beyond the human and environmental tragedy, Chernobyl proved a catalyst in a chain reaction that would sweep away Soviet communism five years later. Writing in 2006, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, wrote that Chernobyl — not his attempts at perestroika, or restructuring — was “perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union”.*** nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Most people don’t remember the testing at Chernobyl that created the meltdown. The accident emerged from a feeling by the professions the plant wasn’t properly designed. They felt the plant didn’t have sufficient diesel generator capacity in a LOOP. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How is our catastrophe with NASA Challenger and Chernobyl similar? They were under the gun of resources limitations or unjustified budget cuts. They were basically a paramilitary operation without independent oversight and full public transparency. It is secrecy that drives all bad outcomes. Budget cuts are the best secrecy generator in hierarchical organizations. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The take home for me; you never know the end point when a political system isn’t properly hard keyed into telling the absolute truth and full honesty to its citizens. When does everyone in the system have to lie, cheat and deceive just to survive? It is where at a nuclear power plant when there is so much painful cognitive dissonance for the employees to in a crooked system. They mal-adapt to the situation by rationalizing it is all a “game”... the term we use is “playing the game”. The rules and all the fundamental human relationships going on in the plant or organization has turned into mechanized games of no meaning other than making slave wages for survival or sport. You can make really big bucks in slave wages too. Working at a plant or organization has no higher meaning or in serving any higher ends...or supporting the vital needs of a nation and its citizens. It just turns into a selfish game or way of individual survival. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:It is how organizations steals our humanity and the souls from us all? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Mike Mulligan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Hinsdale, NH

comment #1652991 posted on 2016-04-26 17:30:58 by steamshovel2002

> You mark my words; all resource limitations, a limitation of any kind, all priories and budgets or budget reductions of any kind always…always, always, always…always vastly disproportionally fall on the sick, weak, disenfranchised and poor. The people with the least capabilities to take care of themselves. Our follies always hurts the sick, the weak, disenfranchised and poor the most. Most of the rich and powerful always completely escape accountability.

comment #1652941 posted on 2016-04-26 11:03:42 by Public Pit Bull

> The USA Today headlines read "Chernobyl carries unlimited heartbreak" & "Chernobyl Disaster Could Trigger More Cancer, Deaths". This is the real legacy of nuclear power that will be with us forever. The havoc meted out to people and the lasting scars to our planet. NRC Commissioners & NRC staff have visited Fukushima & Chernobyl personally only then to come home & do absolutely nothing to prevent a similar accident here. If a nuclear disaster doesn't happen right here in our country, in our own backyard, like TMI, the NRC bows to pressure from the US nuke industry to do nothing that would cost money & perhaps impact the profitability or the viability of nuclear power here in this country. Figures though, as the NRC is not an industry watchdog, it is an industry lapdog!

comment #1653030 posted on 2016-04-27 03:35:47 by Bas Gresnigt in response to comment #1652941

> If the NRC really takes action; nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:- more strict oversight, so no radiation leakages by untested steam generators as at SONGS, etc nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:- more strict regulations, hence less chance that an attack results in a radiation disaster nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:then the already high cost price of nuclear electricity is increased further. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Which implies that more and more reactors will close prematurely until none is left. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:But then the staff of NRC is without a job... nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:So NRC want safe nuclear without much costs for safety. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Safe is also in the interest of NRC, as a nuclear disaster may end the NRC as shown in Japan.

comment #1653121 posted on 2016-04-28 09:14:27 by Public Pit Bull in response to comment #1652983

> Sorry Iazarus, I was not "implying" the NRC did nothing, no, I simply stated that they have done nothing at all! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Some reactors in Japan have been allowed to restart but only after installing a hardened & filtered vent to minimize a radioactive release in the case of an accident. On over 30 identical BWR plants in the US, the US nuke industry successfully lobbied their lapdog regulator here to not install a filtered vent on our plants. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Damaged spent fuel pools at Fukushima released significant amounts of radioactivity into the environment. US spent fuel pools are loaded with far more spent fuel than allowed in spent fuel pools in Japan. Our NRC (I should say our nuclear industry's NRC) has done nothing to relocate this excess fuel to a safe remote storage location. Furthermore, the NRC does not even consider that to be part of their job! nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-

30.status-publish.001.xml:The only stated mission the NRC has is to protect the public health & safety. But their actual mission is to protect the health & viability of the nuclear industry.

comment #1652983 posted on 2016-04-26 14:52:49 by lazarus in response to comment #1652941

"Chernobyl carries unlimited heartbreak" & "Chernobyl Disaster Could Trigger More Cancer, Deaths". nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:That only means that FUD sells papers, and is good click bait, face it the phrase "Could trigger" .... nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:is about as certain as the sky "Could" fall on your head. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Of course it was a tragedy for the people who died and their families and for those who had to leave their homes. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:But where are all the millions or even thousands of cancer victims that are touted by the coal,oil and gas industries and the antinuclear lobby they support? Statistics can not find them. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Read the James Conca article "will the truth about Chernobyl ever come out" nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What lessons were there to be learned from Chernobyl? Don't fool around with a reactor especially not one that has a highly positive void coefficient. As for Fukushima, yes the NRC has implemented billions worth of security upgrades. To imply that it has done nothing is just a malicious lie.

An Outage Twist: Degraded bolts at New York Nuclear Plant Warrant Attention

posted on Wed, 27 Apr 2016 16:24:08 +0000

Neil Sheehan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: *Public Affairs Officer* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: *Region I* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:When the Indian Point Unit 2 nuclear power plant entered a refueling and maintenance outage in early March, the to-do list included a task born of industry operating experience, both in the United States and overseas. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:



Specialists were geared up to check on the condition of bolts employed in the reactor vessel at the Buchanan, N.Y., facility. These are the kind of bolts you likely wouldn't find at your local hardware store. Rather, they are made of a stainless-steel alloy capable of withstanding decades' worth of neutron bombardment, as well as extraordinarily high temperatures and pressure. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Measuring about 2 inches in length and 5/8ths of an inch in diameter, the bolts hold in place a series of vertical metal plates. Known as baffle plates, they help direct water up through the nuclear fuel assemblies, where it is heated and subsequently used for power production. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The baffle plates are attached to eight levels of horizontal plates called baffle-former plates, which are in turn connected to the reactor core barrel. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-

2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:As far back as the late 1980s, cracking was identified in baffle-former bolts – the bolts securing the baffle plates to the baffle-former plates -- in pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) in France. (Both Indian Point Units 2 and 3 are PWRs.) The degradation is caused by what is known as irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:In response, the U.S nuclear industry began checking on these bolts in a small number of domestic PWRs on a sample basis. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The NRC staff also made use of a communications tool called an Information Notice to advise U.S. plant owners of what had been observed in Europe. A March 1998 notice let U.S. plant owners know that the baffle-former bolt cracking reported in foreign PWRs had occurred at the juncture of the bolt head and the shank, a location not accessible for visual examination. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Several U.S. plants subsequently evaluated their baffle-former bolts and in some cases replaced a sizable number. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Jumping ahead, the Electric Power Research Institute developed a standard industry program for the aging management of PWR reactor vessel internals and submitted it to the NRC in January 2009. The NRC staff approved the approach in an agency safety evaluation issued in December 2011 and then published in January 2012 as MRP-227-A. (MRP is short for Materials Reliability Program.) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Under this new standard, U.S. PWRs were to conduct an initial ultrasonic examination of all of their baffle-former bolts when the plant had between 25 and 35 effective full power years of service. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:This is exactly what was being done at Indian Point Unit 2 during the current outage. It was adhering to the standards of MRP-227-A. In the course of this review, it was determined that 227 of 832 baffle-former bolts at the plant were degraded, which means any indication of cracking. What's more, two bolt heads were missing. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The number of degraded baffle-former bolts was the largest seen to date at a U.S. reactor. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Entergy, Indian Point's owner, is in the process of analyzing the condition and replacing the degraded bolts. It will also assess any implications for Indian Point Unit 3, though that reactor is believed to be less susceptible to the condition for several reasons, including fewer operational cycles. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:As for the NRC, we will independently review the company's analysis and bolt-replacement plans to ensure safety. The results of those reviews will be documented in an upcoming inspection report for the plant. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We have already had a metallurgical specialist on-site reviewing the company's evaluations of the bolts and have agency experts reviewing the matter. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:More information will be forthcoming on the issue. However, it's important to note that the NRC staff will ensure the condition is fully understood and addressed prior to the plant returning to service. The NRC staff will also consider all available information in evaluating if changes are needed to the current inspection programs for these bolts across the industry. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:

Comments

comment #1653160 posted on 2016-04-28 17:14:18 by in response to comment #1653130

> Thank you Neil for your work. As a Westchester County resident I look forward to many more years of safe clean energy from the IPEC reactors.

comment #1653177 posted on 2016-04-28 20:52:41 by Erica Gray

> Baffle-former Assembly - Baffle-former Bolts (4-9 and 4-10) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The baffle-former bolts attach the baffle plates to the baffle formers. Documented observations of IASCC cracking of these components exists in multiple designs in the PWR fleet worldwide. These highly irradiated bolts perform a critical safety and operational function in the plant. Loss of a single bolt or isolated multiple failures of the baffle-former bolts are considered to be manageable, but a catastrophic or clustered loss of multiple bolts at adjacent locations could cause a lack of structural stability and potentially raise safety and operational concerns. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1522/ML15222A836.pdf nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:4/28/16 "The number of degraded baffle-former bolts was the largest seen to date at a U.S. reactor," the NRC said on Wednesday. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/albany/2016/04/8597822/regulator-says-faulty-bolts-indian-point-most-ever-seen nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-

03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Can missing bolts contribute to baffle jetting? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Has there been an increase in damaged fuel? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How many damaged fuel rods are being stored at Indian Point.

comment #1653342 posted on 2016-04-30 14:22:56 by CaptD

So how likely is it that bolt heads go missing? How many other reactors have had a similar thing occur and how long did it take to discover the problem and then repair it? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Should they have triggered the Dings and Dents alarms? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:San Onofre's operators ignored their alarm signals and now it is being decommissioned to coverup SCE's engineering and operational debacle which will cost ratepayers many billions!

comment #1653219 posted on 2016-04-29 09:46:23 by NRC in response to comment #1653177

Baffle “jetting” refers to the flow of reactor coolant through gaps between adjacent baffle plates. If a large enough number of baffle bolts were to fail, this condition could occur and it could result in damage to adjoining fuel in the reactor core. Degraded baffle-former bolts have been identified at Indian Point 2 and are being replaced. In this case, that degradation can take the form of an indication of cracking. No failed bolts have been identified, though two boltheads are missing. There has been no damage to fuel observed in the reactor. We do not have immediate information on whether there is any damaged fuel from past operations at the plant. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Neil Sheehan

comment #1653231 posted on 2016-04-29 12:13:04 by steamshovel2002

Baffle jetting really refers to baffle plate creep. Radiation causes the plate to swell, shrink or bend leading to the excess space between the plates more than core design…the gap to increase. It is a serious core design defect not knowing how the plate will respond to heavy duty radiation. A gap in knowledge. Neil only told a selective part of the story. What is the function of the baffle plant gap? I believe it facilities core reflood during a LOCA. The term “baffle jetting” refers to serious core damage and the preventable release of massive amounts of radiation/contamination in the core, throughout the plant and some escaping the plant. The so called solution to baffle jetting is reversing the flow (upflow job)….but this only facilitates the problem. Baffle jetting, core damage and baffle creep is a old well known phenomena. The good guys don't have these problems. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Baffle jetting refers to the excess flow through the baffle plate edge space beyond design impinging on the nearest fuel pins. It causes the pins to spin around in the fuel assemble grid wearing through the cladding. The pins begin leaking, there begins a nasty corrosive process called secondary degradation. This will eat away tremendous amounts cladding leading to the pellets falling out of the pins. The cladding now has fast acting irreversible cancer. The pellets and pins corrosion leaves core debris circulating in the coolant…they find this debris at the bottom of the core. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Outsiders don’t realized this Indian Point baffle plate bolt problem and the “water jetting” core damage at North Anna in 2014 are closely related. North Anna had notorious multiple water jetting events in the distance past. Believe me, the Indian Point baffle bolt problem could get a lot worst if the NRC discloses there was some not declared water jetting damage to the fuel pins (fuel leak). North Anna in the 2012 thought they had a fuel pin leak caused by some unknown debris circulating in the coolant. This is how spotty these normal core inspection are. Next outage they discovered the eye popping core damage. That first leak occurred around the unknown baffle jetting or they intentionally ignored it to the next outage. Dominion was negligent with not preventing this very costly core damage. No wonder why these guys can't make money. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:ThrowBack Friday: Why did North Anna unit 2 in 2014 have water jetting core damage while unit 1 showed no such damage? Unit 1 got the upflow job years ago because of serous core fuel damage, while unit 2 did not? Generically the pins that failed in water jetting have gone through the core three times. Sometimes when plants have fuel damage through water jetting, the utility removes the damages pins and replace them with dummy pins (no uranium in them). nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I got a few more articles on North Anna too. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2014/10/north-anna-has-15-million-fuel-pellets.html nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:‘North Anna Has 15 Million Fuel Pellets update’ nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/view?AccessionNumber=ML14325A692 nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:‘LER 2014-002-00’ nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2014/12/dominions-intentionally-running-their.html nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:‘(North Anna) Dominion's Intentionally Running Their Nuclear Reactor to Failure Philosophy’

comment #1653130 posted on 2016-04-28 10:32:06 by Moderator in response to comment #1653063

The NRC will perform independent analyses and on-site inspections to verify that Entergy has properly completed the replacement of all degraded bolts to ensure the Indian Point Unit 2 baffle-former structure will continue to function as designed. If any parts cannot be accounted for, our inspectors will ensure Entergy completes comprehensive technical analyses to ensure safety will be maintained. Our inspectors will also critically inspect Entergy's evaluations, as they become available, regarding the condition of the removed bolts, the results of any subsequent examinations and metallurgical tests, and Entergy's conclusions as to the causes of the problems. The NRC will assess the adequacy of Entergy's planned and completed corrective actions. The NRC will further review Entergy's evaluations regarding the applicability of this information to Indian Point Unit 3. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC inspector lines of questioning will focus on safety, namely the capability of the baffle-former assembly to structurally respond to conditions ranging from normal operation to accident scenarios. The scope of NRC inspections and conclusions will be documented in reports that will be made publicly available. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Neil Sheehan

comment #1653060 posted on 2016-04-27 12:33:40 by

Nice write-up, Neil. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Frank Costello

comment #1653063 posted on 2016-04-27 13:45:59 by drbillcorcoran

How would the reactor have responded to any and all design basis events, including loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and Steam Line Breaks (SLBs), if one had occurred just before the plant shutdown for the core former inspection? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How will the NRC develop lines of inquiry? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:How will Entergy develop lines of inquiry? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the failure modes? Did all of the failed bolts fail the same way? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the results of the metallographic examinations and tests? Were they all the same? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What is the time distribution of the failures? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the conditions, behaviors, actions, and inactions that resulted in the failures not being manifested before 2016? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Were there any alarms from the Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS)? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Were there any abnormal conditions that could be seen on any instrumentation and/or recordings? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the results of a careful inventory accounting of all of the bolts, bolt pieces, bolt fragments, fasteners, etc to nail down exactly what foreign material is going to be still inside the reactor coolant system? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:(Even temporarily trapped material can be freed by mechanical, hydraulic, or other perturbations/ shocks to the system, in which case the foreign material can damage important equipment including steam generator tubes and fuel cladding.) nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Did the Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS) detect any of the pieces from broken bolts? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If so, how did workers evaluate the quite valuable advice it provided? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If not, should it have detected the impacts from the metal pieces? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the other U.S. reactors that have bolts and similar fasteners inside the reactor coolant pressure boundary? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What are the other questions and lines of inquiry?

comment #1653064 posted on 2016-04-27 13:54:28 by drgenenelson

This is a well-written summary. However, I anticipate that nuclear power plant opponents will exaggerate risks. Here is a short 2:33 video from Areva that outlines the baffle bolt inspection and replacement process. https://youtu.be/fR-lVJUcbtY

comment #1653067 posted on 2016-04-27 14:47:15 by Public Pit Bull

> Yet another "safety first" at the Indian Point site in the backyard of NYC! It has to be another one of Murphy's infamous laws that a nuke site with one of the world's worst safety records has to be located in the backyard of one of the world's largest cities! It is incomprehensible to think that the NRC is seriously considering renewing the license of these units.

comment #1653069 posted on 2016-04-27 15:51:55 by drbillcorcoran in response to comment #1653064

> Dr. Gene, nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Thanks. Nice video. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:What is the risk that shouldn't be exaggerated?

comment #1653070 posted on 2016-04-27 16:31:04 by drbillcorcoran

> What were the circumstances of the “over 8700” bolts Areva has replaced? How many other bolts have been replaced? What were the circumstances?

comment #1653125 posted on 2016-04-28 10:09:01 by steamshovel2002

> Here you can see the folly of the NRC. In all of our government in general though crooked political campaign contributions. You think doing the national interest (altruism) is dragging your feet into following all the voluntary codes and rules or NRC rules? We will voluntarily rule it to death so we justify not doing anything and spending money. Following the endless codes and rules is the ends of life independent of results, not preventing core bolt failure independent any rules, codes or outside force. We are not too far from the rules preventing the detection of broken bolts in the core. Using rules and laws to protect the law breakers instead of our good people. We once used codes and laws to make the bad guys meet the ends of society and bring about a orderly society. Now we are using regulations and laws extensively into blinding the on scene federal inspectors. Next we will removing the guns from all our police and military in the name of faux altruism. We are using rules, laws and government itself to blind the NRC resident inspectors instead of controlling the bad guys. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I guess we live in the times where “black hole” organizations up and down the chain use triumphalism when things go wrong. We are always the heroes in our eyes independent of a orderly society, instead of charging them with gross negligence, incompetence... nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I thought the NRC and Entergy in relicensing by River Keeper, among others, forced Indian Point into doing the inspection. One only wonders when this would have been discovered if it wasn't a relicensing contention. It wasn't a voluntary inspection and the voluntary code boys didn't force anyone hands. It was just rule and voluntary codes churning leading to infinity. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:I keep thinking about my Palisades 2.206 where the primary coolant pump impeller blades were getting flung off by vibrations. They ignoring the requirements and a big blade getting stuck in the core. It is still there, it is stuck in the core. It took impeller blade debris discovered in the core during a inspection before they cared to worry about it multiple times. For decades. And the Salem multiple primary coolant pump missing bolts, indeed multiple plants, and more errant foreign debris found in the core. What a waste of money? A fool would know all this is unsafe in many aspects. What should worry you most, these plants were running totally out of control and without complete knowledge and complete situational awareness for many years and decades. Laws, Rules and codes all clearly facilitated these behaviors and the building incomplete knowledge. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Who does organizations and governments really serve...does policies, laws, rules and codes really serve a orderly society? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Mike Mulligan nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Hinsdale, NH

WCS Sends NRC Interim Storage Application

posted on Thu, 28 Apr 2016 18:42:14 +0000

> *Mark Lombard nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management* nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:You may have heard that the NRC has received an application today for a centralized storage facility for spent nuclear fuel. We thought this would be a good time to talk about what that facility would do, and how we will review the application. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:First some background. “Spent fuel” is the term we use for nuclear fuel that has been burned in a reactor. When spent fuel is removed from a reactor, it is very hot, so it is put immediately into an onsite pool of water for cooling. Initially, the plan in the ‘70s had been to send the spent fuel for “reprocessing” prior to final disposal, so usable elements could be removed and made into fresh fuel. But reprocessing fell out of favor in the United States in the ‘80s. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:[caption id="attachment_7100" align="alignright" width="427"]

Officials from Waste Control Specialists deliver its application to construct and operate a consolidated interim storage facility to Joel Munday, Acting Deputy Director of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.[/caption] nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:To manage their growing inventory, nuclear utilities turned to dry storage. The idea behind dry storage casks is to cool the fuel passively, without the need for water, pumps or fans. The first U.S. dry storage system was loaded in 1986. In the past 30 years, dry storage has proven to be safe and effective. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Against this backdrop, a Texas company, Waste Control Specialists (WCS), filed an application with us today for a dry cask storage facility to be located in Andrews County. WCS plans to store spent fuel from commercial reactors; initially, from reactors that have permanently shut down. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The application discusses utilizing dry storage casks that have previously been approved by the NRC. The spent fuel would arrive already sealed in canisters, so the handling would be limited to moving the canisters from transportation to storage casks. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Ever since Congress enacted the first law for managing spent nuclear fuel in 1982, federal policy has included some centralized site to store spent fuel before final disposal in a repository. Congress made DOE responsible for taking spent fuel from commercial reactors. It gave NRC the responsibility to review the technical aspects of storage facility designs to ensure they protect public health and safety and the environment. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We conduct two parallel reviews – one of the safety and security aspects, the other of potential environment impacts. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:But before those reviews get underway, we will review the application to see if it contains enough information that is of high enough quality to allow us to do the detailed reviews. If it doesn't, WCS will have a chance to supplement it. If we find the application is sufficient and accept it, we will publish a notice in the *Federal Register*. This notice will alert the public that we have accepted the application for technical review, and offer an opportunity to ask for a hearing. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Then we begin our reviews. At the beginning of our safety and security review, NRC staff will hold a public meeting near the site to answer questions about our process. We'll also have public meetings with WCS as needed so the staff can ask questions about the application. We will document this review in a Safety Evaluation Report. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Once we get public and stakeholder input on the scope of our environmental review, we will conduct the review and document the results in a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). We'll ask the public and stakeholders to comment on the draft. After considering those comments, we'll finalize it. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:We expect the review process to take us about three years, assuming WCS provides us with good information in a timely way during our review. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:If interested parties ask for a hearing, and their petition is granted by our Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, then the board will consider specific "contentions," or challenges to our reviews of the safety, security or environmental aspects of the proposed facility. The board will hold a hearing on any contentions that cannot be resolved. We can't predict how long this hearing process would take. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The Safety Evaluation Report, the EIS and the hearing need to be complete before the NRC staff can make a licensing decision. If the application meets our regulations, we're legally bound to issue a license. We don't consider whether there's a need for the facility or whether we think it's a good idea. Our reviews look only at the regulatory requirements, which are carefully designed to ensure public health and safety and the environment will be protected. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Incidentally, we are expecting an application for a second centralized interim storage facility Nov. 30. This one, to be filed by Holtec International, will be for a site in New Mexico. We'll follow the same process in reviewing that application.

Comments

comment #1653165 posted on 2016-04-28 19:07:53 by Reno Deano

> What is wrong with Yucca Mtn. deep waste storage facility, other than Harry Reid! DOE has been collecting money from commercial reactors for many decades! How is that going to set with the rate payers. I would not trust Texas communities to agree with the proposal.(Verbiage here removed by NRC moderator to adhere to blog comment guidelines.)

comment #1653166 posted on 2016-04-28 19:15:29 by Public Pit Bull

> You don't say NRC. It has only taken 34 years to get to this point & how many more years will it take you to do the right thing & even start taking this dangerous crap out of our backyards. Now you aim to put it right in the backyard of Texas & New Mexico. You could not get Nevada to cooperate on the Yucca mountain underground permanent site & you & DOE screwed around for decades doing it all at tremendous cost to us tax & rate-payers. Good luck with dealing with other states & private entities. Should have long ago done what Captain D recommended & put it on a remote, desolate, already-environmentally-screwed-up military reservation. Will you never learn!!

comment #1653185 posted on 2016-04-28 22:47:12 by Erica Gray

> "Against this backdrop, a Texas company, Waste Control Specialists (WCS), filed an application with us today for a dry cask storage facility to be located in Andrews County." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Why is WCS filing an application when the Utah company EnergySolutions is the owner? nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Nuclear Waste Firms Complete $270m Acquisition in US nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Salt Lake City, Utah based nuclear waste processing, transporting and recycling firm, EnergySolutions, Inc. has signed a definitive agreement to acquire Dallas based Waste Control Specialists which operates a 1338 acre radioactive waste disposal facility in Texas that features a 7 ft thick, steel-reinforced concrete liner system. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:https://waste-management-world.com/a/nuclear-waste-firms-complete-270m-acquisition-in-us

comment #1653236 posted on 2016-04-29 13:15:51 by Marni Magda

> This is an important step toward securing the nation's stranded nuclear waste. An interim storage location before a final depository is essential now that the requirements for high burn up fuel placed in dry storage must remain above ground for 60 or more years before they can go to a final depository. The consolidated interim storage facility must include military protection against terrorist to enforce a no fly zone including drones. The land use must be guaranteed for 100 years. The private company running the facility must be under review by a team of NRC and state and local stakeholders with a 20 year renewable contract.

comment #1653159 posted on 2016-04-28 16:41:37 by Don Hancock

> One paragraph is incomplete and misleading. It states: "Ever since Congress enacted the first law for managing spent nuclear fuel in 1982, federal policy has included some centralized site to store spent fuel before final disposal in a repository. Congress made DOE responsible for taking spent fuel from commercial reactors. It gave NRC the responsibility to review the technical aspects of storage facility designs to ensure they protect public health and safety and the environment." nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:While the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act did authorize DOE to find a Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) site, the 1987 amendment nullified the DOE's site at Oak Ridge, TN. Since that time, DOE has not pursued such siting. Instead, nuclear utilities formed Private Fuel Storage (PFS) and NRC licensed that site for storage in February 2006, but it has never operated. Under the law, DOE is NOT responsible for the private storage facilities, such as PRS, WCS, or the forthcoming Holtec application. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:The second sentence also is misleading, as it should state "Congress made DOE responsible for taking spent fuel from commercial reactors to a repository."

comment #1653192 posted on 2016-04-29 01:16:05 by Donna Gilmore

> Mark Lombard states inspecting canisters for corrosion and cracks "is not a now thing", so your claim of "30 years safe storage" assumes the canisters have no cracks, but you have no evidence. You need to stop misleading everyone about this. You know rhe Koeberg plant had a similar component leak in 17 years with cracks deeper than these thin canisters. You know a 2 year old Diablo Canyon canister has all the conditions for cracking, but you have no way to know whether it has started to crack. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=QtFs9u5Z2CA nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:You also know Dr. Singh, Holtec CEO, states it's not possible or feasible to repair the canisters and even a microscopic through wall crack will release millions of curies of radiation into the environment. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=euaFZt0YPi4&feature=youtu.be

comment #1653223 posted on 2016-04-29 10:03:57 by Don Hancock in response to comment #1653218

> I note that you didn't respond to the comment regarding the incomplete second sentence of the paragraph. That sentence should state: “Congress made DOE responsible for taking spent fuel from commercial reactors to a repository.”

comment #1653218 posted on 2016-04-29 09:45:49 by NRC in response to comment #1653159

You are correct that the 1987 amendments nullified DOE's proposal to build a spent fuel storage facility in Oak Ridge, Tenn. The same section of that law authorized the Secretary of Energy to build and operate an MRS for interim storage. It created a commission to look at the need for an MRS, and the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator to broker a deal with a community that would volunteer to host an MRS. DOE provided funding for feasibility grants that allowed communities to explore whether they might want to host an MRS. The Skull Valley Band of Goshutes was in talks with the Negotiator's Office when that office closed in February 1995 (the 1987 law included a "sunset" date for its closure). The Goshutes subsequently struck a deal with Private Fuel Storage for the facility the NRC licensed in 2006. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26 \usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:While PFS was licensed to operate without DOE involvement, Congress has not changed federal policy for interim storage as laid out in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Maureen Conley

comment #1653215 posted on 2016-04-29 08:52:03 by charles wilhelm

What was the fate of "Yucca Mountain"? I thought that was to be the final storage for Dry Casks, or am I mistaken

comment #1653227 posted on 2016-04-29 11:31:51 by

We would like to keep this blog post and discussions about it focused on the interim storage license application we received April 28. There have been several questions and comments about the Yucca Mountain repository program. Our most recent blog post discussing the NRC's role in that program, which links to a detailed backgrounder on licensing Yucca Mountain, can be found here: https://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2015/01/29/the-yucca-mountain-safety-evaluation-report-one-step-of-a-long-journey/ nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml: nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:NRC Moderator nrcpublicblog.wordpress.com-2016-05-02-13_32_26\usnrcblog.wordpress.2016-05-02.post_type-post.start_date-2016-03-01.end_date-2016-04-30.status-publish.001.xml:Maureen Conley

comment #1653229 posted on 2016-04-29 11:41:33 by Public Pit Bull in response to comment #1653227

Maureen, I respectfully disagree. This interim storage application would be totally unnecessary if our government & a couple of its agencies had dealt responsibly with the safe permanent storage of spent fuel in the first place decades ago!
