

## **2016 Mitigating Strategies Assessments for Flooding Documentation Requirements**

### **Acronyms:**

- MSFHI – Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information (from the FHRR and MSFHI letter)
- FHRR – Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report
- DB – Design Basis
- AMS – Alternative Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- THMS – Targeted Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- FLEX DB – FLEX Design Basis (flood hazard)

### **Definitions:**

**FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard:** the controlling flood parameters used to develop the FLEX flood strategies.

### **Assessment**

#### 1. Summary

Provide a brief introduction that states whether or not the FLEX design basis flood bounds the MSFHI and if not, summarizes what mitigation strategy (FLEX works, modify FLEX, AMS, or THMS) has been adopted and the key changes to equipment or deployment. No details are expected in this section, those will come later in the MSA.

#### 2. Documentation

##### 2.1. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.2 – Characterization of the MSFHI (all licensees need to complete)

Document the characterization of the MSFHI. This can be done by summarizing and/or referencing the FHRR submittal and associated RAI/Audit responses.

##### 2.2. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.3 – Comparison of the MSFHI and FLEX DB Flood (all licensees need to complete)

Document any flood parameter not bounded for all applicable flood-causing mechanisms in the following table. The table format should be used for each applicable flood mechanism. The table can be used to define individual controlling flood mechanisms or bounding parameters. Identify if individual controlling flood mechanisms or a bounding set of parameters are utilized. If one set of bounding parameters are utilized, note the associated mechanism for each parameter. This information should have already been developed with the FHRR submittal, and associated RAI responses; for clarity, copy the relevant information into the table below.

If the FLEX design basis flood bounds the MSFHI and is the same as the plant design basis flood for all applicable flood causing mechanisms, no further evaluation is necessary. Submit a summary letter to the NRC documenting the result.

If the FLEX design basis flood bounds the MSFHI for all applicable flood causing mechanisms, but differs from the plant design basis flood (additional conservatism may have

## Flooding MSA Template

Final, Rev 0

been included in the FLEX DB flood in anticipation of MSFHI results), document the relationship of the FLEX DB flood to the plant design basis flood in Table 1 for each flood mechanism and explain the changes. Submit Table 1 in a summary letter to the NRC explaining the result.

If the FLEX DB flood does not bound the MSFHI for all applicable flood causing mechanisms, document the relationship of the flood parameters in Table 1 as explained above and complete the MSA in accordance with section 2.3 below. If the NRC's review of the site's Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR) concluded that the description of associated effects or flood event duration needs to be reviewed in a subsequent evaluation (i.e., in the Focused Assessment, Integrated Assessment, or Mitigating Strategies Assessment), describe how the associated effects and flood event duration listed in the table were determined. Use a level of detail for this explanation that is consistent with the detail in the FHRR.

*Table 1 – Flood Causing Mechanism or Bounding Set of Parameters*

	<b>Flood Scenario Parameter</b>	<b>Plant DB Flood</b>	<b>FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard</b>	<b>MSFHI</b>	<b>MSFHI Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB) by FLEX DB</b>
Flood Level and Associated Effects	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. MSL)				
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. MSL)				
	3. Max Hydrodynamic/Debris Loading (psf)				
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion				
	5. Other associated effects (identify each effect)				
	6. Concurrent Site Conditions				
	7. Effects on Groundwater				
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)				
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)				
	10. Period of Inundation (hours)				
	11. Period of Recession (hours)				
Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations				
	13. Other Factors				
	Additional notes, 'N/A' justifications (why a particular parameter is judged not to				

	<p>affect the site), and explanations regarding the bounded/non-bounded determination.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. [Use Mean Sea Level or other applicable datum].</li> <li>2. [Use Mean Sea Level or other applicable datum]</li> <li>3. [Discuss the loads on flood barriers caused by flowing water and associated debris as identified in the FHRR.]</li> <li>4. [Discuss velocity and scour results and provide comparisons with CDB, permissible velocities, presence of scour resistant material, soil deposition, etc.]</li> <li>5. [Discuss any other significant detrimental effects associated with the flood hazard that are not otherwise listed in the table.]</li> <li>6. [Discuss conditions that could exist concurrent with this flood-causing mechanism or combined-effect flood (e.g. high winds, ice formation, etc.)]</li> <li>7. [Discuss if and how this flood-causing mechanism or combined-effect flood could cause a surcharge to groundwater, considering flood duration and soil conditions.]</li> <li>8. [Discuss warning time; may include information from relevant forecasting methods (e.g., products from local, regional, or national weather forecasting centers) and ascension time of the flood hydrograph to a point (e.g. intermediate water surface elevations) triggering entry into flood procedures and actions by plant personnel. Reference NEI 15-05 for LIP.]</li> <li>9. [Discuss period of site preparation (after entry into flood procedures and before flood waters reach site grade).]</li> <li>10. [Discuss period of inundation.]</li> <li>11. [Discuss period of recession, when flood waters completely recede from site and plant continues to be in a safe and stable state that can be maintained indefinitely and include applicable references to the document where the information is contained if not contained in the description in section 1.1. Also discuss the timing of loss and restoration of site access if the site is not accessible due to flooding for some period during the flood event duration.]</li> <li>12. [Additional notes regarding plant mode of operations and include applicable references to the document where the information is contained if not contained in the description in section 1.1.]</li> <li>13. [Discuss other plant-specific factors (e.g. waterborne projectiles) and include applicable references to the document where the information is contained if not contained in the description in section 1.1.]</li> </ol>
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REVIEWERS NOTE: For some sites, the NRC’s review of the site’s FHRR included a statement that the licensee is expected to develop flood event duration parameters and applicable associated effects to conduct the MSA. For those sites, supporting detail consistent with the FHRR should be provided in addition to the values for those parameters provided in Table 1.

## 2.3. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4 – Evaluation of Mitigating Strategies for the MSFHI

### 2.3.1. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.1 – Assessment of Current FLEX Strategies (all licensees need to complete)

Document the evaluation that demonstrates existing FLEX strategies are acceptable without modification for the MSFHI.

2.3.1.1. Document for each flooding hazard with an exceedance, whether FLEX is viable and if not, what strategy (modify FLEX, AMS or THMS) will be used to address the associated hazard. Reference Section G.4.1 in NEI 12-06 revision 2. Address each of the evaluation bullets in this section.

#### 2.3.1.2. Conclusions

Document which of the following conclusions are drawn from the assessment and provide a basis for the conclusions:

- If the evaluation demonstrates that the existing FLEX strategies can be deployed as designed for all applicable-flood causing mechanisms then the MSA is then considered complete.
- If the evaluation demonstrates that the existing FLEX strategies cannot be implemented as designed, then document the basis for selecting “Modified FLEX”, “AMS”, or “THMS” for each applicable mechanism. Also, provide a brief explanation of why FLEX is not viable for each hazard (for example: deployment pathways were submerged and insufficient warning time was available to pre-deploy equipment).

### 2.3.2. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.2 – Assessment for Modified FLEX Strategies

Document the items in Section G.4.2 in NEI 12-06 revision 2. Address each of the evaluation bullets in this section.

If the existing FLEX strategies cannot be implemented as designed and “Modified FLEX” is selected to address the deficiencies, expand upon the documentation in Section 2.3.1 and provide the following for each hazard that uses a “Modified FLEX” strategy, or for the bounding set of parameters if that approach is used:

- Summary of the changes to the FLEX strategies, including changes to deployment plans;
- Description and explanation of any revised sequence of events, if applicable, demonstrating the necessity of revised FLEX actions, the reason for any changes, and the acceptability of the result;
- Description and justification of any modifications (equipment, procedures, etc.), if applicable, to address the modified FLEX actions;
- A description and explanation of any changes to flood protection features; and
- Identify any validation items that will need to be re-performed based on the changes. Validation documentation does not need to be submitted and should be performed following any modifications or procedure revisions.

### 2.3.3. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.3 and G.4.4 – Assessment of Alternative and Targeted Hazard Mitigating Strategies

Document the items in Section G.4.3 or G.4.4 as applicable in NEI 12-06 revision 2. Address each of the evaluation bullets in this section for each hazard that uses a “THMS” or “AMS” strategy, or for the bounding set of parameters if that approach is used.

If the existing FLEX strategies cannot be implemented as designed and “AMS” or “THMS” is selected to address the deficiencies, expand upon the documentation in Section 2.3.1 and document the evaluation that concludes that the selected strategy will mitigate the MSFHI. The following items should be included:

- A description of the sequence of events for the flood hazard(s), an explanation of any changes with respect to the original FLEX design, and a description of why the result is acceptable;
- A detailed description of the mitigating strategies selected;
- A description of what elements of the strategy have changed as compared to the mitigating strategies design approved for compliance with EA-12-049, and the basis for the change.
- A list of changes to the FLEX equipment necessary for the mitigating strategies. The level of detail in the list should be consistent with the equipment list in the OIP or FIP;
- A description of how the provisions in Sections 3, 6, and 11 of NEI 12-06, Rev. 2 have been addressed;
- A description and explanation of any changes to flood protection features.
- A description and justification of any modifications (equipment, procedures, etc.) to address the mitigating strategies actions;
- A description of any validation items that will need to be performed based on the changes. Validation documentation does not need to be submitted and should be performed following any modifications or procedure revisions.
- For a THMS, document the justification for not maintaining the containment capability.

### 2.3.4. Documentation

The MSA documentation retained at the site and available for NRC audit should be included in and be of the same level of detail as that included in the Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Program Document. The MSA submittal to the NRC should be at a level of detail consistent with the OIP or FIP.

RS-\_\_-\_\_\_\_

December 31, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Example Power Station, Unit 1  
Facility Operating License No. \_\_\_\_  
NRC Docket No. \_\_\_\_\_

**Subject:** Example Generation Company, LLC Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report Submittal

**References:**

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident; dated March 12, 2012.
2. Example Generation Company, LLC Letter to USNRC, Response to March 12, 2012 Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 2, Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Example Generation Company, LLC Letter to USNRC, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Fukushima Lessons Learned – Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Example Generation Company, LLC Letter to USNRC, Response to NRC Audit Review Request for Additional Information Regarding Fukushima Lessons Learned – Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
5. NRC Staff Requirements Memoranda to COMSECY-14-0037, "Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards", dated March 30, 2015.
6. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), Report NEI 12-06 [Rev 2], Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, dated December 2015.
7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1, Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, dated \_\_\_\_\_.

8. NRC Letter, Example Power Station, Unit No. 1 – Interim Staff Response to Reevaluated Flood Hazards Submitted in Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Information Request – Flood-Causing Mechanism Reevaluation (TAC NO. MF 3654), dated \_\_\_\_\_.
9. NRC Letter, Supplemental Information Related to Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Flooding Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 1, 2013.
10. Example Power Station, Compliance Letter and Final Integrated Plan in Response to the March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated \_\_\_\_\_.

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Reference 1 to request information associated with Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1 for Flooding. One of the Required Responses in Reference 1 directed licensees to submit a Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR). For Example Power Station, the FHRR was submitted on \_\_\_\_\_ (Reference 2). The reevaluated flood hazard was further developed in response to requests for additional information (References 3 and 4). Per Reference 9, the NRC considers the reevaluated flood hazard to be “beyond the current design/licensing basis of operating plants”.

Concurrent to the flood hazard reevaluation, Example Power Station developed and implemented mitigating strategies in accordance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events". In Reference 5, the Commission affirmed that licensees need to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within their mitigating strategies for BDB external events, including the reevaluated flood hazards. Guidance for performing mitigating strategies assessments (MSAs) is contained in Appendix G of Reference 6, endorsed by the NRC (with conditions) in Reference 7. For the purpose of the MSAs, the NRC has termed the reevaluated flood hazard, summarized in Reference 8, as the “Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information” (MSFHI). Reference 6, Appendix G, describes the MSA for flooding as containing the following elements:

- Section G.2 – Characterization of the MSFHI
- Section G.3 – Comparison of the MSFHI and FLEX DB Flood
- Section G.4.1 – Assessment of Current FLEX Strategies (if necessary)
- Section G.4.2 – Assessment for Modifying FLEX Strategies (if necessary)
- Section G.4.3 – Assessment of Alternative Mitigating Strategies (if necessary)
- Section G.4.4 – Assessment of Targeted Hazard Mitigating Strategies (if necessary)

The following provides the MSA results for the Example Power Station.

#### Reference 6, Section G.2 – Characterization of the MSFHI

Characterization of the Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information (MSFHI) is summarized in Table 1 of Reference 8; the NRC’s interim response to the flood hazard reevaluation submittal (Reference 2) and amended submittals (References 3 and 4). A more detailed description of the MSFHI, along with the basis for inputs, assumptions, methodologies, and models, is provided in the following references:

- Local Intense Precipitation (LIP): See Section 3.1 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Flooding in Streams and Rivers: See Section 3.2 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Dam Breaches and Failures: See Section 3.4 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Storm Surge: See Section 3.3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Seiche: See Section 3.3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Tsunami: See Section 3.8 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Ice-Induced Flooding: See Section 3.6 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Channel Migration or Diversion: See Section 3.7 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Combined Effects (including wind-waves and runup effects): See Section 3.5 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1, and References 3 and 4.
- Other Associated Effects (i.e. hydrodynamic loading, including debris; effects caused by sediment deposition and erosion; concurrent site conditions; and groundwater ingress): See Sections 3.10 and 4 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1, and References 3 and 4.
- Flood Event Duration Parameters (i.e. warning time, period of site preparation, period of inundation, and period of recession): See Sections 3.10 and 4 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1, and References 3 and 4.

At Example Power Station, the seiche, tsunami, ice-induced flooding, channel migration or diversion, and NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H combined-effect floods H.2 (seismically-induced dam failure) and H.4.1 (floods along the shores of enclosed bodies of water, shore location) flood-causing mechanisms were either determined to be implausible or completely bounded by other mechanisms. Some individual flood-causing mechanisms (i.e. flooding in streams and rivers, dam breaches and failures, and surge) are addressed in one or more of the combined-effect floods. Only LIP and the NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H, H.1 combined-effect flood (floods caused by precipitation events, including hydrologic dam failure) for Example River were determined to be applicable flood-causing mechanisms at Example Power Station.

In Reference 8, the NRC concluded that the “reevaluated flood hazards information [i.e. MSFHI], as summarized in the Enclosure [Summary Table of the Reevaluated Flood Hazard Levels], is suitable for the assessment of mitigating strategies developed in response to Order EA-12-049” for Example Power Station.

[REVIEWERS NOTE: For some sites, the NRC’s review of the site’s FHRR included a statement that the licensee is expected to develop flood event duration parameters and applicable associated effects to conduct the MSA. For those sites, supporting detail consistent with the FHRR should be provided in addition to the values for those parameters provided the [Summary Table of the Reevaluated Flood Hazard Levels] in Reference 8.]

#### Reference 6, Section G.3 – Basis for Mitigating Strategies Assessment (FLEX Design Basis Comparison)

For Example Power Station, the FLEX design basis (FLEX DB) flood, described in Reference 10, is equivalent to the plant’s current design basis (CDB) flood. A complete comparison of the CDB and reevaluated flood hazards is provided in Section 4 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1. As described in References 2, 3, and 4 and summarized below, the CDB and, by relationship, FLEX DB floods bound the reevaluated flood (i.e. MSFHI) for all applicable flood-causing mechanisms, including associated effects and flood event duration parameters.



The NRC further affirms in Reference 8 that “the reevaluated flood hazard mechanisms are bounded by the CDB” and “it is unnecessary for the licensee [Example Power Station] to perform an integrated assessment or focused evaluation”.

Therefore, since the MSFHI is bounded by the FLEX DB (equivalent to the CDB), as affirmed by the NRC, Example Power Station considers the requirement to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within its BDB mitigating strategies as being satisfied with no further action required.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments and no revision to existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the \_\_\_\_\_.

Respectfully submitted,

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs  
Example Generation Company, LLC

RS-\_\_-\_\_\_\_

December 31, 2016

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Example Power Station, Unit 1  
Facility Operating License No. \_\_\_\_  
NRC Docket No. \_\_\_\_\_

**Subject:** Example Generation Company, LLC Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report Submittal

**References:**

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident; dated March 12, 2012.
2. Example Generation Company, LLC Letter to USNRC, Response to March 12, 2012 Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 2, Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
3. Example Generation Company, LLC Letter to USNRC, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Fukushima Lessons Learned – Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
4. Example Generation Company, LLC Letter to USNRC, Response to NRC Audit Review Request for Additional Information Regarding Fukushima Lessons Learned – Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, dated \_\_\_\_\_.
5. NRC Staff Requirements Memoranda to COMSECY-14-0037, "Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards", dated March 30, 2015.
6. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), Report NEI 12-06 [Rev 2], Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, dated December 2015.
7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1, Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, dated \_\_\_\_\_.

8. NRC Letter, Example Power Station, Unit No. 1 – Interim Staff Response to Reevaluated Flood Hazards Submitted in Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Information Request – Flood-Causing Mechanism Reevaluation (TAC NO. MF 3654), dated \_\_\_\_\_.
9. NRC Letter, Supplemental Information Related to Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Flooding Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 1, 2013.
10. Example Power Station, Compliance Letter and Final Integrated Plan in Response to the March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated \_\_\_\_\_.

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Reference 1 to request information associated with Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.1 for Flooding. One of the Required Responses in Reference 1 directed licensees to submit a Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR). For Example Power Station, the FHRR was submitted on \_\_\_\_\_ (Reference 2). The reevaluated flood hazard was further developed in response to requests for additional information (References 3 and 4). Per Reference 9, the NRC considers the reevaluated flood hazard to be “beyond the current design/licensing basis of operating plants”.

Concurrent to the flood hazard reevaluation, Example Power Station developed and implemented mitigating strategies in accordance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events". In Reference 5, the Commission affirmed that licensees need to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within their mitigating strategies for BDB external events, including the reevaluated flood hazards. Guidance for performing mitigating strategies assessments (MSAs) is contained in Appendix G of Reference 6, endorsed by the NRC (with conditions) in Reference 7. For the purpose of the MSAs, the NRC has termed the reevaluated flood hazard, summarized in Reference 8, as the “Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information” (MSFHI). Reference 6, Appendix G, describes the MSA for flooding as containing the following elements:

- Section G.2 – Characterization of the MSFHI
- Section G.3 – Comparison of the MSFHI and FLEX DB Flood
- Section G.4.1 – Assessment of Current FLEX Strategies (if necessary)
- Section G.4.2 – Assessment for Modifying FLEX Strategies (if necessary)
- Section G.4.3 – Assessment of Alternative Mitigating Strategies (if necessary)
- Section G.4.4 – Assessment of Targeted Hazard Mitigating Strategies (if necessary)

The following provides the MSA results for the Example Power Station.

#### Reference 6, Section G.2 – Characterization of the MSFHI

Characterization of the Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information (MSFHI) is summarized in Table 1 of Reference 8; the NRC’s interim response to the flood hazard reevaluation submittal (Reference 2) and amended submittals (References 3 and 4). A more detailed description of the MSFHI, along with the basis for inputs, assumptions, methodologies, and models, is provided in the following references:

- Local Intense Precipitation (LIP): See Section 3.1 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Flooding in Streams and Rivers: See Section 3.2 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Dam Breaches and Failures: See Section 3.4 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Storm Surge: See Section 3.3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Seiche: See Section 3.3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Tsunami: See Section 3.8 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Ice-Induced Flooding: See Section 3.6 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Channel Migration or Diversion: See Section 3.7 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1.
- Combined Effects (including wind-waves and runup effects): See Section 3.5 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1, and References 3 and 4.
- Other Associated Effects (i.e. hydrodynamic loading, including debris; effects caused by sediment deposition and erosion; concurrent site conditions; and groundwater ingress): See Sections 3.10 and 4 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1, and References 3 and 4.
- Flood Event Duration Parameters (i.e. warning time, period of site preparation, period of inundation, and period of recession): See Sections 3.10 and 4 of Reference 2, Enclosure 1, and References 3 and 4.

As discussed in Reference 2, the flood hazard reevaluation showed that the seiche, tsunami, ice-induced flooding, channel migration or diversion, and NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H combined-effect floods H.2 (seismically-induced dam failure) and H.4.1 (floods along the shores of enclosed bodies of water, shore location) flood-causing mechanisms were either determined to be implausible or completely bounded by other mechanisms. Some individual flood-causing mechanisms (i.e. flooding in streams and rivers, dam breaches and failures, and surge) are addressed in one or more of the combined-effect floods. Only LIP and the NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H, H.1 combined-effect flood (floods caused by precipitation events plus hydrologic dam failure) for Example River were determined to be applicable flood-causing mechanisms at Example Power Station. Parameters for these flood-causing mechanisms, including associated effects and flood event duration parameters, are described in detail in Reference 2 and summarized in the enclosure. [Note that Example Power Station elected to provide a bounding set of MSFHI parameters, instead of individual parameters, in the enclosure.]

In Reference 8, the NRC concluded that the “reevaluated flood hazards information [i.e. MSFHI], as summarized in the Enclosure [Summary Table of the Reevaluated Flood Hazard Levels], is suitable for the assessment of mitigating strategies developed in response to Order EA-12-049” for Example Power Station.

[REVIEWERS NOTE: For some sites, the NRC’s review of the site’s FHRR included a statement that the licensee is expected to develop flood event duration parameters and applicable associated effects to conduct the MSA. For those sites, supporting detail consistent with the FHRR should be provided in addition to the values for those parameters provided the [Summary Table of the Reevaluated Flood Hazard Levels] in Reference 8.]

#### Reference 6, Section G.3 – Basis for Mitigating Strategies Assessment (FLEX Design Basis Comparison)

At Example Power Station, the FLEX design basis (FLEX DB) flood, described in Reference 10, is primarily based on the plant’s current design basis (CDB) flood but also incorporated aspects of the reevaluated flood hazard (i.e. MSFHI), including [describe which reevaluated flood-causing mechanisms and parameters were incorporated into the FLEX DB flood].

A complete comparison of the FLEX DB and reevaluated flood hazards (i.e. MSFHI), provided in the enclosure, shows that the FLEX DB flood bound the MSFHI for all applicable flood-causing mechanisms, including associated effects and flood event duration parameters. Therefore, Example Power Station considers the requirement to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within its BDB mitigating strategies as being satisfied with no further action required.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments and no revision to existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the \_\_\_\_\_.

Respectfully submitted,

\_\_\_\_\_

Director - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs  
Example Generation Company, LLC

Enclosure:

- FLEX DB and MSFHI – Flood Parameter Comparison Tables

ENCLOSURE

FLEX DB AND MSFHI – FLOOD PARAMETER COMPARISON TABLES

Table 1 – Local Intense Precipitation Flood Parameter Comparison

Flood Scenario Parameter		Plant's Current Design Basis	FLEX Design Basis	MSFHI	Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB)
Flood Level and Associated Effects	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. MSL)	536.8	536.8	536.6	B
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. MSL)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	3. Max Hydrodynamic (lb/ft)/Debris Loading (lb)	N/I	See note	2.0 lb/ft	B
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion	N/I	See note	See note	B
	5. Other associated effects (identify each effect)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	6. Concurrent Site Conditions	N/I	See note	See note	B
	7. Effects on Groundwater	N/I	See note	See note	N/A
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)	N/A	See note	See note	N/A
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	10. Period of Inundation (hours)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	11. Period of Recession (hours)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations	Any	Any	Any	B
	13. Other Factors	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

N/A = Not Applicable      N/I = Not Included

Additional notes, 'N/A' justifications (why a particular parameter is judged not to affect the site), and explanations regarding the bounded/non-bounded determination. The note numbers below correspond to the parameter number in the table.

1. Elevation may vary around the site; represents the maximum flood elevation.
2. Consideration of wind-wave action for the LIP event is not explicitly required by NUREG/CR-7046 and is judged to be a negligible because of limited fetch lengths and flow depths.
3. The hydrodynamic and hydrostatic loads are determined as force per unit length of structure (lb/ft). To determine the force for the entire structure the loads need to be multiplied by the structure length. The hydrodynamic and hydrostatic loads are bounded by the design basis maximum tornado wind load. The debris load for the LIP event is assumed to be negligible due to the absence of heavy objects at the plant site and due to low flow velocity, the factors combination of which could lead to a hazard due to debris load. Additionally, the water depth around the buildings due to LIP are relatively shallow.
4. The flow velocities due to the LIP event are determined to be below the suggested velocities (USACE 1984) for the ground cover type (concrete and gravel) at the plant area. Therefore, significant erosion is not expected for the LIP flood. Similarly, the relatively low velocities and flow depths are not expect to have the power to transport sediment and cause significant deposition during the LIP flood.
5. None
6. High winds could be generated concurrent to a LIP event. However, manual actions are not required to protect the plant from LIP flooding so this concurrent condition is not applicable.
7. The majority of the plant area is paved or gravel. Also, the soil in the site area is generally characterized by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) as sandy clay loam (Hydrologic Soil Group C). These land use and soil type features would limit the volume of rainfall infiltrated during a short-duration (1-hour) LIP event and groundwater seepage would likely be minimal.
8. SSC's important to safety are currently protected by means of permanent/passive measures. Therefore, warning time is not applicable to the LIP flood.
9. SSC's important to safety are currently protected by means of permanent/passive measures. Therefore, period of site preparation is not applicable to the LIP flood.
10. SSC's important to safety are currently protected by means of permanent/passive measures. Therefore, period of inundation is not applicable to the LIP flood.
11. SSC's important to safety are currently protected by means of permanent/passive measures. Therefore, period of recession is not applicable to the LIP flood.
12. None

13. None

[REVIEWER NOTE: Table notes were developed for this specific example. User should develop site specific notes that are consistent with the NEI MSA template.]



Table 2 – NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H, H.1 Combined-Effect Flood (floods caused by precipitation events plus hydrologic dam failure) Parameter Comparison for Example River

Flood Scenario Parameter		Plant's Current Design Basis	FLEX Design Basis	MSFHI	Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB)
Flood Level and Associated Effects	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. MSL)	540.3	540.3	538.9	B
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. MSL)	N/I	544.0	542.8	B
	3. Max Hydrodynamic (lb/ft)/Debris Loading (lb)	See note	See note	1800/8100	B
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion	N/I	See note	See note	B
	5. Other associated effects (identify each effect)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	6. Concurrent Site Conditions	N/I	See note	See note	B
	7. Effects on Groundwater	See note	See note	See note	B
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)	N/I	96	105.5	B
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)	30.0	30.0	37.1	B
	10. Period of Inundation (hours)	50.0	50.0	37.5	B
	11. Period of Recession (hours)	7.0	9.0	8.0	B
Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations	All	All	All	B
	13. Other Factors	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<p>N/A = Not Applicable      N/I = Not Included</p> <p>Additional notes, 'N/A' justifications (why a particular parameter is judged not to affect the site), and explanations regarding the bounded/non-bounded determination. The note numbers below correspond to the parameter number in the table.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Use Mean Sea Level or other applicable datum.</li> <li>2. Use Mean Sea Level or other applicable datum</li> <li>3. The original structural design criteria (tornado missile loads) for safety-related structures bound the MSFHI loads. FLEX equipment is elevated above the MSFHI wind-wave runup elevation and, as a result, are not subject to flooding loads.</li> <li>4. The flow velocities due to a river flood are determined to be below the suggested velocities (USACE 1984) for the ground cover type (concrete and gravel) at the plant area. Therefore, significant erosion is not expected for the LIP flood. 2D models do not show abrupt changes in direction and magnitude of velocity vectors that would cause significant deposition during the river flood.</li> <li>5. None</li> <li>6. High winds could be generated concurrent to a LIP event. However, the FLEX design considered 1-minute sustained wind-speeds of 45 mph (equivalent to a 100-year 1-minute sustained wind).</li> <li>7. The CLB assumes that safety-related structures below site grade are protected from ingress to plant grade. Therefore, the river flood is not expected to surcharge groundwater and cause ingress below grade during a river flood. The MSFHI stillwater flood elevation is less than the CDB flood elevation so no additional pressure head will be applied beyond the CDB flood.</li> <li>8. None</li> <li>9. None</li> <li>10. None</li> <li>11. None</li> <li>12. None</li> <li>13. None</li> </ol>					

[REVIEWER NOTE: Table notes were developed for this specific example. User should develop site specific notes that are consistent with the NEI MSA template.]

[REVIEWER NOTE: The above tables could be replaced with the table below if the licensee chooses to use a bounding set of MSFHI flood parameters.]

Table 1 – Bounding Set of MSFHI Flood Parameters

Flood Scenario Parameter		Associated Flood-Causing Mechanism	Plant's Current Design Basis	FLEX Design Basis	MSFHI	Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB)
Flood Level and Associated Effects	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. [datum])					
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. [datum])					
	3. Max Hydrodynamic/Debris Loading (psf)					
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion					
	5. Other associated effects (identify each effect)					
	6. Concurrent Site Conditions					
	7. Effects on Groundwater					
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)					
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)					
	10. Period of Inundation (hours)					
	11. Period of Recession (hours)					
Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations					
	13. Other Factors					

N/A = Not Applicable      N/I = Not Included

Additional notes, 'N/A' justifications (why a particular parameter is judged not to affect the site), and explanations regarding the bounded/non-bounded determination. The note numbers below correspond to the parameter number in the table.

1. Use Mean Sea Level or other applicable datum.
2. Use Mean Sea Level or other applicable datum
3. [Discuss the loads on flood barriers caused by flowing water and associated debris as identified in the FHRR.]
4. [Discuss velocity and scour results and provide comparisons with CDB, permissible velocities, presence of scour resistant material, etc.]
5. [Discuss any other significant detrimental effects associated with the flood hazard that are not otherwise listed in the table, such as soil deposition.]
6. [Discuss conditions that could exist concurrent with this flood-causing mechanism or combined-effect flood (e.g. high winds, ice formation, etc.)]
7. [Discuss if and how this flood-causing mechanism or combined-effect flood could cause a surcharge to groundwater, considering flood duration and soil conditions.]
8. [Discuss warning time; may include information from relevant forecasting methods (e.g., products from local, regional, or national weather forecasting centers) and ascension time of the flood hydrograph to a point (e.g. intermediate water surface elevations) triggering entry into flood procedures and actions by plant personnel. Reference NEI 15-05 for LIP.]
9. [Discuss period of site preparation (after entry into flood procedures and before flood waters reach

site grade).]

10. [Discuss period of inundation.]
11. [Discuss period of recession, when flood waters completely recede from site and plant continues to be in a safe and stable state that can be maintained indefinitely. Also discuss the timing of loss and restoration of site access if the site is not accessible due to flooding for some period during the MSFHI.]
12. [Additional notes regarding plant mode of operations.]
13. [Discuss other plant-specific factors (e.g. waterborne projectiles).]

**2016 Mitigating Strategies Assessments for Flooding  
Documentation Requirements  
(DRAFT)**

**Acronyms:**

- MSFHI – Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information (from the FHRR and MSFHI letter)
- FHRR – Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report
- DB – Design Basis
- AMS – Alternative Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- THMS – Targeted Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- FLEX DB – FLEX Design Basis (flood hazard)
- PMF – Probable Maximum Flood
- PMP – Probable Maximum Precipitation
- LIP – Local Intense Precipitation
- ELAP – Extended Loss of AC Power
- LUHS – Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink

**Definitions:**

**FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard:** the controlling flood parameters used to develop the FLEX flood strategies.

1. Summary

The overall strategy for the storage and deployment of FLEX equipment is unaffected by the results of the FHRR and can be implemented as designed. Specifically LIP and PMP, do not impact site FLEX capabilities. Details of the FLEX strategies along with bounding flood will be discussed later in this document. Therefore, the current FLEX strategies can be deployed fully with no additional operator actions or pre-staging additional equipment.

2. Documentation

2.1. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.2 – Characterization of the MSFHI (all licensees need to complete)

The plant identified no issues associated with flood-causing mechanisms from PMF on the East or Winters washes, or LIP. Other mechanisms such as dam failure Storm Surge, Seiche, Tsunami, Ice-Induced Flooding, and Channel Migration Diversions have no impact on the site (Reference NRC Letter ML15280A022).

2.2. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.3 – Comparison of the MSFHI and FLEX DB Flood (all licensees need to complete)

The Current Licensing Basis for the plant states that the site is considered a “Dry Site” (Reference UFSAR section 1.8, response to Regulatory Guide 1.102). It continues in section 2.4.3 stating in part, “Areas adjacent to the power block are sloped away at 0.5 to 1%. This results in a minimum drop of 5 to 7 feet at the peripheral drainage system, as compared to the grade elevation at each unit.” And, “The volume of water in the vicinity of the power block area consequent to a 6-hour PMP is based on zero infiltration losses and a complete blockage of the drainage culverts for the storm

duration.” Table 1 reflects data from the MSFHI for each applicable flood-causing mechanism that are bounded or comparable to the site’s Design Basis/FLEX Design Basis flood.

*Table 1 – Flood Causing Mechanism A or Bounding Set of Parameters*

Flood Scenario Parameter		Plant DB Flood	FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard	MSFHI	MSFHI Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB) by FLEX DB
Flood Level and Associated Effects	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. MSL)	962.8 at “A1” 954.7 at “B” 944.0 at “C”	Same As	963.4 at “A1” 955.2 at “B” 946.2 at “C”	Comparable (see foot note #1)
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. MSL)	964.6 at “A1” 956.5 at “B” 945.8 at “C”	Same As	964.78 at “A1” 956.58 at “B” 947.58 at “C”	Comparable (see foot note #2)
	3. Max Hydrodynamic/Debris Loading (psf)	Did Not Specify	Same As	NA (see foot note #3)	NB (see foot note #3)
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion	See foot note #4	Same As	Screened Out	B
	5. Other associated effects (identify each effect)	None	Same As	None	B
	6. Concurrent Site Conditions	None	Same As	None	B (see foot note #6)
	7. Effects on Groundwater	None	Same As	None	B
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)	0	Same As	0	B (see foot note #8)
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)	None	Same As	None	B
	10. Period of Inundation (hours)	0	Same As	0	B (see foot note #10)
	11. Period of Recession (hours)	None	Same As	None	B
Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations	No Restrictions	Same As	No Restrictions	B (see foot note #12)
	13. Other Factors	None	Same As	None	B
		<p>Additional notes, ‘N/A’ justifications (why a particular parameter is judged not to affect the site), and explanations regarding the bounded/non-bounded determination.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Flooding hazard information is from the East Wash (Reference FHRR, Table 4-3). Although the values in the FHRR are slightly higher than the DB, they are comparable to the DB, since the refined analysis determined that both the north and east embankments of East Wash were not overtopped.</li> <li>2. Flooding hazard information is from the East Wash (Reference FHRR, Table 4-3).</li> </ol>			

	<p>Although the values in the FHRR including wave run-up are slightly higher than the DB, they are comparable to the DB, since the refined analysis determined that both the north and east embankments of East Wash were not overtopped.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Hydrodynamic loading is the maximum load at safety-related structures (Reference FHRR, Table 4-4). Debris loading screened out qualitatively based on flow depths, flow velocities, and flow directions predicted by the FLO-2D model for the powerblock area (Reference FHRR, section 3.2.1.3). This value is not applicable to MSFHI since there are no Safety related structures within the site that is subject to hydraulic loads.</li> <li>4. Scour due to sediment transport during river flooding was evaluated and screened out (UFSAR Section 2.4.10) (Reference FHRR, Table 4-4).</li> <li>5. None.</li> <li>6. Bounded by item 2</li> <li>7. None.</li> <li>8. Since affects from flood causing mechanisms will not impact safe shutdown equipment, the plants capability to achieve cold shutdown will remain the same as the existing design and licensing bases. There are no additional risk due to flooding for an unplanned shut downs.</li> <li>9. None.</li> <li>10. Power block is not inundated as a result of any flooding event (Reference FHRR sections 2 and 3).</li> <li>11. Rain water runoff will collect in the drainage ditches and will completely recede by mostly discharging into the realigned East Wash (Reference UFSAR 2.4.2.2.2). The plants will continue to run safely and be stable throughout the event, and can be maintained indefinitely. At 24 hours into the event, hauling routes will be accessible, allowing equipment to be hauled with existing FLEX vehicles to their designated deployment locations, if FLEX equipment is needed.</li> <li>12. The plants can be in any operating mode during any of these flooding events.</li> <li>13. None.</li> </ol> <p>REVIEWERS NOTE: For some sites, the NRC’s review of the site’s FHRR included a statement that the licensee is expected to develop flood event duration parameters and applicable associated effects to conduct the MSA. For those sites, supporting detail consistent with the FHRR should be provided in addition to the values for those parameters provided in Table 1.</p>
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2.3. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4 – Evaluation of Mitigating Strategies for the MSFHI

2.3.1.NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.1 – Assessment of Current FLEX Strategies (all licensees need to complete)

The overall FLEX planned response to an ELAP and LUHS will be initiated through normal plant command and control procedures and practices. Site emergency operating procedures (EOPs) or abnormal operating procedures (AOPs) govern the operational response. The FLEX strategies

will be deployed in support of the AOPs/EOPs using the FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs), which will provide direction for using FLEX equipment in maintaining or restoring key safety functions.

2.3.1.1. Site flood hazards associated with the parameters of the MSFHI that are comparable to or are bounded by site's Current Licensing Basis."

2.3.1.2. Conclusions

The current FLEX strategies can be deployed as designed as submitted in the Final Integrated Plan. Ponding of rain water runoff at the peripheral drainage system will have receded sufficiently after 24 hours to allow hauling of equipment with existing FLEX vehicles to their designated deployment locations. The first of this equipment, deploying after 24 hours, will be the 480 VAC generators (Reference FLEX Support Guidelines). A minimal amount of accumulation (ponding from rain water runoff) near the facilities is expected which will not impede the operation the FLEX equipment. No other applicable flood-causing mechanisms will affect the hauling routes of FLEX equipment. Flooding event during lower modes is assessed by the shutdown risk assessment when an outage is being planned. Since the site pre-deploys FLEX equipment during the lower modes, the hauling routes do not need to be available at the start of the events when a unit is in an outage. Additionally, the need to start FLEX pumps and generators is not required until 38.5 hours into the event (Reference FLEX Support Guidelines).

**2016 Mitigating Strategies Assessments for Flooding  
Documentation Requirements  
(G.4.2 Draft Template)**

**Acronyms:**

- MSFHI – Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information (from the FHRR and MSFHI letter)
- FHRR – Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report
- DB – Design Basis
- AMS – Alternative Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- THMS – Targeted Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- MSL – Mean Sea Level
- PMP – Probable Maximum Precipitation
- FLEX DB – FLEX Design Basis (flood hazard)
- SWL – Still Water Level
- PMSS- Probable Maximum Storm Surge
- LIP – Local Intense Precipitation
- SWEL – Surface Water Elevation
- ELAP – Extended Loss of AC Power
- PSL – St Lucie Nuclear Plant
- RAB – Reactor Auxiliary Building

**Definitions:**

**FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard:** The controlling flood parameters used to develop the FLEX flood strategies.

1. Summary

The MSFHI provided in the PSL FHRR (Ref.1) has concluded that the Local Intense Precipitation (LIP) and hurricane induced Probable Maximum Storm Surge (PMSS) can challenge implementation of the FLEX strategies. The existing FLEX strategies for these events can be modified to address the impacts of the MSFHI. Other reevaluated flood hazard mechanisms (i.e.: tsunami, channel migrations/diversions, etc.), are bounded by the FLEX design basis and have no impact on the site.

The MSFHI LIP flooding levels develop a depth above critical door sills for a limited period of time. Door seals are being updated and will be maintained to limit water intrusion (Ref. 2) and prevent challenge to the FLEX strategies. Personnel and equipment transport will be delayed during the flooding period. FLEX mitigation strategy timelines have been verified to not be challenged by the LIP affects (Ref. 4 & 5).

The MSFHI Hurricane storm surge delays transportation of portable equipment beyond the period analyzed in the FIP submittal. The surge water level also challenges a remote permanently installed motor control center used the FLEX strategies.

The FLEX response timeline has been modified and verified to ensure FLEX strategies can implemented to address the Probable Maximum Storm Surge with wave run-up (PMSS) generated by a hurricane storm surge (Ref. 4 & 5).



Alternatives to protect the challenged motor center from the storm surge are being tracked in the stations Corrective Action Program. NextEra Energy will continue the modification process once the MSA has been approved by the NRC.

The hardened FLEX equipment storage building and the power block are constructed at an elevation that exceeds the MSFHI results.

Ample hurricane warning time allows for a controlled shut down of the Reactor, implementation of storm preparation activities, and mobilizing additional on-site personnel and resources. Extended coping time, increased resources (personnel, fuel, water and equipment) and the reduced number of required FLEX activities during and after the storm lessen the challenge of the storm surge.

## 2. Documentation

### 2.1. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.2 – Characterization of the MSFHI

#### **Local Intense Precipitation (LIP)**

##### **Flood Height**

The reevaluated LIP analysis, documented in the PSL FHRR (Ref.1), is for a suite of durations (1, 6, 12, 24, 48, 72 hours). The maximum flooding depth of accumulated water in the power block area is 3.20 ft.

##### **Flood Event Duration**

Based upon the LIP effect on Plant Internal Flooding evaluation (Ref.3) and FLEX deployment strategy (Ref. 4) the flood water maintains a depth above critical door sills for a maximum of 2.6hrs.

##### **Relevant Associated Effects**

The bounding calculated water level inside RAB 1 is 2.4 inches (Ref. 3). This value is acceptable as the bottom height of the critical equipment is at least 6 inches above the building floor (19.5 ft PSL-datum). The maximum volume of water conveyed to the lower levels (-0.5 ft PSL-datum) was evaluated to be on the order of 90,000 gallons. This value is also acceptable because the volume of water that can be safely accommodated in the lower level was previously calculated at 135,000 gallons (Ref 3).

For RAB 2 the bounding water level inside is 0.9 in. This value is deemed acceptable because the critical equipment bottom is at least 6 inches above the building floor (+19.5 ft PSL-datum). The volume of water conveyed downstairs to the lower levels (-0.5 ft PSL-datum) was evaluated to reach a maximum of 16,700 gallons. This amount of water can be safely accommodated within the lower levels because it is significantly less than the calculated safe maximum of 135,000 gallons (Ref 3).

##### **Warning Time**

An LIP event resulting from a Synoptic Storm (i.e. large frontal system) provides limited warning time; therefore, the FLEX deployment strategy was evaluated, and it was concluded that sufficient time margin exists to delay deployment until LIP flood waters have receded (Ref 3).

**Probable Maximum Storm Surge (PMSS)**

**Flood Height**

The reevaluated PMSS analysis, documented in the PSL FHRR (Ref.1), determined an SWL of 15.86' MSL (18.3 ft-PSL Datum). PMSS with wave run-up was also analyzed; however, waves dissipate before reaching the Powerblock.

**Flood Event Duration**

Based upon the FHRR (Ref.1) and FLEX deployment strategy (Ref. 4 & 5) the flood water restricts FLEX equipment deployment for approximately 6 hrs.

**Relevant Associated Effects**

The flooding reevaluation determined that the maximum wave run-up occurs at the discharge canal and would result in overtopping of the steel sheet-piling barrier at the nose of the discharge canal, but this overtopping discharge volume is deemed insignificant. The reevaluated wave run-up analyses concluded the Powerblock is protected from wave run-up by the discharge canal steel sheet-piling barrier (Ref. 1). The FLEX equipment storage building is elevated and also protected. The storm surge does flood the redundant travel paths from the equipment storage building and the Powerblock for approximately 6 hours.

A remote motor control center, used to power some phase 1 FLEX equipment is constructed at 15.11' MSL which is 0.75' below the FLEX designed flood level.

**Warning Time**

Hurricane based events provide sufficient warning time (12-72 hrs) that allows the plant to be Shutdown to Mode 3, 4 or 5 (with Steam Generators available) at least 2 hrs prior to projected onset of hurricane force winds (Ref. 4).

2.2. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.3 – Comparison of the MSFHI and FLEX DB Flood

*Table 1a – Flood Causing Mechanism A (LIP) or Bounding Set of Parameters*

	<b>Flood Scenario Parameter</b>	<b>Plant Current Design Basis</b>	<b>FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard</b>	<b>MSFHI LIP</b>	<b>Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB) by FLEX DB</b>
<b>Flood Level and Associated Effects</b>	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. MSL)	19.5 ft. Plant Datum	See Note 1	Maximum Flood Depth 3.16' Unit 1 2.07' Unit 2	NB
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. MSL)	Not included	16.36' MSL 18.8' Plant Datum	See note 2	B
	3. Max Hydrodynamic /Debris Loading (psf)	Not included	See Note 3	See Note 3	NB
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion	Not included	See Note 4	See Note 4	B
	5. LIP associated effects	Not calculated	See Note 5	3.16 ft Unit 1 2.07 ft Unit 2	NB

	6. Concurrent Site Conditions	Not included	N/A	See Note 6	N/A
	7. Effects on Groundwater	Not included	N/A	N/A	N/A
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)	Not included	0	0	B
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)	Not included	0	0	B
	10. Duration of Significant Flooding (hours)	Not included	See Note 7	1.3	NB
	11. Period of Recession (hours)	Not included	See Note 7	2.6	NB
Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations	Not included	All	All	B
	13. Other Factors	Not included	-	-	-
<p>Additional notes, 'N/A' justifications (why a particular parameter is judged not to affect the site), and explanations regarding the bounded/non-bounded determination.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>MSFHI LIP water levels were not considered during the FLEX strategies and therefore are not bounded.</li> <li>Wave run-up was evaluated for the spectrum of waves that can potentially impact PSL coincident with the PMSS event. LIP wave run-up is considered bounded by this analysis or N/A.</li> <li>The FLEX DB did not consider hydraulic or debris loading due to LIP; therefore, the reevaluated LIP loading conditions is considered not bounded. Further evaluation (Ref. 8) concludes the FLEX strategies will not be challenged. The potential debris generation caused by the LIP event will be from unsecured materials located inside the plant Powerblock. Procedurally controlled housekeeping practices (Ref. 7) minimize the amount of material/debris that can be moved by LIP runoff. The flow velocities inside the Powerblock are low, minimizing the ability for waterborne projectiles to adversely affect plant and flood protection features.</li> <li>The maximum velocities around the PSL site during the LIP/PMP generally occur throughout the canal. For scour and erosion to occur, the water velocity must be greater than permissible velocities for the ground cover materials (smooth asphalt 15 ft/s, rough asphalt 12ft/s and natural earth w/ vegetation 6 ft/s). The highest predicted velocities are located in areas already occupied by water, where runoff drains into a body of water or occur in remote places far outside the power block. Given that all velocities greater than 6 ft/s occur on asphalt and/or paved areas, and that the only area where velocities are greater than 12 ft/s occurs inside an existing pond, it was concluded qualitatively that scour/erosion from an LIP or PMP event is insignificant (Ref. 3).</li> <li>The MSFHI LIP results were not considered in the FLEX strategies and therefore are not bounded. A Synoptic Storm provides limited warning time; therefore, the FLEX deployment strategy has been assessed to ensure sufficient time margin exists to delay deployment until LIP flood waters recede (Ref. 3&amp;5). Penetrations that limit water intrusion into the Powerblock will be updated and maintained to ensure FLEX strategies are not challenged (Ref. 2&amp;9).</li> <li>MSFHI LIP and hurricane storm surge hazards bound the flooding hazards at the site and do not occur simultaneously.</li> <li>LIP results in approximately 2.6 hour duration of flooding including 1.3 hours of recessions. The period of flooding and recession was not considered in the FLEX</li> </ol>					

strategies therefore it was considered not bounding. All FLEX strategy required actions can be completed indoors during this period of time. Equipment mobilization is not prohibited because transport is scheduled after the flood has receded prior to the time required by the original time-line (Ref. 5)

*Table 1b – Flood Causing Mechanism A (PMSS) or Bounding Set of Parameters*

Flood Scenario Parameter		Site Current Design Basis	FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard	MSFHI Hurricane	Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB) by FLEX DB
Flood Level and Associated Effects	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. MSL)	19.5 ft (Plant Datum)	17.2' (Plant Datum) 14.76' MSL	18.3' (Plant Datum) 15.86' MSL	NB See Note 1
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. MSL)	18.1 ft- plant island southeast corner 18.5 ft- south discharge canal 18.8 ft- north Unit 1 28.0 ft- north of discharge canal	18.8' (Plant Datum) 16.36' MSL	18.3' (Plant Datum) 15.86' MSL	B See Note 2
	3. Max Hydrodynamic/Debris Loading (psf)	Not considered	See Note 3	See Note 3	B
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion	Not considered	See Note 4	See note 4	B
	5. Other associated effects (Not including LIP)	See Note 5	N/A	N/A	B
	6. Concurrent Site Conditions	Not considered	No Impact	N/A	N/A
	7. Effects on Groundwater	Not considered	No Impact	N/A	N/A
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)	Not considered	12-72	12-72	B See Note 6
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)	Not considered	12-72	12-72	B See Note 6
	10. Duration of Significant Flooding (hours)	Not considered	3	7	NB See Note 7
	11. Period of Recession		2	4	NB See Note 7
Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations		Modes 3, 4 or 5	Modes 3, 4 or 5	B See Note 8
	13. Other Factors	-	-	-	-
<p>Additional notes, 'N/A' justifications (why a particular parameter is judged not to affect the site), and explanations regarding the bounded/non-bounded determination.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The travel paths between the FLEX storage building and the Powerblock flood longer than the period considered for the FLEX strategies and therefore considered not bounded.</li> <li>The CLB is exceeded, but the new levels are below the physical level of protection for critical plant equipment. The reevaluation includes a sea level rise of 0.20 ft for the</li> </ol>					

remainder of the current license. The available physical margin is 1.2 ft (19.5 ft – 18.3 ft = 1.2 ft) for still water and wave run-up.

3. The PMSS event does not result in Hydrodynamic/Debris Loading in Powerblock since the grade is located above the highest probable WSEL, there would be no threat of Hydrodynamic/Debris Loading that could impact safety-related structures in that area (Ref.1). For sections of the FLEX equipment deployment route that are located outside the Powerblock the FLEX DB accounted for debris removal time in the FLEX strategy (Ref. 5).
4. Debris and sedimentation accumulation resulting from a PMSS is expected to have the largest impact on the east side (ocean side) of the plant site due to wave run-up. Because the PSL Powerblock grade is located above the highest probable WSEL, there would be no threat of debris and sedimentation that could impact safety-related structures in that area. Since sections of the FLEX equipment deployment route are located outside the Powerblock the FLEX DB accounted for debris removal time in the FLEX strategy.
5. Tsunami flooding was not considered in the CLB. The tsunami maximum wave runup evaluation determined a surge elevation of EL +17.62 ft-PSL Datum. However, the available physical margin of 1.88 ft (19.5 ft –17.62 ft = 1.88 ft) remains during the event; therefore, the tsunami would not affect critical SSCs.
6. The preparation and time required for the MSFHI hurricane are unchanged and therefore bounded. Hurricane based events provide sufficient warning time to ensure the site is in a hardened state that is well prepared to cope with the events by having the site tanks filled with water, both units shut down and on-site resources augmented (Ref. 4).
7. The MSFFHI hurricane storm surge and recession is greater than the time considered in the FLEX strategies and is therefore considered not bounded. The increased period of storm surge delays the transport of the Portable FLEX equipment for up to 6 hours. FLEX strategy timelines have been adjusted and response margins verified acceptable (Ref. 5).
8. Hurricane based events provide sufficient warning time (12-72hrs) that allows the plant to be Shutdown to Mode 3, 4 or 5 (with Steam Generators available) at least 2 hrs prior to projected onset of hurricane force winds (Ref. 4).

### 2.3. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4 – Evaluation of Mitigating Strategies for the MSFHI

#### 2.3.1.NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.1 – Assessment of Current FLEX Strategies

The overall plant response strategies to an ELAP and loss of ultimate heat sink event using the current FLEX procedures, equipment and personnel can be implemented as described in the Final Implementation Plan provided the following modifications are implemented:

- a. equipment deployment timelines are modified to accommodate the PMSS
- b. key power block penetrations upgraded or verified sufficient to prevent water from challenging installed plant equipment for a LIP event
- c. a flood barrier is constructed to protect a single motor control center from a PMSS.

##### 2.3.1.1. Conclusions – Modify FLEX

NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.2 – Assessment for Modifying FLEX Strategies:

The existing FLEX mitigation strategies can be implemented with relatively minor modifications.

The MSFHI LIP event provides limited warning time and produces rainfall amounts that challenge the current FLEX mitigation strategies. LIP water levels exceed some critical door thresholds and channels in the equipment deployment roadways.

Door seals have been modified and will be maintained to ensure LIP water in-leakage will not challenge the existing FLEX strategies (Ref. 9). The current mitigation strategy timeline contains sufficient margin for local floodwaters to recede prior to the required deployment of FLEX equipment as described in the FIP.

Hurricane preparation activities as described in the FIP are unchanged. Hurricane warning times allow ample time for event preparation which includes maximizing inventories and resources. Existing procedures also require the reactor to be shut down in advance which extends the coping times and reduces the number of required FLEX activities during the event. (i.e. RCS cooldown, boration).

The MSFHI hurricane storm surge delays the portable equipment deployment. The most limiting mitigating strategy time constraint is the deployment of the FLEX 480V generators required to repower one battery charger on each unit. Existing battery management strategies extend life to 14 hours on Unit 2 and 21 hours on Unit 1 (Ref.6). The portable equipment deployment timeline has been modified to reflect the period needed for the hurricane flood water to recede and repowering batteries prior to voltage depletion (Ref 5).

The MSFHI hurricane storm surge also challenges a remote permanently installed motor control center used the FLEX strategies. Design alternatives are being tracked in the station Corrective Action Program and will be progressed once the NRC approves the stations MSA.

Additional on-site personnel provide more resources than previously used to demonstrate that equipment deployment activities meet timeline requirements and therefore the deployment activities will not require re-validation.

#### 2.4. References

1. FPL Letter L-2015-048 to NRC, FPL/St. Lucie Plant's Flooding Hazards Reevaluation for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Flooding Aspects of Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 10, 2015 (ML15083A264)
2. PSL Preventive Maintenance Door Seal Inspection (PMs 82687 & 82688)
3. Enercon Report NEE-131-PR-001, Rev 0, Effects of Local Intense Precipitation (LIP) on Plant Internal Flooding Report, dated August 19, 2015
4. Eval PSL-ENG-SEMS-14-005 Rev 0, St. Lucie FLEX Final Integrated Plan Document (EC 284024)
5. FLEX MSFHI Hurricane and LIP Strategy time-lines
6. Calc FPL064-CAL-04 & -05, Rev0 Unit 1&2 Battery Load Shedding Strategy
7. MA-AA-100-1008 (Station Housekeeping and Material Control)
8. LIP hydraulic and debris loading white paper
9. Penetrations upgrades and maintenance procedures white paper

**2016 Mitigating Strategies Assessment for Flooding  
Documentation Requirements  
(DRAFT Plant G.4.3 Submittal)**

**Acronyms:**

- MSFHI – Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information (from the FHRR and MSFHI letter)
- FHRR – Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report
- DB – Design Basis
- AMS – Alternative Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- THMS – Targeted Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- FLEX DB – FLEX Design Basis (flood hazard)

**Definitions:**

**FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard:** the controlling flood parameters used to develop the FLEX flood strategies.

**1. Summary**

The site is a single unit 700 MWe Westinghouse PWR located on a reservoir that provides cooling water for the site. The Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR) for the site includes a reevaluated flood hazard that exceeds both the plant design basis and FLEX design basis. The maximum reevaluated flood hazard for Flood-Causing Mechanisms for use in the MSA is the Combined-effect River Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). Impacts of the Combined-effects River PMF include flooding on the first level of the Reactor Auxiliary Building and a loss of all AC power due to flooding of the switchyard and the emergency diesels. Additionally, the PMF event results in a loss of the ultimate heat sink upon failure of the reservoir dam.

Due to a loss of the ultimate heat sink an Alternate Mitigating Strategy (AMS) is required.

**2. Documentation**

**2.1. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.2 – Characterization of the MSFHI**

References:

1. NEI 12-06, Rev 2
2. FHRR
3. RAI Responses 1 (additional flood parameters)
4. RAI Responses 2 (dam breach parameters)
5. MSFHI Letter
6. Warning Time Calculation and Procedures for LIP (per NEI 15-05)
7. NEI 12-06, Rev 0

Characterization of the MSFHI

The bounding external flood-causing mechanism from the FHRR (Reference 2, Section 3.9) for the site is a Combined-effects River PMF with a maximum water level of 233.8 ft msl. Site grade is 225 ft

Recommended combinations of events were based on ANSI/ANS 2.8 1992 Section 9.2, and also in NUREG/CR-7046 Appendix H. The site is bounded by a reservoir on the east and a railroad on the west. The 171.5 square mile drainage basin feeds the reservoir that borders the site. The controlling combined-effect applicable to the site is a PMF that results from the combination of a 500 year antecedent storm with a subsequent PMP that includes wave run-up induced by 2-year wind speed (Reference 3) and a subsequent dam breach (Reference 4) on the reservoir adjoining the site. With a flooding stillwater elevation of 231.8 feet msl, the maximum wave run-up is 2.0 feet with a total maximum water level of 233.8 ft msl. This elevation is higher than the site grade of 225 ft msl.

**2.2. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.3 – Comparison of the MSFHI and FLEX DB Flood (all licensees need to complete)**

A Combined-effect River PMF is the only flooding event not bounded for all applicable flood-causing mechanisms. The set of parameters for the flooding event are included in Table 1 below.

*Table 1 – Flood Causing Mechanisms or Bounding Set of Parameters*

**Combined-effect River PMF**

Flood Scenario Parameter		Plant DB Flood	FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard	MSFHI (Reference 5)	Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB) by FLEX DB
Flood Level and Associated Effects	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. msl)	Dry Site	Dry Site	231.8 ft	NB
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. msl)	Dry Site	Dry Site	2.0 ft	NB
	3. Max Hydrodynamic/Debris Loading (psf)	Dry Site	Dry Site	Note 1	N/A
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion	Dry Site	Dry Site	Note 2	N/A
	5. Other associated effects (identify each effect)	Dry Site	Dry Site	None	N/A
	6. Concurrent Site Conditions	Dry Site	Dry Site	2-yr wind speed	NB
	7. Effects on Groundwater	Dry Site	Dry Site	Note 3	N/A
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)	Dry Site	Dry Site	12 hrs	NB
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)	Dry Site	Dry Site	6 hrs	NB
	10. Period of Inundation (hours)	Dry Site	Dry Site	9.5 hrs	NB
	11. Period of Recession (hours)	Dry Site	Dry Site	Note 4	N/A
Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations	Dry Site	Dry Site	All modes	N/A
	13. Other Factors	Dry Site	Dry Site	None	N/A
Notes					
1. Debris from the upstream watershed will not translate to the site due to the low velocities in the flood waters on site and the constricted crossing of the State Road near the north end of the reservoir.					
2. It is also assumed that topography will not change during the event due to sediment erosion/accretion due to the low water velocities on site and the event duration.					



3. No below ground safety related structures exist on site.
4. Due to the site being a free flowing site with a small upstream watershed, no additional time is associated with recession of the flood waters beyond the period of inundation.

**REVIEWERS NOTE: This example does not assume that any open items were identified in the NRC review of the FHRR. For some sites, the NRC's review of the site's FHRR included a statement that the licensee is expected to develop flood event duration parameters and applicable associated effects to conduct the MSA. For those sites, supporting detail consistent with the FHRR should be provided in addition to the values for those parameters provided in Table 1.**

### **2.3. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4 – Evaluation of Mitigating Strategies for the MSFHI**

#### **2.3.1. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.1 – Assessment of Current FLEX Strategies**

Current FLEX Strategies assume a dry site based on the site design basis as required by NEI 12-06 Rev 0 (Reference 7). For the FHRR, site flooding occurs during the Combined-effect PMF. Even though FLEX equipment is stored above the maximum flood waters, the site FLEX strategy would be impacted by the early loss of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump from flood waters. The flood waters prevent deployment of the backup FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (diesel driven) during the event. The current deployment location for the FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater pumps would be also below flood waters. Additional flooding impacts on the FLEX strategy include the loss of ultimate heat sink (adjoining reservoir). The sites FLEX response currently includes only time zero events with no provision for warning time to support pre-deployment.

##### **2.3.1.1. Assessment of FLEX Strategies (Reference Section G.4.1 in NEI 12-06 Rev 2). Responses to the bullets in Section G.4.1 are described below:**

- **The boundary conditions and assumptions of the initial FLEX design are maintained.**

The boundary conditions and assumptions for the initial FLEX design do not include any external flooding events at the site. The current FLEX strategy assumes a dry site and all events are time zero events without warning time. The FHRR Combined-effect PMF flooding scenarios result in flood waters significantly above site grade which inundates the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump that is credited as the primary source of feedwater for FLEX. Floodwaters also prevent access to deploy FLEX during the period of flooding above site grade.

- **The sequence of events for the FLEX strategies is not affected by the impacts of the MSFHI (including impacts due to the environmental conditions created by the MSFHI) in such a way that the FLEX strategies cannot be implemented as currently developed.**

The sequence of events for the FLEX strategies are affected by the impacts of the Combined-effect PMF as described in the FHRR. Due to flooding levels and durations, time sensitive actions for FLEX to establish feed to the Steam Generators cannot be completed within the required 61 minutes when the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump is lost due to flooding. The ultimate heat sink is also lost when the dam on the adjoining reservoir fails. On-site inventories are exhausted 16

hours after a reactor trip. The reservoir will not be available as a water source after dam failure on the adjoining reservoir.

- **The validation performed for the deployment of the FLEX strategies is not affected by the impacts of the MSFHI.**

FLEX strategies cannot be deployed during the flooding event. FLEX strategies for RCS cooling from the Steam Generators are defeated during the event due to a loss the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and an inability to deploy the portable FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. Feedwater makeup is lost after the flooding event due to lack of a water source after site inventories are depleted.

#### **2.3.1.2. Conclusions**

The existing FLEX strategies cannot be implemented as designed. FLEX alone cannot be modified because alternate equipment and ultimate heat sink are required. Alternate Mitigating Strategies (AMS) are required.

#### **2.3.2. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.2 – Assessment for Modifying FLEX Strategies**

Not applicable

#### **2.3.3. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.3 – Assessment of Alternative Mitigating Strategies.**

A description of the events for the flood hazard including the site response is provided in Attachment 1 with detailed description of the following:

- The sequence of events for the flood hazard(s) including elapsed time and actions taken.
- The detailed description of the mitigating strategies.
- A detailed list of equipment necessary for the mitigating strategies.
- A description of how the provisions in Sections 3, 6, and 11 of NEI 12-06, Rev. 2 have been addressed.
- Description of validation items that will need to be performed based on the changes
- On site staffing evaluation to support pre-deployment during the warning time.

Even though alternate mitigation strategies are used, FLEX provides a majority of the mitigating equipment and strategies used to address the FHRR flooding. A summary of the Alternate Mitigating Strategy is provided below with an emphasis on describing those aspects of the strategy that are different from the current FLEX strategy.

- **The sequence of events for the flood hazard(s):**

Current FLEX strategies were designed assuming a dry site (no external flooding) with all events being time zero events with no warning time.

The Combined-effect PMF event is described in detail in Section 3.2 of FHRR (Reference 2). The entire storm event consists of an antecedent storm of 500-year probability that lasts for 72 hours, a dry period of 72 hours, and a 72-hour probable maximum precipitation (PMP) event with wave run-up induced by 2-year wind speed. The antecedent storm delivers rainfall amounts included in the current licensing basis, and the PMP storm provides additional rainfall amounts that are beyond design basis. Water surface elevations at the reservoir overtop the dam causing dam failure.

No site flooding occurs during the 500 year antecedent storm and the subsequent dry period. Site flooding begins approximately 40 hours after the start of the full PMP event. Flood levels increase until the dam on the adjoining reservoir fails. Flooding starts on the site grade and recedes to below site elevation over a duration of approximately 9.5 hours.

- **Description of the mitigating strategies:**

1. Event Warning Time (Reference 6) – Current FLEX strategy does not include warning time for any of the events. As part of the revised strategy to respond to the PMF event, warning time will be used to deploy mitigating strategies prior to flooding. Twelve (12) hours of Warning time will be based on the following: If a storm system is approaching the site within 72 hours (Day 3) with a 24 hour NOAA Probabilistic Quantitative Precipitation Forecast (PQPF) total of 5 inches or more (95<sup>th</sup> Percentile), the corporate meteorologist would then notify the site and monitoring each shift would be initiated at the site. If the PQPF for 24 hour rainfall is projected to be 5 inches or greater within 12 hours, a trigger would be activated to enter the Severe Weather Abnormal Procedure where pre-deployment of mitigating strategies would be initiated.
2. Pre-deployment of mitigating strategies (6 hours required to complete actions assuming minimum on site staffing):
  - a. Feedwater for Core Cooling - Pre-deploy FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (diesel driven) to a new location above the floodwaters on the concrete pad next to the Condensate Storage Tank. As described in the current FLEX Implementation Guide (FIG), the discharge flexible piping would be connected to the FLEX AFW discharge piping connection, and the pump suction to the Condensate Storage Tank. The current FLEX response relies on the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump when the ELAP occurs, with the FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps providing back-up capability. The flood mitigation strategy would rely on the FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and FLEX flow paths as the primary response when the floodwaters cause the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Pump to fail. Current FLEX Implantation Guides are written to direct the operator to use the FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and FLEX flow paths to maintain core cooling. The changes required to the current FLEX strategy including pre-deployment of the FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps to a new dry location, and revising the FIG to inform the operator that flooding may cause the loss of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and require the use of the backup FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.
  - b. Ultimate Heat Sink – The ultimate heat sink and long term water source for current FLEX strategy is lost when the dam fails on the adjoining reservoir. On site inventories will last 16 hours. An alternate makeup water source is provided by pre-staging one of the portable FLEX diesel generators above the flood level on the concrete pad next to the Condensate Storage Tank and connecting the generator AC cable to power the B5b “D” Deepwell pump for Condensate Storage Tank makeup water. A modification would be required to provide a standard FLEX electrical power cable connection with a disconnect to separate the B5b “D” Deepwell pump from the normal power supply. A modification would also be required to provide a FLEX standard makeup

connection to the Condensate Storage Tank. FLEX Implementation Guides would have to be developed to provide guidance to execute these actions and a NEI 12-06 Rev 2 Appendix E evaluation would be needed to validate the actions.

- c. Repower Strategy – The repower strategy is the same as the current FLEX strategy. However, the flooding mitigating strategies uses warning time to eliminate this action as a time critical action. Cables from the pre-staged diesel generator (located in a 2<sup>nd</sup> room above the flooding) are connected to the battery chargers with portable cabling (two complete sets) as currently directed by the FIG.

### 3. ELAP Initiation

- a. Declare ELAP within 60 minutes of the loss of all AC power
- b. Actions taken within first six hours after ELAP:
  - i. Start up the FLEX diesel (150 Kw) and provide AC power to the battery chargers within 60 minutes
  - ii. Manually align valves and initiate feedwater using the FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to feed the S/Gs within 61 minutes of losing the Turbine Driven AFW pump.
  - iii. Manually steam the Steam Generators using the Main Steam Bypass valves and initiate a cooldown of the RCS to ~425F: S/G's to ~290 psig in 2 – 4 hours.
  - iv. Monitor Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) level from the Control Room.
  - v. Monitor Containment pressure
  - vi. Provide notifications to state, counties, NRC, INPO, NSRC
- c. Actions taken beyond six hours:
  - i. Start FLEX diesel and power-up the B5b "D" Deepwell pump to provide makeup as required for the Condensate Storage Tank (site inventories depleted after 16 hours).
  - ii. Pre-job briefs for RCS boration/makeup
  - iii. Makeup to Spent Fuel Pool
  - iv. Track fuel oil consumption
    - 1. Equipment has average of 20 hours onboard supply
    - 2. Two 500 gallon trailered tanks with DC delivery pump in FLEX dome
    - 3. On-site fuel supply will last 5 days
  - v. Monitor SFP (23 hours to 10 feet above fuel)
  - vi. Monitor Containment (43 days to reach 42 psig)

- **Changes to the FLEX equipment necessary for the mitigating strategies.**

Because of a loss of the ultimate heat sink that provide water for the FLEX strategies, the B5b "D" Deepwell pump would provide an alternate water source for Steam Generator feedwater by providing makeup (1320 gpm makeup to support maximum initial feedwater requirements of approximately 300 gpm) to the Condensate Storage tank. A modification would be required to provide a water sealed power connection above the maximum flood level to power the B5b "D" Deepwell pump from the FLEX diesel and a disconnect added to isolate the pump from the normal plant circuitry. One of the FLEX portable AC diesel generators would be deployed to a location above the flood level and to provide power for the B5b "D" Deepwell pump. A modification would also be required to provide FLEX standard hose connections from the B5b "D" Deepwell pump to the Condensate Storage Tank to provide makeup water. This same water source would be used for spent fuel pool make-up as directed by current FLEX strategies.

- **Elements of the strategy that have changed as compared to the mitigating strategies design approved for compliance with EA-12-049, and the basis for the change.**

The majority of the AMS strategy relies on the existing FLEX strategy with the exception of the use of warning time for the flooding event to pre-stage equipment and the use of an alternate water source to supply feedwater after the loss of the ultimate heat sink due to dam failure. Warning time actually allows more time to perform FLEX time sensitive actions (eg charging for the batteries as part of the existing repower strategy).

After the ELAP occurs, the FLEX strategy is used to maintain core cooling, spent fuel pool cooling and containment integrity. Due to the flooding of the Turbine Driven Feedwater pump used in the FLEX strategy, the backup FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pump becomes the primary method for feeding the steam generators. The FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps will be deployed to a new location above the floodwaters on an existing pad located next to the Condensate Storage Tank.

With the loss of the ultimate heat sink due to dam failure, the B5b "D" Deepwell pump can provide all make up water requirements indefinitely. The B5b "D" Deepwell pump is located in a concrete protected enclosure which would provide protection from the floodwaters and any associated effects. To make this source available for flooding mitigating strategies, the existing junction box must be raised above the maximum flood height. The cabling must be modified to include a separate FLEX cable connection to the FLEX diesel generator, a disconnect to separate the pump from its normal power source, and on/off circuitry to operate the pump. These modifications will not impact the sites ability to meet the site B5b requirements.

- **A description and explanation of any changes to flood protection features:**

As a design basis dry site, the only flood protection features are the normal finished floor elevation of buildings and plant equipment above site grade (approximately 1 ft) to protect from rain events. No flood protection features would be added or modified.

- **A description of how the provisions in Sections 3, 6, and 11 of NEI 12-06, Rev. 2 have been addressed;**

The installed plant equipment being used beyond that required for the original implementation of FLEX comes from the B5b program and were designed, procured and maintained to meet the site requirements for B5b. This includes the B5b “D” Deepwell pump and associated piping and circuitry. The piping to supply water to the Condensate Storage tank is a combination of site permanent piping and flexible hoses and connections. The flex hoses and connections would be purchased using the same specifications as FLEX hoses and include the same color coding system to aid in connecting up the flow path without the requirement for tools. All of the AMS portable equipment will be stored in the FLEX building and maintained to the same standards as the FLEX equipment.

- **Describe any validation items that will need to be performed based on the changes. Validation documentation does not need to be submitted and should be performed following any modifications or procedure revisions.**

Validation using NEI 12-06 Rev 2 Appendix E will be required for the following actions to be performed during the warning time prior to the arrival of floodwaters:

- a. Pre-deploy FLEX Auxiliary Feedwater pump to the concrete pad next to the Condensate Storage Tank and connecting the suction and discharge piping.
- b. Pre-deploy the FLEX Diesel Generator to the concrete pad next to the Condensate Storage Tank and connect the electrical cables to the B5b “D” Deepwell Pump.
- c. Pre-deploy cables to support the repower strategy for the battery chargers.

#### **2.3.4 Documentation**

The MSA documentation is retained at the site and available for NRC review. The level of detail is consistent with the sites FLEX FIP and associated Program Documents.

Attachment 1

**REVIEWERS NOTE: A sequence of events for the flood hazard including the site response should be provided as an attachment to the MSA with a level of detail consistent with the FLEX Overall Implementation Plan including:**

- The sequence of events for the flood hazard(s);
- The detailed description of the mitigating strategies;
- A detailed list of equipment necessary for the mitigating strategies;
- A description of how the provisions in Sections 3, 6, and 11 of NEI 12-06, Rev. 2 have been addressed;
- Description of validation items that will need to be performed based on the changes.
- On-site staffing evaluation to support strategy changes such as pre-staging equipment during warning time.

**2016 Mitigating Strategies Assessments for Flooding  
Documentation Requirements  
(Example Plant G.4.4 Submittal)**

**Acronyms:**

- MSFHI – Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information (from the FHRR and MSFHI letter)
- FHRR – Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report
- DB – Design Basis
- AMS – Alternative Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- THMS – Targeted Hazard Mitigating Strategies
- FLEX DB – FLEX Design Basis (flood hazard)

**Definitions:**

**FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard:** the controlling flood parameters used to develop the FLEX flood strategies.

1. Summary

The FLEX DB flood strategy does not bound the NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H, H.1 combined-effect flood (floods caused by precipitation events plus hydrologic dam failure and wind-wave run-up) for Example River were determined to be applicable flood-causing mechanisms at Example Power Station. The river height of this flood will require the units to be shut down and cooled down to <212 F and the containment to be opened to flood the reactor cavities to maintain cold shutdown. Because of not fully maintaining the containment function a THMS is required. The LIP flood is not addressed in Example Power Station's CLB and was therefore determined to not be bounded by the plant's CDB flood. However, the FLEX DB includes the original reevaluation of the LIP flood.

2. Documentation

References:

1. NEI 12-06, Rev 2
2. FHRR Submittal
  - Enclosure 1 – LIP Report
  - Enclosure 2 – FHRR Report
  - Enclosure 3 – CD with pertinent site data
3. RAI Responses 1 (additional flood parameters)
4. RAI Responses 2 (updated LIP report)
5. RAI Responses 3 (additional site-specific PMP information)
6. MSFHI Letter
7. Warning Time Calculation and Procedures for LIP (per NEI 15-05)



## 2.1. Reference 1, Section G.2 – Characterization of the MSFHI

Characterization of the Mitigating Strategies Flood Hazard Information (MSFHI) is summarized in the Enclosure to Reference 6; the NRC's interim response to the flood hazard reevaluation submittal (Reference 2) and amended submittals (References 3, 4, and 5). A more detailed description of the MSFHI, along with the basis for inputs, assumptions, methodologies, and models, is provided in the following references:

- Local Intense Precipitation (LIP): See Reference 4.
- Flooding in Streams and Rivers: See Section 3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 2.
- Dam Breaches and Failures: See Section 3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 2.
- Storm Surge: See Section 3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 2.
- Seiche: See Section 3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 2.
- Tsunami: See Section 3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 2.
- Ice-Induced Flooding: See Section 3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 2.
- Channel Migration or Diversion: See Section 3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 2.
- Combined Effects (including wind-waves and run-up effects): See Section 3 of Reference 2, Enclosure 2.
- Other Associated Effects (i.e. hydrodynamic loading, including debris; effects caused by sediment deposition and erosion; concurrent site conditions; and groundwater ingress): See Reference 3.
- Flood Event Duration Parameters (i.e. warning time, period of site preparation, period of inundation, and period of recession): See Reference 3.

Storm surge, seiche, tsunami, ice-induced flooding, and channel migration or diversion (and associated NUREG/CR-7046 combined-effects flood scenarios) were either determined to be implausible or completely bounded by other mechanisms. Only LIP and the NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H, H.1 combined-effect flood (floods caused by precipitation events plus hydrologic dam failure and wind-wave run-up) for Example River were determined to be applicable flood-causing mechanisms at Example Power Station. Parameters for these flood-causing mechanisms, including associated effects and flood event duration parameters, are described in detail in References 2 (Enclosure 2), 3, and 4 and summarized in Table 1. [Note that Example Power Station elected to provide a bounding set of MSFHI parameters, instead of individual parameters, in the enclosure.]

In Reference 6, the NRC concluded that the “reevaluated flood hazards information [i.e. MSFHI], as summarized in the [Reference 6] Enclosure [Summary Tables of Reevaluated Flood Hazard Levels], is suitable for the assessment of mitigating strategies developed in response to Order EA-12-049” for Example Power Station. The information in the Reference 6 enclosure agrees with the elevation data in Table 1.

## 2.2. Reference 1, Section G.3 – Comparison of the MSFHI and FLEX DB Flood

As discussed in Section 2.1, only LIP and the NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H, H.1 combined-effect flood (floods caused by precipitation events plus hydrologic dam failure and wind-wave run-up) for Example River were determined to be applicable flood-causing mechanisms at Example Power Station.

The LIP flood is not addressed in Example Power Station’s CLB so, therefore, was determined to be not bounded by the plant’s CDB flood. However, the FLEX DB includes the original reevaluation of the LIP flood (Reference 2, Enclosure 1). The LIP flood was updated and submitted in Reference 4; which represents the MSFHI LIP flood. A comparison of the CDB, FLEX DB, and MSFHI for the LIP flood parameters is provided in Table 1.

The NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H, H.1 combined-effect flood (floods caused by precipitation events plus hydrologic dam failure and wind-wave run-up) for Example River includes two individual flood-causing mechanisms, flooding in rivers and streams and dam breaches and failures, plus wind-wave run-up. The flood hazard reevaluation showed that the stillwater elevations associated with flooding in rivers and streams and dam breaches and failures are bounded by the CDB flood. However, the reevaluated wind-wave run-up elevation for the H.1-combination is not bounded by the CDB flood. Other associated effects, including hydrodynamic and debris loads, effects of sediment deposition and erosion, concurrent site conditions, and groundwater ingress for the MSFHI are addressed in Reference 3. Hydrodynamic and debris loads are not addressed in Example Power Station’s CLB so, therefore, was determined to be not bounded by the CDB flood. As indicated in Reference 3, effects of sediment deposition and erosion, concurrent site conditions, and groundwater ingress were determined to be bounded by the CDB flood. MSFHI food duration parameters are also provided in Reference 3. However, the FLEX DB incorporates many of the MSFHI flood parameters and, therefore, bounds the MSFHI flood, with the exception of period of inundation and recession. A comparison of the CDB, FLEX DB, and MSFHI for the H.1 combined-effects river flood is provided in Table 2.

As discussed above and indicated in Tables 1 and 2, the FLEX DB flood does not completely bound the MSFHI flood. Therefore, Example Power Station performed an evaluation of the FLEX strategy against the MSFHI flood parameters in accordance with Reference 1, Section G.4.1. See Section 2.3.1.1.

Table 1 – Local Intense Precipitation Flood Parameter Comparison

Flood Scenario Parameter		Plant DB Flood	FLEX Design Basis Flood Hazard	MSFHI	MSFHI Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB) by FLEX DB
Flood Level and Associated Effects	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. NAVD-88)	N/I	597.6	597.7	NB
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. NAVD-88)	N/I	N/A	N/A	N/A
	3. Max Hydrodynamic (lb/ft)/Debris Loading (lb)	N/I	250.2	263.7	NB
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion	N/I	See note	See note	B
	5. Other associated effects (identify each effect)	N/I	N/A	N/A	N/A
	6. Concurrent Site Conditions	N/I	See note	See note	B
	7. Effects on Groundwater	N/I	See note	See note	N/A
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)	N/I	See note	See note	B
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)	N/I	See note	See note	B
	10. Period of Inundation (hours)	N/I	2.2	2.3	NB
	11. Period of Recession (hours)	N/I	See note	See note	NB

Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations	N/I	Any	Any	B
	13. Other Factors	N/I	N/A	N/A	N/A

N/A = Not Applicable    N/I = Not Included

The numbering of Notes below corresponds to the numbering of the line items in the Table above.

1. Elevation may vary around the site. MSFHI LIP flood represents the maximum flood elevation from Reference 4 at Door 1 of the Reactor Building. The FLEX DB for LIP was based on the original FHRR submittal (Reference 2, Enclosure 1); with the maximum occurring at Door 1 of the Reactor Building.
2. Consideration of wind-wave action for the LIP event is not explicitly required by NUREG/CR-7046 and is judged to be a negligible because of limited fetch lengths and flow depths.
3. The hydrodynamic and hydrostatic loads are included and determined as force per unit length of structure (lb/ft). To determine the force for the entire structure the loads need to be multiplied by the structure length. The loads vary but the maximum occurs at Door 3 of the Turbine Building. The debris load for the LIP event is assumed to be negligible due to the absence of heavy objects at the plant site and due to low flow velocity, the factors combination of which could lead to a hazard due to debris load. Additionally, the water depths around the buildings due to LIP are relatively shallow.
4. The flow velocities due to the LIP event are determined to be below the suggested velocities (USACE 1984) for the ground cover type (concrete and gravel) at the plant area. Therefore, significant erosion is not expected for the LIP flood. Similarly, the relatively low velocities and flow depths are not expected to have the power to transport sediment and cause significant deposition during the LIP flood.
5. None
6. High winds could be generated concurrent to a LIP event. However, manual actions are not required to protect the plant from LIP flooding so this concurrent condition is not applicable.
7. The majority of the plant area is paved or gravel. Also, the soil in the site area is generally characterized by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) as sandy clay loam (Hydrologic Soil Group C). These land use and soil type features would limit the volume of rainfall infiltrated during a short-duration (1-hour) LIP event and groundwater seepage would likely be minimal.
8. FLEX DB LIP warning time procedures were developed in accordance with NEI 15-05. See Reference 7. The procedures define a consequential rainfall depth, monitoring trigger, and action trigger.
9. Site preparation is captured in the FLEX DB LIP warning time procedures, developed in accordance with NEI 15-05. See Reference 7. The procedures define a consequential rainfall depth, monitoring trigger, and action trigger.
10. Period of inundation above the permanent/passive protection levels varies throughout the site; maximum value shown.
11. Captured in the period of inundation.
12. None
13. None

Table 2 – NUREG/CR-7046, Appendix H, H.1 Combined-Effect Flood (floods caused by precipitation events plus hydrologic dam failure) Parameter Comparison for Example River

Flood Scenario Parameter		Plant's Current Design Basis	FLEX Design Basis	MSFHI	MSFHI Bounded (B) or Not Bounded (NB) by FLEX DB
Flood Level and Associated Effects	1. Max Stillwater Elevation (ft. MSL 1912)	603.0	600.9	600.9	B
	2. Max Wave Run-up Elevation (ft. MSL 1912)	N/I	605.0	605.0	B
	3. Max Hydrodynamic (lb/ft)/Debris Loading (lb)	See note	4.1/480	4.1/480	B
	4. Effects of Sediment Deposition/Erosion	N/I	See note	See note	B
	5. Other associated effects (identify each effect)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	6. Concurrent Site Conditions	N/I	See note	See note	B
	7. Effects on Groundwater	See note	See note	See note	B
Flood Event Duration	8. Warning Time (hours)	See note	See note	See note	B
	9. Period of Site Preparation (hours)	96	96	172	B
	10. Period of Inundation (hours)	350	350	412	NB
	11. Period of Recession (hours)	See note	See note	See note	NB
Other	12. Plant Mode of Operations	All	All	All	B
	13. Other Factors	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

N/A = Not Applicable N/I = Not Included

The numbering of Notes below corresponds to the numbering of the line items in the Table above.

1. None
2. None
3. Debris load based on debris weights of 1,000 lbs. Barge impact determined to be not credible; see discussion in Reference 3.
4. The flow velocities due to a river flood are determined to be below the suggested velocities (USACE 1984) for the ground cover type (concrete and gravel) at the plant area. Therefore, significant erosion is not expected for the LIP flood. Also, hydraulic models show relatively low overbank velocities and stream power that is expected to only transport very fine particles with very low settling velocities. Therefore, deposition is expected to be minimal at the site. See discussion in Reference 3.
5. No additional associated effects identified.
6. High winds could be generated concurrent to a LIP event. However, the FLEX design considered 1-minute sustained wind-speeds of 45 mph (equivalent to a 100-year 1-minute sustained wind).
7. The CLB assumes that safety-related structures below site grade are protected from ingress to plant grade. Therefore, the river flood is not expected to surcharge groundwater and cause ingress below grade during a river flood. The MSFHI stillwater flood elevation is less than the CDB and FLEX DB flood elevation so no additional pressure head will be applied beyond the CDB flood.
8. River monitoring (every 2 hours) is triggered when a flood emergency is declared.
9. The CLB "Flood Emergency" procedure goes into effect when the actual river level exceeds elevation 586 ft MSL, as monitored by the gauge at the plant intake bay, or is predicted to exceed elevation 594 ft MSL in less than 96 hours. The MSFHI value is based on T=0 at the end of the rainfall event.
10. None

11. Period of recession captured in the period of inundation.
12. None
13. None

## 2.3. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4 – Evaluation of Mitigating Strategies for the MSFHI

### 2.3.1. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.1 – Assessment of Current FLEX Strategies

External Flood Hazard Assessment from OIP:

Per Plant G.4.4 UFSAR (Section 3.4.1), the maximum flood elevation is 603'-0" at the site. This is above the grade elevation (594'-6"). The maximum flood elevation is a rising river level event that provides 96 hours of warning time. Therefore, time is available to relocate equipment and stage necessary measures to support plant response to rising water levels.

In accordance with NEI 12-06 section 6.2.1, Susceptibility to External Flooding, Plant G.4.4 screens-in for an assessment for external flood hazard.

The current Plant G.4.4 FLEX strategies utilize a combination of Phase 1 (RCIC) and Phase 2 (portable pumps and generators) to maintain core cooling, containment and spent fuel pool cooling functions. The OIP and six month updates do not specifically list the strategy for a flood condition. Plant G.4.4 will utilize a flood abnormality procedure, "Flood Emergency" procedure, to address the MSFSHI riverine flooding event, including flood induced ELAP and LUHS (FLEX) events. This procedure will be initiated upon forecast of increasing river level by the National Weather Service or actual river level of >582 feet. During the warning time of 96 hours, Plant G.4.4 will shutdown both reactors, cool to cold shutdown (mode 4), remove the containment head, disassemble the reactor and flood the cavities to provide cooling and make up to the reactors. This strategy does not maintain the containment function.

Mitigation Strategies Flooding Hazard Information (MSFHI) for the most limiting flood hazard:

- Probable Maximum Flood
  - Combined effects: cool season PMP, 100-year snowpack, upstream dam failure and the effects of coincident wind wave activity
  - Maximum still water elevation is 8 feet above site grade
  - Maximum water elevation is 10 feet above site grade
  - Duration ~ 10 days
  - Warning time: Initiated by a flood forecast by NWS or River Level is greater than 582'. "Flood Emergency" procedure actions are triggered by actual river level greater than 586' or predicted to exceed plant grade in less than 96 hours.

#### 2.3.1.1. Impacts of MSFHI

The MSFHI has been used in the evaluation of FLEX strategies.

##### **Storage:**

The FLEX / Flood equipment will be stored in different locations. Plant G.4.4 will have two storage locations, one robust building that is not protected for flood and one commercial building that is above the flood levels. The flood pump [Darley Model HE20V pump] will be relocated prior to the flood waters reaching grade level. In the event of a flood, the FLEX equipment from the robust building will be relocated to the upper commercial building.

##### **Robustness of plant equipment:**

No plant equipment will be required after flood water is at grade level. All plant equipment used for FLEX prior to being secured meets the requirements of robustness as defined in Appendix A.

**Connection points:**

There are no connections points for the flood strategy. Electrical power will be removed by plant personnel and water will be pumped to the open reactor cavity.

**2.3.1.2. Conclusions**

The current FLEX strategies were developed using the DB flood information per Plant G.4.4 UFSAR Section 3.4.1. The new MSFHI is slightly higher and therefore, the MSFHI is not bounded by the FLEX DB. The containment function will not be maintained and therefore a targeted mitigation strategy will be utilized.

The following summarizes all the applicable flooding hazards at Plant G.4.4 and the status of FLEX for each:

- LIP – FLEX works as designed
- Riverine – FLEX does not work as designed, the containments need to be open to implement the strategy.
- Combined effects (riverine plus dam failure) – FLEX does not work, THMS used as described in this document, the containment needs to be open to implement the strategy.

The current FLEX strategies were developed using the DB flood information per Plant G.4.4 UFSAR Section 3.4.1. The new MSFHI is slightly higher and therefore, the MSFHI is not bounded by the FLEX DB. The containment function will not be maintained and therefore a targeted mitigation strategy will be utilized. The river height of this flood will require the units to be shutdown and cooled down to < 212°F. This will also require opening the containment and flooding the reactors and reactor cavities to maintain cold shutdown. Because of not fully maintaining the containment function, a THMS is required.

**2.3.2. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.2 – Assessment for Modified FLEX Strategies**

Because of not fully maintaining the containment function, a THMS is required, therefore Section G4.2 is N/A.

**2.3.3. NEI 12-06, Rev. 2, Section G.4.3 and G.4.4 – Assessment of Alternative and Targeted Hazard Mitigating Strategies**

Because of not fully maintaining the containment function, a THMS is required. Attachment 1, “Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS” addresses the following:

- The sequence of events for the flood hazard(s);
- The detailed description of the mitigating strategies;
- A detailed list of FLEX equipment necessary for the mitigating strategies;
- A description of how the provisions in Sections 3, 6, and 11 of NEI 12-06, Rev. 2 have been addressed;
- Description of validation items that will need to be performed based on the changes;
- Justification for not maintaining the containment capability.

## Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

### Sequence of events for the flood hazard:

Action item	Elapsed Time	Action	Time Constraint Y/N	Remarks / Applicability
1	- 96 hrs	Event Notification per "Flood Emergency" procedure	N	Plant at 100% power, "Flood Emergency" procedure is entered based on actual river level greater than 582' or predicted to exceed plant grade in less than 96 hours.
2	- 96 hrs	Call out additional staff.	N	OCC staffed and reactor services called in for reactor disassembly.
3	- 96 hrs	Monitor river level.	N	Establishes response action
4	- 96 hrs	Secure from dry cask operation if in progress	N	Only necessary if in progress.
5	- 94 hrs	Initiate Unit 1 and Unit 2 shutdown	N	<u>Both</u> Units will be shut down concurrently and decay heat removed using the normal procedures as specified for the RHR system
7	- 94 hrs	Place mobile Makeup Demineralizer System in operation	N	Provide additional water as required.
8	- 93 hrs	Start setup portable pump (Darley pump) for Cavity and SFP makeup	N	Follow "Flood Emergency" procedure
9	- 87 hrs	Start removal of DW shield plugs	N	Per forced outage schedule
10	- 87 hrs	Both units achieve Mode 3	Y	Need to be in Mode 3 on both units for the pending Rx disassembly
11	- 85 hrs	Seal EDG Fuel Storage and plug IRSF pit lines	N	Prevent water entering diesel storage tank.
12	- 82 hrs	Mode 4, Cold Shutdown achieved on both units	Y	Need to be in Mode 4 to break primary containment and remove DW head.
13	- 82 hrs	Start water addition to Suppression Chambers through RHR system test lines per Flood Emergency procedure.	N	
14	- 78 hrs	Shield plugs removed	N	Need plugs removed to remove DW head
15	- 76 hrs	Darley pump setup complete	N	This needs to be established prior to cavity flood
16	- 72 hrs	Transfer FLEX equipment to higher elevations above predicted flood levels	N	Protect FLEX equipment
17	- 72 hrs	Obtain DW samples	N	Preparation for DW head removal



### Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

Action item	Elapsed Time	Action	Time Constraint Y/N	Remarks / Applicability
18	- 72 hrs	Water addition to suppression chambers complete	N	
19	- 68 hrs	Set up to remove Unit 1 and Unit 2 DW head	N	Once in Mode 4, Cold Shutdown, DW head can be removed.
20	- 65 hrs	DW head removal set up complete	N	Need to be ready to remove DW head once Mode 4 has been established
21	- 62 hrs	Unit 1 DW head removed and stored	N	Need the DW head removed to remove Rx vessel head
22	- 59 hrs	Unit 2 DW head removed and stored	N	Need the DW head removed to remove Rx vessel head
23	- 35 hrs	Unit 1 Rx vessel head removed and stored	Y	This allows the cavity to be filled to maintain cold shutdown
24	- 24 hrs	Unit 2 Rx vessel head removed and stored	Y	This allows the cavity to be filled to maintain cold shutdown
25	- 22 hrs	Unit 1 and Unit 2 cavity filled	N	Allows for sufficient water above the core to maintain cold shutdown.
26	- 22 hrs	Darley pumps connected and alignment for reactor cavity make up.	N	Per "Flood Emergency" procedure
27	- 1 hr	Open plant doors on ground elevation.	N	Equalize loading on buildings.
28	0 hrs	ELAP occurs due to flood Directed by "Flood Emergency" procedure	N	EDGs and SBO DGs not protected from flood water
29	~2 min	Operating crew enters applicable EOPs and abnormal procedures for LOOP.	N	EOP "RPV Control" AOP "Loss of Offsite Power to the 125 VDC Battery Charger with Simultaneous Loss of Auxiliary Electric Power"
30	~5 mins	Start de-energizing station loads prior to water going above grade level	N	Personnel safety
31	~5 mins	DC load shedding initiated per AOP "Loss of AC Power to the 125 VDC Battery Charger with Simultaneous Loss of Auxiliary Electric Power"	N	AOP "Loss of AC Power to the 125 VDC Battery Charger with Simultaneous Loss of Auxiliary Electric Power". Initiation of load shedding is not time critical – completion of load shedding is time critical.
32	30 mins	DC load shedding completed	Y	AOP "Loss of AC Power to the 125 VDC Battery Charger with Simultaneous Loss of Auxiliary Electric Power."
33	30 mins	Complete de-energizing station loads.	N	Personnel Safety

## Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

Action item	Elapsed Time	Action	Time Constraint Y/N	Remarks / Applicability
34	~60 mins	Control Room crew has assessed SBO and plant conditions and declares an Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) event.	N	This is not time critical. Plant G.4.4 will be in a flood condition prior to this declaration.
35	90 mins	FLEX DC load shed complete.	N	DC coping analysis assumes FLEX load shed is complete by 90 minutes.
36	24 hrs	Initial equipment from National SAFER Response Center becomes available.	N	Per NEI 12-06, Section 12 (NSRC).
37	24 -72 hrs	Continue to maintain critical functions of core cooling and SFP cooling. Utilize initial NSRC equipment in spare capacity.	N	Not time critical/sensitive since Phase 2 actions result in indefinite coping times for all safety functions.
38	10 days	Flood water subsides below grade level, start plant restoration.	N	Time based on MSFHI

### A detailed description of the mitigating strategies selected:

#### Maintain Core Cooling:

The following actions will be initiated four days prior to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594'6" or greater, with both Units being shut down and decay heat being removed using the normal procedures as specified for the RHR system. Flood stage levels on the Example River are predicted several weeks in advance by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In the highly unlikely event that a maximum probable flood is predicted, the plant will be shut down and cooled four days prior to the predicted time at which water will go above plant grade elevation of 594.5'. This will reduce decay heat from the reactor to a level which can be removed by natural circulation cooling between the reactor and the reactor cavities and fuel storage pools. (reference UFSAR Section 3.4.1, "Flood Protection").

Upon entry into "Flood Emergency" procedure, Plant G.4.4 will call out additional personnel as necessary to shutdown both reactors and once shutdown and cooled down, disassemble the reactors. Unit shutdown will commence within the first two hours of entry into the procedure. Operators will be briefed and start a normal unit shutdown per "Reactor Power Operations" procedure and "Normal Unit Shutdown" procedure. Both reactors will be shut down in parallel.

A flood watch schedule will be established to monitor for rising river levels. Subsequent actions and decisions to continue with plant shutdown and disassembly will be based on the river rate of rise and level. An onsite mobile makeup demineralizer system will be placed in operation to fill the CCSTs and provide additional water to flood the reactor cavity. FLEX equipment from the lower FLEX storage area will be transferred to the FLEX storage building near the upper parking lot which is an elevated site not

## Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

susceptible to the river flood. Specific flood equipment as listed in the equipment section will be obtained and staged in preparation for maintaining the reactor cavity water level once the units are shutdown and the cavities flooded.

Both units will enter Mode 4 approximately 14 hours after entry into the "Flood Emergency" procedure or hour -82 per the time line. At this time, Unit 1's containment head will be removed and stored. After removal of the Unit 1 containment head, the staff will commence removal of the Unit 2 containment head. Both containment heads will be removed at hour -59 per the time line. Once both containment heads are removed, setup and removal of both reactor heads will commence. Both reactor heads will be removed and stored at hour -24 per the time line. After both reactor heads are removed, the reactor cavities will be filled. Under this condition, no heat removal nor related electrical power supply systems are needed. The recirculation loops will be isolated to prevent leakage from the pump seals limiting the water loss from the reactors. Units will be maintained in cold shutdown (<212°F) via natural circulation. Water level will be maintained in the normal cavity filled level.

Additionally, during the warning time period, other activities will occur. Both suppression chambers will be filled, the outdoor water storage tanks will be filled, sealing the EDG Fuel Storage tanks and plug drain lines in IRSF pit will be completed. The flood pumps (Darley pumps) will be connected and alignment for reactor cavity makeup established. Since this is the same strategy as used for the design basis and FLEX flood response, no additional access provisions are required for the operators.

Ninety six (96) hours after "Flood Emergency" procedure initiation, water level is predicted to reach grade level. At this time, plant doors will be opened to ensure pressure is equalized. Power will be removed by de-energization of station loads. This will be designated as "Time 0". The operating crew will enter the applicable EOPs and abnormal procedures for LOOP. DC load shedding will commence and declaration of an ELAP will be made. The ELAP is caused when the plant staff removes power to the site per procedure. Since this is a planned evolution, all preparations will be complete and plant staff will be staged at key locations to implement the actions. Once DC load shed is complete, the operating crew will continue to maintain the critical functions of core cooling and spent fuel pool cooling until flood waters subside and recovery can be entered.

## Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

### A detailed list of equipment necessary for the mitigating strategies:

- Portable Flood pump [Darley Model HE20V]
- Emergency Portable Pump 'A'
- Emergency Portable Pumps 'B'
- Emergency Portable Pumps 'C'
- Trash pumps in H building
- Two 10' sections of 4" suction hose with suction strainer
- Pump discharge hose, approximately 400 feet of 2 ½ inch fire hose for two pumps.
- Ten day supply of gasoline, 400 gallons of gasoline (approximately 40 gallons per day)
- Scaffolding
- FLEX Haul Vehicles
- Two boats with outboard motors, 50 gallons of gasoline, safety equipment
- Reactor and Containment disassembly equipment
  - Miscellaneous rigging equipment
  - Miscellaneous hand held tools
  - Reactor Stud De-Tensioners
  - Portable stairs

### A description of how the provisions in Sections 3, 6, and 11 of NEI 12-06, Rev. 2 have been addressed:

- **Section 3 Establish Baseline Coping Capability**

The general criteria and initial plant conditions were reviewed during the development of the THMS. All applicable aspects of these sections have been incorporated into the THMS.

**Section 3.2.1.3** was reviewed and since this is a specific BDB event, flood, some of the initial conditions do not apply.

3.2.1.3.1        “No specific initiating event is used. The initial condition is assumed to be a loss of off-site power (LOOP) at a plant site resulting from an external event that affects the off-site power system either throughout the grid or at the plant with no prospect for recovery of off-site power for an extended period. The LOOP is assumed to affect all units at a plant site.” This is specific to a flood event. The LOOP will be caused when plant staff removes power from the site due to the flood conditions.

3.2.1.3.2.        “All design basis installed sources of emergency on-site ac power and SBO alternate ac power sources are assumed to be not available and not imminently recoverable. Station batteries and associated dc buses along with ac power from buses fed by station batteries through inverters remain available.” The plant staff will induce the loss of power based on flood levels. Once the flood waters subside, actions will be initiated to recover on-site ac power. During the warning period Station batteries and associated dc buses along with ac power from buses fed by station batteries through inverters remain available. After the plant staff initiates the ELAP, DC Power and AC power from buses fed by station batteries through inverters is assumed lost and is not required for the THMS strategy.

3.2.1.3.5.        “Fuel for FLEX equipment stored in structures with designs which are robust for the applicable hazard(s) remains available.” The plant staff will continue to protect fuel stored in the EDG storage tanks, but due to the flood, this fuel will not be accessible until the flood water

## Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

subsides.

3.2.1.3.8. “Installed electrical distribution system, including inverters and battery chargers, remain available provided they are protected consistent with current station design.” All of the electrical distribution systems will be considered normally available until just before flood waters reach plant grade elevation (EL 595). At that point, operations personnel de-energize station electrical loads including offsite power and onsite backup power (AC and DC).

**Section 3.2.1.4**, Reactor Transient – the units will be shut down and cooled down prior to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594’6” or greater.

**Section 3.2.1.5**, Reactor Coolant Inventory Loss – the units will be shut down and cooled down prior to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594’6” or greater. The coolant losses will be reduced as compared to the initial mitigating strategies assessment. The reactor recirculation pumps will be isolated which will isolate any leakage due to pump seal leakage. Loss due to evaporation is considered for make up to the reactor cavities.

**Section 3.2.1.6**, SFP Conditions – the units will be in a condition where the cavities and SFPs are connected. Make up to the SFPs will be via the Darley pump to the reactor cavities. All assumptions in this section for the SFP have been reviewed and apply to the development of the THMS.

**Section 3.2.1.7**, Event Response Actions – the response is based on the timeline established for the flood event. Additional plant staff will be available to complete all actions specified in the THMS. All principles in this section have been reviewed and are met by the THMS.

**Section 3.2.1.8**, Effects of Loss of Ventilation – the loss of ventilation has been considered in the development of the FLEX strategies. These considerations will apply for the THMS. The conditions and timing under which ventilation will be lost are unchanged as compared to the original FLEX strategy.

**Section 3.2.1.9** Personnel Accessibility – areas requiring personnel access have been evaluated. Plant staff will be able to access upper areas of the reactor and turbine buildings during the event. Boats will need to be utilized in some areas of the site for access. This will not impede any actions in the THMS. Two boats with outboard motors will be stored at an area above the flood elevation.

**Section 3.2.1.10**, Instrumentation and Controls – all instruments and controls will be available for use during the warning period. After the plant staff removes power from the units, the only instruments required for mitigation will be SFP level. Readings can be obtained locally or via the SFPI.

**Section 3.2.1.11**, Containment Isolation Valves – all valves will be in the isolated position and do not require operation during the event.

**Section 3.2.1.12**, Qualification of Plant Equipment – prior to the flood water reaching plant grade, all plant equipment required for the THMS is qualified to current plant design. After the flood reaches grade and the staff removes power from the units, only portable equipment will

## Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

be required.

**Section 3.2.1.13**, FLEX Analyses, Methodologies and Generic Topics – this section has been reviewed and applicable topics are incorporated in the development of the THMS.

### **Section 3.2.2, Minimum Baseline Capabilities**

Phase 1 will be during the warning period. Plant equipment used to shut down and cool down the plant will be used. In addition to this equipment, refueling equipment will be used to disassemble the reactors and flood the reactor cavities. Phase 2 equipment consists of a portable make up pump, Darley pump, to supply make up water to the reactor cavities. Small generators will be available for use if required. The THMS does not require the use of portable generators during the event.

Phase 3 equipment from off site will be available and used for spares if required. An off-site staging area has been established for Phase 3 equipment. If required, the Phase 3 equipment can be transferred from the staging area to the plant using helicopters, boats or a combination of these means.

All aspects of section 3.2.2 were considered in the development of the site FLEX FSGs. The THMS will also incorporate the guidelines needed to support the development of other FSGs for a flood event. FSGs that will be used during the flood; control room vent/habitability, lighting, plant area ventilation, and deployment of spare equipment have been developed.

- **Section 6 Assess External Flooding Impact**

6.1 and 6.2: Section 6.1 of NEI 12-06 is information for the utility and has been reviewed.

Section 6.2 review follows:

Plant G.4.4 is a not a dry site. Per section 6.2.2, characterization of the Applicable Flood Hazard was performed. This analysis is in section 1.1 of this submittal.

#### **6.2.3.1 Protection of FLEX Equipment:**

Plant G.4.4 will meet the following section for protection:

“6.2.3.2.1.1.c FLEX equipment can be stored below flood level if time is available and plant procedures/guidance address the needed actions to relocate the equipment. Based on the timing of the limiting flood scenario(s), the FLEX equipment can be relocated to a position that is protected from the flood, either by barriers or by elevation, prior to the arrival of the potentially damaging flood levels. This should also consider the conditions on-site during the increasing flood levels and whether movement of the FLEX equipment will be possible before potential inundation occurs, not just the ultimate flood height.”

Plant G.4.4 will have two storage locations, one robust building that is not protected for flood and one commercial building that is above the flood levels. In the event of a flood, the FLEX equipment from the robust building will be relocated to the upper commercial building. Equipment required to implement the THMS will be relocated to the area of deployment, which is above the predicted flood levels. In the event the flood levels are above the predicted levels, the flood pump and related equipment can be moved to a higher location. Equipment is available to support the operation of the flood pump at a higher location.

#### **6.2.3.2 Deployment of FLEX Equipment:**

## Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

The equipment necessary for the strategy will be deployed prior to the flood waters reaching grade elevation. All of the necessary support equipment will also be staged prior to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594'6" or greater. Per section 6.2.3.2.:

"1. For external floods with warning time, the plant may not be at power. In fact, the plant may have been shut down for a considerable time and the plant configuration could be established to optimize FLEX deployment. For example, the FLEX pump could be connected, tested, and readied for use prior to the arrival of the critical flood level. Further, protective actions can be taken to reduce the potential for flooding impacts, including cooldown, borating the RCS, isolating accumulators, isolating RCP seal leak off, obtaining dewatering pumps, creating temporary flood barriers, etc. These factors can be credited in considering how the baseline capability is deployed."

Plant G.4.4 units 1 and 2 will be shut down and cooled down to less than 212° F for at least 3 days prior to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594'6" or greater. The Flood pump (Darley pump) will have been set up and readied for use.

"2. The ability to move equipment and restock supplies may be hampered during a flood, especially a flood with long persistence. Accommodations along these lines may be necessary to support successful long-term FLEX deployment."

Supplies for duration of 10 days will be staged and available for use.

"3. Depending on plant layout, the ultimate heat sink may be one of the first functions affected by a flooding condition. Consequently, the deployment of the FLEX equipment should address the effects of LUHS, as well as ELAP."

Plant G.4.4 THMS will not require the use of the UHS equipment. The ELAP will be self-induced prior to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594'6" or greater. Any power needs will be established prior to the ELAP.

"4. FLEX equipment will require fuel that would normally be obtained from fuel oil storage tanks that could be inundated by the flood or above ground tanks that could be damaged by the flood. Steps should be considered to protect or provide alternate sources of fuel oil for flood conditions. Potential flooding impacts on access and egress should also be considered."

The below ground fuel tanks will be protected prior to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594'6" or greater. Fuel for the Darley pump for 10 day duration will be staged near the pump.

"5. Connection points for FLEX equipment should be reviewed to ensure that they remain viable for the flooded condition."

The discharge of the Darley pumps will be directly into the reactor cavity. There are no connections required for the THMS. All fuel pool gates will be open and the reactor cavities connected to the fuel pool. This allows for discharging the output from the Darley pump into the fuel pool to maintain level in both reactor cavities.

## **Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS**

“6. For plants that are limited by storm-driven flooding, such as Probable Maximum Surge or Probable Maximum Hurricane (PMH), expected storm conditions should be considered in evaluating the adequacy of the baseline deployment strategies.”

This does not apply to Plant G.4.4.

“7. Since installed sump pumps will not be available for dewatering due to the ELAP, plants should consider the need to provide water extraction pumps capable of operating in an ELAP and hoses for rejecting accumulated water for structures required for deployment of FLEX strategies.”

Water extraction will only be required once the flood waters subside. There will be small trash pumps and the FLEX pumps available for dewatering areas of the plant.

“8. Plants relying on temporary flood barriers should assure that the storage location for barriers and related material provides reasonable assurance that the barriers could be deployed to provide the required protection.”

Plant G.4.4 does not rely on temporary flood barriers for the THMS.

“9. A means to move FLEX equipment should be provided that is also reasonably protected from the event.”

The Darley pump is a small pump that can be moved by operators. This pump does not need a separate vehicle to transport the pump.



## Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

### 6.2.3.3 Procedural Interfaces

Plant G.4.4 has developed a procedure for flood, "Flood Emergency" procedure. This procedure incorporates all necessary actions for the THMS.

### 6.2.3.4 Considerations in Utilizing Off-site Resources

Plant G.4.4 will have a staging area designated for any off-site resources. This staging area is above the flood levels. Site access will be limited and the use of boats will be required to access various areas of the plant. Any additional pumps required for the THMS will be small and can be transported via boat to the location needed.

- **Section 11 Programmatic Controls**

**11.1**, Quality Attributes – the Darley is a commercially available pump. This pump was procured for use during floods.

**11.2** Equipment Design – the Darley pump design basis has been reviewed. The pump will meet all performance requirements for the THMS. The pump curve is available for reference as an attachment in "Flood Emergency" procedure. All design factors in section 11.2 have been considered.

**11.3** Equipment Storage – the Darley pump will be stored in the Protected Area Warehouse. The pump will be relocated prior to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594'6" or greater.

**11.4** Procedure Guidelines – all procedures developed for the THMS meet the guidelines specified in this section.

**11.5** Maintenance and Testing – PMs have been established the Darley pump. These PMs fully meet the Utility program requirements. The Utility program was developed using EPRI guidance. For unavailability, the Darley will be added to the FLEX unavailability program and subject to the same unavailability controls as FLEX equipment.

**11.6** Training – Operators and plant staff have been trained on "Flood Emergency" procedure. This is included in the Operator training program for periodic training per the training plan.

**11.7** Staffing – additional staff will be called out prior to the event. The plant will be fully staffed to perform all tasks necessary to shut down and disassemble the units to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594'6" or greater.

**11.8** – Configuration Control – the THMS will be included in the FLEX program and subject to the same unavailability controls as FLEX equipment.

## Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS

### Validation items that will need to be performed:

Action item	Elapsed Time	Action	Time Constraint Y/N	Remarks / Applicability
10	- 87 hrs	Both units achieve Mode 3	Y	This will be validated using past refuel outage performance data.
12	- 82 hrs	Mode 4, Cold Shutdown achieved on both units	Y	This will be validated using past refuel outage performance data.
23	- 35 hrs	Unit 1 Rx vessel head removed and stored	Y	This will be validated using past refuel outage performance data.
24	- 24 hrs	Unit 2 Rx vessel head removed and stored	Y	This will be validated using past refuel outage performance data.
32	30 mins	DC load shedding completed	Y	DC load shedding has been validated for FLEX strategies. There are no new actions or environmental factors apply for this load shed, therefore, re-validation of this action is not required.

### Justification for not maintaining the containment capability:

The function of the primary containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the Reactor Primary System following a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material. The primary containment consists of a drywell, which is a steel pressure vessel, enclosed in reinforced concrete, and a suppression chamber, which is a steel torus-shaped pressure vessel, connected by vent pipes. The primary containment surrounds the Reactor Primary System and provides an essentially leak tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment.

The safety design basis for the primary containment is that it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate. The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment.

In this configuration, there will be 490,000 gallons of water above each reactor core. The reactor recirculation system will be isolated preventing inventory loss due to normal pump seal leakage. The loss due to evaporation 4 days after shutdown will be approximately 50 gallons per minute per reactor. The reactors will be able to be maintained in cold shutdown for the duration of the event via natural circulation.

## **Plant G.4.4 Flood THMS**

The THMS for Plant G.4.4 will require both units to be shut down and cooled down prior to the predicted arrival of a flood of elevation 594'6" or greater. Both units will be in Mode 4 prior to the removal of the containment heads.