



Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
2807 W County Road 75
Monticello, MN 55362

January 26, 2016

L-MT-16-004
10 CFR 50.71(e)
10 CFR 50.59(d)(2)

ATTN: Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
Docket 50-263
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-22

Submittal of Revision 33 to the Updated Safety Analysis Report

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e), Revision 33 to the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) is provided. This revision completes an update of the information in the USAR for the period from May 16, 2015, to November 24, 2015.

The changes in this revision reflect the incorporation of modifications, license amendments, and editorial corrections and clarifications. These changes are made in accordance with the guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Report NEI 98-03, "Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports", Revision 1, dated June 1999 and Regulatory Guide 1.181, "Content of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e)", dated September 1999.

Enclosure 1, "Report of Changes, Tests and Experiments", indicates that one 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was performed. This report is provided as required by 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2).

Enclosure 2, "Report of Changes to Licensee Docketed Commitments", indicates that in accordance with the guidance provided in NEI 99-04, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes", dated July 1999, for this period, there was one change to a commitment.

Enclosure 3, "Summary of Information Removed from the USAR", provides the information removed from the USAR for this revision cycle. This information is provided in accordance with Revision 1 of NEI 98-03 and Regulatory Guide 1.181.

Enclosure 4 contains Revision 33 of the MNGP USAR. The USAR is being submitted electronically, in its entirety, on CD-ROM according to the instructions in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) RIS 2001-005, "Guidance on Submitting Documents to the NRC by Electronic Information Exchange or on CD-ROM".

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Enclosure 5, "Report of Changes to the Monticello Fire Protection Program", provides a summary of changes to the program. Changes to the Fire Protection Program are provided in accordance with the guidance contained in Generic Letter 86-10, "Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements", dated April 24, 1986.

Summary of Commitments

This letter contains no new commitments.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e)(2), I certify that the information presented herein, accurately presents changes made since the previous submittal prepared pursuant to Commission requirement and identifies changes made under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 not previously submitted to the Commission.



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Enclosures (5)

cc: Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Monticello, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Monticello, USNRC

ENCLOSURE 1

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS

The following includes a brief description and summary of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for those changes, tests and experiments that were carried out without prior U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2).

Evaluation No. SCR 12-0559 Revision 1:
HPCI Logic Change to Provide Margin to MO-2035 and #16 Battery
EC 23786 Rev 0 and associated documents listed on the [Affected
Document List] ADL

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Revision 32, as submitted on September 18, 2015, contained the revision to USAR Table 5.2-3b evaluated in Revision 1 to SCR 15-0559. Evaluation No. SCR-12-0559 Revision 1 was inadvertently omitted from the September 18, 2015 submittal.

Activity Description:

A summary of evaluation SCR 12-0559 Revision 0 was submitted to the NRC on January 18, 2014. Subsequent to the completion of SCR 12-0559 Revision 0, the NRC issued NCV 05000263/2013007-01, Failure to Evaluate the Effects of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Steam Isolation Outboard Valve Closure Time Increase, for failing to evaluate the effect of increasing the allowed closure time for HPCI Steam Isolation Valve MO-2035 from 40 seconds to 50 seconds in multiple analyses. Revision 0 to SCR 12-0559 evaluated an increase to the allowable stroke time for MO-2035 from 40 to 50 seconds in accordance with Engineering Change 20039. This was understood to be within the Safety Analysis requirements because the redundant AC valve, MO-2034, has a total allowable stroke time of 55 seconds accounting for Emergency Diesel Generator start time, which is the limiting time for calculating the mass release due to a HPCI High Energy Line Break (HELB) event.

It was later discovered that the HELB input used to justify the increase to 50 seconds did not account for the Group IV HPCI primary containment isolation delay. The maximum time to isolate had become greater than 55 seconds for the HELB scenario.

NCV 05000263/2013007-01 was corrected by reducing the allowable closure time for MO-2035 to 45 seconds. A closure time of 45 seconds coupled with a Group IV HPCI primary containment isolation delay of 9 seconds results in a total

closure time of 54 seconds, which is less than the limiting stroke time of the redundant valve, MO-2034.

Summary of Evaluation Revision:

The USAR-described time increase to close MO-2035 from 40 to 45 seconds does not introduce the possibility of a change in the frequency of occurrence of a loss of coolant accident or a main steam line break (MSLB) because this time change is not an initiator of any accident and no new failure modes are introduced.

There are no physical changes related to the change in closure time for MO-2035 and as such there is no increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a Structure, System or Component (SSC) important to safety. The closure time of MO-2035 is not used in any accident analyses.

The change to closure time of MO-2035 from 40 seconds to 45 seconds does not introduce the possibility of a change in the consequences of an accident because the HPCI system is not an initiator of any accidents and no new failure modes are introduced. The HPCI HELB analysis is bounded by the closure time of MO-2034 which must account for the EDG start time of 15 seconds due to the assumption of a station blackout (SBO) event. Therefore, the 55 second closure time of MO-2034 is the limiting time for calculating the mass release due to a HPCI HELB event. The HPCI HELB is bounded by the analyzed MSLB as described in Chapter 14 of the USAR.

A HPCI HELB is the only malfunction that could credibly occur and would be the result of steam line break. This is not a new malfunction and is one that has been previously evaluated. The consequences of a HPCI HELB are currently analyzed by plant calculations which are bounded by MSLB analysis. The change in valve closure time for MO-2035 from 40 to 45 seconds plus its delay time of 9 seconds is bounded by the analyzed 55 second closure time of MO-2034.

The proposed time change for closing MO-2035 does not affect the design parameters (provide 2700 gpm and 45 seconds) or the operation of the HPCI system. The USAR revision to the MO-2035 closing time for Group IV isolation does not affect the HPCI initiation, as initiation flow and injection time is not required coincident with an isolation.

The increased time for closing MO-2035 does not introduce the possibility for a malfunction of an SSC with a different result because there is no change to the operation of the HPCI system since the valve is normally open. The timing only affects the closure time which is bounded by MO-2034 for a HPCI HELB event.

This increased valve closure time for MO-2035 results in the closure time changing from 40 seconds to 45 seconds due to available battery voltage. The closure time affects the mass release during a HPCI HELB event which is associated with and bounded by a MSLB and is not associated with a fission

product barrier. Therefore, the increased closure time for MO-2035 does not result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the USAR being exceeded or altered. The design limits for fission product barriers, as listed in USAR Section 3.1 Table 3.1-2, are not affected by this change.

ENCLOSURE 2

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES TO LICENSEE DOCKETED COMMITMENTS

Commitments are identified and reported to the Commission in accordance with guidance provided in NEI Technical Report 99-04 Revision 0, "Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes."

This enclosure provides a brief description and a summary of changes to commitments established with the NRC by the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) per NEI 99-04 guidelines.

For Revision 33:

The following change was made to existing Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant commitment and required the station to provide notification of the change to the NRC.

1. Monticello Commitment Number: *M76012A*

Source Document: Letter dated December 10, 1976, "*Comparison of Existing Fire Protection Provisions to the Guidelines Contained in Standard Review Plan 9.5.1,*" Item No. 47, IV.B.3(h)

Commitment: Cable trays, raceways, conduits, trenches or culverts are used only for cables. Diesel oil, turbine oil, and hydrogen gas piping is not installed in these areas. "*Miscellaneous storage in these areas will be prohibited by administrative directives.*"

Change: Clarification has been added to include the following language, "*Cable pull lines (ropes/tapes) may be found in these areas due to a site past practice. When found in these areas, cable pull lines will be evaluated under the Fire Protection administrative controls for combustibles.*"

Basis for Change:

Description

Cable pull lines (ropes/tapes) have been left installed in the plant after cable pulls were completed. NRC Commitment M76012A states, "Cable trays, raceways, conduit, trenches or culverts should be used only for cables". The site response to this criteria states that, "*Miscellaneous storage in these areas will be prohibited by administrative directives*".

Safe Shutdown Capability

Cable pull line's effect on Safe Shutdown is limited to those cable pull lines that transition between Appendix R Fire Area Boundaries. This transition would occur via penetration seals. Fire testing of cable pull lines in penetration designs was completed. If the testing did not encompass a penetration within an Appendix R Fire

ENCLOSURE 2

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES TO LICENSEE DOCKETED COMMITMENTS

Area Boundary installed in the site, that penetration was inspected for the existence of pull cables. One penetration not covered by the testing was identified with pull ropes in it. This penetration was previously identified prior to the inspections. Based on this, Appendix R Fire Area Boundaries and the capability to achieve Safe Shutdown have been determined to not be affected by the existence of cable pull lines.

Fire Hazard Analysis

If cable pull lines are found within cable trays, raceways, conduit, etc. they are evaluated one of two ways.

- a. If the cable pull lines that are found in sealed junction boxes pull boxes, conduits, etc. are considered to fall under the assumption of the Combustible Loading Calculation.

Cable insulation on conductors in rigid conduit is not considered. Basis - Cable insulation is enclosed in conduit which virtually eliminates fuel contribution outside the conduit. Combustion within the conduit is severely limited.

Since the cable pull ropes/tapes are combustibles (like the cable insulation described above) that are enclosed within a non-combustible enclosure, they do not contribute to the combustible loading of the fire zone.

- b. If the cable pull lines are found exposed, (e.g. lying in cable trays or raceways), they are evaluated as fixed or permanent combustible loading for that fire zone.

Since the Fire Area Boundaries are not impacted and the combustibles when found are accounted for in the combustible loading of the fire zone, the Fire Hazards Analysis is not impacted by existence of the cable pull lines.

Conclusion

The existence of cable pull lines found in within cable trays, raceways, conduits, trenches or culverts does not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

ENCLOSURE 3

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REMOVED FROM THE USAR

Consistent with the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Report NEI 98-03, "Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports," Revision 1 and Regulatory Guide 1.181, "Content of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e)," information removed from the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) is summarized below.

- USAR Change 01101248/01457570

Affected sections:

USAR-03.06, Reactor - Other Reactor Vessel Internals
3.6.3, Performance Evaluation; Reference 83

USAR-03.07, Reactor - References; References 53, 83, 85

USAR-04.02, Reactor Coolant System - Reactor Vessel
4.2.3.2.4, Irradiation Effects; Reference 104

USAR-04.09, Reactor Coolant System - References;
References 63, 101, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124

USAR-05.04, Containment System - References;
References 74, 109, 110, 111, 134, 157, 158

USAR-06.08, Plant Engineered Safeguards - References;
References 3, 26, 36, 44

USAR-08.13, Plant Electrical Systems - References;
References 70, 71, 75

USAR-09.01, Plant Radioactivity Waste Control Systems - Summary
Description; Reference 1

USAR-09.05, Plant Radioactive Waste Control Systems - References;
References 1, 11, 12

USAR-10.05, Plant Auxiliary Systems - References; References 62, 67

USAR-14.11, Plant Safety Analysis - References;
References 37, 45, 112, 113, 114, 116, 124, 128, 172, 173

Deletions of obsolete and unused references, within affected sections are

due to implementation of approved License Amendment 176, Extended Power Uprate, and License Amendment 180, Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus. These deletions were replaced with references appropriate to the approved License Amendments.

USAR-05.02, Containment System - Primary Containment System;
5.2.3.4.1, Metal-Water Reaction

Reference to "*decay heat curves used as input to the*" removed from last sentence of first paragraph.

Metal water reaction is considered in the containment response analysis as part of the calculated value for core thermal power. Decay heat is also part of core thermal power calculation. Decay heat is based on ANSI/ANS 5.1-1979 with recommendations of GE Safety Information Letter (SIL) 636 plus 2 sigma uncertainty with custom G-factor. This approach is consistent with current NRC requirements. Metal water reaction requirements are specified in Regulatory Guide 1.7.

USAR-07.01, Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems - Summary
Description

7.1.1.2.2.1, Auto Depressurization System (ADS)

Deletion of "*partial redundant valving...*" removed from this section.

All three valves are now credited to ensure the small break accident is not limiting accident consistent with License Amendment 176, Extended Power Uprate.

USAR-07.FIG, Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems - Figures
Figures 7.3-4 and 7.3-5

Figures deleted are due to implementation of approved License Amendment 176, Extended Power Uprate. The specific Rod Withdrawal Event analysis previously discussed in USAR section 7.3.4.3 has been replaced with a discussion of the generic RWE analysis contained in NEDO-23842, Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal Transient in the Startup Range. The replacement of the site-specific RWE analysis with a generic one rendered Figures 7.3-4 and 7.3-5 obsolete.

USAR-09.02, Plant Radioactive Waste Control Systems - Liquid Radwaste System

Table 9.2-1, Liquid Source Terms from the Monticello Plant

Table 9.2-2, Monticello Liquid Radwaste System

Deletion of Tables 9.2-1 and 9.2-2 due to implementation of approved License Amendment 176, Extended Power Uprate. Evaluation now based on fission and corrosion products based on ANSI 18.1 methodology.

USAR-09.03, Plant Radioactive Waste Control Systems - Gaseous Radwaste System

Table 9.3-2 Air Ejector Off-gas Subsystem Release Rates

Deletions are due to implementation of approved License Amendment 176, Extended Power Uprate. Evaluation now based on fission and corrosion products based on ANSI 18.1 methodology.

USAR-12.03, Plant Structures and Shielding - Shielding and Radiation Protection

12.3.1.6, Specific Design Conditions

Deletions are due to implementation of approved License Amendment 176, Extended Power Uprate. Time to reach equilibrium is no longer related to 1880 MWt power level.

USAR-I.02, Appendix I Evaluation of High Energy Line Breaks Outside of Containment - High Energy Systems and Piping

1.2.1.3, Condensate System

Deletion was due to the implementation of Engineering Change (EC) 10915, EPU - Reactor Feedwater Pump Replacement. The reference to feedwater pump balance drum leakoff lines (C4A-2"-EB and C4B-2"-ED) was deleted, as the new pump design did not require it.

USAR-J.04, Appendix J Fire Protection Program - Safe Shutdown Analysis

Page J.04-398; References J.4.7.28, J.4.7.29, J.4.7.30, J.4.7.38, J.4.7.39

Deletions of obsolete references within affected section are

due to implementation of approved License Amendment 176, Extended Power Uprate, and License Amendment 180, Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis Plus.

- USAR Change 01441967
Affected section:

USAR-02.02, Site and Environs - Site Description
Table 2.2-2, Estimated 2000 Population Distribution around the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

Table 2.2-2 was deleted as the previous 10-year estimate is no longer needed. The 2010 census data report contains the most current census data for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone.

- USAR Change 01445693
Affected sections:

USAR-01.03, Introduction and Summary - Summary Design Description and Safety Analysis
1.3.6, Plant Fuel Storage and Handling System
USAR-10.02, Plant Auxiliary Systems - Reactor Auxiliary Systems
10.2.1.1, Design Basis
10.2.1.2, Description
10.2.2.3, Performance Analysis

Deletions within these sections are associated with the implementation of approved License Amendment 182, Fuel Storage System Changes. The new fuel vault is not used for fuel storage.

- USAR Change 01478399
Affected sections:

USAR-08.04, Plant Electrical Systems - Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
8.4.1.2, Description
8.4.1.3, Performance Analysis

Deletion was due to the implementation of EC 23085, EDG Fuel Oil Train Separation. Information removed because the statements were not consistent with the design change. The fuel oil service pump has been replaced with a safety related fuel oil transfer pump. Both divisions have

power supplied to the fuel oil transfer pumps via safety related power. The larger tank remains consistent with the one week fuel capacity but the minimum required fuel capacity changed with the design.

USAR-J.04, Appendix J Fire Protection Program - Safe Shutdown Analysis

Pages J.04-6, J.04-19, J.04-29, J.04-53, J.04-88, J.04-90, J.04-181, J.04-217, J.04-244, J.04-250, J.04-265, J.04-282, J.04-291, J.04-302, J.04-317, J.04-326, J.04-338, J.04-342, J.04-351, J.04-359, J.04-381

Incorporation of EC 23085, EDG Fuel Oil Train Separation, removed the Portable Diesel Oil Transfer Pump (P-229), Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (P-11) and Fuel Oil Service Pump (P-77) from the safe shutdown analysis.

- USAR Change 01478936
Affected sections:

USAR-I.05, Appendix I Evaluation of High Energy Line Breaks Outside Containment - HELB and Safe Shutdown Evaluation

I.5.2.14, CRD System

Table I.5-1, Location of High Energy Systems and Safe Shutdown Equipment by Volume

Deletion was due to revised analysis that eliminated the HELB break at the Control Rod Drive System check valve, CRD-31.

- USAR Change 01482495
Affected section:

USAR-05.02, Containment System - Primary Containment System
5.2.4.2, Containment Penetrations

Testing of the airlock was removed from this section as a result of Amendment No. 187, Revise Technical Specification 5.5.11, "Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program".

- USAR Change 01483863
Affected sections:

USAR-10.03, Plant Auxiliary Systems - Plant Service Systems
10.3.1.5.1 General

10.3.1.5.4, Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS)

Deletion was due to the implementation of EC23085, EDG Fuel Oil Train Separation. The statements were not consistent with the design change. The Division II fuel oil transfer pump and associated cabling were relocated during the design.

- USAR Change 01483869

Affected section:

USAR-I.05, Appendix I Evaluation of High Energy Line Breaks Outside Containment - HELB and Safe Shutdown Evaluation

I.5.1.2, Single Active Failure Evaluation

Deletion was due to the implementation of EC23085, EDG Fuel Oil Train Separation. The change removes the statement for crediting the use of a gasoline driven portable pump for a failure of the essential fuel oil transfer pump.

ENCLOSURE 4

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT USAR REVISION 33

ENCLOSED CD-ROM

File Name Rev. 33	File Size (KB)
001 – USAR LOEP	250
002 – USAR TOC	98
003 – USAR Section 1	1,041
004 – USAR Section 2	2,233
005 – USAR Section 3	2,087
006 – USAR Section 4	1,508
007 – USAR Section 5	3,479
008 – USAR Section 6	1,039
009 – USAR Section 7	2,665
010 – USAR Section 8	1,049
011 – USAR Section 9	431
012 – USAR Section 10	806
013 – USAR Section 11	583
014 – USAR Section 12	734
015 – USAR Section 13	360
016 – USAR Section 14	4,470
017 – USAR Section 15, Part 1 of 5	7,757
017 – USAR Section 15, Part 2 of 5	7,208
017 – USAR Section 15, Part 3 of 5	7,892
017 – USAR Section 15, Part 4 of 5	8,120
017 – USAR Section 15, Part 5 of 5	5,881
018 – USAR Appendix A, Part 1 of 5	8,136
018 – USAR Appendix A, Part 2 of 5	8,052
018 – USAR Appendix A, Part 3 of 5	8,070
018 – USAR Appendix A, Part 4 of 5	8,180
018 – USAR Appendix A, Part 5 of 5	5,177
019 – USAR Appendix C	78
020 – USAR Appendix D	100
021 – USAR Appendix E	145
022 – USAR Appendix F	403
023 – USAR Appendix G	4,383
024 – USAR Appendix H	10,310
025 – USAR Appendix I	1,651
026 – USAR Appendix J	4,133
027 – USAR Appendix K	498

ENCLOSURE 5

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES TO THE MONTICELLO FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM

This enclosure contains a report of changes to the Monticello Fire Protection Program (FPP) in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.71(e), 10 CFR 50.59, and Generic Letter (GL) 86-10.

In conformance with GL 86-10, the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis (UFHA) and the Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSDA) are incorporated directly into the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) as Appendix J.05 and J.04 respectively. The following summarizes fire protection program documents changes since the previous submittal.

1. USAR J.04, SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS

Revision 32*

- USAR 01471146 - Revised Figure J.4.1.2-3 to the correct circuit diagram.

Revision 33

- USAR 01478399 – Incorporation of Engineering Change (EC) Modification 23085, “Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Train Separation”. Removed the portable diesel oil transfer pump (P-229), diesel fuel oil transfer pump (P-11) and fuel oil service pump (P-77) from the safe shutdown analysis. Added the four new, safe shutdown, divisionally separated EDG fuel oil transfer pumps (P-160A, P-160B, P-160C and P-160D) to the safe shutdown analysis.
- USAR 01101248 – Revised references used as inputs throughout the safe shutdown analysis based on Extended Power Uprate implementation Engineering Change (EC) 13638.
- USAR 01222887 – Incorporation of Engineering Change (EC) Modification 12816 which replaced and revised the cable designations for the 1AR feeder cables to busses 15 and 16.

2. USAR J.05, FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

Revision 32*

- USAR 01434187 – The following changes were made to correct inaccurate information/statements:
 - The correct Fire Zone (Fire Zone 12B) was identified for the Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit suppression system.

- Inadvertent Activation/Rupture of Suppression Systems Section was added to capture the site's response to Information Notice 83-14, "Actuation of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-Related Equipment".
- Removed discussion regarding the allowable transient value for combustibles.
- Reworded the language regarding Fire Barrier Penetration qualification and where Fire Barrier Penetrations are listed.
- The Fire Zone Summary and associated matrix was updated to reflect hose stations located in Fire Zone 2B.
- Turbine Building Addition Fire Zone number was corrected in Fire Hazards Analysis Matrix for Fire Zones 15B, 15C, 15D and 17.

Revision 33

- USAR 01466886 – Incorporation of Engineering Change (EC) Modification 25260 identifying the extension of Fire Zone 15A, Diesel Generator Room No. 12, via a trench that runs under Fire Zone 15B, Diesel Generator Room No. 11. Discussion of the trench 3 hour fire barrier rating was also included with applicable references.
 - USAR 01463416 – Removed specific Safe Shutdown information from the Fire Hazards Matrices Section XI, "Minimum Safe Shutdown Systems Affected", as this information resides in USAR J.04, "Safe Shutdown Analysis". Section XI now states to reference USAR J-04 for specific systems and components impacted. This USAR action also revised the Fire Hazards Analysis Matrices Sections XII, "Consequences of Design Basis Fire", and XIV, "Conclusions", as necessary to gain consistency. Lastly, this USAR action made corrections to Table 2, "Safe Shutdown Systems Affected", column as necessary to correct errors.
 - USAR 01491869 – Incorporation of Engineering Change (EC) Modification 23085, "Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Train Separation". This included correcting the Fire Area XI divisional designation, updating Table 2, "Safe Shutdown Systems Affected" column, and Fire Hazards Matrices, as applicable.
3. 4 AWI-08.01.00, FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM PLAN
No permanent revisions were made during this reporting period.
 4. B.08.05-05, FIRE PROTECTION - SYSTEM OPERATION, Tables A.2-1, A.2-2, A.2-3 and A.2-4
Revision 66 (PCR 01468409, issued 5/28/2015)*

- Change to Table A.2-1 was made to provide clarification on fire barriers that are required to be sealed with no air or light.
- Change to Table A.2-2 added a statement regarding the surveillance frequency interval which allows for fire protection surveillance to be extended by 25% similar to the Technical Specification Surveillance allowance.
- No changes made to Tables A.2-3 and A.2-4

*Denotes changes that were incorporated during the Revision 32 of the USAR as submitted in letter L-MT-15-068 dated September 18, 2015; however, these changes are included in this submittal for completeness because the effective dates of the changes occurred between the period of May 16, 2015, and November 24, 2015.



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