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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Headquarters
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

To Whom It May Concern:

Enclosed is the final After Action Report/Improvement Plan for the Limerick Generating Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plume Exercise that was held on November 17th, 2015. This report also includes the Mass Care Walk Downs on October 29th and 30th, and Out of Sequence Exercise on November 17th and 18th, 2015.

There were no Level 1 Findings or Plan Issues identified during the exercise. There was one Level 2 Finding identified that was successfully re-demonstrated during the exercise.

Based on the results of the exercise and a review of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and procedures submitted, FEMA Region III has determined they are adequate (meet the planning and preparedness standards of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, November 1980, as referenced in 44 CFR 350.5) and there is reasonable assurance they can be implemented, as demonstrated during this exercise.

If you have any questions, please contact Thomas Scardino at (215) 931-5546.

Sincerely,

MaryAnn Tierney
Regional Administrator

Enclosure

IX49
NRR

Limerick Generating Station

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date – November 17, 2015

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program

Published February 1, 2016

FEMA

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Limerick Generating Station

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Published

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 17, 2015, a full-scale Plume Exercise was evaluated in the 10-mile plume exposure pathway, Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Limerick Generating Station (LGS) by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region III. Out-of-sequence Mass Care Walkdowns were conducted the 29th and 30th of October, 2015. The purpose of the exercise and the out-of-sequence demonstrations was to assess the State and local offsite response organization's preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. The exercise and out-of-sequence demonstrations were held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and procedures.

The most recent prior full-scale exercise at this site was conducted on November 18, 2013. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the risk jurisdictions of Berks, Chester, and Montgomery Counties; the support jurisdictions of Bucks and Lehigh Counties; and 16 participating municipalities who were evaluated during this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility as volunteers providing vital emergency services twenty four (24) hours to the communities of which they live. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants was observed during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the evaluation of the following out-of-sequence activities:

- Mass Care Walkdowns were conducted on October 29th and 30th, 2015
- Emergency Workers, Equipment and Vehicles – Monitoring and Decontamination were conducted November 18, 2015.
- School Interviews were conducted on November 17, 2015.
- Traffic/Access Control interviews with the Pennsylvania State Police Skippack Barracks 2047C, Bridge Road, Schwenksville in Montgomery County were conducted November 18, 2015.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were no Level 1 Findings or Plan Issues identified during the exercise. There was one Level 2 Performance Issue identified which was successfully re-demonstrated during the exercise.

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name
Limerick Generating Station Plume Exercise

Type of Exercise
Plume

Exercise Date
November 17, 2015

Program
Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Scenario Type
Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

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1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Limerick Generating Station Exercise:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

State EOC

- American Red Cross
- Auxiliary Communication Services (ACS)
- Bureau of Radiation Protection
- Department of Military and Veteran Affairs
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Pennsylvania Department Office of Administration
- Pennsylvania Department of Aging
- Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture
- Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
- Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
- Pennsylvania Department of Education
- Pennsylvania Department of Fish and Boat Commission
- Pennsylvania Department of General Services
- Pennsylvania Department of Health
- Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
- Pennsylvania Department of Human Services
- Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
- Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry
- Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
- Pennsylvania Game Commission
- Pennsylvania State Police
- Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission
- Pennsylvania Utility Commission
- U.S. Department of Agriculture

PA Joint Information Center/Exelon Joint Information Center
- Bureau of Radiation Protection
- Exelon Corporation
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency

Accident Assessment Center
- Bureau of Radiation Protection
- Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle
- Bureau of Radiation Protection and Emergency Response Team
- Department of Environmental Protection
- State of Pennsylvania

State Field Monitoring Team A
- Department of Emergency Response, Norristown Regional Office
- Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Harrisburg Office
- Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Norristown Office
- Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection

State Field Monitoring Team B
- Bureau of Radiation Protection
- Department of Environmental Protection Emergency Management

Berks County

Berks County EOC
- American Red Cross
- Berks County Agricultural Extension Office
- Berks County Civil Air Patrol
- Berks County Department of Emergency Services
- Berks County Planning Commission
- Berks County Public Works Department
- Berks County Sheriff's Office
- Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
- Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
- Pennsylvania State Police
- Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)

Douglass Township EOC
Douglass Township Traffic & Access Control
Washington Township EOC

- Bally Community Ambulance
- Berks County RACES
- Eastern Berks Fire Department
- Washington Township Board of Supervisors
- Washington Township Roadmaster
- Washington Township Public Works
- Washington Township Transportation Commission
- Washington Township Back-up Route Alerting
- Bally Borough/Washington Township/Bechtelsville Borough emergency Management Agency

Berks County Schools

- Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
- Berks County Department of Emergency Services
- Boyertown Area School District
- Boyertown Elementary School
- Boyertown Junior High School West
- Daniel Boone Area School District
- Daniel Boone High School
- Monocacy Elementary Center

Berks County Mass Care Walkdowns

- Conrad Weiser High School
- Conrad Weiser Middle School
- Twin Valley High School
- Twin Valley Middle School
- Wilson Middle School South
- Muhlenberg Middle School

Chester County

- Chester County EOC
- Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
- Chester county Department of Emergency services (DES)
- Chester County Department of Transportation
- Chester County Department of Environmental Protection
- Chester County Department of Public Health
- Chester County Medical Services
- Chester County Department of Public Safety
- Chester County Sheriff's Office
- Chester County Department of Agriculture

- Pennsylvania State Police

Chester County 911 Call Center (Communications)
American Red Cross
ARES/RACES
Chester County School Districts
Chester County Evacuation Support Officer (EFS #6)
Chester County Fire and Emergency Medical Services
Chester County Public Information Officer
Chester County Housing and Human services
Chester County Oil and Hazardous Material Response (ESF #10)

East Vincent Township EOC

- East Vincent Township Department of Public Works
- East Vincent Township Emergency Management
- East Vincent Police Department
- East Vincent Public Safety and Security
- East Vincent Township Fire Services
- East Vincent Township Public Health and Medical Services
- East Vincent Township Transportation Services
- Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)

South Coventry Township EOC

- Exelon
- South Coventry Township Emergency Management
- South Coventry Township Back-Up Route Alerting
- CCAR/Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)
- Ridge Fire Company

West Pikeland Township EOC

- West Pikeland Township Police
- West Pikeland Township Emergency Management
- West Pikeland Township Public Works
- Cumberland County Department of Emergency Services
- RACES

Chester County Schools

- Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
- Chester County Department of Emergency Services
- Downingtown Area School District
- Shamona Creek Elementary
- Downingtown High School West
- Great Valley Area School District
- KD Markley Elementary School
- Owen J. Roberts School District
- Owen J. Roberts High School

- Chester County Department of Emergency Services
- Owen J. Roberts High School
- Owen J. Roberts High School Safety and Security
- East Coventry Elementary School
- Phoenixville Area School District
- Phoenixville High School
- Kindergarten Center

Chester County Mass Care Walkdowns

- Avon Grove High School
- Charles Patton Middle School
- Fred Engle Middle School
- Kennett High School
- Mary Lang Elementary
- Unionville High School

Montgomery County

Montgomery County EOC

- American Red Cross Southeast Pennsylvania Chapter
- Montgomery County Animal Response Team
- Montgomery County Critical Incident Stress Management Team
- Montgomery County 911 Emergency Communications Center
- Montgomery County Department of Public Safety

Lower Providence Township EOC

- Lower Providence Administration
- Lower Providence Emergency Management Agency
- Lower Providence Emergency Medical Services
- Lower Providence Fire Department
- Lower Providence Police Department
- Lower Providence Public Works
- Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)

Lower Salford Township EOC

- Lower Salford Township Back-Up Route Alerting
- Pottstown Borough EOC

Upper Frederick Township EOC

- Upper Frederick Township Board of Supervisors
- Upper Frederick Township Department of Public Works
- Upper Frederick Township Emergency Management Organization
- Upper Frederick Township Town Constable
- Upper Frederick Township Town Manager
- Upper Frederick Township Volunteer Fire Department

Upper Pottsgrove Township EOC
- Upper Pottsgrove Township Police Department
- Upper Pottsgrove Township Public Works
- Upper Pottsgrove Township Volunteer Fire Company 79
- Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)/Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)

Montgomery County Schools
- Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
- Montgomery County Department of Emergency Services
- Methacton Area School District
- Arcola Intermediate School
- Skyview Elementary School
- Perkiomen Valley School District
- Perkiomen Valley High School
- Schwenksville Elementary School
- Pottsgrove School District
- Lower Pottsgrove Elementary School
- Pottstown Area School District
- Franklin Elementary School
- Pottstown Middle School
- Souderton Area School District
- Indian Valley Middle School
- Spring Ford Area School District
- Evans Elementary School
- Limerick Elementary School
- Royersford Elementary School
- 9th Grade Center
- Upper Perkiomen School District

Montgomery County Mass Care Walkdowns
- Abington Junior High School
- Abington Senior High School
- Cheltenham High School

Bucks County

Bucks County EOC

Bucks County Mass Care Walkdowns
- Council Rock Newtown Middle School
- Council Rock South High School
- Edgewood Elementary
- Eleanor Roosevelt Elementary
- Franklin Roosevelt School

- Holland Middle School
- Lenape Middle School
- Makefield Elementary
- Milford Township Fire Company
- Milford Middle School
- Morrisville Middle/Senior High School
- Poquessing Middle School
- Quakertown Community High School
- Richboro Middle School
- Springfield Elementary

Lehigh County

Lehigh County EOC

- Lehigh County Emergency Management Agency
- Lehigh County Health Network Office of Emergency Management
- Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
- American Red Cross
- Emmaus Emergency Management Agency
- Washington Township Emergency Management Agency
- Weisenberg Emergency Management Agency
- North Whitehall Emergency Management Agency

Lehigh County Mass Care Walkdowns

- DeSales University
- Eyer Junior High School
- Orefield Middle School
- South Mountain Middle School
- Springhouse Junior High School

State Traffic/Access Control Points

- Pennsylvania State Police
- Troop K, Skippack Barracks

Reception Centers/Mass Care/Mon/Decon

Berks County

Mass Care/Mon/Decon-Fleetwood High School

- Fleetwood Volunteer Fire Company
- Eastern Pennsylvania Region American Red Cross

Mass Care-Wyomissing High School

- American Red Cross
- Berks County Emergency Management Agency
- Berks County Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)

Mon/Decon-Wyomissing High School
- Wyomissing Fire Department and Township of Spring Fire Rescue
- Berks County Emergency Management Agency

Reception Center-Morgantown Crossings
- Berks County Department of Emergency Services
- Caernarvon Township Emergency Management Agency
- Caernarvon Township Police
- Twin Valley Fire Department

Bucks County
Reception/Mon/Decon-County Line Plaza
- Souderton Fire Company
- Bucks County Emergency Management Agency

Chester County
Reception/Mon/Decon-Downingtown High School West
- Chester County HazMat Team

Lehigh County
Reception/Mass Care/Mon/Decon- Emmaus High School
- American Red Cross
- Emmaus Fire Department
- Emmaus Police Department
- Emmaus Emergency Management Agency
- Lehigh County Emergency Management Agency

Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station

Chester County
Lionville Middle School
- Chester County HazMat Team

Montgomery County
Upper Perkiomen High School
- Montgomery County Office of Emergency Management
- Pennsburg Fire Station Staff

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume the lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities were conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees. FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

A. Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures developed by State and local governments;

B. Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;

C. Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993, Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993; and

D. Coordinating the activities of the following Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- U.S. Department of Commerce,
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
- U.S. Department of Energy,
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
- U.S. Department of Transportation,
- U.S. Department of Agriculture,
- U.S. Department of the Interior, and
- U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the Region III Radiological Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

A Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise was conducted on November 17, 2015, to assess the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving Limerick Generating Station (LGS). The purpose of this exercise report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the off-site response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency. The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region III RAC Chairperson and approved by FEMA Headquarters. These reports are provided to the NRC and participating States. State and local governments utilize the findings contained in these reports for the purposes of planning, training, and improving emergency response capabilities.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in the following:

- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

- Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual, July 2015

Section 1 of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview", presents the "Exercise Planning Team" and the "Participating Organizations".

Section 2 of this report, entitled "Exercise Design Summary", and includes the "Purpose and Design", "Exercise Objectives, Capabilities, and Activities", and the "Scenario Summary".

Section 3 of this report, entitled "Analysis of Capabilities", presents detailed "Drill Evaluation and Results" information on the demonstration for each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issue-only format (Criteria Evaluation Summaries).

Section 4, of this report, entitled "Conclusion", is a description of the Region's overall assessment of the capabilities of the participating organizations. It also presents information on planning issues if any were identified.

Emergency Planning Zone Description:

Limerick Generating Station (LGS) is located in southeastern Pennsylvania on the Schuylkill River about 1.7 miles southeast of Pottstown Borough. The river passes through the site, separating the western portion, which is in East Coventry Township in Chester County, from the eastern portion, which is in Limerick and Lower Pottsgrove Townships in Montgomery County.

The plant is owned and operated by Exelon Nuclear. Two boiling water reactors each generate an electrical output of 1,050 megawatts (MW). Unit 1 was issued a full-power license in August 1985; commercial operations began in February 1986. Unit 2 was issued a full-power license in August 1989 with commercial operations beginning in January 1990.

The site encompasses 595 acres and is divided into three (3) parts. The principal portion, where the major operating equipment and buildings are located, is on the east bank of the Schuylkill River. This portion is separated from the second segment, where the cooling water intake is located, near the main line of the Reading Railroad. The third portion lies on the west bank of the river, adjacent to Conrail railroad tracks. The site coordinates are approximately 40°13'27"N and 75°35'15"W.

The minimum exclusion distance for the LGS is 2,500 feet from the center of each reactor. The utility owns all the land within the exclusion area. No private residences are located within the exclusion area; however, some farming may be permitted.

There are 165 sirens installed to cover the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. These sirens are activated three (3) minutes before the Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages issued by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are broadcast. Soils in this area are of the Reaville-Penn-Klinesville Association and are characteristic of rolling uplands. They are underlain by sedimentary rocks of the Brunswick Formation, consisting mostly of red shale with some fine-grained sandstone interbedding. The normal pool elevation of the Schuylkill River in this area is 200 feet above mean sea level (msl). The topography of the area is hilly, with elevations ranging from 100-300 feet above msl within five (5) miles of the site. The plant is approximately 217 feet above msl.

The climate in this area is dominated by prevailing westerly winds that produce humid, continental-type weather characterized by warm summers and moderately cold winters. Montgomery County is the warmest part of Pennsylvania, with an average annual temperature of 57°F. Annual precipitation is approximately 42 inches. The area in the immediate vicinity of the plant is made up mostly of agricultural and other open land. The Pottstown Borough in Montgomery County is the nearest community. The nearest major population center (more than 25,000 people) is Philadelphia that lies 25 miles to the southeast of the site.

Two major industries employ a total of 850 persons within two (2) miles of the plant. Two small airfields are also located nearby. A small private airfield is about one (1) mile to the northeast, but its runway is oriented so that the flight path does not pass over the plant. The Pottstown Municipal Airport is 4.3 miles northwest of the site. The LGS does not lie in the approach pattern for this airport. No major thoroughfares are located in the immediate vicinity of the plant. The main line of the Reading Railroad runs along the north bank of the Schuylkill River and traverses the site about 500 feet from the plant.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

The objective of the 2015 Limerick Generating Stations (LGS) Plume Exercise was to demonstrate the capabilities of State and local emergency management agencies to mobilize emergency management and emergency response personnel, to activate emergency operations centers and support facilities, and to protect the health, lives, and property of the citizens residing within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

To demonstrate the ability to communicate between multiple levels of government and provide timely, accurate, and sufficiently detailed information to the public, the emergency management agencies use a variety of resources, including radios, telephones, the Internet, the media, the Emergency Alert System (EAS), and the utility Alert and Notification System (ANS) Sirens. All of these communication resources were employed and evaluated. The EAS and ANS were simulated and media information was prepared but not actually released.

An essential capability of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP) is to evacuate, monitor and decontaminate, if necessary, and provide temporary care and shelter to displaced residents from the EPZ. The ability of the risk/support counties to mobilize personnel and resources to establish reception, monitoring and decontamination, and mass care centers was demonstrated.

The protection of school children is also a vital mission of the REPP. School districts and selected schools demonstrated the capability to communicate and coordinate the collection, evacuation, transportation and shelter of students attending schools within the EPZ. Provisions for students who live within the EPZ, but attend school outside were also evaluated.

2.3 Scenario Summary

SCENARIO SUMMARY LIMERICK GENERATING STATION

DHS-FEMA Region III, PLUME EXERCISE - November 17, 2015

NOTE: The times for the events are approximate as the NRC licensee's operations crew on the reactor training simulator will be provided opportunity for free play. **All scenario events are simulated.**

On November 17, 2015 **at 1600, the Plume exercise started** in the Limerick Generating Station (LGS) control room simulator. LGS Unit 1 and Unit 2 are boiling water reactors operating at 100 percent power. Unit 1 was participating in the exercise. At 1600, the wind direction was from the North East, 43 degrees, into the South West at 6 miles per hour (mph). The atmospheric stability class was E. The near term weather forecast was for the winds to trend towards the East, and then shift to the North East. Initial conditions on Unit 1 were that the containment spray system was out of service, and one of the two standby gas treatment systems was out of service. Repairs were expected to be completed within 24 to 36 hours. In the event

of a loss of cooling accident this would reduce the capability of the plant to mitigate the release of radioactive materials.

At 1630, the reactor was shut down successfully when there was a 90 gallons per minute (gpm) leak from the reactor coolant system into the reactor containment.

By 1647, an Alert was declared based on EAL FA1 loss of the reactor coolant system barrier. There were no releases to the environment.

At 1700, maintenance reported that the second train of the standby gas treatment system was out of service.

At 1738, a loss of cooling accident into the containment occurred. The containment pressure was increasing and the reactor water level was falling to below the top of the fuel rods. The containment radiation level was 300 R/hour and rising. Some fuel clad damage occurred.

By 1811, a Site Area Emergency was declared based on EAL FS1, loss of both the reactor coolant system and the fuel clad barriers. There were no releases to the environment.

At 1850, radioactive releases to the environment commenced when the reactor containment pressure began decreasing owing to a leak into the reactor building through the personnel hatch seal. The stack effluent monitor reading increased significantly.

By 1905, a General Emergency was declared based on EAL FG1, loss of all three fission product barriers. **Limerick issued a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR)**, "Evacuate the 0 to 2 miles ring. Evacuate the 2 to 5 mile downwind sectors SSW/SW/WSW/W/WNW. Administer potassium iodide to the public, and advise the remainder of the EPZ to monitor and prepare". Radioactive releases were in progress. The wind direction was from 59 degrees ENE at 10 mph with a stability class of E. Limerick station dose projections indicated that the EPA Protective Action Guides were not exceeded beyond the site boundary.

At 1950, the wind direction changed to be from 33 degrees NNE at 10 mph with a stability class of E. **By 2005, Limerick station upgraded their Protective Action Recommendation (PAR),** "Evacuate the 0 to 2 miles ring. Evacuate the 2 to 5 mile downwind sectors S/SSW/SW/WSW/W/WNW. Administer potassium iodide KI to the public, and advise the remainder of the EPZ to monitor and prepare".

Field monitoring teams would detect plume centerline gamma exposure rates (closed window) of about 7 mR/hr at the site boundary to 1 mR/hr at about 9 miles from the site. Air sample iodine cartridge readings on the plume centerline would be as high as 50 net corrected counts per minute out to about 4 miles from the site.

By 2100, the Evaluated Exercise **will end if all objectives are met.**

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluations of all jurisdictions and locations that participated in the November 17, 2015, Plume Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise. This report also includes the Mass Care Walk Downs on October 29th and 30th, and Out of Sequence Exercise on November 17th and 18th, 2015. The exercise was conducted to demonstrate the ability of State, County and local jurisdictional Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) to respond to a radiological release within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) associated with the Limerick Generating Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of the appropriate Exercise Evaluation Area Criteria contained in the REP Program Manual. Detailed information on the exercise evaluation area criteria and the Extent-of-Play agreement are found in Appendix E.

The exercise was conducted and evaluated in accordance with the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual and NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix presented in Table 3.1, on the following pages, presents the status of the exercise evaluation area criteria from the REP Program Manual that was scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise evaluation area criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of the criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

(L1) Level 1 Finding: an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a determination that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).

(L2) Level 2 Finding: an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.

(P) Plan Issue: an observed or identified inadequacy in the offsite response organizations' (OROs) emergency plan/implementation procedures, rather than that of the ORO's performance.

(N) Not Demonstrated: term applied to the status of a REP exercise Evaluation Area Criterion indicating that the ORO, for a justifiable reason, did not demonstrate the Evaluation Area

Criterion, as required in the Extent-of-Play agreement or at the two-year or eight-year interval required in the FEMA REP Program Manual.

(M) Met: status of a REP exercise Evaluation Area Criterion indicating that the participating ORO demonstrated all demonstration criteria for the Evaluation Area Criterion to the level required in the Extent-of-Play agreement with no Findings assessed in the current exercise and no unresolved prior Findings.

Tables 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

Table 3.1a - Exercise Evaluation by Classification – Criteria Met

Date: 11/17/2015 Site: Limerick Generating Station		
Location Abbreviation	Criteria Title	Criteria
BkCo EOC (S)	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
BkCo EOC (S)	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BkCo EOC (S)	Communications Equipment	1d1
BkCo EOC (S)	Direction and Control	1c1
BkCo EOC (S)	Mobilization	1a1
BkCoMCCCRNMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCCRSHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCEES	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCERES	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCFRMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCHMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCLMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCMES	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCMMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCMMSHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCMTFC	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCPMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCQCHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCRMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCoMCCSES	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BkCo MDC CoLnPlza	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
BkCo MDC CoLnPlza	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BkCo MDC CoLnPlza	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BkCo RC CoLnPlza	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
BkCo RC CoLnPlza	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BrCo BASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
BrCo BASD ByrtwnES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
BrCo BASD ByrtwnJHSW	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
BrCo DBASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
BrCo DBASD MEC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1

BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
BrCo DglsTwp EOC	Mobilization	1a1
BrCo DglsTwp TACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BrCo DglsTwp TACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BrCo DglsTwp TACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
BrCo DglsTwp TACP	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
BrCo DglsTwp TACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
BrCo EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
BrCo EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
BrCo EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
BrCo EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
BrCo EOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
BrCo EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
BrCo EOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
BrCo EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
BrCo EOC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
BrCo EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BrCo EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BrCo EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
BrCo EOC	Mobilization	1a1
BrCoMCCCWHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BrCoMCCCWMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BrCoMCCFHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BrCoMCCMMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BrCoMCCTVHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BrCoMCCTVMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BrCoMCCWHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BrCoMCCWSMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
BrCoMDCFHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
BrCoMDCFHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BrCoMDCFHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BrCoMDCWHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
BrCoMDCWHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BrCoMDCWHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BrCoMDCWHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
BrCoMDCWHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BrCoMDCWHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BrCo WshtnTwp EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
BrCo WshtnTwp EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
BrCo WshtnTwp EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
BrCo WshtnTwp EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1

BrCo WshtnTwp EOC	Mobilization	1a1
BrCo WshtnTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
BrCo WshtnTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
BrCo WshtnTwp EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
BrCoWTwpBuRA	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
BrCoWTwpBuRA	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BrCoWTwpBuRA	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BrCoWTwpBuRA	Mobilization	1a1
BrCoWTwpBuRA	Communications Equipment	1d1
BRP R3V	Field Team Management	4a2
BRP R3V	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
BRP R3V	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
BRP R3V	Communications Equipment	1d1
BRP R3V	Direction and Control	1c1
BRP R3V	Mobilization	1a1
CC DASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC DASD DHSW	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC DASD SCES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC EOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
CC EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
CC EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CC EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
CC EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
CC EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
CC EOC	Mobilization	1a1
CC EOC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
CC EOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
CC EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
CC EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
CC EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Mobilization	1a1
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
CCEVcntTwpEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
CCEVcntTwpTACP	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
CCEVcntTwpTACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1

CCEVcntTwpTACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CCEVcntTwpTACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CCEVcntTwpTACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
CC EWMDS LMS	Monitoring/Decontamination of Emergency Workers/Equipment/Vehicles	6b1
CC EWMDS LMS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CC EWMDS LMS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CC EWMDS LMS	Communications Equipment	1d1
CC EWMDS LMS	Direction and Control	1c1
CC GVSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC GVSD KDMES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CCMCCAGHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
CC MCC CPMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
CCMCCFEMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
CCMCCKHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
CCMCCMLES	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
CCMCCUnHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
CC MDC DHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CC MDC DHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
CC MDC DHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CCOJRSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CCOJRSDECES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CCOJRSDOJRHS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC PASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC PASD KC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC RC DHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CC RC DHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
CCSCTwpBuRA	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
CCSCTwpBuRA	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CCSCTwpBuRA	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CCSCTwpBuRA	Communications Equipment	1d1
CCSCTwpBuRA	Mobilization	1a1
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
CC SCvntryTwp EOC	Mobilization	1a1
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1

CC WPklndTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Mobilization	1a1
CC WPklndTwp EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
CC WPklndTwp TACP	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
CC WPklndTwp TACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
CC WPklndTwp TACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
CC WPklndTwp TACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
CC WPklndTwp TACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
EJIC	Communications Equipment	1d1
EJIC	Mobilization	1a1
LhCo EOC (S)	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
LhCo EOC (S)	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LhCo EOC (S)	Communications Equipment	1d1
LhCo EOC (S)	Direction and Control	1c1
LhCo EOC (S)	Mobilization	1a1
LhCo MCC DU	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
LhCoMCCEHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
LhCoMCCEJHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
LhCoMCCOMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
LhCoMCCSMMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
LhCoMCCSphMS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
LhCoMDCEHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
LhCoMDCEHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
LhCoMDCEHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
LhCo RC EHS	Monitoring, Decontamination, & Registration of Evacuees	6a1
LhCo RC EHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MC EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
MC EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
MC EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MC EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
MC EOC	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
MC EOC	Mobilization	1a1
MC EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
MC EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
MC EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MC EOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1

MC EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MC EOC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
MC EWMDS UPHS	Monitoring/Decontamination of Emergency Workers/Equipment/Vehicles	6b1
MC EWMDS UPHS	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MC EWMDS UPHS	Direction and Control	1c1
MC EWMDS UPHS	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MC EWMDS UPHS	Communications Equipment	1d1
MC LPTwp TACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MC LPTwp TACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MC LPTwp TACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MC LPTwp TACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
MCLrPrvTwpEOC	Mobilization	1a1
MC LSlfrdTwp TACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MC LSlfrdTwp TACP	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
MC LSlfrdTwp TACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MC LSlfrdTwp TACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MC LSlfrdTwp TACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
MCLSTBuRA	Activation of the Back-up ANS	5a3
MCLSTBuRA	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MCLSTBuRA	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MCLSTBuRA	Communications Equipment	1d1
MCLSTBuRA	Mobilization	1a1
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Mobilization	1a1
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
MC LwrSlfrdTwp EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
MCMCCAJHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
MCMCCASHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1

MCMCCCHS	Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1
MC MSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC MSD AIS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MCMSDSUES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC PASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC PASD FES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC PASD PMS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC PSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC PSD LPES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC PSVD SES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Mobilization	1a1
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
MC PtstwnBr EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
MC PtstwnBr TACP	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
MC PtstwnBr TACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MC PtstwnBr TACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MC PtstwnBr TACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MC PtstwnBr TACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
MC PVSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC PVSD PVHS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC SASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC SFASD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MCSFASD9GC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC SFASD EvnsES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC SFASD LES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC SFASD RyrsfrdES	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC SVASD IVMS	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MCUFTwpEOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MCUFTwpEOC	Direction and Control	1c1
MCUFTwpEOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MCUFTwpEOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
MCUFTwpEOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
MCUFTwpEOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MCUFTwpEOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
MCUFTwpEOC	Mobilization	1a1
MCUFTwpEOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1

MCUFTwpEOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MCUpPtgrTTACP	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
MCUpPtgrTTACP	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MCUpPtgrTTACP	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MCUpPtgrTTACP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MCUpPtgrTTACP	Communications Equipment	1d1
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Mobilization	1a1
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Implementation of PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	3c1
MC UprPtsgrvTwp EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
MC UPSD	Implementation of PADs for Schools	3c2
PAAACSEOCBRP	PAD decision-making process and coordination for the General Public	2b2
PAAACSEOCBRP	Accident Assessment and PARs for the Emergency Event	2b1
PAAACSEOCBRP	Emergency Worker Exposure Control Decisions	2a1
PAAACSEOCBRP	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
PAAACSEOCBRP	Communications Equipment	1d1
PAAACSEOCBRP	Direction and Control	1c1
PAAACSEOCBRP	Mobilization	1a1
PA EOC	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
PA EOC	Activation of the Prompt Alert & Notification System	5a1
PA EOC	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
PA EOC	Communications Equipment	1d1
PA EOC	Mobilization	1a1
PA EOC	Implementation of KI PAD for Institutionalized Individuals/Public	3b1
PA EOC	PADs for disabilities & access/functional needs people	2c1
PA EOC	PAD decision-making process and coordination for the General Public	2b2
PA EOC	Direction and Control	1c1
PA JIC/RumCon	Emergency Information & Instructions for the Public/Media	5b1
PA JIC/RumCon	Communications Equipment	1d1
PA JIC/RumCon	Mobilization	1a1
PA TACP SPBSkpk	Impediments to Evacuation	3d2
PA TACP SPBSkpk	Implementation of Traffic & Access Control	3d1
PA TACP SPBSkpk	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
PA TACP SPBSkpk	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
PA TACP SPBSkpk	Communications Equipment	1d1
SFMT A SER	Mobilization	1a1
SFMT A SER	Plume Phase Field Measurement, Handling, & Analyses	4a3

SFMT A SER	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
SFMT A SER	Communications Equipment	1d1
SFMT A SER	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
SFMT B SER	Plume Phase Field Measurement, Handling, & Analyses	4a3
SFMT B SER	Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1
SFMT B SER	Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1
SFMT B SER	Communications Equipment	1d1
SFMT B SER	Mobilization	1a1

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 State Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 PA State Field Monitoring Team A, South East Region

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.2 PA State Field Monitoring Team B, South East Region

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.3 Pennsylvania Accident Assessment Center, State EOC-Bureau of Radiation Protection

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. OBSERVED ONLY: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.4 Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.5 Pennsylvania Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. OBSERVED ONLY: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.6 Pennsylvania Joint Information Center/Rumor Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. OBSERVED ONLY: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.1.7 Pennsylvania State Traffic and Access Control Points, State Police Barracks Skippack

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 Berks County Emergency Operation Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.2 Berks County Mass Care Center, Conrad Weiser High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.3 Berks County Mass Care Center, Conrad Weiser Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.4 Berks County Mass Care Center, Fleetwood High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.5 Berks County Mass Care Center, Muhelenberg Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.6 Berks County Mass Care Center, Twin Valley High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.7 Berks County Mass Care Center, Twin Valley Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.8 Berks County Mass Care Center, Wilson Southern Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.9 Berks County Mass Care Center, Wyomissing High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.10 Berks County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Fleetwood High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.11 Berks County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Wyomissing High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.12 Berks County Reception Center, Morgantown Crossing

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.e.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.13 Berks County, Boyertown Area District, Boyertown Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.14 Berks County, Boyertown Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.15 Berks County, Boyertown Area School District, Boyertown Junior High School West

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.16 Berks County, Daniel Boone Area District, Monocacy Elementary Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.17 Berks County, Daniel Boone Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.18 Berks County, Douglass Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.19 Berks County, Douglass Township Traffic and Access Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.20 Berks County, Washington Township Backup Route Alerting

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.21 Berks County, Washington Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.22 Bucks County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, County Line Plaza

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.23 Chester County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.24 Chester County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, Lionville Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.25 Chester County Mass Care Center, Avon Grove High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.26 Chester County Mass Care Center, Charles Patton Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.27 Chester County Mass Care Center, Fred Engle Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.28 Chester County Mass Care Center, Kennett High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.29 Chester County Mass Care Center, Mary Lang Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.30 Chester County Mass Care Center, Unionville High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.31 Chester County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Downingtown High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.32 Chester County Reception Center, Downingtown High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.e.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.33 Chester County, Downingtown Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.34 Chester County, Downingtown Area School District, Downingtown High School West

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.35 Chester County, Downingtown Area School District, Shamona Creek Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.36 Chester County, East Vincent Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.37 Chester County, East Vincent Township Traffic and Access Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.38 Chester County, Great Valley School District, KD Markley Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.39 Chester County, Owen J. Roberts School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.40 Chester County, Owen J. Roberts School District, East Coventry Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.41 Chester County, Owen J. Roberts School District, Owen J. Roberts High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.42 Chester County, Phoenixville Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.43 Chester County, Phoenixville Area School District, Kindergarten Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.44 Chester County, South Coventry Township Backup Route Alerting

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.45 Chester County, South Coventry Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: ONE

LOCATION: South Coventry Township Emergency Operation Center

ISSUE NO: 35-15-3a1-L2-01

CRITERION: Emergency Worker Exposure Control

CONDITION: The Radiological Briefing was not conducted in accordance with procedures and content required.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Radiological Officer (RO) not adequately trained.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1: J.10.e, K.3.a & b, K.4

EFFECT: The briefing was not done correctly to prepare Emergency Workers (EW) for deployment with the correct understanding of what the risks were and what proper monitoring and KI procedures to follow. As a result the EWs were not able to successfully answer the required interview questions.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The Exelon representative provided training for the substitute Radiation Officer on the proper briefing content, risks, and proper monitoring and KI procedures. The Radiation Officer was then able to conduct a proper Radiation Briefing to the personnel in the EOC and for the TCP staff. Two staff were interviewed and able to answer the questions correctly on monitoring and KI procedures.

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.46 Chester County, West Pikeland Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.47 Chester County, West Pikeland Township Traffic and Access Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.48 Montgomery County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.49 Montgomery County Emergency Worker Monitoring & Decontamination Station, Upper Perkiomen High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.50 Montgomery County Mass Care Center, Abington Jr High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.51 Montgomery County Mass Care Center, Abington Sr. High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.52 Montgomery County Mass Care Center, Cheltenham High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.53 Montgomery County, Lower Providence Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.54 Montgomery County, Lower Providence Township Traffic and Access Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.55 Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.56 Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Traffic and Access Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.57 Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Backup Route Alerting

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 5.a.3

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.58 Montgomery County, Methacton School District,

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.59 Montgomery County, Methacton School District, Arcola Intermediate School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.60 Montgomery County, Methacton School District, Skyview Upper Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.61 Montgomery County, Perkiomen Valley School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.62 Montgomery County, Perkiomen Valley School District, Perkiomen Valley High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.63 Montgomery County, Perkiomen Valley School District, Schwenksville Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.64 Montgomery County, Pottsgrove School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.65 Montgomery County, Pottsgrove School District, Lower Pottsgrove Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.66 Montgomery County, Pottstown Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.67 Montgomery County, Pottstown Area School District, Franklin Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.68 Montgomery County, Pottstown Area School District, Pottstown Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.69 Montgomery County, Pottstown Borough Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.70 Montgomery County, Pottstown Borough Traffic and Access Control

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.71 Montgomery County, Souderton Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.72 Montgomery County, Souderton Valley Area School District, Indian Valley Mid. School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.73 Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.74 Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, 9th Grade Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.75 Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, Evans Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.76 Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, Limerick Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.77 Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, Royersford Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.78 Montgomery County, Upper Frederick Township Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.79 Montgomery County, Upper Perkiomen School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.80 Montgomery County, Upper Pottsgrove Township Emergency Operation Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.2.81 Montgomery County, Upper Pottsgrove Township Traffic and Access Control Point

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3 Support Jurisdictions

3.3.3.1 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Lenape Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.2 Bucks County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.3 Bucks County Mass Care Center Franklin Roosevelt Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.4 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Council Rock Newtown Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.5 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Council Rock South High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.6 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Edgewood Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.7 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Eleanor Roosevelt Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.8 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Holland Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.9 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Makefield Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.10 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Milford Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.11 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Milford Township Fire Company

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.12 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Morrisville Middle/Senior High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.13 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Poquessing Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.14 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Quakertown Community High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.15 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Richboro Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.16 Bucks County Mass Care Center, Springfield Elementary School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.17 Bucks County Reception Center, County Line Plaza

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.e.1, 6.a.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.18 Chester County, Great Valley School District

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.c.2

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.19 Lehigh County Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.20 Lehigh County Mass Care Center, DeSales University

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.21 Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Emmaus High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.22 Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Eyer Jr. High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.23 Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Orefield Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.24 Lehigh County Mass Care Center, South Mountain Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.25 Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Springhouse Middle School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.26 Lehigh County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Emmaus High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.3.27 Lehigh County Reception Center, Emmaus High School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

b. MET: 6.c.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

3.3.4 Private Jurisdictions

3.3.4.1 Exelon Joint Information Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

c. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 5.b.1

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: NONE

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: NONE

d. PLAN ISSUES: NONE

e. PRIOR ISSUES: RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ISSUES: UNRESOLVED: NONE

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and local jurisdictions, except where noted in this report demonstrated knowledge of their Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and procedures were adequately implemented during the Limerick Generating Station Plume exercise evaluated on November 17, 2015.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluators provided analyses of over 300 evaluation criteria. These analyses resulted in a determination of no Level 1 Findings, (1) One Level 2 Finding, successfully re-demonstrated during the exercise and no New Plan Issues, and no unresolved Plan Issues.

"Based on the results of the exercise and a review of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and procedures submitted, FEMA Region III has determined they are adequate (meet the planning and preparedness standards of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, November 1980, as referenced in 44 CFR 350.5) and there is reasonable assurance they can be implemented, as demonstrated during this exercise."

An After Action Implementation Plan (IP) will not be developed as part of this report.

APPENDIX A: BEST PRACTICES

1. IPAWS Pilot Implementation

Summary: The Chester County Department of Emergency Services, working with support from the FEMA Region III Technological Hazards Branch, and the FEMA IPAWS lab located at the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) in Indian Head, Maryland, conducted the Nation's first pilot demonstration of the IPAWS Nuclear Power Plant Warning (NUW) alert code during a scheduled Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise. The demonstration was not an evaluated component of the REP exercise, but it was executed in sequence with exercise play using real-time scenario information. As a result, the capabilities of both the hardware components of the system and the training of the responders who would potentially use it were realistically tested.

Description: The Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) is an important modernization and integration of the nation's alert and warning infrastructure that will save time for Federal, State, territorial, Tribal, and local alerting authorities who choose to use the system. The ability to pre-script messages for each Emergency Classification Level (ECL) and to choose which routes the alert may take to reach the affected population from a single interface represents a key evolutionary step in the timely notification of the public of an incident at a Nuclear Power Plant.

Alerting authorities who are designated as REP risk and/or ingestion pathway counties may choose to use IPAWS and may also integrate local systems that use Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) standards with the IPAWS infrastructure. Examples of CAP-compliant Emergency Alerting systems available for use in Chester County which are commonly found throughout other REP jurisdictions include terrestrial radio, television, cable, broadcast, satellite, and wireline providers. Additional notification tools demonstrated in Chester County included Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEAs), which were transmitted to local cellular towers and have the capability to effectively reach transient populations as well as residents with actionable emergency information.

The Chester County Department of Emergency Services (DES) chose to demonstrate initial public alert and warning at the Site Area Emergency (SAE) ECL at 1833 hours by sending a simulated SAE NUW message to the IPAWS Lab at JITC. DES chose to simulate the use of WEAs, as well as to integrate the test with their-existing CAP-compliant EAS message outlets. A test report from JITC was returned in real-time which demonstrated the success or failure of each component. All components tested were successful. Tests of NUW messages using the IPAWS lab during scheduled REP exercise play or as a component of a regular preparedness testing program are available to any REP jurisdiction who has completed the requirements to become an IPAWS alerting authority.

At 1834 hours, the Chester County DES simulated a real-time expansion of the flexibility of their IPAWS platform by incorporating a simulated siren failure event from the scenario into their demonstration. In the Chester County plans, the failure of this particular siren requires the activation of a backup route alerting protocol for the population affected by the failure. Route 6C2 was chosen both in real-time evaluated exercise play and for the non-evaluated IPAWS component of the exercise. Typically, this route requires the notification of a municipal EOC (South Coventry Township) and the subsequent dispatch of a volunteer fire department to report to the Fire Station, confirm instructions, and drive the complete length of the route--to include side roads and long driveways--which would not have received notification due to the failure of the siren. The completion time goal for backup route alerting tasks across the REP program nationwide is 45 minutes.

In real-time exercise play, the backup route alerting team needed all of the available 45 minutes to complete the task in addition to a seven minute response time for the volunteers to report to the fire station. During the simulated backup route alert notification initiated in the Chester County EOC, the Watch Officer opened a map on his computer screen using a Google Chrome browser, highlighted a map area to create a polygon which directly matched Route 6C2, and pushed out the backup route alert via IPAWS using the Wireless Emergency Alert tools to ping local cell phone towers. The test met the FEMA requirement to notify "essentially 100% of the population" and was completed in three minutes. Through their whole-of-community collaborative planning process, Chester County is working with response partners to validate best practices for ensuring that previously-identified Special Needs residents are notified during initial notifications as well as any potential backup route alerting processes using the IPAWS platform.

Using Chester County as a model going forward, FEMA strongly encourages the integration of IPAWS with existing REP offsite alert and notification plans. As IPAWS is adopted continues to expand throughout FEMA Region III and nationwide, technical and planning assistance is available for any interested REP jurisdiction by contacting their respective partners at the FEMA Regional Office Technological Hazards/REP Branch. The local REP Site Specialist and/or REP Regional Assistance Committee Chairperson can facilitate the process with the IPAWS Program Management Office and testing lab.

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE

DATE: 11/17/2015, SITE: Limerick Generating Station

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received at the Listed Location								
		PA SEOC	PA AAC	Exelon JIC	Berks County	Douglass Township	Washington Township	Chester County	East Vincent Township	South Coventry Township
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	1634	1652	1652	1732	1703	1703	1654	1703	1734	1653
SAE	1750	1809	1805	1811	1815	1825	1811	1818	1814	1838
GE	1854	1914	1914	1916	1914	1931	1926	1914	1914	1914
Start of Simulated Radiation Release	N/A	1923	1910	1916	1914	1931	1938	1914	1914	1914
Termination of Simulated Radiation Release	N/A	Ongoing	N/A	NA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		1705	1630	1805	1655	1741	1745	1715	1830	1728
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		1815	1814	1834	1829	1853	1850	1814	1914	1809
Exercise Terminated		2045	1920	2100	2038	2058	2057	2050	1953	2030
First Precautionary/Protective Actions: Describe: Airspace Restrictions Boating and fishing restriction Air, Rail and Restrictions Shelter and place livestock or stored feed and water		1819	1819	1816	1819	1823	1825	1819	1821	1831

Siren Sounding	1829	1829	1829	1829	1829	1829	1829	1829	1829
EAS Broadcast time	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832
Second Precautionary/Protective Actions. Describe: Recommend population within 10 miles to evacuate. Special Population shelter in place and prepared KI for general public and Emergency Workers Air Restriction, 10 miles, 10K feet Access limited disable	1937	1937	1946	1937	1951	1944	1937	1946	1945
Siren Sounding	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947
EAS Message Broadcast	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950
KI Decision (YES) EWs	1939	1934	1946	1934	1951	1934	1941	1953	1945
KI Decision (YES) General Public	1939	1934	1946	1934	2003	1934	1941	1953	1945
KI Decision (YES) Persons with Disabilities or Access Functional needs	1939	1934	1946	1934	2003	1934	1941	1953	1945

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Time That Notification Was Received at the Listed Location								
		West Pikeland Township	Montgomery County	Lower Providence Township	Lower Salford Township	Pottstown Borough	Upper Frederick Township.	Lower Pottsgrove Township	Bucks County	Lehigh County
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	1634	1709	1703	1650	1650	1650	1648	1704	1704	1703
SAE	1750	1813	1815	1810	1810	1810	1810	1810	1809	1807
GE	1854	1924	1910	1921	1924	1922	1919	1922	1924	1917
Start of Simulated Radiation Release	N/A	2008	1900	1921	1924	1922	1919	1921	1937	1924
Termination of Simulated Radiation Release	N/A	N/A	N/A	NA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		1709	1652	1702	1901	1706	1809	1722	1645	1720
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		1809	1814	1834	1946	1945	1834	1834	1834	1814
Exercise Terminated		2018	2048	2052	2045	2052	2045	2052	2035	2038
First Precautionary/Protective Actions: Describe: Water/rail, 10 miles Air 3000 feet, 3 miles Sheltering livestock stored feed		1831	1819	1829	1829	1832	1825	1829	1819	1819
Siren Sounding		1919	1829	1825	1829	1829	1829	1829	1829	1829
EAS Broadcast time		1832	1832	1832	1829	1832	1832	1832	1832	1832

Second Precautionary/Protective Actions. Describe: Air, 10 miles, 10,000 feet Evac Shelter, KI and TCP KI/Shelter in Place	1945	1937	1945	1946	1945	1946	1947	1945	1945
Siren Sounding	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947	1947
EAS Message Broadcast	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950	1950
KI Decision (YES) EWs	1934	1934	1945	1946	1945	1946	1947	N/A	N/A
KI Decision (YES) General Public, specify if restricted to sectors	1934	1934	1945	1946	1945	1946	1947	N/A	N/A
KI Decisions (YES) Persons with Disabilities or Access/Functional needs	1934	1934	1945	1946	1945	1946	1947	N/A	N/A

APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

The following is the list of Evaluators and Team Leaders for the Limerick Generating Station 2015 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plume Exercise evaluated on November 17, 2015. The following constitutes the managing staff for the Exercise Evaluation:

- Thomas Scardino, DHS/FEMA, Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chairman
- Tina Thomas, DHS/FEMA, Project Officer and Site Specialist

DATE: 11/17/2015, SITE: Limerick Generating Station

LOCATION	TEAM LEADER	AGENCY
Berks County Emergency Operation Center	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Conrad Weiser High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Fleetwood High School	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Muhelenberg Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Twin Valley High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Twin Valley Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Wilson Southern Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Wyomissing High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Fleetwood High School	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Wyomissing High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Reception Center, Morgantown Crossing	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Berks County, Boyertown Area District, Boyertown Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Berks County, Boyertown Area School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Berks County, Boyertown Area School District, Boyertown Junior High School West	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Berks County, Daniel Boone Area District, Monocacy Elementary Center	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Berks County, Daniel Boone Area School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Berks County, Douglass Township Emergency Operations Center	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Berks County, Douglass Township Traffic and Access Control	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Berks County, Washington Township Backup Route Alerting	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Berks County, Washington Township Emergency Operations Center	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Lenape Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Emergency Operations Center	Bridget Ahlgrim	FEMA HQ
Bucks County Mass Care Center Franklin Roosevelt Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3

Bucks County Mass Care Center, Council Rock Newtown Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Council Rock South High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Edgewood Elementary School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Eleanor Roosevelt Elementary School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Holland Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Makefield Elementary School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Milford Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Milford Township Fire Company	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Morrisville Middle/Senior High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Poquessing Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Quakertown Community High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Richboro Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Springfield Elementary School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, County Line Plaza	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Reception Center, County Line Plaza	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Emergency Operations Center	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, Lionville Middle School	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Avon Grove High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Charles Patton Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Fred Engle Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Kennett High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Mary Lang Elementary School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Unionville High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Downingtown High School	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Reception Center, Downingtown High School	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, Downingtown Area School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, Downingtown Area School District, Downingtown High School West	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, Downingtown Area School District, Shamona Creek Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, East Vincent Township Emergency Operations Center	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, East Vincent Township Traffic and Access Control	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, Great Valley School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, Great Valley School District, KD Markley Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, Owen J. Roberts School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3

Chester County, Owen J. Roberts School District, East Coventry Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, Owen J. Roberts School District, Owen J. Roberts High School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, Phoenixville Area School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, Phoenixville Area School District, Kindergarten Center	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, South Coventry Township Backup Route Alerting	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, South Coventry Township Emergency Operations Center	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, West Pikeland Emergency Operations Center	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Chester County, West Pikeland Township Traffic and Access Control	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Exelon Joint Information Center	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Emergency Operations Center	Bridget Ahlgrim	FEMA HQ
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, DeSales University	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Emmaus High School	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Eyer Jr. High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Orefield Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, South Mountain Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Springhouse Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Emmaus High School	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Reception Center, Emmaus High School	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Emergency Worker Monitoring & Decontamination Station, Upper Perkiomen HS	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Mass Care Center, Abington Jr. High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Mass Care Center, Abington Sr. High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Mass Care Center, Cheltenham High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Lower Providence Township Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Lower Providence Township Traffic and Access Control	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Traffic and Access Control	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Backup Route Alerting	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Methacton School District,	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Methacton School District, Arcola Intermediate School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Methacton School District, Skyview Upper Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Perkiomen Valley School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3

Montgomery County, Perkiomen Valley School District, Perkiomen Valley High School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Perkiomen Valley School District, Schwenksville Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Pottsgrove School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Pottsgrove School District, Lower Pottsgrove Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Pottstown Area School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Pottstown Area School District, Franklin Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Pottstown Area School District, Pottstown Middle School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Pottstown Borough Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Pottstown Borough Traffic and Access Control	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Souderton Area School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Souderton Valley Area School District, Indian Valley Mid. School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, 9th Grade Center	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, Evans Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, Limerick Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, Royersford Elementary School	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Upper Frederick Township Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Upper Perkiomen School District	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Upper Pottsgrove Township Emergency Operation Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Upper Pottsgrove Township Traffic and Access Control Point	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
PA State Field Monitoring Team A, South East Region	Martin Vyenielo	FEMA Region 3
PA State Field Monitoring Team B, South East Region	Martin Vyenielo	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Accident Assessment Center, State EOC-Bureau of Radiation Protection	Martin Vyenielo	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle	Martin Vyenielo	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Emergency Operations Center	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Joint Information Center/Rumor Control	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania State Traffic and Access Control Points, State Police Barracks Skippack	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
Berks County Emergency Operation Center	Miriam Weston	FEMA Region 2
Berks County Emergency Operation Center	Barton Freeman	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Emergency Operation Center	Frank Cordaro	ICF
Berks County Emergency Operation Center	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Conrad Weiser High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Fleetwood High School	Gary Goldberg	ICF
Berks County Mass Care Center, Muhelenberg Middle School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Twin Valley High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Twin Valley Middle School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Wilson Southern Middle School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Mass Care Center, Wyomissing High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Fleetwood High School	Gary Goldberg	ICF
Berks County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Wyomissing High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Berks County Reception Center, Morgantown Crossing	Thomas Essig	ICF
Berks County, Boyertown Area District, Boyertown Elementary School	Frank Cordaro	ICF
Berks County, Boyertown Area School District	Roger Kowieski	ICF
Berks County, Boyertown Area School District, Boyertown Junior High School West	Bill Webb	FEMA Region 10
Berks County, Daniel Boone Area District, Monocacy Elementary Center	Ronald Bonner	ICF
Berks County, Daniel Boone Area School District	Laurel Ryan	FEMA Region 9
Berks County, Douglass Township Emergency Operations Center	Paul Anderson	FEMA Region 9
Berks County, Douglass Township Emergency Operations Center	Ronald Bonner	ICF
Berks County, Douglass Township Traffic and Access Control	Lenora Borchardt	ICF
Berks County, Washington Township Backup Route Alerting	Brian Hasemann	FEMA Region 2
Berks County, Washington Township Emergency Operations Center	Andrew Chancellor	FEMA R7
Berks County, Washington Township Emergency Operations Center	Gregg Dawkins	ICF
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Lenape Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Emergency Operations Center	Kerry Holmes	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center Franklin Roosevelt Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Council Rock Newtown Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Council Rock South High School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Edgewood Elementary School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Eleanor Roosevelt Elementary School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Holland Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Makefield Elementary School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Milford Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Milford Township Fire Company	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Morrisville Middle/Senior High School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Poquessing Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Quakertown Community High School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3

Bucks County Mass Care Center, Richboro Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Mass Care Center, Springfield Elementary School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Bucks County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, County Line Plaza	John Zeidler	ICF
Bucks County Reception Center, County Line Plaza	Brad McRee	ICF
Chester County Emergency Operations Center	Christopher Roe	FEMA Region 5
Chester County Emergency Operations Center	John Price	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Emergency Operations Center	Michael Shuler	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Emergency Operations Center	Steve Ward	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station, Lionville MS	Reggie Rodgers	ICF
Chester County Mass Care Center, Avon Grove High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Charles Patton Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Fred Engle Middle School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Kennett High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Mary Lang Elementary School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Mass Care Center, Unionville High School	Tina Lai-Thomas	FEMA Region 3
Chester County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Downingtown High School	Richard Smith	ICF
Chester County Reception Center, Downingtown High School	Richard Smith	ICF
Chester County, Downingtown Area School District	Lenora Borchardt	ICF
Chester County, Downingtown Area School District, Downingtown High School West	Robert Duggleby	ICF
Chester County, Downingtown Area School District, Shamona Creek Elementary School	Gregg Dawkins	ICF
Chester County, East Vincent Township Emergency Operations Center	Marynette Herndon	ICF
Chester County, East Vincent Township Emergency Operations Center	Robert Duggleby	ICF
Chester County, East Vincent Township Traffic and Access Control	James Hickey	ICF
Chester County, Great Valley School District	Marynette Herndon	ICF
Chester County, Great Valley School District, KD Markley Elementary School	James Hickey	ICF
Chester County, Owen J. Roberts School District	Roger Jobe	ICF
Chester County, Owen J. Roberts School District, East Coventry Elementary School	David Kayen	ICF
Chester County, Owen J. Roberts School District, Owen J. Roberts High School	Roger Jobe	ICF
Chester County, Phoenixville Area School District	Robert Lemeshka	ICF
Chester County, Phoenixville Area School District, Kindergarten Center	Carl Wentzell	ICF
Chester County, South Coventry Township Backup Route Alerting	Roger Jobe	ICF
Chester County, South Coventry Township Emergency Operations Center	Laura Forrest	FEMA Region 2
Chester County, South Coventry Township Emergency Operations Center	Bill Webb	FEMA Region 10
Chester County, West Pikeland Emergency Operations Center	David Kayen	ICF
Chester County, West Pikeland Emergency Operations Center	Lisa Hamilton	FEMA Region HQ
Chester County, West Pikeland Township Traffic and Access Control	Robert Lemeshka	ICF
Exelon Joint Information Center	Roger Kowieski	ICF
Lehigh County Emergency Operations Center	Paul Nied	ICF

Lehigh County Mass Care Center, DeSales University	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Emmaus High School	Kent Tosch	ICF
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Eyer Jr. High School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Orefield Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, South Mountain Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Mass Care Center, Springhouse Middle School	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Lehigh County Monitoring and Decontamination Center, Emmaus High School	Robert Walker	ICF
Lehigh County Reception Center, Emmaus High School	Kent Tosch	ICF
Montgomery County Emergency Operations Center	Bridget Ahlgrim	FEMA HQ
Montgomery County Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Emergency Operations Center	Matthew Wiedemer	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Emergency Operations Center	Peter Herrick, Jr.	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Emergency Worker Monitoring & Decontamination Station, Upper Perkiomen HS	Mario Vigliani	ICF
Montgomery County Mass Care Center, Abington Jr. High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Mass Care Center, Abington Sr. High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County Mass Care Center, Cheltenham High School	Robert Neff	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Lower Providence Township Emergency Operations Center	Jon Christiansen	ICF
Montgomery County, Lower Providence Township Emergency Operations Center	Rufus Mobley	FEMA Region HQ
Montgomery County, Lower Providence Township Traffic and Access Control	Carl Wentzell	ICF
Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Emergency Operations Center	Cristina Schulingkamp	EPA
Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Emergency Operations Center	Kathy Duran	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Traffic and Access Control	Brenda Rembert	ICF
Montgomery County, Lower Salford Township Backup Route Alerting	Thomas Reynolds	ICF
Montgomery County, Methacton School District,	Brenda Rembert	ICF
Montgomery County, Methacton School District, Arcola Intermediate School	Thomas Reynolds	ICF
Montgomery County, Methacton School District, Skyview Upper Elementary School	Wes Ryals	ICF
Montgomery County, Perkiomen Valley School District	Clayton Spangenberg	ICF
Montgomery County, Perkiomen Valley School District, Perkiomen Valley High School	Lynn Steffensen	ICF
Montgomery County, Perkiomen Valley School District, Schwenksville Elementary School	Bruce Swiren	ICF
Montgomery County, Pottsgrove School District	Rebecca Thomson	ICF
Montgomery County, Pottsgrove School District, Lower Pottsgrove Elementary School	Rebecca Thomson	ICF
Montgomery County, Pottstown Area School District	Robert Walker	ICF
Montgomery County, Pottstown Area School District, Franklin Elementary School	Robert Walker	ICF

Montgomery County, Pottstown Area School District, Pottstown Middle School	Paul Nied	ICF
Montgomery County, Pottstown Borough Emergency Operations Center	LaShawn Halsey	FEMA HQ
Montgomery County, Pottstown Borough Emergency Operations Center	Taneeka Hollins	FEMA Region 1
Montgomery County, Pottstown Borough Emergency Operations Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Pottstown Borough Traffic and Access Control	Wes Ryals	ICF
Montgomery County, Souderton Area School District	John Zeidler	ICF
Montgomery County, Souderton Valley Area School District, Indian Valley Mid. School	John Zeidler	ICF
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District	Thomas Essig	ICF
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, 9th Grade Center	Gary Goldberg	ICF
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, Evans Elementary School	Brad McRee	ICF
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, Limerick Elementary School	Richard Smith	ICF
Montgomery County, Spring-Ford Area School District, Royersford Elementary School	Kent Tosch	ICF
Montgomery County, Upper Frederick Township Emergency Operations Center	Clayton Spangenberg	ICF
Montgomery County, Upper Frederick Township Emergency Operations Center	Ryan Jones	FEMA Region 1
Montgomery County, Upper Perkiomen School District	Mario Vigliani	ICF
Montgomery County, Upper Pottsgrove Township Emergency Operation Center	Lee Torres	FEMA Region 3
Montgomery County, Upper Pottsgrove Township Emergency Operation Center	Bruce Swiren	ICF
Montgomery County, Upper Pottsgrove Township Emergency Operation Center	Lynn Steffensen	ICF
Montgomery County, Upper Pottsgrove Township Traffic and Access Control Point	Rebecca Thomson	ICF
PA State Field Monitoring Team A, South East Region	Deborah Blunt	ICF
PA State Field Monitoring Team B, South East Region	Johanna Berkey	FEMA Region 9
Pennsylvania Accident Assessment Center, State EOC-Bureau of Radiation Protection	Martin Vyenielo	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle	Reggie Rodgers	ICF
Pennsylvania Emergency Operations Center	Joseph Suders	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Emergency Operations Center	Thomas Murray	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania Joint Information Center/Rumor Control	Laurel Ryan	FEMA Region 3
Pennsylvania State Traffic and Access Control Points, Station Police Barracks Skippack	Jon Christiansen	ICF

APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	Access Control Points
ACS	Auxiliary Communications Service
AO	Agriculture Officer
AP	Assistant Principal
ARC	American Red Cross
ARRA	Area Requiring Corrective Action
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Services
ATEOC	Amity Township Emergency Operations Center
BASD	Boyertown Area School District
BCEOC	Berks County Emergency Operations Center
CART	County Animal Response Team
CCEOC	Chester County Emergency Operations Center
CCEPRS	Chester County Emergency Preparedness Radio System
CERT	Crisis Emergency Response Team
DASD	Downingtown Area School District
DRD	Direct Reading Dosimeter
DT	Douglass Township
EAL	Emergency Action Level
EAS	Emergency Alert System
ECC	Emergency Communications Center
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
EDO	Emergency Duty Officer
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
EMC	Emergency Management Coordinator
EMD	Emergency Management Director
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
ENEOC	East Nantmeal Emergency Operations Center
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOCD	Emergency Operations Center Director
EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
EPT	Emergency Preparedness Team
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ERP	Emergency Response Procedure
ERT	Emergency Response Team
ESF	Emergency Support Function
EW	Emergency Workers
FAA	Federal Aviation Authority
FCP	Forward Command Post
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRT	Facility Response Team
GE	General Emergency
GES	Gilbertsville Elementary School

GIS	Geospatial Information System
HAB	Hostile Action Base
JIC	Joint Information Center
LGS	Limerick Generating Station
LNGA	Limerick Nuclear Generating Station
LSC	Logistic Section Chief
LVFD	Lionville Volunteer Fire Department
MC	Montgomery County
MCCEOC	Montgomery County Emergency Operations Center
MCT	Mobile Computer Terminal
MDC	Mobile Data Computer
MDT	Mobile Data Terminal
MERT	Medical Emergency Response Team
MPS	Municipal Planner Specialist
MSD	Methacton School District
MTFD	Montgomery Township Fire Department
NARS	Nuclear Accident Reporting System
ORO	Offsite Response Organization
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PBEMA	Phoenixville Borough Emergency Management Agency
PBEOC	Phoenixville Borough Emergency Operations Center
PBPD	Phoenixville Borough Police Department
PCS	Personal Communications Services
PEIRS	Pennsylvania Emergency Incident Reporting System
PEMA	Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
PFES	Pine Forge Elementary School
PIO	Public Information Officer
PM	Portal Monitor
PRD	Permanent Radiation Dosimeter
PSP	Pennsylvania State Police
PVES	Pickering Valley Elementary School
PVSD	Perkiomen Valley School District
PWD	Public Works Department
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services
RAT	Route Alerting Teams
REOP	Radiological Emergency Operations Plan
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
RERP	Radiological Emergency Response Plan
RO	Radiological Officer
RSAN	Roam Secure Alert Network
RSO	Radiation Safety Officer
SAC	Staging Area Commander
SAE	Site Area Emergency

SASD	Souderton Area School District
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SES	Schuylkill Elementary School
SEVAN	Statewide Emergency Voice Activation Network
SSL	School Services Liaison
TCP	Traffic Control Points
TEDE	Total Effective Dose Equivalent
TLD	Thermo Luminescent Dosimeter
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
USVFC	Upper Salford Volunteer Fire Company
UUT	Upper Uwchlan Township
WT	Warwick Township

APPENDIX E: EXERCISE PLAN

The enclosed Exercise Plan was created as an overall tool for facilitation and implementation of the Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise and to integrate the concepts and policies of the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program with the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Exercise Methodology.

The Exercise Plan was originally drafted by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency as an independent document and is annexed here. The Limerick Generating Station Extent-of-Play (EOP) was negotiated and agreed upon by FEMA Region III, and PEMA. The Extent-of-Play is included as an Appendix of the Exercise Plan.

Preface

The 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise (FSE) is sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA). This Exercise Plan (ExPlan) was produced with input, advice, and assistance from the Exercise Planning Team (EPT), which followed the guidance set forth in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).

The ExPlan gives officials, observers, media personnel, and players from participating organizations the information necessary to observe or participate in a nuclear power plant accident response exercise focusing on participants' emergency response plans, policies, and procedures as they pertain to this type of event. The information in this document is current as of the date of publication and is subject to change as dictated by the EPT.

The 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise is an *unclassified exercise*. The control of information is based more on public sensitivity regarding the nature of the exercise than on the actual exercise content. Some exercise material is intended for the exclusive use of exercise planners, Controllers, and Evaluators, but Players may view other materials deemed necessary to their performance. The ExPlan may be viewed by all exercise participants, *but the Controller and Evaluator (C/E) Handbook is a restricted document intended for Controllers and Evaluators only.*

All exercise participants should use appropriate guidelines to ensure the proper control of information within their areas of expertise and to protect this material in accordance with current jurisdictional directives. Public release of exercise materials to third parties is at the discretion of DHS and the EPT.

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Handling Instructions

1. The title of this document is 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise Plan (ExPlan).
2. The information gathered in this ExPlan should be handled as sensitive information not to be disclosed. This document should be safeguarded, handled, transmitted, and stored in accordance with appropriate security directives. Reproduction of this document, in whole or in part, without prior approval from Exercise Planning Director is prohibited.
3. At a minimum, the attached materials will be disseminated only on a need-to-know basis and when unattended, stored in an area offering sufficient protection against theft, compromise, inadvertent access, and unauthorized disclosure.
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Chapter 1: General Information

Introduction

The 2015 Limerick Generating Station Exercise is a full-scale exercise (FSE) designed to establish a learning environment for players to exercise emergency response plans, policies, and procedures as they pertain to Nuclear Power Plant accidents. An FSE is a complex event that requires detailed planning. To conduct an effective exercise, subject matter experts (SMEs) and local representatives from numerous agencies have taken part in the planning process and will take part in exercise conduct and evaluation.

This Exercise Plan (ExPlan) was produced at the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) with the input, advice, and assistance of the EPT. The 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise is evidence of the growing partnership between State and local jurisdictions for response to the threats our nation and communities face.

Confidentiality

The 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise is an *unclassified exercise.* The control of information is based more on public sensitivity regarding the nature of the exercise than on the actual exercise content. Some exercise material is intended for the exclusive use of exercise planners, controllers, and evaluators, but players may view other materials deemed necessary to their performance. This ExPlan may be viewed by all exercise participants, *but the Controller and Evaluator (C/E) Handbook is a restricted document intended for controllers and evaluators only.*

All exercise participants should use appropriate guidelines to ensure the proper control of information within their areas of expertise and protect this material in accordance with current Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) directives.

Public release of exercise materials to third parties is at the discretion of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the EPT.

Purpose

The purpose of this exercise is to evaluate player actions against current response plans and capabilities for a nuclear power plant-related incident, and to comply with the requirements of 44 CFR 350 and the guidelines of NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1. Exercise planners utilized the elements described in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual (July 2015) to develop this exercise.

The objective of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) is to demonstrate reasonable assurance that the public can be protected during a nuclear power plant emergency.

Core Capabilities

The establishment of the National Preparedness Priorities have steered the focus of homeland security toward a capabilities-based planning approach. Capabilities-based planning focuses on planning under uncertainty, since the next danger or disaster can never be forecast with complete accuracy. Therefore, capabilities-based planning takes an all-hazards approach to planning and preparation which builds capabilities that can be applied to a wide variety of incidents. States and Urban Areas use capabilities-based planning to identify a baseline assessment of their homeland security efforts by comparing their current capabilities against the Core Capabilities List (CCL) and the critical tasks of the Universal Task List (UTL). This approach identifies gaps in current capabilities and focuses efforts on identifying and developing priority capabilities and tasks for the jurisdiction. These priority capabilities are articulated in the jurisdiction's homeland security strategy and Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (TEP), of which this exercise is a component.

The capabilities listed below have been selected by the EPT planning team from the priority capabilities identified in Pennsylvania Multi-Year TEP. These capabilities provide the foundation for development of the exercise objectives and scenario, as the purpose of this exercise is to measure and validate performance of these capabilities and their associated critical tasks.

- Operational Communications
- Public Health and Medical Services
- Critical Transportation
- Public and Private Services and Resources
- Operational Coordination
- Public Information and Warning
- On-scene Security and Protection
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety
- Mass Care Services
- Supply Chain Integrity and Security
- Economic Recovery

Exercise Objectives

The EPT selected objectives that focus on evaluating emergency response procedures, identifying areas for improvement, and achieving a collaborative attitude. This exercise will focus on the following objectives:

- The objective of this exercise is to demonstrate reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public can be protected, through successful demonstration of tasks identified in Appendix B, Extent-of-Play.

- The players in this exercise will satisfactorily demonstrate negotiated competency on key Demonstration Criteria as defined in Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Manual (July 2015) as negotiated and defined in Appendix B, Extent-of-Play.

Outstanding Issues

There are no (0) Issues remaining as a result of the FEMA-evaluated plume-phase exercise at Limerick Generating Station in 2013.

Chapter 2: Exercise Logistics

Exercise Summary

General

The 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise is designed to establish a learning environment for players to exercise their plans and procedures for responding to an incident at a Nuclear Power Plant. The 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise will be conducted on November 17, 2015. Exercise play is scheduled for eight (8) hours or until the Lead Controller in consultation with FEMA and the Utility determines that the exercise objectives have been met at each venue. Out-of-Sequence Evaluations will be conducted as follows:

- The MS-1 hospital demonstration was federally evaluated at Brandywine Hospital, Chester County, on August 11, 2015.
- The exercise window for school demonstrations will be between 9:00 – 11:00 a.m. on November 17, 2015.
- The demonstration of reception centers, mass care centers (as indicated), monitoring/decontamination centers and emergency worker stations will be conducted between 7:00 p.m. - 9:30 p.m. on November 18, 2015.
  - Thirty six mass care centers (6 in Berks, 15 in Bucks, 6 in Chester, 5 in Lehigh, and 4 in Montgomery) will receive "walkdown" baseline evaluations on October 29 and 30, 2015. These 36 mass care centers will not be evaluated during the evening of November 18. There are two co-located Mass Care/Monitoring and Decontamination Centers in Berks and one in Lehigh that will be evaluated on the evening of November 18.
- The interview of Pennsylvania State Police traffic control/access control points will be from 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon November 18, 2015.

Assumptions

Assumptions constitute the implied factual foundation for the exercise and, hence, are assumed to be present before the start of the exercise. The following general assumptions apply to the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise:

- The exercise will be graded against the REP criteria. Elements outside the scope of the REP criteria will not be graded.
- This exercise will be conducted in a no-fault learning environment wherein systems and processes, not individuals, will be evaluated.
- Exercise simulation will be realistic and plausible, containing sufficient detail from which to respond.

- Exercise players will react to the information and situations as they are presented, in the same manner as if this had been a real event.

Constructs and Constraints

Constructs are exercise devices designed to enhance or improve exercise realism. Alternatively, constraints are exercise limitations that may detract from exercise realism. Constraints may be the inadvertent result of a faulty construct or may pertain to financial and staffing issues. Although there are a number of constructs and constraints (also known as exercise artificialities) for any exercise, the EPT recognizes and accepts the following as necessary:

- Exercise communication and coordination will be limited to the participating exercise venues and the Simulation Cell (SimCell).
- Only those communication methods listed in the Communication Directory will be available for players to use during the exercise.
- Out-of-Sequence play is allowed.
- Certain simulations are allowed.

The participating agencies may need to balance exercise play with real-world emergencies. It is understood that real-world emergencies will take priority.

Exercise Participants

The following are the categories of participants involved in this exercise; note that the term "participant" refers to all categories listed below, not just those playing in the exercise:

- *Players.* Players are agency personnel who have an active role in responding to the simulated emergency and perform their regular roles and responsibilities during the exercise. Players initiate actions that will respond to and mitigate the simulated emergency.
- *Controllers.* Controllers set up and operate the exercise site; plan and manage exercise play; act in the roles of response individuals and agencies not playing in the exercise. Controllers direct the pace of exercise play and routinely include members from the exercise planning team. They provide key data to players and may or initiate certain player actions to ensure exercise continuity.
- *Simulators.* Simulators are control staff personnel who role-play as nonparticipating organizations or individuals. They most often operate out of the SimCell, but may occasionally have face-to-face contact with players. Simulators function semi-independently under the supervision of SimCell controllers, enacting roles (e.g., as media reporters or next of kin) in accordance with instructions provided in the Master Scenario Events List (MSEL). All simulators are ultimately accountable to the Exercise Director and/or the Senior Controller.
- *Evaluators.* Evaluators are chosen to evaluate and provide feedback on a designated functional area of the exercise. They are chosen based on their expertise in the functional

area(s) they have been assigned to review during the exercise and their familiarity with local emergency response procedures. Evaluators assess and document participants' performance against established emergency plans and exercise evaluation criteria, in accordance with HSEEP standards and within the bounds of REP Program guidance and regulations. They are typically chosen from amongst planning committee members or the agencies/organizations that are participating in the exercise. FEMA Evaluators will not serve as Controllers.

- *Actors.* Actors are exercise participants who act or simulate specific roles during exercise play. They are typically volunteers who have been recruited to play the role of victims or other bystanders.
- *Observers.* Observers visit or view selected segments of the exercise. Observers do not play in the exercise, and do not perform any control or evaluation functions. Observers will view the exercise from a designated observation area and will be asked to remain within the observation area during the exercise. VIPs are a type of observer, but are frequently grouped separately. A dedicated group of exercise Controllers should be assigned to manage these groups. PEMA will provide observers to risk municipalities to observe and document activity at evaluated and non-evaluated OROs.
- *Media Personnel.* Some media personnel may be present as observers pending approval by the Exercise Director in coordination with the PEMA Press Office. Media interaction may also be simulated by the SimCell to enhance realism and meet related exercise objectives. A dedicated group of exercise controllers should be assigned to manage these groups.
- *Support Staff.* Exercise support staff includes individuals who are assigned administrative and logistical support tasks during the exercise (i.e. registration, catering, etc.)

Exercise Tools

Controller Handbook

The 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise C/E Handbook is designed to help exercise Controllers and evaluators conduct and evaluate an effective exercise. This Handbook also enables Controllers and Evaluators to understand their roles and responsibilities in exercise execution and evaluation. Should a Player, Observer, or media representative find an unattended Handbook, it should be provided to the nearest Controller or Evaluator. PEMA determine if a Controller Handbook will be used.

Master Scenario Events List

The MSEL outlines benchmarks, as well as injects that drive exercise play. It also details realistic input to the exercise players, as well as information expected to emanate from simulated organizations (i.e., those nonparticipating organizations, agencies, and individuals who would usually respond to the situation). An inject will include several items of information, such as

inject time, intended recipient, responsible controller, inject type, a short description of the event, and the expected player action.

Exercise Implementation

Exercise Play

Exercise play will begin at approximately 4:00 p.m. on November 17, 2015 with a situation update going to each participating venue. Play will proceed according to the events outlined in the MSEL, in accordance with established plans and procedures. The exercise will conclude upon the completion of operations and attainment of the exercise objectives, as determined by FEMA and the Utility.

Exercise Rules

The following are the general rules that govern exercise play:

- Real-world emergency actions take priority over exercise actions.
- Exercise participants will comply with real-world response procedures, unless otherwise directed by control staff.
- All communications (written, radio, telephone, etc.) made during the exercise will begin and end with the phrase, *"This is an exercise."*

Exercise participants placing telephone calls or initiating radio communication with the SimCell must identify the organization, agency, office, and/or individual with whom they wish to speak.

Safety Requirements

General

Exercise participant safety takes priority over exercise events. Although the organizations involved in the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise come from various response agencies, they share the basic responsibility for ensuring a safe environment for all personnel involved in the exercise. In addition, aspects of an emergency response are dangerous. Professional health and safety ethics should guide all participants to operate in their assigned roles in the safest manner possible. The following general requirements apply to the exercise:

- All exercise controllers, evaluators, and staff will serve as safety observers while the exercise activities are underway. Any safety concerns must be immediately reported to the Lead Controller.
- Participants will be responsible for their own and each other's safety during the exercise. It is the responsibility of all persons associated with the exercise to stop play if, in their

opinion, a real safety problem exists. Once the problem is corrected, exercise play can be restarted.

- All organizations will comply with their respective environmental, health, and safety plans and procedures, as well as the appropriate Federal, State, and local environmental health and safety regulations.

Exercise Setup

Exercise setup involves the pre-staging and dispersal of exercise materials; including registration materials, documentation, signage, and other equipment as appropriate.

Accident Reporting and Real Emergencies

- Anyone observing a participant who is seriously ill or injured will first advise the nearest controller, then if possible, render aid, provided the aid does not exceed his or her training.
- The controller who is made aware of a real emergency will initiate the broadcast *"Real-World Emergency"* on the controller radio network, providing the following information to the Senior Controller and Exercise Director:
    - Venue/function
    - Location within the venue/function
    - Condition
    - Requirements
- The SimCell will be notified as soon as possible if a real emergency occurs.
- If the nature of the emergency requires a suspension of the exercise at the venue/function, all exercise activities at that facility will immediately cease. Exercise play may resume at that venue/function once the "Real-World Emergency" situation has been addressed.
- Exercise play at other venue/functions should not cease if one venue/function has declared a "Real-World Emergency" unless they are reliant on the affected venue.
- If a real emergency occurs that affects the entire exercise, the exercise may be suspended or terminated at the discretion of the Exercise Director and Senior Controller. The notification will be made from the SimCell.

Site Access

Observer Coordination

Each organization with observers will coordinate with the PEMA and the Utility for access to the exercise site. Observers will be escorted to an observation area for orientation and conduct of the exercise. All observers will be asked to remain within the designated observation area during the exercise. Designated PEMA or Utility representatives and/or the Observer Controller will be

present to explain the exercise program and answer questions for the observers during the exercise.

PEMA Observers and Liaison Officers

PEMA will assign Observers and Liaison Officers to each County and Municipal Emergency Operations Center that is being evaluated in the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise. The Lead Controller will provide a list of Observers and Liaison Officers to the appropriate Off-Site Response Organizations prior to the day of the exercise. All Observers and Liaison Officers will receive a pre-exercise briefing.

PEMA Observers are not intended to be players and should excuse themselves from any active participation in the exercise. If an Observer is engaged in any way by one of the exercise players he/she should refer the player to the PEMA Liaison Officer.

PEMA Liaison Officers are players and are assigned specific responsibilities for the exercise. Liaison Officers are instructed to call into the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) upon arrival at the exercise venue. They are required to confirm their arrival and provide to the SEOC Watch Officer phone numbers at which they can be reached during the exercise. Liaison Officers are allowed to interact in the exercise as a PEMA representative and are sometimes required to provide injects to facilitate exercise play.

Exercise Identification

Identification badges may be issued to exercise staff. All exercise personnel and observers will be identified by badges distributed by the staff from each participating agency.

Communications Plan

Exercise Start, Suspension, and Termination Instructions

The exercise is scheduled to run for eight (8) hours or until the Lead Controller in coordination with FEMA and the Utility determines that the exercise objectives have been met. The Lead Controller will announce the exercise suspension or termination through the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).

All spoken and written communication will start and end with the statement, "THIS IS AN EXERCISE."

Player Communication

Players will use routine, in-place agency communication systems. Additional communication assets may be made available as the exercise progresses. The need to maintain capability for a real-world response may preclude the use of certain communication channels or systems that would usually be available for an actual emergency incident. In no instance will exercise

communication interfere with real-world emergency communications. Each venue will coordinate its own internal communication networks and channels.

The primary means of communication among the SimCell, Controllers, and the venues will be telephone. A list of key telephone and fax numbers, and radio call signs will be available as a Communication Directory before the start of the exercise.

Player Briefing

Controllers/Evaluators may be required to read specific scenario details to the participants to begin exercise play. They may also have technical handouts or other materials to give to players in order to better orient them to the exercise environment.

Public Affairs

Joint Information Centers will be established at both the Utility Emergency Operations Facility and the State Emergency Operations Centers. Actors will play the role of reporters "public briefings will be given as they would for a real incident." These "public briefings will be simulated and not broadcast for the public." The briefings will be available for viewing at the County EOCs.

Any participation by the actual media will be coordinated through the Exercise Director in conjunction with the PEMA Public Information Office.

This exercise enables Players to demonstrate an increased readiness to deal with a nuclear power plant incident. Any nuclear power plant exercise may be a newsworthy event. Special attention must be given to the needs of the media, allowing them to get as complete and accurate a story as possible while ensuring their activities do not compromise the exercise realism, safety, or objectives.

Exelon, FEMA, PEMA, and involved counties are responsible for disseminating public information in advance of the exercise.

Chapter 3: Player Guidelines

Exercise Staff

Exercise Director

The Exercise Director has the overall responsibility for planning, coordinating, and overseeing all exercise functions. The Exercise Director for the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise is the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair. He/she manages the exercise activities and maintains a close dialogue with the Controllers regarding the status of play and the achievement of the exercise design objectives.

The FEMA Region III RAC Chair for the Limerick Generating Station has authority to make determinations concerning evaluation issues and re-demonstrations.

The PEMA Limerick Generating Station Planner has responsibility to organize and lead the Exercise Planning Team.

Trusted Agents

Trusted agents are exercise planners and participants who are responsible for developing the Scenario and the Master Scenario Events List (MSEL). These documents are restricted and are not available to the rest of the Exercise Planning Team, Players, or other Participants. The trusted agents for the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise include the Exercise Director, Lead Controller, Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) Representative, FEMA Emergency Management Program Specialist, and the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair.

Lead Controller

The Lead Controller also functions as a Trusted Agent. As such he is involved in developing the Master Scenario Events List and is privy to the scenario used at the utility to generate exercise play. The Lead Controller is responsible for scheduling controllers at the "Out-of-Sequence" components of the exercise and the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise. The Lead Controller monitors exercise progress and coordinates decisions regarding deviations or significant changes to the scenario caused by unexpected developments during play. The Lead Controller monitors actions by individual Controllers and ensures they implement all designated and modified actions at the appropriate time. The Lead Controller will be the PEMA REP Staff designee and is stationed in the State EOC during the Exercise.

The Lead Controller is responsible for the overall organization of the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise. The Lead Controller monitors exercise progress and coordinates decisions regarding deviations or significant changes to the scenario caused by unexpected developments during play. The Lead Controller monitors actions by individual Controllers and ensures they implement all designated and modified actions at the appropriate

time. The Lead Controller debriefs the Controllers after the exercise and oversees the setup and takedown of the exercise.

Controllers

At least one observer, liaison, or controller will be onsite with every facility and field team participating in the exercise, and at each out-of-sequence interview. The Lead Facility Controller at each location will coordinate any changes that impact the scenario or affect other areas of play through the Lead Controller. The individual controllers issue exercise materials to players as required and monitor the exercise. Controllers or liaison also provide injects to the players as described in the MSEL.

Lead Evaluator

The Lead Evaluator is responsible for the overall evaluation of the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise. The Lead Evaluator monitors exercise progress and stays in contact with the Lead Controller regarding changes to the exercise during play. The Lead Evaluator monitors actions of individual Evaluators and ensures they are tracking progress of the players in accordance with the Extent-of-Play. The Lead Evaluator debriefs the evaluators after the exercise and oversees the entire evaluation and After Action process.

Evaluators

Evaluators work under the direction of the Lead Evaluator, and as a team with Controllers. Evaluators are SMEs who record events that take place during the exercise and assess/submit documentation for review and inclusion in the After Action Report (AAR).

Before the Exercise

- Review the appropriate emergency plans, procedures, and exercise support documents.
- Be at the appropriate site at least 30 minutes before the start of the exercise. Wear appropriate uniform/identification badge.
- If you gain knowledge of the scenario before the exercise, notify a controller so that appropriate actions can be taken to ensure a valid evaluation.
- Read your Player Information Handout, which includes information on exercise safety.
- Please sign in.

During the Exercise

- Respond to the exercise events and information as if the emergency were real, unless otherwise directed by an exercise controller.
- Controllers will only give you information they are specifically directed to disseminate. You are expected to obtain other necessary information through existing emergency information channels.
- Do not engage in personal conversations with controllers, evaluators, observers, or media personnel while the exercise is in progress. If you are asked an exercise-related question, give a short, concise answer. If you are busy and cannot immediately respond, indicate so, but report back with an answer at the earliest time possible.
- If you do not understand the scope of the exercise or if you are uncertain about an organization's or agency's participation in an exercise, ask a controller.
- Parts of the scenario may seem implausible. Recognize that the exercise has objectives to satisfy and may require the incorporation of unrealistic aspects. Note that every effort has been made by the trusted agents to balance realism with safety and the creation of an effective learning and evaluation environment.
- All exercise communication will begin and end with the phrase "This is an exercise." This is a precaution taken so anyone overhearing the conversation will not mistake the exercise play for a real-world emergency.
- When communicating with the SimCell, identify the organization, agency, office, and/or individual with which you want to speak.
- Verbalize out loud when taking an action. This will ensure that evaluators are made aware of critical actions as they occur.
- Maintain a log of your activities. Many times, this log may include documentation of activities missed by a controller or evaluator.

Following the Exercise

- At the end of the exercise at your facility, participate in the brief critique with the controllers and evaluators.
- Complete the Participant Feedback Form. This form allows you to comment candidly on emergency response activities and effectiveness of the exercise. Please provide the completed form to a controller or evaluator.
- Provide any notes or materials generated from the exercise to your controller or evaluator for review and inclusion in the AAR.

Simulation Guidelines

Because the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Exercise is of limited duration and scope, the physical description of what would fully occur at the incident sites and surrounding areas will be relayed to the Players by Simulators or Controllers.

If a real emergency occurs during the exercise, the exercise at your respective venue may be suspended or terminated at the discretion of the controller(s) at each venue. If a real emergency occurs, say "Real-World Emergency" and notify the nearest Controller and Evaluator.

Chapter 4: Evaluation and Post-Exercise Activities

Exercise Documentation

The goal of the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise is to comprehensively exercise and evaluate the OROs' plans and capabilities as they pertain to a potential nuclear power plant incident. After the exercise, data collected by Controllers, Evaluators, the SimCell, and Players will be used to identify strengths and areas for improvement in the context of the exercise design objectives.

Exercise Evaluation Guides

DHS has developed Exercise Evaluation Guides (EEGs) that identify expected activities for evaluation, provide consistency across exercises, and link individual tasks to disciplines and expected outcomes.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region III has decided not to use EEG's as part of Exercise Documentation process.

Players Critique

Immediately following the completion of exercise play, Controllers will facilitate a critique with Players from their assigned location. The critique is an opportunity for Players to voice their opinions on the exercise and their own performance. At this time, Controllers can also seek clarification on certain actions and what prompted Players to take them. The critique should not last more than 30 minutes. Controllers should take notes during the critique and include these observations in their analysis.

Hotwash

Prior to the Participants and Public/Media Briefing, The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will facilitate a Hotwash with the State, Risk and Support Counties, local jurisdictions and agencies participating in the exercise. The Hotwash is an opportunity for evaluators and participants to voice preliminary performance concerns, demonstrated strengths, and thank those who played. At this time, Evaluators can also seek clarification on certain actions and what prompted Players to take them. Evaluators should take notes during the Hotwash and include these observations in their analysis, if necessary. The Hotwash will be held at 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, November 19, 2015 at the Courtyard Valley Forge/Collegeville, 600 Campus Drive, Collegeville, Pennsylvania 19426.

Participants and Public/Media Briefings

The Participants Briefing will be conducted on Friday November 20, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. at Courtyard Valley Forge/Collegeville, 600 Campus Drive, Collegeville, Pennsylvania 19426.

The Public/Media Briefing will also be conducted on Friday November 20, 2015 at 11:00 a.m. at the same location mentioned above.

After Action Report

The AAR is the culmination of the exercise. It is a written report outlining the strengths and areas for improvement identified during the exercise. The AAR will include the timeline, executive summary, scenario description, performance issues, planning issues, deficiencies, and capability analysis. The AAR will be drafted by a core group of individuals from the exercise planning team.

After Action Conference and Improvement Plan

The improvement process represents the comprehensive, continuing preparedness effort of which the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise is a part. The lessons learned and recommendations from the AAR will be incorporated into the Improvement Plan (IP).

After Action Conference

The After Action Conference (AAC) will be scheduled for approximately 90 days following the exercise, is a forum for jurisdiction officials to hear the results of the evaluation analysis, validate the findings and recommendations in the draft AAR, and begin development of the IP.

Improvement Plan

The IP identifies how recommendations will be addressed, including what actions will be taken, who is responsible, and the timeline for completion. It is created by key stakeholders from the 2015 Limerick Generating Station Evaluated Full Scale Exercise participating agency officials during the AAC.

Annex A: Exercise Schedule

Table A.1 *2015 Limerick Generating Station Exercise Schedule*

Time (Tentative)	Personnel	Activity
November 17, 2015		
4:00 p.m. – 10:00 p.m.	State, County, and Municipal EOCs; Utility EOF and Alternate TCF, DEP/BRP Field Monitoring Teams	Full Scale Exercise

Table A.2 *2015 Limerick Generating Station Exercise Out-of-Sequence Schedule*

Time (Tentative)	Personnel	Activity
August 11, 2015		
Completed	Brandywine Hospital, Chester County	MS-1 Hospital Federal Evaluation
October 29-30, 2015		
Various times	Mass Care Facilities in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Montgomery, and Lehigh Counties	Mass Care Walkdown Inspections by PEMA, FEMA, American Red Cross and County Personnel
November 17, 2015		
9:00 – 11:00 a.m.	23 Pennsylvania Schools will be evaluated in 13 school districts in Berks, Chester, and Montgomery Counties.	School Demonstrations
November 18, 2015		
10:00 – 12:00 noon	PSP Skippack Barracks, in Schwenksville, Montgomery County	TCP/ACP Deployment and manning Interview and Briefing of concepts to Evaluators
7:00 p.m. – 9:30 p.m.	Selected Reception, Mon/Decon Centers/Stations and Mass Care Facilities in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Lehigh and Montgomery Counties	Mass Care, Reception Center , and Decontamination Station Demonstration Evaluations

Annex B: Method of Operation and Extent-of-Play

See PEMA Extent-of-Play

Annex C: Participating Agencies and Site Maps

Not Used

Annex D: Addresses of Locations to be Evaluated

Not Used

Annex E: Open Issues

No Open Issues

LIMERICK GENERATING STATION

EXTENT-OF-PLAY

2015 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

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LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
2015 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

METHOD OF OPERATION

I. Limerick Generating Station (LGS)

The facility normally uses off-watch section personnel to participate in the exercise. The plant's simulated events, radiation readings, and emergency classifications will trigger offsite exercise actions. A pre-approved exercise scenario will be used. LGS will notify the State EOC, the Bureau of Radiation Protection and Risk Counties of emergency classifications.

II. Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP)

BRP personnel will be present at the State EOC, the nuclear facility EOF, Branch and field locations; BRP field teams WILL be evaluated during this exercise. BRP field teams will perform air sampling out-of-sequence, preferably before they deploy to the plume area.

III. PEMA Operations at State EOC

This "Method of Operation" Document includes activities for the Full-Scale Plume Exercise (November 17, 2015), and the "Out-of-sequence" Activities (November 18, 2015).

A. Plume Exercise – November 17, 2015

PEMA staff, augmented by designated PEMA personnel from the Fire Commissioner's Office, the Bureau of Administration, Technical Services, Planning and Preparedness, plus Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) with accompanying response team members from designated state departments/agencies, including representatives from the USDA State Emergency Board will comprise initial operations at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The State EOC will not be evaluated during this exercise.

B. Plume Exercise – "Out-of-Sequence" Activities – November 17, 2015

PEMA staff, augmented by designated PEMA personnel will disseminate exercise related messages to the participating Counties for dissemination to the participating School Districts during the morning of November 17, 2015. The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and County EOCs will NOT be

evaluated during the "Out-of-Sequence" component. PEMA personnel will serve as "Observers" at the identified School Districts.

C. "Out-of-Sequence" Activities – November 18, 2015

PEMA personnel will serve as "Observers" at the various field exercise locations during the evening "Out-of-Sequence" component November 18, 2015. An exercise coordinator will remain in the State EOC. The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Counties will NOT be evaluated during the evening "Out-of-Sequence" component.

The Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) demonstration will take place at PSP Skippack Barracks, 2047 C Bridge Road, Schwenksville, Montgomery County. The PSP briefing will be performed out-of-sequence in a demonstration window of 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon on November 18, 2015.

IV. PEMA Area Office Operations

The PEMA Area Office (Hamburg – Eastern Area) will not be activated nor evaluated during this exercise. Selected staff of the Area Office will serve as Liaison Officers to Risk and Support Counties as assigned. Liaison Officers are exercise participants.

V. Counties Designated to Participate

The three risk counties (Berks, Chester, and Montgomery), in coordination with PEMA, will demonstrate the capability to mobilize appropriate staff, activate their respective Emergency Operations Centers and implement emergency response operations to include sheltering and/or evacuation. County government will provide direction and coordination to risk municipalities. The two support counties (Bucks and Lehigh) will participate in their assigned support roles. Actual sheltering or evacuation of the general public will be simulated.

VI. PEMA Liaison Officers

Liaison officers will be present at the participating risk and support county EOCs, the LGS Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and LGS Joint Information Center (JIC) to provide assistance, guidance, and support. These liaison officers will participate as players in the exercise.

VII. Controllers

A lead controller will be present in the State EOC on November 17, 2015. Controllers will be present at the emergency worker monitoring/decontaminating stations and the mass care monitoring/decontamination centers (November 18, 2015). Controllers are not players. Controllers will provide pre-approved injects and information to the players, as

appropriate, regarding radiological readings during the monitoring of personnel. Live radioactive sources will not be used. ***Exception:*** *individuals tasked with the setup of portal monitoring equipment will use a standard 1 micro curie Cesium 137 source for the purpose of conducting operational tests. Additionally, appropriate test sources will be available and used to verify the operation of the monitoring/survey instruments per manufacturer's recommendations.*

VIII. PEMA Observers

PEMA staff, qualified county emergency management personnel, and/or nuclear power plant personnel will be assigned, if required, to key locations for the purpose of observing, noting response actions and conditions, and recording observations for future use. Observers *will not take an active part in the proceedings*, but will interact with staff members to the extent necessary to fulfill their observer responsibilities. Coaching of players by observers is not permitted except to provide training to participants awaiting a re-demonstration. (Refer to paragraph XIII)

IX. FEMA Evaluators

Federal evaluators will be present at the risk and support county EOCs, identified risk municipal EOCs, and at appropriate field locations to evaluate player response to the actual and simulated events in the exercise scenario. FEMA will evaluate approximately one-third of the risk municipalities in Berks, Chester, and Montgomery Counties.

Out-of-Sequence Period (November 17 and 18, 2015): On November 17, Federal evaluators will be present at the identified "out-of-sequence" demonstration sites per Attachment A, Section I.1. These include the identified Public School Districts and participating school buildings. On November 18, Federal evaluators will also be present at identified Reception Centers, Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Stations, Mass Care Centers and Mass Care Monitoring and Decontamination Centers, as identified in Attachment A, Section I.B.1, I.B.2 and I.B.3.

Plume Phase Exercise (November 17, 2015): Federal evaluators will be present at the identified risk and support county EOCs to evaluate player response to the actual and simulated events in the exercise scenario. Additionally, approximately one-third of the risk municipalities will be federally evaluated.

X. Demonstration Windows

In order to provide for more effective demonstrations, as well as to permit the release of volunteers from exercise play at a reasonable hour, periods of time (Demonstration Windows) have been designated during which specified actions will be accomplished/demonstrated.

The "demonstration windows" for this exercise are:

A. Plume Phase Exercise

The out-of-sequence MS-1 hospital demonstration will be federally evaluated at Brandywine Hospital, Chester County on August 11, 2015.

The out-of-sequence exercise window for school demonstrations will be between 9:00 – 11:00 a.m. on November 17, 2015.

The out-of-sequence demonstration of reception centers, mass care centers (as indicated), monitoring/decontamination centers and emergency worker stations will be conducted between 7:00 p.m. – 9:30 p.m. on November 18, 2015. Locations are specified within Attachment A, Section I.

Thirty six mass care centers (6 in Berks, 15 in Bucks, 6 in Chester, 5 in Lehigh, and 4 in Montgomery) will receive "walkdown" baseline evaluations on October 29th and 30th, 2015. *These 36 mass care centers will not be evaluated during the evening of November 18. There are two co-located Mass Care/Monitoring and Decontamination Centers in Berks and one in Lehigh that will be evaluated on the evening of November 18. (Please refer to the Extent-of-Play Demonstration Tables, Attachment A)*

The out-of-sequence interview of Pennsylvania State Police traffic control/access control points will be from 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon November 18, 2015.

All demonstrations will commence promptly and, barring any complications, not continue beyond the time of the designated demonstration window.

County and municipal EOC operations will be conducted on November 17, 2015 with exercise period from approximately 4:00 – 10:00 p.m. unless terminated by the Lead Controller in coordination with the Utility and PEMA. (Please refer to the Extent-of-Play Demonstration Tables, Attachment A)

B. Post Plume Exercise

No post-plume phase exercise is scheduled during this evaluation.

XI. Stand-down

All jurisdictions will request approval on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis prior to stand-down. Upon completion of all requirements and after having informed the FEMA evaluator that all evaluation areas have been demonstrated and/or completed, the risk municipality EOCs may request approval from their county EOC to stand-down their portion of the exercise.

A. Support counties may request approval to stand-down upon completion of all evaluated objectives from the state EOC.

B. The risk county EOC will remain operational until the exercise is officially terminated by the State Lead Controller. **The State EOC will issue an Exercise Termination Message.**

XII. General Concepts

An emergency plan is drafted to address the generally expected conditions of an emergency. Not everything in the emergency plan may be applicable for a given scenario. The main purpose of an emergency plan is to assemble sufficient expertise and officials so as to properly react to the events as they occur. The responders should not be so tied to a plan that they cannot take actions that are more protective of the public. Furthermore, if, by following the plan there is a failure to protect the public health and safety, it should be noted so that the plan can be modified and the appropriate negative assessment applied.

XIII. Re-demonstrations

During the exercise, any activity that is not satisfactorily demonstrated may be re-demonstrated by the participants provided it does not negatively interfere with the

exercise. Refresher training may be provided by the players, observers, and/or controllers. Evaluators are not permitted to provide refresher training. Re-demonstrations will be negotiated between the players, observers, controllers, and evaluators. PEMA may advise the RAC Chair prior to initiating any re-demonstrations. It is permissible to extend the demonstration window, within reason, to accommodate the re-demonstration. Activities corrected from a re-demonstration will be so noted.

LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
2015 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE

EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT

EVALUATION AREA 1

Emergency Operations Management

Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate and staff emergency facilities.

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.
(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, out-of-sequence evaluation or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensee; verify the notification; and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner and demonstrate the ability to maintain and staff 24-hour operations. Twenty-four-hour operations can be demonstrated during the exercise via rosters or shift changes or otherwise in an actual activation. Local responders must demonstrate the ability to receive and/or initiate notification to the licensees or other respective emergency management organizations of an incident in a timely manner, when they receive information from the licensee or alternate sources. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival. Activation of facilities and staff, including those associated with the Incident Command System, must be completed in accordance with ORO plans/procedures. The location and contact information for facilities included in the incident command must be available to all appropriate responding agencies and the NPP after these facilities have been activated.

Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. This includes the staggered release of resources from an assembly

area. Additionally, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations may be used in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

The REP program does not evaluate Incident Command System tactical operations, only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs, pursuant to plans/procedures.

Initial law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical response to the NPP site may impact the ability to staff REP functions. The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures must be demonstrated. Exercises must also address the role of mutual aid in the incident, as appropriate. An integral part of the response to an HAB scenario at an NPP may also be within the auspices of the Federal Government (e.g., FBI, NRC, or DHS). Protocols for requesting Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement support must be demonstrated, as appropriate. Any resources must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they can be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Pre-positioning of state emergency personnel (Liaison Officers) at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Utility Joint Information Center (JIC) and Risk and Support Counties is appropriate due to the commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. Risk counties/municipalities will conduct call-outs to demonstrate the mobilization of key personnel. The utility JIC will be evaluated for this drill.

- *Actual calls (or pager notifications) will be made to the county/municipal EOC personnel for the Plume Phase exercise per plans and procedures.*
- *In all instances, the demonstration of a shift change is **NOT** required. Twenty-four hour staffing will be demonstrated by means of a roster or staffing chart.*
- *All out-of-sequence players will be pre-positioned and equipment will be demonstrated or shown to be inventory (School District personnel, PSP TCP/ACP, Reception Centers, Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Stations Mass Care/Sheltering Centers and Monitoring and Decontamination Centers).*
- *Individuals working in state facilities and county EOCs may be pre-positioned for the plume phase.*
- *Other locations, including Municipal EOCs, will **NOT** pre-stage but will wait for notification of emergency before staffing their duty location.*

Sub-element 1.b – Facilities

INTENT

This sub-element derives from NUREG–0654, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.3; G.3.a; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, SAVs, or by out-of-sequence evaluations.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate, no less than once every 8 years, the availability of facilities to support accomplishment of emergency operations (this includes all alternate and backup facilities). Evaluations are typically performed for EOCs and JICs, as well as other facilities such as reception/relocation centers. Some of the areas evaluated within the facilities are adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, access to backup power, and/or alternate facility, if required to support operations. Radio stations, laboratories, initial warning points and hospitals are not evaluated under 1.b.1.

In addition, facilities will be evaluated for this criterion during the first biennial exercise after any new or substantial changes in structure, equipment, or mission that affect key capabilities, as outlined in respective emergency plans/procedures. A substantial change is one that has a direct effect or impact on emergency response operations performed in those facilities. Examples of substantial changes include modifying the size or configuration of an emergency operations center, adding more function to a center, or changing the equipment available for use in a center.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

None

Sub-element 1.c – Direction and Control

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

Leadership personnel must demonstrate the ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort (e.g., keeping staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.) Leadership must demonstrate the ability to prioritize resource tasking and place/supplement resources (e.g., through MOUs or other agreements) when faced with competing demands for finite resources. Any resources identified through LOA/MOUs must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they may be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play

None

Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs establish and operate reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguous governments within the EPZ, Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, EOCs, Incident Command Posts, and FMTs.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished initially in a baseline evaluation and subsequently in periodic testing and drills. System familiarity and use must be demonstrated as applicable in biennial or tabletop exercise, or if their use would be required, during an actual event.

OROs must demonstrate that a primary system, and at least one backup system for fixed facilities, is fully functional at all times. Communications systems are maintained and tested on a recurring basis throughout the assessment period and system status is available to all operators. Periodic test results and corrective actions are maintained on a real time basis. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units are used as needed for transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities, FMTs, and incident command must have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations. OROs must ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. Exercise scenarios may require the failure of a communication system and use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Risk and Support Counties will communicate with the State EOC via SEVAN (primary) and e-mail (secondary.) PASTAR, State 800 MHz Radio System, and commercial telephone are available for back-up. The State EOC may communicate with the utility and the risk counties via dedicated telephone circuits, commercial "dial-up" lines, or other available means.

Risk Counties will communicate with their risk municipalities via public safety radio frequencies (EMA Radio), Commercial Telephone, Fax, or Amateur Radio Communications (ARES/RACES) or other available means.

Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished primarily through a baseline evaluation and subsequent periodic inspections.

A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO's emergency operations plans. Use of maps and other displays is encouraged. For non-facility-based operations, the equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role. At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones, and signs) must be available, or their availability described.

Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment, as follows:

KI: Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by: (1) emergency workers; (2) institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and (3) where stipulated by the plans/procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make KI available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans/procedures). The plans/procedures must include the forms to be used for documenting emergency worker ingestion of KI, as well as a mechanism for identifying emergency workers that have declined KI in advance. Consider carefully the placement of emergency workers that have declined KI in advance.

ORO quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at the storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the ALC submission, and/or verified during an SAV. Available supplies of KI must be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

Dosimetry: Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers must be available for issuance to all emergency workers who will be dispatched to perform an ORO mission. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make dosimetry available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans/procedures).

Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry must allow an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans/procedures.

Direct-reading dosimeters must be zeroed or operationally checked prior to issuance. The dosimeters must be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced when necessary. Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CD V-138s) (0-200 mR), due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, must be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced when necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Operational checks and testing of electronic dosimeters must be in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Monitoring Instruments: All instruments must be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation must be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. In addition, instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker-affixed to their sides indicating the effective range of the readings. The range of readings documentation specifies the acceptable range of readings that the meter should indicate when it is response-checked using a standard test source.

For FMTs, the instruments must be capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting beta radiation. These instruments must be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection / exposure control of team members and detection of activity on air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans/procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1R/hr) and for high-range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high-range instrument, a procedure must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high-range instrument can make useful readings.

In areas where portal monitors are used, the OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s). The monitor(s) must conform to the standards set forth in the Contamination

Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor Used for Emergency Response, FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995) or in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Mutual Aid Resources: If the incoming resources arrive with their own equipment (i.e., monitors and/or dosimetry), they will be evaluated by REP Program standards. FEMA will not inventory equipment that is not part of the REP Program. If an agency has a defined role in the REP Plan, they are subject to the planning process and standards, as well as the guidance of this Manual.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

In Pennsylvania support counties do not have DRDs, or KI, but those responsible for reception centers and/or monitoring and decontamination centers will have PRDs.

Evaluation of DRD and KI quantities will be verified using inventory sheets. DRDs and KI will not be removed from storage locations and boxes/packages will not be opened. KI questions will be addressed through interviews.

Leakage testing verification and KI extension letters (as appropriate) will be available to the evaluator.

All DRDs "read" in units of Roentgens. The commonwealth, counties and municipalities do not use direct reading dosimeters which "read" in units of milli-Roentgens.

EVALUATION AREA 2

Protective Action Decision Making

Sub-element 2.a – Emergency Worker Exposure Control

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into consideration TEDE or organ-specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans/procedures.

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.
(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; f; K.3.a; K.4)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be assessed concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ must demonstrate a capability to comply with emergency worker exposure limits based on their emergency plans/procedures.

Participating OROs must also demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and the number of emergency workers receiving radiation doses above pre-authorized levels. This would include providing KI and dosimetry in a timely manner to emergency workers dispatched onsite to support plant incident assessment and mitigating actions, in accordance with respective plans/procedures.

As appropriate, OROs must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for emergency workers, based on their plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAGs for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

None

Sub-element 2.b. – Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs.

OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PAGs from their plans/procedures or EPA's Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents and other criteria, such as plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordination of precautionary and/or protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs and incident command), availability of in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAB incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response, and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that create higher than normal risk from general population evacuation.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10 and Supplement 3)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plans/procedures, to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee as well as field monitoring data, if available. The ORO must also consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee.

The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs must be appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose must be demonstrated. Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged format.

When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a factor of 10, the ORO and licensee must determine the source of the difference by discussing input data and assumptions,

using different models, or exploring possible reasons. Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PARs if timely and appropriate. The ORO must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.e, f; m)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

OROs must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions. OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident, based on information from the licensee, assessment of plant status and potential or actual releases, other available information related to the incident, input from appropriate ORO authorities (e.g., incident command), and PARs from the utility and ORO staff. In addition, a subsequent or alternate precautionary and/or protective action decision may be appropriate if various conditions (e.g., an HAB incident, weather, release timing and magnitude) pose undue risk to an evacuation, or if evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action.

OROs must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g., mutual aid) necessary to implement a precautionary and/or protective action decision if local law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical resources are used to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.

Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. In addition, incident command must provide input regarding considerations for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions. The decision-makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all these factors.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans/procedures, then it must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making process must involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision making, all appropriate OROs must communicate and coordinate precautionary and/or protective action decisions with each other. In addition,

decisions must be coordinated/communicated with incident command. OROs must demonstrate the capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

None

Sub-element 2.c – PAD Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to determine precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation, sheltering, and use of KI, if applicable, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed day cares, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are, or potentially will be, affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

Criterion 2.c.1: Precautionary and/or protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

Usually it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for incidents where there is a high-risk environmental condition or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, factors that must be considered include weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation versus risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with the incident command. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the ORO must consider use of KI.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective

actions for students. Demonstration requires that the OROs actually contact public school systems/districts during the exercise.

The OROs must demonstrate how the decision-making process takes those with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., nursing homes, correctional facilities, licensed day cares, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals) into account.

In accordance with plans/procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. The decision-making process, including any preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, must consider the location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are still at home, en route to school, or at school).

Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate host hospitals, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

If the scenario has no radiological release, or potential of a radiological release, the decision-making process used to make protective action recommendations can be addressed through an interview.

Sub-element 2.d. – Radiological Assessment and Decision Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

Sub-element 2.e. – Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3

Protective Action Implementation

Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of the PAGs, and the capability to provide KI for emergency workers, always applying the "as low as is reasonably achievable" principle as appropriate.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.3.a, b; K.4)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of TEDE and maximum exposure limits, for those emergency workers involved in lifesaving activities, contained in the ORO's plans/procedures.

Each emergency worker must have basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures. If supplemental resources are used, they must be provided with just-in-time training to ensure basic knowledge of radiation exposure control. Emergency workers must demonstrate procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers must demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker must report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans/procedures. OROs must demonstrate the actions described in the plans/procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, authorize the worker to incur additional exposures, or take other actions. If exercise play does not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators must interview at least two workers to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in case authorization is needed, and at what exposure levels. Workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission. In such cases, adequate control of exposure can be achieved for all team members using one direct-reading dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers assigned to low-exposure rate fixed facilities (e.g., EOCs and communications center within the EPZ, reception centers, and counting laboratories) may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored using group dosimetry (i.e., direct-reading dosimeters strategically placed in the work area). Each team member must still have his or her own permanent record dosimetry. Individuals authorized by the ORO to reenter an evacuated area during the plume (emergency) phase, must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

OROs may have administrative limits lower than EPA-400-R-92-001 dose limits for emergency workers performing various services (e.g., lifesaving, protection of valuable property, all activities). OROs must ensure that the process used to seek authorization for exceeding dose limits does not negatively impact the capability to respond to an incident where lifesaving and/or protection of valuable property may require an urgent response.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they did so. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it. Emergency workers must demonstrate basic knowledge of procedures for using KI whether or not the scenario drives the implementation of KI use. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Radiological briefings will be provided to address exposure limits and procedures to replace those approaching limits and how permission to exceed limits is obtained from the municipality and county. Emergency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI and on whose authority. Distribution of KI will be simulated. A maximum of six (6) Dosimetry-KI report forms will be demonstrated.

OROs should also demonstrate the use of all applicable dosimetry forms to emergency workers.

At any time, players may ask other players or supervisors to clarify radiological information.

In Pennsylvania, emergency workers outside of the EPZ do not have turn-back values.

Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, (e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers) may have individual direct reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. In Pennsylvania this will be accomplished through the use of an area kit. The area kit process is explained in State, County and Municipal Plans.

Standard issue of dosimetry and potassium iodide for each category of emergency worker is as follows:

Category A: 1 PRD, 1 DRD, and 1 unit of KI
Category B: 1 PRD and 1 unit of KI
Category C: 1 PRD

All locations that have dosimetry equipment indicated within their Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP), will make the dosimetry equipment (and KI) available for inspection by the Federal Evaluator. Simulation PRDs with mock serial numbers will be used.

Personnel assigned to operate monitoring/decontamination centers and stations are not issued DRDs or KI since the centers/stations are located outside the EPZ. Each will be issued a simulated PRD with mock serial numbers. For purposes of demonstration, a maximum of six PRDs will be issued.

Sub-element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the General Public

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide KI for institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plans/procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to institutionalized individuals, providing KI to the general public is an ORO option and must be

reflected as such in ORO plans/procedures. Provisions must include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of distributing KI.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, f)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in their plans/procedures, to members of the general public. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.

OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.

If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information must be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plans/procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Within Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of Health is responsible for distribution of KI to the general public located within the EPZ. Pre-distribution is accomplished on an annual basis. KI is not distributed to the general public at the time of an emergency.

Evaluation of emergency worker KI quantities will be verified using inventory sheets. KI will not be removed from storage locations and boxes will not be opened. KI questions will be addressed through interviews.

Personnel assigned to operate monitoring/decontamination centers and stations are not issued DRDs or KI since the centers/stations are located outside the EPZ. Each will be issued a simulated PRD with mock serial numbers. For purposes of demonstration, a maximum of six PRDs will be issued.

Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of precautionary and/or protective action decisions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

Criterion 3.c.1: Precautionary and/or protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.
(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (i.e., provide PARs and emergency information and instructions to) persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals/medical facilities, nursing homes, correctional facilities, and mobility-

impaired and transportation-dependent individuals. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs in accordance with plans/procedures.

Contact with persons with disabilities and access/functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent-of-Play. Some contacts with transportation providers must be actually contacted, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play. All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate host hospitals, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

The names, locations and contact information of identified individuals with identified special needs are maintained on a list at their respective municipal EOC (based upon residential jurisdiction). Copies of these lists will not be provided to the evaluators; however, evaluators will be allowed to inspect the lists during the exercise.

***NOTE:** Berks County maintains a countywide special needs list for individuals requiring assistance. This list may be viewed at the county as it will not be disseminated for exercise purposes.*

Initial contact, by the County, with special populations (hospitals, nursing homes and county correctional facilities) will be actual. All subsequent calls will be simulated. Actual contacts (up to two per risk county) will be made with transportation providers per their plan. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, staff assistance visit, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

School systems/districts (these include public and private schools, kindergartens, preschools, and licensed day cares) must demonstrate the ability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions for students. The demonstration must be made as follows: each school system/district within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation of protective actions.

At least one school per affected system/district must participate in the demonstration. Canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview, appropriate school personnel including decision-making officials (e.g., schools' superintendent/principals and transportation director/bus dispatchers), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) must be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plans/procedures, must be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

If a school facility has emergency plans as a condition of licensing, those plans may be submitted to FEMA review in place of demonstration or interview pursuant to the ORO's plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

School students will not be involved during the exercise. Actions and activities associated with the demonstration of Criterion 3.c.2 will be limited to the School District Administration key personnel and the County. Evacuation of students will be conducted through an interview process with School District personnel or the building principal.

The role of the bus driver may be conducted through an interview with school or transportation officials (or designee) if a bus driver is not available. Actual demonstration of the bus route is not required and will not be demonstrated. Maps or route descriptions will be available for illustration purposes.

Risk County school plans do not require communications between the school and vehicles. Bus drivers are not considered emergency workers and therefore do not require dosimetry.

Private schools, private kindergartens, and day care centers do not participate in REP exercises. However, OROs will be prepared to show evaluators lists of these facilities that they would contact in the event of an emergency in accordance with plans and procedures. Any simulated contacts should be logged.

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans/procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This Sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points, and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, staff assistance visit, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff must demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas, as per the Extent-of-Play Agreement. These capabilities may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic), they must demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies that have the needed authority, as agreed upon in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Municipal Traffic and Access control will be demonstrated by interview at the applicable EOC of jurisdiction. The traffic/access control personnel will not be deployed to the traffic/access control point(s). If the designated assignment is a location within the EPZ, a radiological briefing will be provided to the assigned individuals.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, staff assistance visit, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuations. In demonstrating this capability, the impediment must remain in place during the evacuation long enough that re-routing of traffic is required and must also result in demonstration of decision-making and coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees. When, due to specifics of the scenario or jurisdiction, the impediment cannot be located on an evacuation route, it must be located so as to impact the evacuation. When not possible, actual dispatch of resources need not be physically demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, must be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as tow trucks, need not be demonstrated; however, simulated contacts will be logged. If the scenario does not lead to evacuation the criteria shall be deemed complete if the ORO can describe to the evaluator through controller inject or interview the actions they would take to overcome a major traffic impediment during an evacuation and how such actions would be communicated to the public and affected OROs. (Risk counties only)

Sub-element 3.e – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

Sub-element 3.f – Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 4

Field Measurement and Analyses

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to deploy FMTs with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 indicates that OROs must have the capability to use FMTs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In an incident at an NPP, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collect field radiological data to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.1: [RESERVED]

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.
(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; J.10.a)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise. Other means may include drills that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to brief FMTs on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. During an HAB incident, the Field Team management must keep the incident command informed of field monitoring teams' activities and location. Coordination with FMTs and field monitoring may be demonstrated as out-of-sequence demonstrations, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and support the adequacy of implemented protective actions, or to be a factor in modifying protective actions.

Teams must be directed to take measurements at such locations and times as necessary to provide sufficient information to characterize the plume and its impacts.

If the responsibility for obtaining peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by ORO monitoring teams. If the licensee FMTs do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all FMTs (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential.

OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) field teams are equipped with the necessary instrumentation and supplies. FEMA observers will meet the field teams at the R3V staging area at Wilson Farm Park, 500 Lee Road in Chesterbrook, Pennsylvania at 1:30 p.m. on November 17, 2015 to observe instrumentation checks and equipment inventory verification.

Field Team Control will be performed within or near the 10 mile EPZ using the DEP Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle (R3V). Field Team control is expected to initially be out-of-sequence with the plume timeline. During the exercise the field teams will be directed to take measurements in locations to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts. In addition to field team measurements, remote detectors will be located by the field teams near the expected plume pathway, these detectors will automatically transmit data to the R3V. These detectors will be used to keep field team dose ALARA.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12: I.8, 9; J.10.a)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise. Other means may include drills that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

Two or more FMTs must demonstrate the capability to make and report measurements of ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment team, or other appropriate authority. FMTs must also demonstrate the capability to obtain an air sample for measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates, and to provide the appropriate authority with field data

pertaining to measurement. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the authority must consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form(s), to a radiological laboratory(ies) must be demonstrated.

OROs must share data in a timely manner with all other appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory (ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures.

OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Measurements will be made by Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP), in accordance with the State Annex E, Appendix 6, and BRP Standard Implementing Procedures (IPs). Two mobile monitoring teams from BRP DEP South East Regional Office will demonstrate ambient radiation monitoring and radioiodine and particulate sampling. Field teams will be equipped with appropriate dosimetry and KI. ***Field teams WILL be evaluated by FEMA.*** *Each team will be directed to monitoring locations and perform actual radiation measurements at each location. Measurements may consist of truck installed radiation monitor or hand-held radiation instruments. An actual air sample will be taken at the R3V staging area prior to field team departure to LGS. Field teams will discuss air sample counting procedures via an interview process. Teams will then take additional simulated air samples, as directed, at additional locations, if conditions are appropriate for radioiodine sampling and relay information to the Radiological Rapid Response Vehicle (R3V). In place of silver zeolite cartridges, charcoal cartridges will be used for the exercise. All measurements will be forwarded to theR3V immediately upon obtaining data.*

FEMA observers will meet the field teams at the R3V staging area at Wilson Farm Park, 500 Lee Road in Chesterbrook, Pa. at 1:30 p.m., November 17, 2015.

Sub-element 4.b – Post-Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards to determine the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ and to support relocation, reentry, and return decisions. This Sub-element focuses on collecting environmental samples for laboratory

analyses that are essential for decisions on protecting the public from contaminated food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision making. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; I.8; J.11)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

The ORO's FMTs must demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures.
The FMTs and/or other sampling personnel must secure ingestion pathway samples from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return must be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Sub-element 4.c – Laboratory Operations

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to support protective action decision making.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial, tabletop exercise, or an actual event. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

The laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging information, preventing contamination of the laboratory(ies), preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory (ies) must be appropriately equipped to provide, upon request, timely analyses of media of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions anticipated in the ORO's plans/procedures. The laboratory instrument calibrations must be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident must be as described in the plans/procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of a terrorist incident) or if warranted by incident circumstances. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff must be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 5

Emergency Notification and Public Information

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this Sub-element are further discussed in Section V, Part A of this Manual, Alert and Notification Systems.

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, OROs must complete system activation for primary alert/notification and disseminate the information / instructions in a timely manner. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test message(s) is not required. The procedures must be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. The alert signal activation should be simulated, not performed. Evaluations of EAS broadcast stations may also be accomplished through SAVs.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis must be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system, including verification of provisions for backup power or an alternate station.

The initial message must include at a minimum the following elements:

- Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message;
- Identification of the commercial NPP and a statement that an emergency exists there;
- Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency; and
- A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected population stay tuned for additional information, or that the population tune to another station for additional information.

If route alerting is demonstrated as a primary method of alert and notification, it must be done in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures and the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of primary alert and notification included in their plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has implemented a Statewide EAS Control system in cooperation with the Pennsylvania Association of Broadcasters per the State Emergency Communications Committee and Pennsylvania Emergency Alert System State EAS Plan (April 1, 2004). The State EOC (PEMA) is the initiating point for the activation of the EAS. Risk Counties have the control equipment for activation of sirens. Coordination will occur between the State EOC and the affected counties with respect to the Alert and Notification System (ANS) process. Sirens will be coordinated and the sounding simulated at the appropriate time with the simulated activation of EAS taking place approximately 3 minutes following the simulated activation of the sirens. Regular Broadcasting will not be interrupted on the EAS Stations. Broadcast of the message(s) or test message(s) is ***NOT*** *required and* ***NOT*** *requested. Counties may elect to simulate county specific supplemental messages to their electronic local media.*

Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, ANS activation should be accomplished in a timely manner for primary alerting/notification. This action will be performed in a responsible time and without delay.

All actions to broadcast stations will be simulated. Systems that use automatic sending technology may be demonstrated by explanation during an interview.

Each evaluated municipality per risk county will demonstrate, by interview, route alerting of the hearing impaired residents within their jurisdiction. Hearing impaired notification teams will not be deployed.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

If the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s) or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function during the exercise, OROs must demonstrate backup means of alert and notification. Backup means of alert and notification will differ from facility to facility.

Backup alert and notification procedures that would be implemented in multiple stages must be structured such that the population closest to the plant (e.g., within 2 miles) is alerted and notified first. The populations farther away and downwind of any potential radiological release would be covered sequentially (e.g., 2 to 5 miles, followed by downwind 5 to 10 miles, and finally the remaining population as directed by authorities). Topography, population density, existing ORO resources, and timing will be considered in judging the acceptability of backup means of alert and notification.

Although circumstances may not allow this for all situations, FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators attempt to establish backup means that will reach those in the plume exposure EPZ within a reasonable time of failure of the primary alert and notification system, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes. The backup alert message must, at a minimum, include: (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant; and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

When backup route alerting is demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast), as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of backup alert and notification included in their plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Back-up alert notification of the public due to a simulated siren failure will be demonstrated. (Refer to Attachment A, Section I. 4.) County liaisons will give an inject to the county siren dispatcher, upon confirmation that sirens were sounded, that a particular siren has failed in the municipalities scheduled to demonstrate back-up route alerting. Notice of the siren failure will then be communicated to the appropriate municipalities/locations so they can demonstrate their recommended goal of 45 minute per-identified back-up route alert run as per Attachment A, Section I.A.4. Pennsylvania does not have any "exception areas." The 45-minute clock starts when the siren dispatcher receives the notification that a siren has failed.

IPAWS may be used, as long as it does not interfere with the required demonstrated and evaluated notifications. Alternate methods of route alerting will NOT be evaluated.

Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

OROs with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report), 5 to 10 miles from the NPP, must demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s). FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators establish means that will reach those in approved exception areas within 45 minutes once the initial decision is made by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an incident. The exception area alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route must be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcasted) as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location. For exception areas

alerted by air / water craft, actual routes will be negotiated in the Extent-of-Play, but must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

This sub-element will not be demonstrated or evaluated during this exercise. Pennsylvania has no exception areas.

Sub-element 5.b – Subsequent Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to disseminate appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions, to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 requires OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 also provides that a system must be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the "public inquiry hotline."

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, or drills.

The responsible ORO personnel/representatives must demonstrate actions to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Message elements: The ORO must ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials. The emergency information must contain all necessary and applicable instructions (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and persons with disabilities and

access/functional needs, and public inquiry hotline telephone number) to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided. The ORO must also be prepared to disclose and explain the ECL of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs must demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information must be all-inclusive by including the four items specified under exercise Demonstration Criterion 5.a.1 and previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. Information about any rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments should also be included. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plans/procedures. OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plans/procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs must demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to predetermined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures.

Media information: OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and releases must be consistent with PADs and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits must be available for dissemination to the media.

Public inquiry: OROs must demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls received via the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff must demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, must be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner. This will NOT be subject to specific time requirements. One media briefing will be demonstrated in each risk county.

Risk and Support Counties will receive and handle "Public Inquiry" messages via their individual "Public Inquiry" processes (in compliance with NIMS terminology, Rumor Control is now considered to be "Public Inquiry"). Counties will receive approximately ten (10) public inquiry calls from the State Exercise cell assigned this responsibility. Counties will be expected to receive and log the calls, identify any trends and take appropriate actions to include follow-up message development, distributions and/or briefings.

EVALUATION AREA 6

Support Operations/Facilities

Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facility. OROs must also have the capability to identify and register evacuees at reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, drills, or SAV.

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees must be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs conducting this demonstration must have one-third of the resources (e.g., monitoring teams/instrumentation/portal monitors) available at the facility (ies) as necessary to monitor 20 percent of the population within a 12-hour period. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Availability of resources can be demonstrated with valid documentation (e.g., MOU/LOA, etc.) reflecting how necessary equipment would be procured for the location. Plans/procedures must indicate provisions for service animals.

Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees must demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain, within about 12 hours, a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20 percent EPZ population planning base. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure. For demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities, a minimum of six evacuees must be monitored per station using equipment and procedures specified in the plans/procedures. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators to determine whether the 12-hour requirement can be met.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the

evacuee's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of- Play Agreement.

Decontamination of evacuees may be simulated and conducted by interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any evacuee found to be contaminated, procedures must be discussed concerning handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

Individuals who have completed monitoring (and decontamination, if needed) must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger/action level or have been placed in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary.

In accordance with plans/procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not require confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area or monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do require confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Radiological monitoring demonstration sites should possess a roster of the monitoring personnel required to process the population allocated to the facility within a 12 hour period.

Water from decontamination activities may go directly to a storm drain or other sewer or drain system or area normally designated for wastewater that has been used for bathing or washing of vehicles and or equipment.

Radiological monitoring of the public may be co-located at either reception centers or mass care centers depending on the county plan.

***At each reception center (stand alone – non-mon/decon activity sites)** a minimum of three volunteer evacuees will be processed, briefed, issued the appropriate strip map or directions, and instructed to proceed to a mass care center designated for demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration. A sample of the appropriate strip maps or directions will be made available for the demonstration. Note: Co-located facilities do not require strip maps or written directions.*

***Mass care centers and mass care monitoring/decontamination centers** will be demonstrated per Attachment A during the out-of-sequence window. The counties will provide space at designated mass care centers for operation of monitoring/decontamination centers. Schematics of these monitoring/decontamination centers will be available to show the organization and layout within the facility and space management for monitoring and decontamination. Procedures will be demonstrated to show the separation of contaminated and non-contaminated (clean) individuals to minimize cross contamination.*

***At the evacuee monitoring/decontamination centers (if using hand-held meters),** a minimum of six (6) volunteer evacuees will be monitored (or one volunteer evacuee may be monitored six times). **Centers using portal monitors are only required to demonstrate three (3) volunteer evacuees.** Suitable radiological monitoring instruments will be issued to and demonstrated by the initial monitoring team(s). A monitoring team consists of one monitor and one recorder equipped with one survey instrument. Those individuals found to be free of "contamination", based upon scenario injects, will be directed to the mass care registration point for further processing. **Note:** Actual radiological sources will not be attached to or hidden upon the volunteer evacuees.*

*One of the simulated evacuees, based upon controller injects, will not be able to be decontaminated. Discussions concerning the processing of contaminated personnel will include capabilities and written procedures for showering females separate from males. Showering will be simulated, water will not be used. **Note: If portal monitors are used, see below.***

At the emergency worker monitoring/decontamination stations,** two (2) emergency workers will be monitored. Discussions concerning processing of contaminated personnel will include capabilities and written procedures for showering females separate from males. Showering will be simulated, water will not be used. Suitable radiological monitoring instruments will be issued to the initial monitoring team. **Note: If portal monitors are used, the Portal Monitor Extent-of-Play described below shall be used.

Portal Monitor Use: *Risk and Support counties may, during this exercise, utilize portal monitors to monitor simulated evacuees and/or emergency workers. The monitoring/decontamination team requirements will be based on the portal monitor capabilities as applicable based on the procedure/guidelines, and the recommendations of the manufacturer.* ***Note:*** *PEMA Interim Annex E letter, April 2009 or superseding document shall apply.*

Monitoring/decontamination centers and Emergency Worker monitoring and decontamination station personnel are not issued DRDs or KI since the centers and stations are outside the EPZ. Category "C" Dosimetry applies. Simulated permanent record dosimeters (PRDs) will be worn.

Radiation readings/contamination data for the evacuees and vehicle will be provided by the controller as appropriate based upon information contained in the scenario package. Set-up of the facility will be performed the same as for an actual emergency with all route markings and contamination control measures in place including step-off pad (if used). Long runs of plastic covered with paper will not be demonstrated, but the materials may be available and explained (as appropriate). Positioning of a fire apparatus on-site may be simulated if otherwise required.

Note: *Re-demonstrations may be performed as appropriate and time permitting.*

Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inclusive of vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, an actual event, or SAV.

The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures.

Specific attention must be given to equipment, including any vehicles that were in contact with contamination. The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles based on trigger/action levels and procedures stated in the ORO plans/procedures. Monitoring of emergency workers does not

have to meet the 12-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination must be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping, and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles must be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with contaminated individuals must also be checked.

Decontamination of emergency workers may be simulated and conducted via interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals where applicable; provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to register emergency workers upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the emergency worker's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any emergency workers who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans/procedures.

Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be successfully decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Emergency worker station personnel will consist of a minimum of one monitor and one recorder and sufficient personnel to demonstrate monitoring of at least one vehicle. Schematics of these

monitoring/decontamination stations will be available to show organization and space management within the facility. The evaluator will request that decontamination procedures be explained after the vehicle which has simulated contamination has been monitored. One radiological survey meter will be issued to each monitoring/decontamination team. One vehicle and/or piece of equipment will not be able to be decontaminated. Simulated radiation contamination data will be included in the scenario package, and injected by a controller. Set-up of the facility will be performed as closely as possible to that for an actual emergency with all route markings in place including clearly defined exit areas, per contamination control procedures and/or step-off pads (if used); with the exception of long runs of plastic covered with paper which will not be demonstrated, but the materials may be available and explained (as appropriate.).

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, will be simulated and conducted by interview.

Note: *Re-demonstrations may be performed as appropriate and time permitting.*

Sub-element 6.c – Temporary Care of Evacuees

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires OROs to have the capability to establish relocation centers in host/support jurisdictions. The American Red Cross normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters of agreement.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.h, J.12)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, drills, an actual event, or SAV.

The evaluator must conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with applicable guidance.

For planning purposes, OROs must plan for a sufficient number of congregate care centers in host/support jurisdictions based on their all-hazard sheltering experience and what is historically relevant for that particular area. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the

substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this criterion, exercise demonstration expectations must be clearly specified in Extent-of-Play Agreements.

Congregate care staff must also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before entering the facility.

Individuals arriving at congregate care facilities must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been placed in a secured area or monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger/action level.

In accordance with plans/procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not need confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do need confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility(ies). However, availability of such items must be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

Counties demonstrating the operation of mass care centers during the out-of-sequence window (Berks and Lehigh Counties) will provide floor plans of the mass care centers to show organization within the facility and space management during a real emergency. Mass care center locations are listed in the demonstration tables "Demonstration of Mass Care Centers (Attachment A, Section B.3).

Personnel, at a minimum, will consist of one manager and one assistant for each mass care center opened during the out-of-sequence window. The responsible American Red Cross chapter will show the source and quantities, by job functional description, to be provided to mass care centers to support the 24-hour operation. The responsible Red Cross Chapter(s) will be visited, or telephonically contacted during business hours on November 18, 2015, by an exercise evaluator, or interviewed at the mass care center (as appropriate) during the out-of-sequence evaluation to provide information regarding the 24-hour operation. Schematics of these mass

care centers will be available, during the demonstration window, to show organization within the facility and space allocation for the registration and sheltering the evacuating public. Necessary signs, directional arrows and forms will be available and used to demonstrate registration, at a minimum, of three evacuees requiring emergency housing. Evacuees will be shown the location where they would be housed in an actual situation. Bedding, cots, food, etc. normally associated with mass care will not be moved to the site, but the sources of those items should be explained to FEMA evaluators. This out-of-sequence demonstration window will be from 7:00 PM – 9:30 PM on November 18, 2015.

Those facilities identified for the FEMA walk-down evaluations will be supported by a participating representative from the appropriate Red Cross Chapter(s). An interview process will be conducted to determine facility compliance of the above stated requirements.

AMERICAN RED CROSS RISK AND SUPPORT COUNTY CHAPTERS:

Tri County Chapter
(Serving Berks and Chester Counties)
701 Centre Avenue
Reading, Pennsylvania 19601
Brittany Rivera (484) 894-8754

Greater Lehigh Valley Chapter
(Serving Bucks and Lehigh Counties)
3939 Broadway
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18104
Nina Johnson (484) 403-4715

Southeastern Pennsylvania Chapter
(Serving Montgomery County)
2221 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia Pennsylvania 19103
Kevin Bone (267) 246-4309

Sub-element 6.d – Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

INTENT

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services.

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services

to contaminated injured individuals.
(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Assessment/Extent-of-Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or drills. FEMA has determined that these capabilities have been enhanced and consistently demonstrated as adequate; therefore, offsite medical services drills need only be evaluated biennially. FEMA will, at the request of the involved ORO, continue to evaluate the drills on an annual basis. All hospitals listed in the plan as medical services hospitals must be evaluated, with a transportation provider, every 2 years. Additional transportation providers will be rotated through the drills in the 8-year exercise cycle. For ambulance providers who do not participate in an evaluated drill during the two year cycle, training will be provided. This training will be documented in the ALC.

Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts must not delay urgent medical care for the victim.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to monitor/decontaminate and transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities.

An ambulance must be used for response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, OROs may use any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) to transport the victim to the medical facility. It is allowable for an ambulance to demonstrate up to the point of departure for the medical facility and then have a non-specialized vehicle transport the "victim(s)" to the medical facility. This option is used in areas where removing an ambulance from service to drive a great distance (over an hour) for a drill would not be in the best interests of the community.

Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility must be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. In addition, the ambulance crew must demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport or en route, or may be deferred to the medical facility. Contaminated injured individuals transported to medical facilities are monitored as soon as possible to assure that everyone (ambulance and medical facility) is aware of the medical and radiological status of the individual(s). However, if an ambulance defers monitoring to the medical facility, then the ambulance crew presumes that the patient(s) is contaminated and demonstrate appropriate contamination controls until the patient(s) is monitored. Before using monitoring instruments, the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities must be completed as

they would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures must be demonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Medical facilities are expected to have at least one trained physician and one trained nurse to perform and supervise treatment of contaminated injured individuals. Equipment and supplies must be available for treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for collection and analysis of samples and decontamination of the individual must be demonstrated or described to the evaluator. Waste water from decontamination operations must be handled according to facility plans/procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

PEMA Negotiated Extent-of-Play:

This sub-element will be evaluated at Brandywine Hospital, Chester County, on August 11, 2015.

NOTE: Responding EMS crew does not monitor nor decontaminate the injured patient. The injured patient will be monitored at the hospital. If found contaminated, the patient will be decontaminated at the hospital as well.

ATTACHMENT A

LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
EXTENT-OF-PLAY DEMONSTRATION TABLES

I. Plume Phase Exercise

A. Activities – November 17, 2015

1. School Districts – Out-of-Sequence Exercise

Risk Public School Districts with schools located within the EPZ and those districts situated outside the EPZ, but with students living within the EPZ, will participate and be evaluated by FEMA. Each identified District Administration Office will be evaluated. When a school system is comprised of multiple buildings (High School, Middle School, Elementary School), the affected buildings (those with students from the EPZ) will be evaluated on a rotational basis to coincide with the eight-year exercise cycle.

Time: Out-of-sequence – 9:00 – 11:00 AM

Asterisks (*) items indicate buildings not in EPZ – students may live in the EPZ

"Bold" indicated those facilities that are scheduled for Federal evaluation.

COUNTY	SCHOOL DISTRICT	SCHOOLS (approx. 1/4th evaluated)
Berks	**Boyertown Area**	1. Boyertown Elementary 2. Boyertown JHS West
	Daniel Boone Area	1. Daniel Boone HS * 2. Monocacy Elementary Center
Chester	**Downingtown Area**	1. Shamona Creek Elementary * 2. Downingtown HS West *
	Great Valley	1. KD Markley Elementary *
	Owen J. Roberts	1. Owen J Roberts HS 2. East Coventry Elementary
	Phoenixville Area	1. Phoenixville Senior HS 2. Kindergarten Center
Montgomery	**Methacton Area**	1. Arcola Intermediate 2. Skyview Elementary

	Perkiomen Valley	1. Perkiomen Valley HS 2. Schwenksville Elementary
	Pottsgrove	1. Lower Pottsgrove Elementary
	Pottstown Area	1. Franklin Elementary 2. Pottstown MS
	Souderton Area	1. Indian Valley MS *
Montgomery (cont'd)	**Spring-Ford Area**	1. Evans Elementary 2. Limerick Elementary 3. Royersford Elementary 4. 9th Grade Center
	Upper Perkiomen	Only the school district will be evaluated.

2. County Emergency Operations Center (EOCs)

   Time: Per Exercise Scenario

DEMONSTRATION FOR EOC MOBILIZATION FOR COUNTIES		
COUNTY	**DATE**	**Time**
Berks	November 17, 2015	Exercise Scenario
Bucks	November 17, 2015	Exercise Scenario
Chester	November 17, 2015	Exercise Scenario
Montgomery	November 17, 2015	Exercise Scenario
Lehigh	November 17, 2015	Exercise Scenario

3. BRP field teams will be evaluated at the R3V staging area located at Wilson Farm Park, 500 Lee Road, Chesterbrook, Pennsylvania on November 17, 2015 at 1:30 p.m.

4. Municipal Emergency Operations Center (EOCs)

   Time: Per Exercise Scenario

   Asterisks (*) items indicate joint EOCs.

   "Bold" indicates those facilities that are scheduled for Federal evaluation. Non-bold indicates those facilities being observed by PEMA.

DEMONSTRATION FOR EOC MOBILIZATION FOR MUNICIPALITIES		
RISK COUNTY	**MUNICIPALITY**	**DATE**
Berks (6)	Amity Twp	November 17, 2015
	* Boyertown Borough/Colebrookdale Twp	November 17, 2015
	Douglass Twp	November 17, 2015
	Earl Twp	November 17, 2015
	Union Twp	November 17, 2015
	Washington Twp – RA	November 17, 2015
Chester (15)	Charlestown Twp	November 17, 2015
	East Coventry Twp	November 17, 2015
	East Nantmeal Twp	November 17, 2015
	East Pikeland Twp	November 17, 2015
	East Vincent Twp	November 17, 2015
	North Coventry Twp	November 17, 2015
Chester (cont'd)	Phoenixville Borough	November 17, 2015
	Schuylkill Twp	November 17, 2015
	South Coventry Twp – RA	November 17, 2015
	Spring City Borough	November 17, 2015
	Upper Uwchlan Twp	November 17, 2015
	Uwchlan Twp	November 17, 2015
	Warwick Twp	November 17, 2015
	West Pikeland Twp	November 17, 2015
	West Vincent Twp	November 17, 2015
Montgomery (20)	Collegeville Borough	November 17, 2015
	Douglass Twp	November 17, 2015
	*Greenlane Borough/Marborough Twp	November 17, 2015
	Limerick Twp	November 17, 2015
	Lower Frederick Twp	November 17, 2015
	Lower Pottsgrove Twp	November 17, 2015
	Lower Providence Twp	November 17, 2015
	Lower Salford Twp – RA	November 17, 2015
	New Hanover Twp	November 17, 2015
	Perkiomen Twp	November 17, 2015
	Pottstown Borough	November 17, 2015
	Royersford Borough	November 17, 2015
	Schwenksville Borough	November 17, 2015
	Skippack Twp	November 17, 2015
	Trappe Borough	November 17, 2015

	Upper Frederick Twp	November 17, 2015
	Upper Pottsgrove Twp	November 17, 2015
	Upper Providence Twp	November 17, 2015
	Upper Salford Twp	November 17, 2015
	West Pottsgrove Twp	November 17, 2015

5. One back-up one route alerting demonstration by one municipality in each risk county. (During Scenario Exercise)

BACK-UP ROUTE ALERTING		
COUNTY	**MUNICIPALITY / ROUTE / SIREN**	**DATE**
Berks	Washington Twp – 22A / #1 (2 teams)	November 17, 2015
Chester	South Coventry Twp – 62C / #154 (2 teams)	November 17, 2015
Montgomery	Lower Salford Twp – 61A / #43 (2 teams)	November 17, 2015

6. Traffic and Access Control Points

   a. The Pennsylvania State Police will brief at the PSP Skippack Barracks, 2047C Bridge Road, Schwenksville, Montgomery County. Members attending the briefing will NOT actually deploy to the TCP/ACPs.

   b. The PSP briefing will be performed out-of-sequence in a demonstration window of 10:00 a.m. – 12:00 a.m. on November 18, 2015.

   c. Each municipal/regional police force with a TCP assigned in its plan will demonstrate all preparation duties including TCP responsibilities and radiological briefing. Dispatch of persons to the TCP site will not occur during the exercise.

   d. Municipal and county staffs will be prepared to brief the FEMA evaluator on actions to be taken should there be an impediment to evacuation on a designated route. This will be demonstrated between 4:00 p.m. – 10:00 p.m. on November 17, 2015.

      These municipal/regional police forces are (by county) being federally evaluated through an interview process at their respective municipality:

Berks	Chester	Montgomery
Douglass Township	East Vincent Township	Upper Pottsgrove Township
	West Pikeland Township	Lower Providence Township
		Lower Salford Township
		Pottstown Borough

B. Activities – November 18, 2015

1. Reception Centers

Time: Out-of-sequence – 7:00 p.m. – 9:30 p.m.

The asterisks (*) indicate monitoring/decontamination center activities at the respective reception centers.

RECEPTION CENTERS LOCATIONS		
COUNTY	**LOCATION**	**Quantity**
Berks	Morgantown Crossings	1
*Bucks	County Line Plaza (alt. Souderton Fire Company)	1
*Chester	Dowington West High School (alt. Chester County Government Services Building; EOC location)	1
*Lehigh	Emmaus High School	1

2. Emergency worker monitoring/decontamination stations for each risk county.

EMERGENCY WORKER MONITORING/DECONTAMINATION STATION		
COUNTY	**LOCATION**	**DATE**
Chester	Lionville Middle School (alt. Chester County Government Services Building; EOC location)	November 18, 2015
Montgomery	Upper Perkiomen High School (alt. Pennsburg Fire Department)	November 18, 2015

3. Evacuee monitoring/decontamination station for each risk and support counties.

EVACUEE MONITORING/DECONTAMINATION STATION		
COUNTY	**LOCATION**	**DATE**
Berks	Fleetwood High School	November 18, 2015
	Wyomissing High School	November 18, 2015

Bucks	County Line Plaza (alt. Souderton Fire Company)	November 18, 2015
Chester	Dowington West High School (alt. Chester County Government Services Building)	November 18, 2015
Lehigh	Emmaus High School	November 18, 2015

II. Mass Care Center Walkdowns

Berks and Lehigh Counties (*) conduct monitoring/decontamination center activities at their mass care centers.

DEMONSTRATION OF MASS CARE CENTERS / HOST SCHOOL		
COUNTY	**DATE**	**TIME**
* Berks (22/6)	Thirty five walkdowns are scheduled for October 29-30, 2015 See schedule below	
Bucks (61/15)		
Chester (12/6)		
* Lehigh (15/5)		
Montgomery (13/3)		

MASS CARE CENTER LOCATIONS		
COUNTY	**LOCATION**	**Quantity**
* Berks **Blue Team** **October 29, 2015** **9:00 A.M.**	1. Conrad Weiser High School 2. Conrad Weiser Middle School 3. Twin Valley High School 4. Twin Valley Middle School 5. Wilson Middle School South 6. Muhlenberg Middle School	**6**
Bucks **Red Team** **October 29, 2015** **9:00 A.M.**	1. Franklin Roosevelt School 2. Holland Middle School 3. Morrisville Middle / Senior High School 4. Poquessing Middle School 5. Richboro Middle School 6. Milford Township Fire Company 7. Milford Middle School 8. Quakertown Community High School 9. Council Rock South High School 10. Council Rock Newtown Middle School 11. Lenape Middle School 12. Eleanor Roosevelt Elementary	**15**

MASS CARE CENTER LOCATIONS		
COUNTY	**LOCATION**	**Quantity**
Bucks continued	13. Makefield Elementary 14. Edgewood Elementary 15. Springfield Elementary	
Chester **Blue Team** **October 30, 2015** **9:00 A.M.**	1. Avon Grove High School 2. Fred Engle Middle School 3. Charles Patton Middle School 4. Unionville High School 5. Kennett High School 6. Mary Lang Elementary	**6**
* Lehigh **Red Team** **October 30,2015** **9:00 A.M.**	1. Eyer Junior High School 2. Orefield Middle School 3. South Mountain Middle School 4. Springhouse Junior High School 5. DeSales University	**5**
Montgomery **Blue Team** **October 29, 2015** **1:00 P.M.**	1. Abington Junior High School 2. Abington Senior High School 3. Cheltenham High School	**3**

ATTACHMENT B

LIMERICK GENERATING STATION
PREVIOUS ISSUES

WE DID NOT HAVE ANY ISSUES FROM THE LGS HAB EXERCISE HELD ON NOVEMBER 18, 2013.