From: Michael Mulligan [mailto:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 11:27 AM
To: Cowan, Grace <Grace.Cowan@nrc.gov>
Subject: Hope Creek and chief Paul Krohn

Mr. Krohn,

I am a safety advocate. I had recent issues with Hope Creek's SRV setpoint lift inaccuracies and my issues were placed on the docket. We are watching Hope Creek very carefully. You signed off on the below IR.

Entry on my blog:
"Junk Plant Hope Creek: PSEG's Frivolous Denial Of NRC Non Sited Violation"
http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2016/02/junk-plant-hope-creek-frivolous-psegs.html

My friends and I were debating this issue this morning. We think this issue deserves a much higher violation level.

So why wasn't Hope Creek required to ask NRC permission to put all the safety related "sw pump discharge isolation valves (4 of them)" in the "intentionally reverse direction"? Why didn't they fulfill the requirements of 50:59? Why wasn't this in the inspection report? Why wasn't the public immediately informed of this licensing deviation through a safety evaluation?

We feel if Hope Creek was required to ask NRC permission, they would have taken the easy way out and put in the proper quality valves for the intended duty. They would have properly fixed these leaking valves when the symptoms first was seen? It's pretty pathetic the NRC didn't immediately flip this 2013 event up into a regular inspection report.

We think collectively Hope Creek and the NRC has systemic "Normalization of Deviance" on steroids big time???

I believe I have spoken to you in the past and you are one of the good guys. Did we talk about the structure of the CDBIs? The public meeting? Do I remember it right, with all the nuke guys bitching about how useless the CDBIs were, and a diversion from safety?

Could we have a discussion just about this particular issue?

I never have any confidentiality or anonymity needs what-so-ever.

Mike Mulligan
Hinsdale, NH

Hope Creek Generating Station - Component Design Bases Inspection Report
05000354/2015007

Description. 1 EAHV-2198C is the 'C' SW pump discharge isolation valve. The valve is a 28- inch Weir Tricentric butterfly valve with a SMB-1/HBC-4 (60-1) Limitorque motor operator. The valve has an active safety function in the open position to provide normal SW flow to the safety related safety auxiliaries cooling system (SACS) heat exchangers (HXs) and non-1 E reactor auxiliaries cooling system (RAGS) HXs, and emergency SW flow to other systems. PSEG had originally intentionally installed all four 1 EAHV-2198 valves in the reverse flow direction to permit the downstream header pressure to seat the valve tighter to minimize seat leakage during SW pump and strainer on-line maintenance.