



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

February 2, 2016

Mr. Bryan C. Hanson
Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2015007; 05000265/2015007

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On December 3, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial Fire Protection Inspection at your Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on January 7, 2016, with Mr. S. Darin and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings were identified during this inspection.

In accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265
License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30

Enclosure:
IR 05000254/2015007; 05000265/2015007

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-254; 50-265
License Nos: DPR-29; DPR-30

Report No: 05000254/2015007; 05000265/2015007

Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Facility: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Cordova, IL

Dates: November 4 through December 3, 2015

Inspectors: A. Dahbur, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead
B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector
I. Hafeez, Reactor Inspector

Observers: A. Shaikh, Senior Reactor Inspector
I. Khan, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000254/2015007, 05000265/2015007; 11/04/2015 – 12/03/2015; Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

This report covers an announced Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III based engineering inspectors. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5, dated February 2014.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05T)

The purpose of the Fire Protection Triennial Baseline Inspection was to conduct a design-based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensee's Fire Protection Program's defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:

- preventing fires from starting;
- rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur;
- providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe-shutdown of the reactor plant; and
- taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires.

The inspectors' evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plant's Fire Protection Program, post-fire safe shutdown systems, and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a Fire Protection Program that: (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant; (2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability; (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; (4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features; (5) ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured; (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and (7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution Program.

In addition, the inspectors' review and assessment focused on the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk-significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspectors' review and assessment also focused on the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and the requirements of Title 10, *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR), Part 50.54 (hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The fire zones and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below and in Section 1R05.13. The fire zones selected constituted three inspection samples and the B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constituted two inspection samples, respectively, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05T.

Fire Area	Fire Zone	Description
RB-1N	1.1.1.3	Unit 1 Reactor Building Second Floor
TB-II	8.2.6.C	Common Area Turbine Building Ground Floor
TB-III	8.2.7.B	Unit 1 Turbine Building Mezzanine Level

.1 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee’s design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Safety Evaluation Reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.

The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as, NRC Safety Evaluation Reports, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.

The team observed an unannounced fire drill simulating a fire near the aboveground vehicle fuel dispensing area. The team observed fire brigade members fight a simulated fire. The team verified that the licensee identified problems, openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and identified appropriate corrective actions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

The inspectors conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.6 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the licensee performed a post-fire safe shutdown analysis for the selected fire areas and the analysis appropriately identified the structures, systems, and components important to achieving and maintaining safe shutdown. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee's analysis ensured that necessary electrical circuits were properly protected and that circuits that could adversely impact safe shutdown due to hot shorts, shorts to ground, or other failures were identified, evaluated, and dispositioned to ensure spurious actuations would not prevent safe shutdown.

The inspectors' review considered fire and cable attributes, potential undesirable consequences, and common power supply/bus concerns. Specific items included the credibility of the fire threat, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes, and actuations resulting in flow diversion or loss of coolant events.

The inspectors also reviewed cable raceway drawings for a sample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to verify that cables were routed as described in the cable routing matrices.

The inspectors reviewed circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipment needed to conduct post-fire safe shutdown activities would not be impacted due to a lack of coordination. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of circuit breaker maintenance records to verify that circuit breakers for components required for post-fire safe shutdown were properly maintained in accordance with procedural requirements.

The inspectors verified for cables that are important to safe shutdown, but not part of the success path, and that do not meet the separation/protection requirements of Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, that the circuit analysis considered the cable failure modes. In addition, the inspectors have verified that the licensee has either: (1) determined that there is not a credible fire scenario (through fire modeling), (2) implemented feasible and reliable manual actions to assure safe shutdown capability, or (3) performed a circuit fault analysis demonstrating no potential impact on safe shutdown capability exists.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.7 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order. The inspectors reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.8 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.9 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.10 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review of the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.11 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed changes to the approved Fire Protection Program to verify that the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.12 Control of Transient Combustibles and Ignition Sources

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sources were being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.13 B.5.b Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing selected mitigating strategies. This review ensured that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b related license conditions and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that:

- Procedures were being maintained and adequate;
- Equipment was properly staged, maintained, and tested;
- Station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures; and
- Additionally, inspectors reviewed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b-related equipment.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s B.5.b-related license conditions and evaluated selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of Temporary Instruction 2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections.

The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below. The offsite and onsite communications, notifications/emergency response organization activation, initial operational response actions and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3 1 of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 06-12, “B.5.b Phase II and III Submittal Guidance,” Revision 2 are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies’ scenario selected.

NEI 06-12, Revision 2, Section	Licensee Strategy (Table)
3.2	Command and Control
3.4.2	DC Power to De-pressurize PRV and Inject with Portable Pump
3.4.8	Manual Operation of Containment Vent Valves

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Corrective Action Program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the Fire Protection Program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the Corrective Action Program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

Unresolved Item 05000254/2011004-05; 05000265/2011004-05, "Transition from Emergency Operating Procedure to Appendix R Safe Shutdown Procedure - Time Zero Issue"

In 2011, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) associated with the use of safe shutdown procedures in the event of a fire. The issue dealt specifically with the transition time from the QCOA (Fire/Explosion) and QGAs (General Abnormal) to QCARPs (Appendix R safe shutdown) procedures. The inspectors were concerned that a potential delay could occur from the inception of fire until entry into the QCARP. This time delay could be any length of time and any number of spurious operations before the transition takes place. The licensee performed a fire safe shutdown evaluation for this URI per EC 385597 (Time Zero Evaluation) and revised the fire response Procedure QCOA 0010-12 to improve the transition from the QGAs to the QCARPs.

During this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee evaluations and procedures including two evaluations for multiple spurious operations (MSOs), scenario 2ac (Generic NEI scenario) for the potential to isolate the suction path to the RCIC pump, and scenario 8I (Quad Cities site specific scenario) for potential RCIC pump damage if the turbine cooling water supply valve spuriously closes when the pump is running. The inspectors noticed that Engineering Changes EC 384980 and EC 384995 for MSO 2ac and MSO 8I evaluation respectively identified that spurious operation of associated valves could potentially damage the RCIC pump and affect a Unit 2 safe shutdown in the event of a fire in either Fire Area SB-I or TB-II. Licensee evaluations credited the mitigation strategies identified in the QCARPs by locally tripping the RCIC pump and opening the breakers for the associated valves and verifying that all valves were in their required safe shutdown positions. The inspectors were concerned that the instructions provided in the QCOA and the QGA procedures were not sufficient to preclude RCIC pump damage in the event of a spurious operation of any of its associated valves if the pump was running. This URI will remain open pending the inspectors' review of additional information, which was provided by the licensee after the inspection.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On January 7, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. S. Darin, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

S. Darin, Site Vice President
C. Alguire, Design Engineering Senior Manager
W. Beck, Regulatory Assurance Manager
D. Collins, Engineering
T. Bell, Engineering Director
T. Petersen, Regulatory Assurance Lead
M. Rice, Engineering Manager
B. Wake, Operations Superintendent
T. Wojick, Engineering Lead
M. Humphrey, Regulatory Assurance
M. Leuschke, Engineering
M. Wagner, Contractor
J. Smerecky, Engineering
C. Pragman, Corporate Fire Protection
L. Geerts, Fire Marshal
C. Boelte, Engineering Programs

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. Murray, Senior Resident Inspector
K. Carrington, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Document Access and Management System
CFR	<i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
EC	Engineering Change
MSO	Multiple Spurious Operations
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS	Publicly Available Records System
RCIC	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
URI	Unresolved Item

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Rev.</u>
EC 384995	Multiple Spurious Operation Scenario 8I Evaluation	0
EC 385597	Time Zero Evaluation	0
EC 384978	Multiple Spurious Operation Scenario 2x Evaluation	0
EC 384993	Multiple Spurious Operation Scenario 7c Evaluation	0
EC 384968	Multiple Spurious Operation Scenario 2b Evaluation	0
NDIT QDC-98-113	Accessibility Evaluation – Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Building and HPCI	—

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
02583304	NRC Identified Incorrect Terminal Point Specified in QCOP 0203-02	11/06/2015
02583396	RHR Drywell Spray HDR Hose Connection Valve PM	11/06/2015
02589015	Issue Identified with Temporary Cable Routing	11/17/2015
02593419	Clarification Needed for Safe Shutdown Report	11/30/2015
02595878	QCOA 0010-12 RCIC Appendix R Spurious Operation issue	12/04/2015

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
02579542	Inadequate Closure of Action Items	10/30/2015
02578908	NRC Concerns: Gaps on Fire Doors 191	10/29/2015
02562944	NOS Finding: Inadequate Actions to Correct ELBP Data Sheets	09/30/2015
00661481	WO 87669501 Fire Stop Inspections will not Complete as Scheduled	08/16/2007
01271644	Post Fire Safe Shutdown Procedure Entry Requirements	10/03/2011
01048591	Multiple Spurious Operation 2AC – RCIC Suction Valves	03/26/2010

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Rev.</u>
4E-6731T	Schematic and Wiring Diagram Junction Box 2TB-208 Fire Protection System	E
4E-6705A	Interconnection Block Diagram Fire Protection System Loop 5-1 and 5-2	D
4E-6704A	Interconnection Block Diagram Fire Protection System Loop 4-1 and 4-2	C

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Rev.</u>
4E-2484E	Schematic Diagram – Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Sheet 1	W
4E-2806K	Wiring Diagram/Schematic Diagram – 208V MCC 28-1A-1	AQ
M-89	Diagram of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RCIC Piping	BE
4E-1462, Sheet 1	Schematic Diagram Auto Blowdown Part II	AW
4E-1462, Sheet 2	Schematic Diagram Auto Blowdown Part II	AD
4E-1529	Schematic Diagram High Pressure Coolant System Valves MO 1-2301-9 & -10	AE
4E-1530	Schematic Diagram High Pressure Coolant Injection System Valves MO 1-2301-15 & -19	U
4E-6613A	Schematic Diagram Motor Operated Valves 0-2901 and 0-2901-7 Safe Shutdown System	G
4E-1684B	Wiring Diagram Reactor Building 250VDC MCC 1A Part2	AJ

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Rev.</u>
QCMMS 4100-97	Hose Reel Inspection	8
QCEMS 0850-01	Bi-Annual Electrical Penetration Fire Barrier Seal Inspection	4
QCMMS	Bi-Annual Mechanical Penetration Fire Barrier Seal Inspection	2
MA-AA-723-350	Emergency Lighting Battery Pack Quarterly Inspection	14
QCMMS 4100-61	Fire Door Inspection	2
QCAP 1500-06	Penetration Fire Seals	16
QCOS 0010-03	Safe Shutdown Equipment Inspection	28
QCARP 0030-01	TB-II Injection with SSMP and Brining the Unit to Cold Shutdown	28
QCOA 0010-12	Fire / Explosion	47
QCOA 1300-02	RCIC Automatic Initiation	17
QCOP9000-04; Attachment D	Site Areas of Difficult Radio Transmission	8
QCARP 0030-04	TB-II Unit 2 Injection with RCIC and Bringing the Unit to Cold Shutdown	25

WORK ORDERS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
01831659	EM Group 9 Eight Hour ELBP Inspection	07/22/2015
01835320	Special Hose Reel Fire Inspection	07/08/2015
01835319	Reactor Building Fire Hose Reel Inspection	08/08/2015
01832825	Turbine/Radwaste Buildings Fire Hose Reel Inspection	08/21/2015

Mr. Bryan C. Hanson
Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - TRIENNIAL FIRE
PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000254/2015007; 05000265/2015007

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Sincerely,

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Robert C. Daley, Chief
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