

DOCKET NUMBER
50-287

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER
INCIDENT REPORT

TO: MR N C MOSELEY

FROM: DUKE POWER CO
L CHARLOTTE, NC
W O PARKER, JR

DATE OF DOCUMENT
9-17-76

DATE RECEIVED
9-30-76

LETTER
 ORIGINAL
 COPY

NOTORIZED
 UNCLASSIFIED

PROP INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED
1 SIGNED

DESCRIPTION
LTR TRANS THE FOLLOWING.....

PLANT NAME: OCONEE

ENCLOSURE
REPORTABLE OCCURENCE ON 8-19-76 (RO-287/76-12)
REF LOSS OF ES 600V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER.....

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

10-04-76 RB

BRANCH CHIEF: Schwencer
W/5 CYS FOR ACTION
 LIC. ASST.: SHEPPARD
W/ CYS
ACRS 16 CYS HOLDING/SENT TO LA

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- REG FILE
- NRC PDR
- I & E (2)
- MIPC
- SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO
- HOUSTON
- NOVAK/CHECK
- GRIMES
- CASE
- BUTLER
- HANAUER
- TEDESCO/MACCARY
- EISENHUT
- BAER
- SHAO
- VOLLMER/BUNCH
- KREGER/J. COLLINS

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: WAHALLA, SC
 TIC:
 NSIC:

CONTROL NUMBER

9927

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

September 17, 1976

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



RE: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287/76-12

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report 50-287/76-12.

Very truly yours,

William O Parker / JBL

William O. Parker, Jr.

LJB:ge
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

9927

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: RO-287/76-12

Report Date: September 17, 1976

Occurrence Date: August 19, 1976

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Loss of ES 600V Motor Control Center

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 80 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On August 19, 1976, following the connection of a battery charger, 3CS, to instrument and control battery, 3CB, the feeder breaker connecting the Oconee Unit 3 3X10 Load Center to Motor Control Center 3XS3 tripped resulting in a loss of power to MCC 3XS3 and to associated ES equipment for nine minutes. The equipment consisted of Reactor Building Cooling Unit 3B and three ES Reactor Building isolation valves. The battery charger was disconnected and the breaker was reset. All loads were returned to service except RBCU 3B. Subsequent examination revealed that a control power cable in the breaker between RBCU 3B and MCC 3XS3 had failed. Approximately seven hours later repair was completed on the RBCU 3B breaker and the unit was returned to service.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Investigation revealed that two incidents occurred within a short span of time that could have resulted in tripping the breaker between the 3X10 Load Center and the MCC 3XS3. The most probable cause of the occurrence was the failure of a control power cable in the breaker between the RBCU 3B and MCC 3XS3. This cable was partially severed due to contact with another cable and therefore shorted to ground. The short could have resulted in the trip of the breaker between the load center and the motor control center. Also, a battery charger, which was powered via MCC 3XS3, was connected to an instrument and control battery and could have caused an overload and the subsequent loss of the load center.

Analysis of Occurrence:

This occurrence resulted in the loss of three ES valves receiving power via Motor Control Center 3XS3 for a period of nine minutes. The valves were returned to service as per Technical Specification 3.6.4.6, and during this time, the redundant ES valves were operable and would have functioned properly, if required. Additionally, one Reactor Building cooling unit was out of service for approximately seven hours. As required by Oconee Technical Specification 3.3.6(d), both Reactor Building spray systems and the remaining two Reactor Building cooling units were operable during this period. It is, therefore, felt that due to the operability of redundant ES trains and the brief interval over which this incident occurred that the health and safety of the public were not affected by this occurrence.

Corrective Action:

To assure that similar cable routing problems do not exist, all RBCU breakers will be inspected by November 1, 1976. A Nuclear Station Modification, which will reroute the power supply to the RBCU's by installing a separate power line and feeder breaker for the RBCU's between the motor control center and the load center, has been written and will be implemented by January 1, 1977. Additionally, a study of the breaker coordination for 600 volt ES motor control centers and their respective load centers will be completed by January 1, 1977.

U.S. AIR
REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION II
ATLANTA, GA.

SEP 21 10 15 AM '76