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50-287

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INCIDENT REPORT

TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley

FROM: Duke Power Company
Charlotte, N.C. 28242
Wm. O. Parker, Jr.

DATE OF DOCUMENT
7-27-76

DATE RECEIVED
8-6-76

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DESCRIPTION Ltr trans the following:

ENCLOSURE Reportable Occurrence RO-287/76-9
on 7-13-76 refailure of feedwater transient
resulting from a spurious 80 per cent
decrease in feedwater demand for approxima-
tely two seconds....

(1 cy encl rec'd)

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ACKNOWLEDGED

PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 3

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

DHL 8-9-76

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: Waihana, S.C.

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CONTROL NUMBER

7963

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

Regulatory Docket File

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

July 27, 1976




Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence
Report RO-287/76-9.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

EDB:vr
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

7963

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Regulatory Docket File

Report No.: RO-287/76-9

Report Date: 7-27-76

Report Date: July 27, 1976

Occurrence Date: July 13, 1976

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Power increase above power level cutoff during feedwater transient

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 81 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On July 13, 1976, Oconee Unit 3 was operating at 81 percent full power until xenon conditions as prescribed by Oconee Technical Specification 3.5.2.5.d could allow operation above the power level cutoff of 82.5 percent full power. During this time a feedwater transient caused a reactor power increase of approximately 3 percent. The resulting power level of 84 percent full power therefore exceeded the power level cutoff limit by approximately 1½ percent. The control room operator promptly placed the feedwater controls in manual and decreased the feedwater flow to lower reactor power below the power level cutoff.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This occurrence was apparently caused by a feedwater transient resulting from a spurious 80 percent decrease in feedwater demand for approximately two seconds. This induced an oscillation in the feedwater system resulting in an increase in feedwater flow and a lowering of the average reactor temperature (T_{ave}). Consequently, reactor power was automatically increased by the Integrated Control System in order to maintain T_{ave} .

Analysis of Occurrence:

This occurrence resulted in a power level increase above the power level cutoff for a period of less than a minute. At this time the xenon level was approaching its equilibrium value and the xenon worth was changing very slowly with time. This very brief power escalation caused no significant xenon perturbation or apparent power peaking. All control systems functioned properly and had the control operator not placed the feedwater control in manual, the ICS would have automatically reduced the power level as required. It is concluded, therefore, that this incident did not affect the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action:

The control operator involved promptly performed the appropriate corrective action by placing the feedwater system in manual control and reducing reactor power below the power level cutoff limit. This is the first incident of this type and investigation of the Integrated Control System did not determine the cause of the transient. It is considered that no further corrective action is appropriate.

7/17/59

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