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INCIDENT REPORT

TO: N.C. Moseley

FROM: Duke Power Co.  
Charlotte, N.C.  
W.O. Parker, Jr.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

6-8-76

DATE RECEIVED

6-17-76

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DESCRIPTION

Ltr. trans the following.....

ENCLOSURE

Reportable Occurrence # 76-7, on 5-26-76  
Concerning Isolation of Keowee Hydro Station  
Unit from underground feeder circuit.....

( 1 Signed Cy. Received)

(3 Pages)

**DO NOT REMOVE**

**ACKNOWLEDGED**

PLANT NAME: Oconee # 3

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED  
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

SAFETY

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

ENVIRO

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
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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242



June 8, 1976

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



RE: Oconee Unit 3  
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/76-7.

Very truly yours,

*William O. Parker, Jr.*  
William O. Parker, Jr.

EDB:ge  
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information  
and Program Control

Duke Power Company  
Oconee Unit 3

Report No.: RO-287/76-7

Report Date: June 8, 1976

Occurrence Date: May 26, 1976

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Isolation of Keowee Hydro Station unit from underground feeder circuit

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100% full power

Description of Occurrence:

On May 26, 1976, during the performance of the emergency startup testing for Keowee Hydro Station, Keowee Unit 1 was removed from service before connecting Keowee Unit 2 to the underground feeder circuit. This was contrary to Oconee Technical Specification 3.7.2 which requires that during power operation, one Keowee hydro unit may be inoperable for periods up to 24 hours provided that the other Keowee hydro unit is connected to the underground feeder circuit.

This condition existed for approximately three minutes until electrical breaker ACB-4 was closed, tying Keowee Unit 2 to the underground feeder circuit.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

This occurrence resulted from a breakdown in communication between personnel involved. When informed by the test coordinator that his next action would be to disable Keowee Unit 2, the Keowee operator misinterpreted the instruction and immediately removed Unit 2 from service before the Oconee Control Room operator had closed the electrical breaker connecting Keowee Unit 1 to the underground feeder circuit.

Analysis of Occurrence:

As a result of this incident, Keowee Unit 2 was not available to supply power automatically to Oconee via the underground feeder circuit for approximately three minutes. However, if an emergency start had been initiated, the unit would have been available to supply power through the 230 kV switchyard. Other sources of power available to Oconee at the time of the incident, include the 230 kV and 500 kV networks and the 100 kV transmission system. It is concluded therefore, that this incident did not endanger the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Action:

Procedure PT/O/A/620/15, Keowee Hydro Emergency Startup Test, has been revised to more clearly delineate the steps necessary to remove one unit from service and connect the other unit to the underground feeder circuit. Also, a "warning" has been added to the appropriate section of the procedure requiring that prior to inhibiting either Keowee unit, it must be verified that the other unit is connected to the underground feed circuit.

JUN 10 9 55 AM '76

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