

50-287

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER
INCIDENT REPORT

TO: Mr Moseley

FROM: Duke Power Company
Charlotte, NC
W O Parker Jr

DATE OF DOCUMENT
12-20-76

DATE RECEIVED 1-14-77

LETTER
 ORIGINAL
 COPY

NOTORIZED
 UNCLASSIFIED

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED
one signed

DESCRIPTION

Ltr trans the following:

PLANT NAME: Oconee #3

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO# 76-20) on 11-21-76 concerning inoperability of feedwater containment isolation valve 3FDW-108 due to undetermined causes.....

**DO NOT REMOVE
ACKNOWLEDGED**

**NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS**

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 1-19-77 ehf

BRANCH CHIEF:	<i>Schwencer</i>
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION	
LIC. ASST.:	<i>Sheppard</i>
W/1 CYS	
ACRS/6 CYS HOLDING/SENT	<i>As CAT A 1-18-77</i>

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REG FILE				
NRC PDR				
I & E (2)				
MIPC				
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO				
HOUSTON				
NOVAK/CHECK				
GRIMES				
CASE				
BUTLER				
HANAUER				
TEDESCO/MACCARY				
EISENHUT				
BAER				
SHAO				
VOLLMER/BUNCH				
KREGER/J. COLLINS				

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

CONTROL NUMBER

LPDR: <i>Walhalla, SC</i>				
TIC:				
NSIC:				

471D²⁸⁷
A0.4

DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

December 20, 1976

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Regulatory Docket File

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303




Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/76-20.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

LJB:ge
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control



DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: RO-287/76-20

Report Date: December 17, 1976

Occurrence Date: November 21, 1976

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Feedwater containment isolation valve 3FDW-108 inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 90 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On November 21, 1976, following chemical sampling of the "3B" once-through steam generator, feedwater containment isolation valve 3FDW-108 failed to close under system pressure. This valve, located outside the Reactor Building, is part of the chemical sampling system and provides containment isolation following an ES actuation. The redundant valve, 3FDW-107, located inside the Reactor Building was closed and locked as required by Oconee Technical Specification 3.6.4.b.2.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurrence has not been determined. The valve remained inoperable after it had been lubricated, the spring had been replaced and an inspection had determined that the solenoid was operating correctly. Previous problems with valve 3FDW-108, which were discussed in reports UE-287/74-4, UE-287/75-7 and RO-287/76-13, transmitted by our letters of November 29, 1974, July 1, 1975 and September 21, 1976, respectively, have been analyzed. This analysis and the above ineffective corrective actions indicate that the problem lies in the valve internals instead of the operator. The internal valve parts may be defective or the valve stem may have been bent. Investigation of these possibilities is described under corrective action.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Valve 3FDW-108 was properly isolated in compliance with Technical Specification 3.6.4.b.2 by securing redundant valve 3FDW-107 in the closed position. In the event that containment isolation had been required prior to securing valve 3FDW-107, valve 3FDW-107 would have closed upon an ES actuation. Containment integrity was not affected by this incident and it is thus concluded that the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

Valve 3FDW-108 was lubricated, the spring was replaced and the solenoid was tested for operability. Parts have been ordered to replace the stem, disc and canopy ring of the valve internals. After receipt of these parts, the valve internals will be examined and the new parts will be installed. If no damage to the valve stem or to other internal valve parts is observed,

further investigation will be conducted. No similar recurrences have been observed on identical valves on Units 1 or 2.

In the interim, valve 3FDW-107, the redundant valve, will be locked closed. Also, valve 3FDW-108 is being rechecked and a gage is being fabricated to measure the pressure on the valve operator after the valve is closed in order to assure that there is no remaining pressure which is keeping the valve from fully closing.

DEC 23 9 32 AM '76

U.S.A.E.C.
REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION II
ATLANTA, GA