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DESCRIPTION:

ltr trans the following

ENCLOSURES:

Unusual event report UE-287/75-1
Inoperability of Keowee manual emergency start pushbottons 2-11-75

PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 3

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FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

March 25, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-287/75-1.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso

3407

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: UE-287/75-1

Report Date: March 25, 1975

Event Date: February 11, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Inoperability of Keowee manual emergency start pushbuttons

Conditions Prior to Event: Not applicable

Description of Event:

On February 11, 1975, an Oconee Test Engineer noticed that the electrical drawings did not show the wiring for the Keowee Hydro Station emergency start pushbuttons to be complete in the Oconee Unit 3 control room. Investigation revealed that the pushbuttons labeled "Keowee Emergency Channel A" and "Keowee Emergency Channel B" were wired to a nearby terminal board; however, wiring was not present from the terminal board to the Keowee emergency start panels. Although the automatic Engineered Safeguards (ES) actuation was not affected, the manual emergency start feature was inoperable. A station modification was prepared and completed on March 14, 1975.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

The apparent cause of this event was a design error in omitting the circuit between the terminal board and the Keowee emergency start panel. This error was not discovered during construction since Quality Assurance compares installation to the design drawings. A test of these circuits was not included as a part of preoperational testing.

Analysis of Event:

This incident revealed that the capability to manually start the Keowee Hydro Station from the Oconee Unit 3 control room was inoperable. This in no way affected the similar capability from the Unit 1 and 2 control room, nor did it affect the automatic Engineered Safeguards initiation. Thus, the system would have performed properly in the event of a loss of main feeder bus or an actual accident condition. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The station modification which provides for the wiring of the Unit 3 emergency start circuit has been completed. The annual test of this circuit, originally scheduled for July, 1975, will be completed by April 1, 1975.