

REPORT OF ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE AND/OR INCIDENT

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CONTROL NO: 2948

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, N.C. A.C. Thies		DATE OF DOC 3-12-75	DATE REC'D 3-17-75	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Norman C. Moseley		ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>xxx</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>xxx</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS xxx	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-287		
DESCRIPTION: Ltr. reporting abnormal occurrence No. AO-287/75-4 trans the following...				ENCLOSURES: Abnormal occurrence concerning Engineered Safeguards logic buffer failure. (1 cy. encl rec'd)			
PLANT NAME: Oconee # 3				ACKNOWLEDGED			

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

VCR 3-18-75

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

March 12, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence
Report A0-287/75-4.


Very truly yours,



A. C. Thies,

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: AO-287/75-4

Report Date: March 12, 1975

Occurrence Date: February 26, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Engineered Safeguards logic buffer failure

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 75 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On February 26, 1975 the Engineered Safeguards Analog Channel 1 on Line Calibration Test was performed for Oconee Unit 3. When Analog Channel 1 was placed in the test position, it tripped and tripped Digital Channel 4; however, Digital Channel 3 did not receive a trip signal. The test was repeated several times with both Digital Channels 3 and 4 tripping as required.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The apparent cause of this occurrence was the intermittent failure of one set of contacts of a mercury wetted relay on the output of the Analog Channel 1 logic buffer. The relay itself functioned properly because a trip signal was received at ES Digital Channel 4.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The Engineered Safeguards (ES) System consists of eight two-out-of-three coincidence logic networks for actuating the equipment in four safeguards systems; thus, each system is actuated by two redundant coincident logics or protective channels. In this incident, one of two redundant low pressure injection ES channels was placed in a two-out-of-two logic. The redundant ES low pressure injection channel remained in a two-out-of-three logic configuration. Thus, the Engineered Safeguards System remained capable of performing its designed function. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action:

The logic buffer was replaced even though the failure could not be reproduced. This was the first such failure of this type of relay at Oconee and is considered an isolated incident. The periodic surveillance program is considered adequate to detect such failures.

Failure Data:

The relay that malfunctioned is manufactured by the C. P. Clare and Company
Part No. CH5TN-1005.

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U.S.A.E.C.
REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION II
ATLANTA, GA.