

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

TO:

Mr. Norman C. Moseley

FROM:
Duke Power Company
Charlotte, North Carolina
Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.

DATE OF DOCUMENT
2/15/77

DATE RECEIVED
2/28/77

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DESCRIPTION

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PLANT NAME:
LOconee Unit No. 3

(1-P)

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO 50-287/77-1) on 1/26/77 concerning Reactor Building containment isolation valve 3RC-7 inoperable.....

DO NOT REMOVE

ACKNOWLEDGED

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 3/2/77

RJL

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CONTROL NUMBER

2048

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

February 15, 1977

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303




Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-287/77-1.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

LJB:ge
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control



2048

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: RO-287/77-1

Report Date: February 15, 1977

Occurrence Date: January 26, 1977

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Reactor Building containment isolation valve
3RC-7 inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On January 26, 1977, while performing a channel 5 and 6 Engineered Safeguards (ES) on-line test, Reactor Building containment isolation valve 3RC-7 failed to close. This valve is located in the pressurizer sample line and is required to close upon receiving an ES actuation signal in order to assure containment integrity. Valve 3RC-7 was isolated within one and one-half hours by locking closed the redundant isolation valves 3RC-5 and 3RC-6, pursuant to Oconee Technical Specification 3.6.4.b.2.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Investigation revealed that two circumstances could have resulted in the malfunction of valve 3RC-7. The failure could have been related to maintenance performed on the valve on January 2, 1977. The maintenance was minor and consisted of adjusting the valve packing; however, the valve was not cycled after the adjustment as required by the maintenance procedure. Also, paint was discovered on the valve stem which could have prevented the valve from functioning properly.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Valve 3RC-7 was properly isolated in compliance with Oconee Technical Specification 3.6.4(b)(2) by securing the redundant valves, 3RC-5 and 3RC-6, in the closed position. In the event that containment integrity had been required, the redundant isolation valves were available to close upon an ES actuation. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The valve stem was cleaned and lubricated and the valve packing was loosened. The valve was cycled several times and functioned properly. This occurrence was discussed with the personnel involved and the deficiency in their actions identified. Also, all maintenance personnel will review this incident to assure that maintenance procedures are followed properly.

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