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(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 13014

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT FILE

FROM: Duke Power Co. Charlotte, N.C. William O. Parker, Jr		DATE OF DOC 11-11-75	DATE REC'D 11-13-75	LTR xxxxxx	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley		ORIG none	CC 1	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR _____ xxx		SENT LOCAL PDR <u>xxxx</u>
CLASS	UNCLASS xxxxxx	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-287		

DESCRIPTION:  
Ltr trans the following:  
  
PLANT NAME: Oconee #3

ENCLOSURES:  
Abnormal Occurrence #75-12 on 10-28-75 concerning containment isolation valve discovered inoperable .....

**ACKNOWLEDGED**  
**DO NOT REMOVE**

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

11-17-75 JGB

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DUKE POWER COMPANY

Regulatory

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POWER BUILDING



422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704  
373-4083

November 11, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Unit 3  
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence Report AO-287/75-12.

Very truly yours,

*W.O. Parker, Jr.*  
William O. Parker, Jr. *By [Signature]*

EDB/esw  
Attachment

✓ cc: Mr. Roger S. Boyd

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: AO-287/75-12

Report Date: November 10, 1975

Occurrence Date: October 28, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Containment isolation valve discovered inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100% full power

Description of Occurrence:

On October 28, 1975, periodic Engineered Safeguards actuation testing was being performed on Oconee Unit 3. During this testing, attempts to close valve 3PR-7, the Reactor Building air sampling line inlet valve, failed. It was discovered that the valve's electrical breaker had been left open and, consequently, the valve was inoperable.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Review of all logs and valve maintenance histories indicated that the valve had not been involved in any test or maintenance activity since periodic actuation testing on September 19, 1975. Therefore, there was no reason the electrical breaker should have been left open leaving the valve in an inoperable mode. This occurrence then, was apparently caused by a personnel error by which the valve breaker had inadvertently been left open.

Analysis of Event:

Valve 3PR-7 is a Reactor Building containment isolation valve used to isolate the Reactor Building sample line in the event containment is required. This incident resulted in one of two redundant Reactor Building valves being inoperable. The valve 3PR-8, located downstream in the sampling line was operable and would have closed if containment integrity had been necessary. Therefore, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The electrical breaker was immediately closed and the valve tested to assure its operability. It is felt that present surveillance testing procedures are sufficient to discover errors of this type.