

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 1204

FILE: INCIDENT REPORT

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N.C. 28201 A.C. Thies		DATE OF DOC 1-31-75	DATE REC'D 2-3-75	LTR XX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr. Norman C. Moseley		ORIG	CC 1	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XX</u>		SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>
CLASS	UNCLASS XXXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-287		
DESCRIPTION: Ltr trans the following:				ENCLOSURES: Unusual Event 50-287/74-5 on 12-18-74 re inadvertent isolation of Keowee overhead feeder....			
PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit 3				(1 cy encl rec'd) ACKNOWLEDGED Do Not Remove			

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION DHL 2-4-75

BUTLER (S) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER (S) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN (S) W/ Copies	REGAN (E) W/ Copies
CLARK (S) W/ Copies	STOLZ (S) W/ Copies	DICKER (E) W/ Copies	LEAR (S) W/ Copies
PARR (S) W/ Copies	VASSALLO (S) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON (E) W/ Copies	SPEIS (S) W/ Copies
KNIEL (S) W/ Copies	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PURPLE (S) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REG FILE	<u>TECH REVIEW</u>	<u>DENTON</u>	<u>LIC. ASST.</u>	<u>A/T IND</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AEC PDR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SCHROEDER	GRIMES	DIGGS (S)	BRAITMAN
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OGC, ROOM P-506-A	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MACCARRY	GAMMILL	GEARIN (S)	SALTZMAN
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GOSSICK /STAFF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> KNIGHT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> KASTNER	GOULBOURNE (S)	B. HURT
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PAWLICKI	BALLARD	KREUTZER (E)	
GIAMBUSSO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SHAO	SPANGLER	LEE (S)	<u>PLANS</u>
BOYD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STELLO		MAIGRET (S)	MCDONALD
MOORE (S) (BWR)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HOUSTON	<u>ENVIRO</u>	REED (E)	CHAPMAN
DEYOUNG (S) (PWR)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOVAK	MULLER	SERVICE (S)	DUBE w/input
SKOVHOLT (S)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROSS	DICKER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SHEPPARD (S)	E. COUPE
GOLLER (S)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IPPOLITO	KNIGHTON	SLATER (E)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> R. Hartfield (2)
P. COLLINS	TEDESCO	YOUNGBLOOD	SMITH (S)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> KLECKER
DENISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LONG	REGAN	TEETS (S)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> F. WILLIAMS
<u>REG OPR</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LAINAS	PROJECT LDR	WILLIAMS (E)	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FILE & REGION	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BENAROYA		WILSON (S)	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> T.R. WILSON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> STEELE	<u>HARLESS</u>	INGRAM (S)	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VOLIMER			

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1-LOCAL PDR <u>Walhalla, S.C.</u>	(1) (2) (10) -NATIONAL LABS	1-PDR SAN/LA NY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1-TIC (ABERNATHY)	1-M. PENNINGTON, RM E-201 G.T.	1-BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1-NSIC (BUCHANAN)	1-CONSULTANTS	1-G. ULRIKSON, ORNL
1-ASLB	NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN	1-AGMED (RUTH GUSSMAN) RM B-127 G.T.
1-NEWTON ANDERSON		1-J. RUNKLES, RM E-201 G.T.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 5-ACRS SENT TO LIC. ASST. Sheppard 2-4-75		

DUKE POWER COMPANY


POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

January 31, 1975



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Suite 818
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:


Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event
Report UE-287/74-5.

Very truly yours,

A. C. Thies
A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: UE-287/74-5

Report Date: January 31, 1975

Approved w/lt. dated 1-31-75

Event Date: December 18, 1974

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Inadvertent isolation of Keowee overhead feeder

Conditions Prior to Event: Unit 1 - refueling shutdown
Unit 2 - heatup in progress
Unit 3 - 99 percent full power

Description of Event:

On December 18, 1974, Oconee Nuclear Station power circuit breakers PCB8 and 9 tripped and isolated the overhead transmission line from Keowee to the 230 kV switchyard. The other Keowee unit, connected to the underground feeder, was not affected by this incident. Investigation revealed that the air supply line to air circuit breaker ACB-4 had come loose, reducing the air pressure in the accumulator for that breaker and resulting in the operation of the pilot wire monitoring relay which tripped PCB8 and PCB9.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

The main air supply line to ACB4 was not adequately supported at the coupling and vibratory motion caused the line to work loose from the coupling.

Analysis of Event:

The overhead transmission line from Keowee Hydro Station to the 230 kV switchyard is one of several redundant sources of backup power which can supply the Oconee Nuclear Station. The primary source of emergency power, the Keowee Hydro Station through the underground feeder cable, was not affected by the isolation of the overhead transmission line. Provision is made in Technical Specification 3.7.2 for one Keowee unit to be inoperable for test or maintenance for periods not to exceed 24 hours. Since one Keowee unit was connected to the underground feeder during this instance and the overhead transmission line was returned to service within three hours, it can be concluded that emergency power supplies to Oconee were not significantly degraded. The health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

The air line was reconnected to ACB4 and PCB8 and PCB9 were closed to restore the Keowee overhead transmission line to service. The air line mounting

will be improved to relieve the vibratory stress on the coupling to prevent future occurrences. This will be accomplished by March 1, 1975

The pilot wire monitoring relay trip function has been evaluated and has been determined not to be required. The trip function will be deleted and the pilot wire monitoring relay will provide an alarm function only.

The deletion of the trip function has no safety significance and will improve the reliability of the overhead transmission line. The protective features of the overhead line have not been degraded in that other devices serve to sense faults on the line itself and will cause it to be isolated if required.