

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 11515

FILE: _____

FROM: Duke Power Co Charlotte, NC A C Thies		DATE OF DOC 11-7-74	DATE REC'D 11-11-74	LTR XXXX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr Moseley		ORIG none signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>xx</u> SENT LOCAL PDR <u>xx</u>		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-287		

DESCRIPTION:

Ltr trans the following:

DO NOT REMOVE

ENCLOSURES:

Abnormal Occurrence #74-5 on 10-24-74 concerning core flood tank discharge valve breaker not locked open.....

PLANT NAME: Oconee 3

FOR ACTION INFORMATION 11-27-74 ehf

BUTLER (L) W/ Copies	SCHWENCER (L) W/ Copies	ZIEMANN (L) W/ Copies	REGAN (E) W/ Copies
CLARK (L) W/ Copies	STOLZ (L) W/ Copies	DICKER (E) W/ Copies	LEAR (L) W/ Copies
PARR (L) W/ Copies	VASSALLO (L) W/ Copies	KNIGHTON (E) W/ Copies	
KNIEL (L) W/ Copies	PURPLE (L) W/ Copies	YOUNGBLOOD (E) W/ Copies	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

REG FILE	<u>TECH REVIEW</u>	<u>DENTON</u>	<u>LIC ASST</u>	<u>A/T IND</u>
AEC PDR	SCHROEDER	GRIMES	DIGGS (L)	BRAITMAN
LOGC, ROOM P-503A	MACCARY	GAMMILL	GEARIN (L)	SALTZMAN
MUNTZING STAFF	NIGHT	RASTNER	GOULBOURNE (L)	B. HURT
CASE	RAWLICKI	BALLARD	KREUTZER (E)	<u>PLANS</u>
GIAMBUSO	HAO	SPANGLER	LEE (L)	MCDONALD
BOYD	STELLO	<u>ENVIRO</u>	MAIGRET (L)	CHAPMAN
MOORE (L) (BWR)	HOUSTON	MULLER	REED (E)	DUBE w/ input
DEYOUNG (L) (PWR)	OVAK	DICKER	SERVICE (L)	E. COUPE
SKOVHOLT (L)	ROSS	KNIGHTON	SHEPPARD (L)	
GOLLER (L)	POLITO	YOUNGBLOOD	SLATER (E)	THOMPSON (2)
P. COLLINS	TEDESCO	REGAN	SMITH (L)	LECKER
DENISE	LONG	PROJECT LDR	TEETS (L)	EISENHUT
REG OPR	AINAS	<u>HARLESS</u>	WILLIAMS (E)	
FILE & REGION (3)	ENAROYA		WILSON (L)	
MORRIS	VOLINER			
STEELE				

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- | | | |
|--|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| LOCAL PDR <i>Walhalla, S.C.</i> | 1 - NATIONAL LABS | 1 - PDR SAN LAMNY |
| TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10) | 1 - ASLPIE W. E. Bldg, Rm 5201 | 1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB |
| 1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN) | 1 - W. PENNINGTON Bldg, Rm E-201 GT | 1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL |
| 1 - ASLB | 1 - B&M SWINERDAD, Rm E-201 GT | 1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSMAN) |
| 1 - Newton Anderson | 1 - CONSULTANTS | Rm B-127 GT |
| 10 - ACRS HOLDING | NEWARK SILVERMAGBABIAN | 1 - R. D. MUELLER, Rm E-201 GT |
| Sent to Lic Asst. <i>Sheppard</i> | | |


DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

November 7, 1974

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 3
Docket No. 50-287

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Abnormal Occurrence
Report AO-287/74-5.


Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. C. Thies".

A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso



11515

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 3

Report No.: AO-287/74-5

Report Date: November 7, 1974

Occurrence Date: October 24, 1974

Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Core flood tank discharge
Valve breaker not locked open

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Operating at 40 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.3.3 requires that the core flood tank discharge valves be open and the electrical breakers for these valves be locked open and tagged when Reactor Coolant System pressure is above 800 psi. On October 24, 1974, the Oconee Unit 3 core flood discharge valve, 3CF-1, electrical breaker was discovered open and tagged, with the padlock in place but not locked. The lock was immediately relocked and this was reported to the Shift Supervisor.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The core flood discharge valve electrical breaker was opened and locked open on October 16, 1974 during startup of Oconee Unit 3. The padlock was verified locked by the utility operator and so noted in the startup procedure. Apparently, the padlock had not been fully locked and fell open at a later time.

Analysis of Occurrence:

During the period that the motor operator breaker for core flood discharge valve 3CF-1 was not locked, both 3CF-1 and 3CF-2 were open and tagged open and both core flood tanks were operational as required by the Technical Specifications. The presence of the padlock on the motor operator breaker, even though it was not locked, prevented the breaker from being remotely operated. In addition, there are two independent position detectors on these valves to keep the control room operator informed of their position in the unlikely event that someone would remove the lock and manually close the breaker. The health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

All operations personnel have been informed of this incident and of the necessity to recheck the padlocks after locking.