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FILE NUMBER

TO: Mr B C Rusche

FROM: Duke Pwr Co
Charlotte, NC
W O Parker

DATE OF DOCUMENT
3-1-77

DATE RECEIVED 3-7-77

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DESCRIPTION

Ltr notarized 3-1-77...trans the following:

2p

PLANT NAME: Oconee 1-3

ENCLOSURE

Amdt to OL/Change to Tech Specs: Consisting of revisions to testing requirements for reactor core internal vent valves.....

2p

SAFETY		FOR ACTION/INFORMATION		ENVIRO	3-7-77	dhf
ASSIGNED AD:		ASSIGNED AD:				
BRANCH CHIEF:	Schwencer (5)	BRANCH CHIEF:				
PROJECT MANAGER:	Zech	PROJECT MANAGER:				
LIC. ASST. :	Sheppard	LIC. ASST. :				

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REG FILE	SYSTEMS SAFETY	PLANT SYSTEMS	SITE SAFETY &
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NRC PDR	HEINEMAN	TEDESCO	ENVIRO ANALYSIS
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> I & E (2)	SCHROEDER	BENAROYA	DENTON & MULLER
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OELD		LAINAS	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GOSSICK & STAFF	ENGINEERING	IPPOLITO	ENVIRO TECH.
MIPC	MACARRY	KIRKWOOD	ERNST
CASE	BOENAK		BALLARD
HANAUER	SIHWEIL	OPERATING REACTORS	SPANGLER
HARLESS	PAWLICKI	STELLO	
			SITE TECH.
PROJECT MANAGEMENT	REACTOR SAFETY	OPERATING TECH.	GAMMILL
BOYD	ROSS	EISENHUT	STEPP
P. COLLINS	NOVAK	SHAO	HULMAN
HOUSTON	ROSZTOCZY	BAER	
PETERSON	CHECK	BUTLER	SITE ANALYSIS
MELTZ		GRIMES	VOLLMER
HELTIMES	AT & I		BUNCH
SKOVHOLT	SALTZMAN		J. COLLINS
	RUTBERG		KREGER

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION			CONTROL NUMBER
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LPDR: Waltham, SC	NAT. LAB:	BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB.	2413
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TIC:	REG V.IE	ULRIKSON (ORNL)	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NSIC:	LA PDR		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ASLB:	CONSULTANTS:		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACRS / 6 CYS HOLDING / SENT AS CAT B			

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Ap 2
GD

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING


422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

March 1, 1977

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. Benard C. Rusche, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555




Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Mr. Rusche:

Your letter of October 12, 1976 requested the submittal of Technical Specifications establishing requirements for the testing of reactor core internal vent valves. The purpose of such specifications is to assure that vent valves operate as required to prevent vapor lock in the reactor vessel following a postulated reactor coolant inlet pipe rupture. In response to this request and pursuant to 10CFR50, §50.90, an amendment to the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, -47, and -55 is requested. The proposed specification, provided in the attached pages, allows for surveillance and testing of reactor internals vent valves during each refueling outage. This proposal is similar in scope to the model specification provided by your letter of October 12, 1976, with the following exceptions. The model specification proposed criteria requiring that vent valves start to open with a maximum differential pressure of 0.15 psid and are fully open with a maximum pressure of 0.30 psid. In the proposed specification, however, the criterion has been changed to require that the valve can be fully opened with a force equivalent to or less than 1.0 psid. This limit is justified by a recent review of the Oconee ECCS analysis (BAW-10103 Topical Report, June, 1975) conducted by the Oconee NSSS vendor, the Babcock & Wilcox Company. The results of this review provide conservative assurance that during the reflooding phase following a cold leg pipe rupture, a minimum pressure differential of 1.0 psid will be maintained across the vent valves throughout the transient. Therefore, the pressure differential required to fully open the vent valves must be shown to be no more than 1.0 psid as indicated in the proposed specification.

Additionally, it is proposed that Specification 4.2.12 which previously required inspection and testing of vent valves to a lesser extent, be deleted. A replacement page showing this proposed change is also attached.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

MST:ge
Attachments




2413

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR., being duly sworn, states that he is Vice President of Duke Power Company; that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this request for amendment of the Oconee Nuclear Station Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55; and that all statements and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.




William O. Parker, Jr., Vice President

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of March, 1977.



Notary Public

My Commission Expires:



Applicability

Applies to reactor vessel internals vent valves used to prevent vapor lock in the reactor vessel following a postulated reactor coolant inlet pipe rupture.

Objective

To verify that the reactor vessel internals vent valves operate as required.

Specification

At least once each refueling cycle, each reactor vessel internals vent valve shall be demonstrated operable by:

- a. Conducting a remote visual inspection of visually accessible surfaces of the valve body and disc sealing faces and evaluating any observed surface irregularities.
- b. Verifying that the valve is not stuck in an open position, and
- c. Verifying that the valve can be fully opened with force equivalent to or less than 1.00 psid.

Bases

The internals vent valves are provided to relieve the pressure generated by steaming in the core following a LOCA so that the core remains sufficiently covered. Inspection and manual actuation of the internals vent valves (1) assures operability, (2) assures that the valves are not open during normal operation, and (3) demonstrates that the valves are fully open at the forces equivalent to the differential pressures justifiable by the ECCS analysis.

4.2.10 For Unit 1, Cycle 3 operation, the surveillance capsules will be removed from the reactor vessel and the provisions of Specification 4.2.9 will be revised prior to Cycle 4 operation. For Unit 2, Cycle 2 operation, the surveillance capsules will be removed from the reactor vessel and the provisions of Specification 4.2.9 will be revised prior to Cycle 3 operation. For Unit 3, Cycle 2 operation, the surveillance capsules will be removed from the reactor vessel and the provisions of Specification 4.2.9 will be revised prior to Cycle 3 operation.

4.2.11 During the first two refueling periods, two reactor coolant system piping elbows shall be ultrasonically inspected along their longitudinal welds (4 inches beyond each side) for clad bonding and for cracks in both the clad and base metal. The elbows to be inspected are identified in B&W Report 1364 dated December 1970.

Bases

The surveillance program has been developed to comply with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Coolant Systems, 1970, including 1970 winter addenda, edition. The program places major emphasis on the area of highest stress concentrations and on areas where fast neutron irradiation might be sufficient to change material properties.

The reactor vessel specimen surveillance program for Unit 1 and Unit 2 is based on equivalent exposure times of 1.8, 19.8, 30.6 and 39.6 years. The contents of the different type of capsules are defined below.

A Type

Weld Material
HAZ Material
Baseline Material

B Type

HAZ Material
Baseline Material

For Unit 3, the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program is based on equivalent exposure times of 1.8, 13.3, 26.7, and 30.0 years. The specimens have been selected and fabricated as specified in ASTM-E-185-72.

Early inspection of Reactor Coolant System piping elbows is considered desirable in order to reconfirm the integrity of the carbon steel base metal when explosively clad with sensitized stainless steel. If no degradation is observed during the two annual inspections, surveillance requirements will revert to Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.