

DEC 7 1973

50-269/270/287

Honorable James R. Mann  
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Mann:

In my letter to you of November 8, 1973, regarding inquiries made by Mr. Charles W. Parrott III, President, Piedmont Organic Movement, Greer, South Carolina, I stated that we were in the process of gathering documents requested by Mr. Parrott. The documents have been transmitted to Mr. Parrott by our Regional Office in Atlanta, Georgia. Enclosed is a copy of the letter sent by the Director of the Atlanta Regional Office to Mr. Parrott which lists the documents transmitted.

Some of the documents are rather bulky; however, if you desire copies of them, we would be pleased to provide copies for your records.

Sincerely,

Donald F. Knuth, Director  
of Regulatory Operations

Enclosure:

Copy of ltr - N. C. Moseley to  
C. W. Parrott, dtd 11/27/73

bcc: Chairman (2)  
L. M. Muntzing, DR  
J. F. O'Leary, L  
A. Giambusso, L  
H. K. Shapar, OGC  
D. F. Knuth, RO  
J. G. Davis, RO


I. A. Peltier, L  
B. M. Bordenick, OGC  
PDR (50-269, 270, 287)  
Local PDR (~~50-269, 270, 287~~)  
G. Ertter (DR-6304)  
N. C. Moseley, RO:II  
CCR (3)

OFFICE	RO:FS/EB	RO:FS/EB,C	RO:DD/FO	RO:DIR	OCR	Hearing
SURNAME	RCPaulus:das	H. K. Shapar	J. G. Davis	D. F. Knuth	DF	OP
DATE	12/3/73	12-3-73	12/4/73	12/4/73	12/6/73	


FROM Rep. James R. Mann (S.C.)		6304	
		DATE OF DOCUMENT 10/23/73	ACTION COMPLETION DEADLINE 10/31/73
TO OCR		ACTION PROCESSING DATES Acknowledged _____ Interim Report _____ Final _____	PREPARE FOR SIGNATURE OF: _____ Chairman _____ Director of Regulation <b>X</b> Knuth
DESCRIPTION Referral <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Original <input type="checkbox"/> Ccpy <input type="checkbox"/> Other		REMARKS	
Encl ltr fm Charles W. Parrott III, President, Piedmont Organic Movement, Greer, S.C., re radioactive borac acid release and other incidents at Oconee			
		37246	
REFERRED TO	DATE	IS NOTIFICATION TO THE JCAE RECOMMENDED? _____	
Knuth f/action	10/26/73		
Cys: O'Leary Giambusso Shapar			

DO NOT DETACH THIS COPY

DIRECTOR OF REGULATION  
COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL



Form HQ-32 (6-71)  
USA EC



UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS  
REGION II - SUITE 818  
230 PEACHTREE STREET, NORTHWEST  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

TELEPHONE: (404) 526-4503

NOV 27 1973

Charles W. Parrott III, President  
Piedmont Organic Movement  
714 South Line Street  
Greer, South Carolina 29651

Dear Mr. Parrott:

Your letter of October 11, 1973, has been referred to me for reply. Please excuse our delay in answering your request; however, my staff has been assembling the list of documents you desired.

The following is a list of enclosures to this letter which we are transmitting for your use:


1. All Reactor Operating Experience (ROE) reports from 1969 through the present. We do not have extra copies of previous ROE's (from 1963 to 1968). However, they are available for purchase from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22151.
2. All Reactor Construction Experience (RCE) reports that have been published.
3. WASH-1270, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram."
4. Copies of 10 CFR 20 and of the proposed Annex to Appendix D, 10 CFR 50.
5. WASH-1250, "The Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors and Related Facilities (Final Draft)"; final publication plans have not been made yet; this final draft is the document that was used for the Congressional hearings.
6. The environmental statement on the Oconee Station.

NOV 27 1973

The Oconee County Library in Walhalla, South Carolina, has a set of files on Oconee which are similar to those at our public document room in Washington. These files should contain all correspondence and reports on Oconee, such as environmental impact statements and inspection reports. We have been informed that the library is open Mondays from 10:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., Tuesday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and Saturdays from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The files are in the Librarian's (Miss Marcum) Office in a file cabinet. We understand that the Library staff would be happy to assist anyone who wants to use the files and that they have a copying machine in the Library.

We understand that Mr. Olson at the proposed Anderson Fuels Recycle Plant has answered your questions about the filtration system. We appreciate your interest in these facilities and trust that the above information will be useful to you.

Sincerely,



Norman C. Moseley  
Director

cc: J. G. Davis, RO:HQ

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.


October 23, 1973 kx

Mr. Robert D. O'Neill  
Director  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

The attached communication  
is sent for your consideration.  
Please investigate the statements  
contained therein and forward me  
the necessary information for re-  
ply, returning the enclosed corre-  
spondence with your answer.

Yours truly,



James R. Mann, M. C.  
4th District, South Carolina

DR-6304

10/25/73  
2:15

Greer, S. C. - 29651

October 17, 1973

Honorable James R. Mann  
United States Congressman  
Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Mann:

By my copies of letters to Senator Hollings and Dr. Donald F. Knuth of the AEC you of aware of some of my concerns over some incidents at the Duke Power Company Oconee Nuclear Station at Keowee-Toxaway.

The incident referred to concerning the two workers exposed to radioactive boron was carried in the Greenville Piedmont of this date. A copy is enclosed for your convenience. Six percent of the radiation exposure permitted by the federal codes is 30 millirems, since federal guidelines set 500 millirems as the annual exposure for workers in nuclear facilities. 170 millirems is the limit for the general population.

I would like to call your attention to the fact that the EPA has called for a hundred-fold reduction in these amounts. They base this on "disturbing trends" in cancer, leukemia and infant death rates near nuclear power stations.

Our information was correct in this instance, and I have no doubt we will be proved correct in at least 5 other incidents at Oconee. Of much more importance and concern to citizens than the above mentioned incident is one in which we have been informed that Duke has been generating so much radioactive waste water (due to the fact that the radioactivity in unit 1 has gone up, caused possibly by a damaged fuel rod or rods, we are told) that they couldn't ship it off-site fast enough. We were told that some of this radioactive waste water was run through the hydro station located on site, and is now in Lake Hartwell. We have also learned of a spill of some sort of radioactive material at this station, and reading the AEC news releases on the problems encountered with this station do not build one's confidence in the safety of Oconee.

Oconee is in your Congressional District, and it is your constituents that are endangered, as well as your family and mine.

Having the utmost confidence in your sincere interests for the welfare of the citizens of Congressional District 4 and South Carolina, I know you will consider that I have not done my duty as a taxpayer and citizen if I did not bring these to your attention.

I will continue to keep you informed of any further developments that may come to my attention. The Nuclear Study Committee of the Piedmont Organic Movement is in the process of gathering data now on these and other incidents around the state.

Thank you for your concern and interest in these matters. If I can supply you with any additional, more specific information, please advise me.

Sincerely,



Charles W. Parrott III  
President, Piedmont  
Organic Movement

enc:

# Radiation Exposure Is 6 P.C.

SENECA, S.C. (AP)—Two employees of Duke Power Co.'s Oconee Nuclear Station who accidentally breathed radioactive boric acid crystals received six per cent of the radiation exposure permitted by federal codes, a Duke Power spokesman said today.

The spokesman said the two employees, identified as Furman Lark and William Holcombe, were among several workers performing routine maintenance on a valve in the nuclear reactor area of the plant on Aug. 22. He said a small amount of the boric acid was released and inhaled by the two men after they tried to tighten the valve by striking it with a hammer.

50-269

NOV 29 1973

Honorable James R. Mann  
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Mann:

This is in response to your recent inquiry to Dr. Ray regarding two telegrams you received from Mr. Charles W. Parrott III, President, Piedmont Organic Movement, Greer, South Carolina. Mr. Parrott's telegrams deal with an accident at Oak Ridge, Tennessee and with an occupational radiation exposure at the Duke Power Company's Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1. Mr. Parrott also refers to other incidents at the Oconee Nuclear Station which he brought to the attention of the Atomic Energy Commission. These relate to the release of waste water containing radioactivity, and a spill of liquid containing radioactive material at the plant site.

The accident at Oak Ridge, Tennessee occurred at an AEC facility rather than a privately owned, AEC licensed facility. We have enclosed the Commission's public announcement on the incident which involved the classified development program on the gas centrifuge method of enriching uranium. No nuclear reactor was involved. The small amount of uranium hexafluoride released was essentially natural uranium and therefore, a very low level of radioactivity. Nobody was hurt. Full details of the incident could not be made public at the time because of the classified nature of the program. However, a decision was eventually made to issue a public announcement in view of the industrial interest in the gas centrifuge development program.

The gas centrifuge process has been under development for a number of years and it is a potential competitor to the process currently being used for the separation of uranium isotopes. The gas centrifuge unit that failed was undergoing test operations in a facility at Oak Ridge. One of the purposes of this test facility is to screen the design for defects before the unit undergoes further investigations. Design modifications will be made to eliminate future occurrence of this type. The Commission appointed a special AEC team to investigate the incident for the purpose of recommending design changes as appropriate.

With respect to the occupational radiation exposure, on August 22, 1973, two employees were exposed to airborne concentrations of radioactive iodine (Iodine 131). Upon learning of the incident, Duke Power Company withdrew the employees from further work in radiation zones. The employees were examined on two separate occasions by whole body counting.

50269

OFFICE▶					
SURNAME▶					
DATE▶					

This is a technique used to determine the total quantities of radioactive material present in the body. Results from these studies indicated that the two employees had approximately six and four percent, respectively, of the maximum permissible amount of Iodine 131 in the body. Because iodine is eliminated from the body in a short time, the radiation dose due to the presence of the quantities found would correspond to about 0.25 Rems and 0.16 Rems to the thyroids of the two employees. The maximum permissible occupational dose to the thyroid recommended by the International Committee on Radiological Protection (ICRP) is 30 Rems per year. Atomic Energy Commission limits on exposures of employees to concentrations of airborne radioactive materials are based on the ICRP recommendations. Thus, the radiation doses received by the two employees represent less than one percent of this permissible dose.

Although this matter was not required to be reported to the Atomic Energy Commission, Duke Power Company did inform us within a day of its occurrence. The circumstances surrounding the incident and Duke Power Company's actions following the incident were examined by our inspectors. We concluded that the company had handled the matter in a responsible manner and we found no violations of AEC regulations. As Mr. Parrott points out, Duke Power Company did not immediately make public the facts of this case; however, there is no requirement that the company make news releases for incidents of this type. As noted above, the actual radiation dose received by the two employees was less than one percent of the permissible annual dose recommended by ICRP.

With respect to the release of waste water containing radioactivity, Duke Power Company has filed a report on this matter with the Commission. A copy of the report is enclosed with this letter. This matter will be examined by the Directorate of Regulatory Operations during subsequent inspections of the facility.

Regarding the spill of radioactivity contaminated liquid, Duke Power Company informed us on September 12, 1973, that on the previous day, approximately 20 gallons of waste water containing low concentrations of radioactive material were accidentally spilled on an asphalt pad at the plant site. The water was immediately removed from the asphalt pad and the area decontaminated. Samples collected after decontamination indicated concentrations were below the maximum permissible concentrations specified in Atomic Energy Commission regulations. Based on the quantity of water spilled and the concentrations of radioactive materials in the

OFFICE▶					
SURNAME▶					
DATE▶					

Hon. James R. Mann

-3-

water, we concluded that this matter was not required to have been reported to the Commission.

I hope that the above information will serve your needs.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

D. F. Knuth

D. F. Knuth, Director  
of Regulatory Operations

Enclosures:

1. AEC Public Announcement No. R-461, dtd 11/1/73
2. Copy of ltr fm Duke Power Co., dtd 10/26/73
3. Incoming telegrams - C. W. Parrott to Cong. J. K. Mann, dtd 11/6/73, and 11/7/73

bcc: Chairman (2)

- L. M. Muntzing, DR
- J. F. O'Leary, L
- A. Giambusso, L
- H. K. Shapar, *OC-C*
- D. F. Knuth, RO
- J. G. Davis, RO
- N. C. Moseley, RO:II
- I. A. Peltier, L
- B. M. Bordenick, GC
- OCR(3)
- G. Ertter (DR-6357)
- F. P. Baranowski, PMM
- P. D. Keif, OIS
- PDR 50-269
- LPDR

*Rec'd in DR Mail Room for dispatch 11/27/73 4:05*

OFFICE	RO:FS/EB	RO:FS/EB,C	RO:DD/FO	RO:DIR	OCR	PMM
SURNAME	<i>RC</i> RCPaulus:das	<i>HD</i> Hornburg	<i>JG</i> JDavis	<i>DF</i> DFKnuth	<i>OS</i>	See note prepared by PMM 11/16/73
DATE	11/19/73	11-19-73	11/19	11/19/73	11/28/73	attached

PROPOSED REPLY TO CONGRESSIONAL  
LETTER ON CENTRIFUGE ACCIDENT

The accident at Oakridge Tennessee which your constituent asked about, occurred, at an AEC facility rather than a privately owned, AEC licensed facility under the jurisdiction of the Regulatory side of the AEC. We have enclosed the Commission's public announcement on the incident which involved the classified development program on the gas centrifuge method of enriching uranium. No nuclear reactor was involved. The small amount of uranium hexafluoride released was essentially natural uranium and therefore, a very low level of radioactivity. Nobody was hurt. Full details of the incident could not be made public at the time because of the classified nature of the program. But a decision was eventually made to issue a public announcement in view of the industrial interest in the gas centrifuge development program.

The gas centrifuge process has been under development for a number of years and it is a potential competitor to the process currently being used for the separation of uranium isotopes. The gas centrifuge unit that failed was undergoing test operations in a facility at Oakridge. One of the purposes of this test facility is to screen the design for defects before the unit undergoes further investigations. Design modifications will be made to eliminate future occurrence of this type. The Commission appointed a special AEC team to investigate the incident for the purpose of recommending design changes as appropriate.




Taken by dictation from Germantown to RCPaulus

DAS 11-16-73

*Public Announcement No.  
R-461*

~~Baranowski prepared~~

*Above note prepared by PMM  
(consumed in by Baranowski)  
and transmitted by Phil Keif, OIS  
on 11-16-73*



No. R-461  
Contact: Philip Keif  
Tel. 301/973-3335

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
(Thursday, November 1, 1973)

### EXPERIMENTAL GAS CENTRIFUGE MODEL ACCIDENTALLY DAMAGED IN TEST

The Atomic Energy Commission said today an experimental gas centrifuge model was virtually destroyed in an accident during test stand operations at a centrifuge development facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The incident occurred on October 20.

When the centrifuge model--a cylindrical device which revolves at high speeds--failed, it damaged a number of other experimental units and support piping. There were no personal injuries. Approximately four ounces of uranium hexafluoride were released in the building, but there was no overexposure of personnel. Many other centrifuges were unaffected by the incident and are continuing in test operation.

The AEC is conducting research into the gas centrifuge method of separating uranium isotopes. The "feed" material is uranium hexafluoride in gaseous form.

The AEC presently uses a different process--gaseous diffusion--in the production of uranium enriched in the U-235 isotope. The fissionable U-235 is used as power reactor fuel and in weapons.

The experimental centrifuge involved was an advanced model. Screening procedures are routinely conducted on advanced machines to confirm design characteristics and component performance. Some centrifuges have failed previously during the screening procedures, but those failures did not significantly affect operation of other machines.

A special AEC committee is investigating the accident in an effort to determine the cause and possible adjustments in future design and/or operation of experimental gas centrifuges.



Telegram

NAE094(1313)(2-175872E310)PD 11/06/73 1312

NOV 6 1973

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP

8038774101 NL TDMT GREER SC 100 11-06 0112P EST

PMS CONGRESSMAN J R MANN

CAPITOLHILL DC

I URGE YOU TO SET UP AN INDEPENDANT INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE  
FOR AN IMMEDIATE IMPARTIAL AND COMPLETE INVESTIGATION INTO THE  
DESTRUCTIVE APALLING AEC ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION NUCLEAR ACCIDENT  
AT OAKRIDGE TENNESSEE OCT 20 1973 NOT REPORTED UNTIL NOV 1 12  
DAYS LATER. I FURTHER URGE YOU TO MAKE THE INVESTIGATION IMMEDIATE  
AND PUBLIC. SINCERLY

CHARLES W PARROTT PRES PIEDMONT ORGANIC MOVEMENT 714 SOUTH  
LINE ST GREER SC 29651

NNNN

Rec'd Off. Dir. of Reg.  
Date 11/14/73  
Time 11:15



Telegrams

NAD004(0131)(2-203572E311)PD 11/07/73 0131

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP

8038774101 TDMT GREER SC 237 11-07 0131A EST

PMS REP JAMES R MANN

CAPITOL HILL DC

NOV 07 1973

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE MANN

ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 25TH 1973 WE LEARNED OF A RADIATION RELATED ACCIDENT INVOLVING TWO WORKERS AT THE DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NEUCLAR STATION WE ADVISED SENATOR ERNEST F HOLLINGS OF THIS INCIDENT ON OCTOBER 1 1973 HE REPLIED TO US HE STATED I WAS SHOCKED TO RECIEVE THE INFORMATION YOU SENT ME ABOUT THESHUT DOWN AND ACCIDENT AT OCONEE AND I AM WRITING TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA BOARD OF HEALTH FOR A REPORT ON THIS SITUATION ON WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 17 THIS ITEM APPEARED IN THE GREENVILLE PEADMONT NEWSPAPER RADIATION EXPOSURE IS SIX PERCENT SENICA SOUTH CAROLINA AP NEWS RELEASE TWO EMPLOYEES OF DUKE POWER COMPANIES

SF-1201 (RS-69)



Telegra

NAE094(1313)(2-175872E310)PD 11/06/73 1312

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP

8038774101 NL TDMT GREER SC 100 11-06 0112P EST

PMS CONGRESSMAN J R MANN

CAPITOLHILL DC

I URGE YOU TO SET UP AN INDEPENDANT INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE  
FOR AN IMMEDIATE IMPARTIAL AND COMPLETE INVESTIGATION INTO THE  
DESTRUCTIVE APALLING AEC ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION NUCLEAR ACCIDENT  
AT OAKRIDGE TENNESSEE OCT 20 1973 NOT REPORTED UNTIL NOV 1 12  
DAYS LATER. I FURTHER URGE YOU TO MAKE THE INVESTIGATION IMMEDIATE  
AND PUBLIC. SINCERLY

CHARLES W PARROTT PRES PIEDMONT ORGANIC MOVEMENT 714 SOUTH  
LINE ST GREER SC 29651

NNNN

NOV 6 1973  
Rec'd Off. Dir.  
Date 11/14/73  
Time 11:25

**WU**  
Western Union

**Telegram**

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION WHO ACCIDENTIALLY BREATHED RADIOACTIVE BORIC ACID CRYSTALS RECEIVED 6 PERCENT OF THE RADIATION EXPOSURE PERMITTED BY FEDERAL CODES A DUKE POWER SPOKEMAN SAID TODAY WE DEMAND TO KNOW WHY THIS INCIDENT WAS NOT MADE PUBLIC AT THE TIME IT OCCURED IN ADDITION WE HAVE ADVISED THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION OF THIS AND OTHER INCIDENTS AT THE OCONEE STATION AND DISPIE THE FACT THAT WE WERE ADVISED INVESTIGATIONS WOULD PROCEED AND WE WOULD BE INFORMED OF THESE NO ACTION HAS TAKEN PLACE. IN VIEW OF THE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH COULD RESULT FROM A CONTINUATION OF LIKE INCIDENTS WE DEMAND AN IMMEDIATE AND PUBLIC INVESTIGATION OF CONDITIONS AT OCONEE NEUCLAR STATION

CHARLES W PARROTT PREFERRED PRESIDENT PIEDMONT ORGANIC MOVEMENT  
714 SOUTH LINE ST GREER SC 29651

8F-1201 (R5-69)

# DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES  
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT  
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

October 26, 1973

Mr. Angelo Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Directorate of Licensing  
Office of Regulation  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545



Re: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.2 and 1.9(b) attached to Operating Licenses DPR-38 and DPR-47, we are reporting as an unusual event a situation which exists at Oconee Nuclear Station. The unusual event concerns the fact that liquid and gas waste management systems are processing larger volumes of fluids than were estimated in Chapter 11 of the Final Safety Analysis Report.

The basic waste management problems are briefly summarized as follows:

1. Due to mixing of volumes of water containing no radioactivity from miscellaneous sources with the small quantities of low level waste water, composite volumes of liquid to be treated as radioactive waste are greater than that identified in Table 11-1a of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
2. Volumes of gaseous waste, due to the nitrogen overblanket on certain tanks, are substantially higher than those predicted in Table 11-1a of the Final Safety Analysis Report.
3. Boron and other chemicals sometimes present in the liquid waste complicate the ability to discharge those wastes that are otherwise within Technical Specification limits.
4. The existing waste management systems are not operating at their full expected capacities.

In order to assess the extent of the waste handling problems and determine solutions, a waste management task force was appointed consisting of engineering, production, and station personnel. The task force has made recommendations concerning the liquid waste handling, and Duke is pro-

ceeding concurrently with efforts in the four following areas:

1. Provide Interim Waste Management Facilities

We are proceeding to design, procure and install interim waste management facilities to give us reasonable assurance that Ocone 3 can be operated satisfactorily. The interim facilities may include a 15 gpm evaporator, a demineralizer tank and associated piping. The estimated date for completion of the interim facilities is May 1, 1974. Based on this schedule and the fact that these are interim facilities, the design of the system may not be in accordance with all design criteria and code requirements which would be provided in a permanent facility. However, piping, valves, and associated components will be procured and installed consistent with the power piping code ANSI B31.1-1973.

2. Provide Additional Permanent Waste Management Facilities

Preliminary plans indicate that two evaporators of 25 gpm capacity each, a gas stripper, two demineralizers, a drumming station, tankage, and associated piping and controls may be necessary to completely solve the waste management problems and give us adequate margins to cope with all conditions. A separate building will be required to house these facilities. This facility would be designed in accordance with criteria consistent with that for the existing waste management system. The estimated date for completion is January 1, 1976.

3. Improve Operation of the Existing System

Studies and tests will be continuing in order to improve the operation of the existing installed systems. We estimate that a majority of this work can be completed by January 1, 1974.

4. Separation of Non-Radioactive Waste Water from Contaminated Areas

Studies will continue to attempt to isolate non-radioactive waste from contaminated waste.

While the waste management problems at the station caused by handling larger volumes of fluids have been significant at times, improvement in the operation of the waste management system has been accomplished. For instance, low level liquid waste volumes were being generated at rates as high as 14,000 gallons per day during August and September of 1973. Due to successful efforts to decrease secondary side leakage, liquid wastes are currently being generated at the rate of 7,000 gallons per day for Units 1 and 2 (7,000 gallons per day is equivalent to approximately 5 gallons per minute).

Mr. Angelo Giambusso

Page 3

October 26, 1973

It should be emphasized that although unexpected quantities of liquid and gaseous wastes have been collected and processed, the radioactive releases have been low and well within the limits of Technical Specifications 3.9 and 3.10. We will advise you of our progress in solving this problem.

Very truly yours,



A. C. Thies

ACT:vr

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley

PROPOSED REPLY TO CONGRESSIONAL  
LETTER ON CENTRIFUGE ACCIDENT

The accident at Oakridge Tennessee which your constituent asked about, occurred, at an AEC facility rather than a privately owned, AEC licensed facility under the jurisdiction of the Regulatory side of the AEC. We have enclosed the Commission's public announcement on the incident which involved the classified development program on the gas centrifuge method of enriching uranium. No nuclear reactor was involved. The small amount of uranium hexafluoride released was essentially natural uranium and therefore, a very low level of radioactivity. Nobody was hurt. Full details of the incident could not be made public at the time because of the classified nature of the program. But a decision was eventually made to issue a public announcement in view of the industrial interest in the gas centrifuge development program.

The gas centrifuge process has been under development for a number of years and it is a potential competitor to the process currently being used for the separation of uranium isotopes. The gas centrifuge unit that failed was undergoing test operations in a facility at Oakridge. One of the purposes of this test facility is to screen the design for defects before the unit undergoes further investigations. Design modifications will be made to eliminate future occurrence of this type. The Commission appointed a special AEC team to investigate the incident for the purpose of recommending design changes as appropriate.

Taken by dictation from Germantown to RCPaulus

DAS 11-16-73

Public Announcement No.  
R-461

~~Baranowski request~~

Above note prepared by PMM  
(Concurred in by Baranowski)  
and transmitted by Phil Kaif, OIS  
on 11-16-73

FROM <b>Rep. James H. Mann (S.C.)</b>		CONTROL NUMBER <b>6361</b>	FILE LOCATION
		DATE OF DOCUMENT <b>11/7/73</b>	ACTION COMPLETION DEADLINE <b>11/19/73</b>
TO <b>Chairman</b>		ACTION PROCESSING DATES Acknowledged _____ Interim Reply _____ Final <i>[Signature]</i>	PREPARE FOR SIGNATURE OF: _____ Chairman _____ Director of Regulation
DESCRIPTION <b>ltr</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Original <input type="checkbox"/> Copy <input type="checkbox"/> Other		REMARKS <b>DR-0304, 6357</b>  <b>Note: "OIS, please provide input to Reg. on gas centrifuge incident."</b>  <b>O. Stradinger, GCR</b>	
		<b>57174</b>	
REFERRED TO	DATE	IS NOTIFICATION TO THE JCAE RECOMMENDED? _____	
<b>Routh</b>	<b>6/action</b>	<b>11/14/73</b>	
		Cys: <b>O'Leary</b> <b>Claiborne</b> <b>Sluspar</b>  <b>POC 50-269</b> <b>LPDR</b>	
		Return inclosing ltr w/reply	
DIRECTOR OF REGULATION COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL			Form HQ-32 (1-73) USAEC