

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

TO: B.C. Rusche

FROM: Duke Power Co.
Charlotte, N.C.
W.O. Parker, Jr.

DATE OF DOCUMENT
3-10-76

DATE RECEIVED
3-16-76

LETTER
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DESCRIPTION
Ltr. re. their ltr. of 7-9-75...
Comments on the re-evaluation of the ECCS Cooling
Performance.....

(1 Signed Cy. Received)

PLANT NAME: Oconee # 1,2 & 3

ENCLOSURE

DO NOT WRITE
ACROSS THIS LINE

SAFETY	FOR ACTION/INFORMATION	ENVIRO	SAB 3-18
ASSIGNED AD :		ASSIGNED AD :	
BRANCH CHIEF :	PAPP W/6	BRANCH CHIEF :	
PROJECT MANAGER:	Rosen	PROJECT MANAGER :	
LIC. ASST. :	Gaulbourne (LTC)	LIC. ASST. :	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REG FILE <i>Reg File</i>	SYSTEMS SAFETY	PLANT SYSTEMS	ENVIRO TECH
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NRC PDR	HEINEMAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TEDESCO	ERNST
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> I & E (2)	SCHROEDER	BENAROYA	BALLARD
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CELD		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LAINAS	SPANGLER
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GOSSICK & STAFF	ENGINEERING	IPPOLITO	
MIPC	MACCARY		SITE TECH
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CASE	KNIGHT	OPERATING REACTORS	GAMMILL
HANAUER	SIHWEIL	STELLO	STEPP
HARLESS	PAWLICKI		HULMAN
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PROJECT MANAGEMENT <i>DeYoung</i>	REACTOR SAFETY	OPERATING TECH	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BOYD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROSS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EISENHUT	SITE ANALYSIS
P. COLLINS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOVAK (3)	SHAO	VOLLMER
HOUSTON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ROSZTOCZY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BAER	BUNCH
PETERSON	CHECK	SCHWENCER	J. COLLINS
MELTZ		GRIMES	KREGER
HELTEMES	AT & I		
SKOVHOLT	SALTZMAN	SITE SAFETY & ENVIRO	
	RUTBERG	ANALYSIS	
		DENTON & MULLER	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION	CONTROL NUMBER	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LPDR: Walhalla, S.C.	NATL LAB	BROOKHAVEN NATL LAB
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TIC	REG. V-IE	ULRIKSON(ORNL)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NSIC	LA PDR	
ASLB	CONSULTANTS	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACRS 16 HOLDING/SENT		
		2644

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

March 10, 1976

Mr. Benard C. Rusche
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555



Attention: Mr. R. A. Purple, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Sir:

My letter dated July 9, 1975 described a re-evaluation of the ECCS cooling performance which had been accomplished for the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3. The model utilized in the performance of this re-evaluation is described in Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) non-proprietary Topical Report BAW-10104, "B&W's ECCS Evaluation Model". In non-proprietary Topical Report BAW-10103, "ECCS Evaluation of B&W's 177 FA Lowered Loop NSS", a description of the results of the re-evaluation for a generic B&W unit of the Oconee class was presented. This analysis showed that Oconee Units 2 and 3 were conservative in relation to the generic analysis provided in BAW 10103. In the case of Oconee 1, portions of the analysis presented in BAW 10103 were also performed utilizing specific Oconee 1 parameters and was included as attachment 2 to the July 9, 1975 submittal.


In Section 4.6 of BAW 10103 and Section 3.5 of the specific Oconee 1 analysis, the worst single failure postulated is the loss of a diesel, following loss of off-site power, which results in the operation of only one LPI and one HPI pump. The Oconee emergency power system uses two hydro-electric generating units instead of diesels and a single failure of one of these sources will have no effect upon ECCS performance. However, failure of a 4160 volt switchboard could cause the loss of one HPI and one LPI pump, but there is no possibility of a common mode failure which will result in the loss of more than one 4160 volt switchboard. Therefore, although the failure mechanism for the Oconee



Mr. Benard C. Rusche
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units is different from that described in BAW 10103 and the specific Ocone 1 analysis, the worst case single failure still results in the operation of only one HPI and one LPI pump, and the conclusions of the analyses remain valid.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "William O. Parker, Jr.", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

William O. Parker, Jr.

MST:mmb