

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

TO:
MR. NORMAN C. MOSELEY

FROM:
DUKE POWER COMPANY
CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA
MR. WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.

DATE OF DOCUMENT
5/13/76

DATE RECEIVED
6/1/76

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DESCRIPTION

LTR. TRANS THE FOLLOWING:

PLANT NAME:

OCONEE #1

(1-P)

ENCLOSURE

LICENSEE EVENT RPT. (RO 50-269/76-6) ON
4/14/76 CONCERNING FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING
ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ISOLATION VALVE.

ACKNOWLEDGED
DO NOT REMOVE

(1-P)

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

SAFETY

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

ENVIRO

6/3/76

RJL

BRANCH CHIEF: PURPLE
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION
 LIC. ASST: SHEPPARD
W/1 CYS
ACRS 16 CYS HOLDING/SENT TO LA

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

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EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: WALHALLA, SC.
 TIC
 NSIC

CONTROL NUMBER

5333

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

May 13, 1976

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303




Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/76-6.

Very truly yours,



William O. Parker, Jr.

EDB:mmb

Attachment

CC Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control

Regulatory Docket File



5333

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report No.: RO-269/76-6

Report Date: May 13, 1976

Occurrence Date: April 14, 1976

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Failure of Reactor Building Engineered
Safeguards isolation valve.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 86% full power.

Description of Occurrence:

On April 14, 1976, during the performance of routine surveillance testing, ES valve PR-7 failed in the closed position after being cycled from open to closed. This valve is located in the air sample line for the Reactor Building Purge System and provides containment isolation upon an ES actuation. A work request was issued to investigate the problem, and within two hours the valve was opened for test. However, attempts to reclose the valve were unsuccessful. Valve PR-7 was then isolated by locking closed the redundant valve PR-8 located outside of the Reactor Building. This action was completed within 3.5 hours from the time valve PR-7 was re-opened electrically from the failed closed position. Technical Specification 3.6.4.b.2 specifies that a containment isolation valve may be inoperable provided that the affected penetration is isolated within four hours by the use of a deactivated automatic valve secured and locked in the isolated position.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Investigation revealed that the limit switch and torque switch for valve PR-7 were inoperable and that the valve spindle was broken.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Valve PR-7 was properly isolated in compliance with Oconee Technical Specification 3.6.4.b.2 by securing the redundant valve PR-8 in the closed position. In the event that containment integrity had been required, redundant isolation valve PR-8 on the outside of containment would have closed upon an ES actuation. Containment integrity was not affected by this incident, and it is, therefore, concluded that the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

Valve PR-7 has been repaired and its operability verified.