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DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL

50-269/270/287

REC: CASE E G  
NRC

ORG: PARKER W D  
DUKE PWR

DOCDATE: 02/16/78  
DATE RCVD: 02/21/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: YES  
SUBJECT:

COPIES RECEIVED  
LTR 3 ENCL 40

LICENSE NOS. DPR-39, 47 & 55 APPL FOR AMEND: TECH SPECS PROPOSED  
CHANGE CONCERNING PROPOSAL THAT THE LOSS OF ONE PUMP TRIP SETPOINT  
BE DELETED FROM THE SUBJECT FACILITY TECH SPECS. NOTORIZED  
02/16/78.

PLANT NAME: OCONEE - UNIT 1  
OCONEE - UNIT 2  
OCONEE - UNIT 3

REVIEWER INITIAL: XRL  
DISTRIBUTER INITIAL:

\*\*\*\*\* DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS \*\*\*\*\*

NOTES:

1. M. CUNNINGHAM - ALL AMENDMENTS TO FSAR AND CHANGES TO TECH SPECS

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOR AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LICENSE.  
(DISTRIBUTION CODE A001)

FOR ACTION: BR CHIEF REID\*\*W/7 ENCL

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NRC PDR\*\*W/ENCL  
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CHECK\*\*W/ENCL  
SHAO\*\*W/ENCL  
BUTLER\*\*W/ENCL  
J COLLINS\*\*W/ENCL

EXTERNAL:

LPDR'S  
WALHALLA, SC\*\*W/ENCL  
TIC\*\*W/ENCL  
NSIC\*\*W/ENCL  
ACRS CAT B\*\*W/16 ENCL

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 40 ENCL 39  
SIZE: 2P+1P+7P

CONTROL NBR: 780520205

\*\*\*\*\* THE END \*\*\*\*\*

apz  
wr

## DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
STEAM PRODUCTION

February 16, 1978

TELEPHONE: AREA 704  
373-4083

Mr. Edson G. Case, Acting Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

RE: Oconee Nuclear Station  
Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Mr. Case:

By letter of September 14, 1977, we requested a change in the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, requiring the pump monitor trip function to be set to initiate reactor trips upon loss of one pump in addition to the normal trip upon the loss of two pumps. This change was proposed in order to include in the Oconee 1 flux-flow trip setpoint a suitable DNBR margin based on the NRC Rod Bow-DNBR Penalty model. This Technical Specifications change was approved by the NRC in conjunction with the approval of the Oconee 1 Cycle 4 Technical Specifications, and the modified pump monitor trip setpoint has been implemented for all three Oconee units.

The pump monitor trip on loss of one pump results in, however, a reactor trip upon loss of power to the pump monitor of any one of the pumps. Therefore, in order to avoid unnecessary reactor trips, it is desirable to delete the loss of one pump trip setpoint if other DNBR margin credits are available. In the case of Oconee 2 and Oconee 3, the necessary DNBR margins, based on the NRC interim Rod Bow-DNBR Penalty model, are available in terms of excess Reactor Coolant (RC) flow, as demonstrated in the Oconee 3 Cycle 3 Reload Report (BAW-1453). The required excess RC flow credit is 3% for Oconee 2 and 2% for Oconee 3. The RC flow verifications performed in the current fuel cycles have confirmed that the required flow of 106.5% + 3% and 106.5% + 2% for Oconee 2 and Oconee 3, respectively, have adequate margins to the available flows. Therefore, it is proposed that the loss of one pump trip setpoint be deleted for Oconee 2 and Oconee 3, and pursuant to 10CFR50.90, the attached proposed changes to the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications are requested. The proposed changes also include corrections to Technical Specifications pages 2.3-1, 2.3-4, 2.3-11 and 2.3-12, which contained information pertinent to Oconee 1 Cycle 2 (this information is no longer applicable) and deleted the setpoints associated with single loop operation (pages 2.3-2, 2.3-3, 2.3-4, 2.3-11 and 2.3-12).

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3/40


Mr. Edson G. Case, Acting Director

Page Two

February 16, 1978

We request that approval of the proposed changes be granted as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "William O. Parker, Jr.", is written over the typed name. The signature is fluid and extends to the right.


William O. Parker, Jr.

PMA:ge


Attachment

Mr. Edson G. Case  
Page 3  
February 16, 1978

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR., being duly sworn, states that he is Vice President of Duke Power Company; that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this request for amendment of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55; and that all statements and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
William O. Parker, Jr., Vice President

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of February, 1978.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

February 15, 1982

## 2.3 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS, PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION

### Applicability

Applies to instruments monitoring reactor power, reactor power imbalance, reactor coolant system pressure, reactor coolant outlet temperature, flow, number of pumps in operation, and high reactor building pressure.

### Objective

To provide automatic protective action to prevent any combination of process variables from exceeding a safety limit.

### Specification

The reactor protective system trip setting limits and the permissible bypasses for the instrument channels shall be as stated in Table 2.3.1A-Unit 1 and 2.3-1B-Unit 2  
2.3-1C-Unit 3

Figure 2.3-2A-Unit 1  
2.3-2B-Unit 2  
2.3-2C-Unit 3

The pump monitors shall produce a reactor trip for the following conditions:

- a. Loss of one pump during four-pump operation of Unit 1 (only) if power level is greater than 80% of rated power.
- b. Loss of two pumps and reactor power level is greater than 55% of rated power.
- c. Loss of two pumps in one reactor coolant loop and reactor power level is greater than 0.0% of rated power.
- d. Loss of one or two pumps during two-pump operation.

### Bases

The reactor protective system consists of four instrument channels to monitor each of several selected plant conditions which will cause a reactor trip if any one of these conditions deviates from a pre-selected operating range to the degree that a safety limit may be reached.

The trip setting limits for protective system instrumentation are listed in Table 2.3-1A-Unit 1. The safety analysis has been based upon these protective  
2.3-1B-Unit 2  
2.3-1C-Unit 3  
system instrumentation trip setpoints plus calibration and instrumentation errors.

### Nuclear Overpower

A reactor trip at high power level (neutron flux) is provided to prevent damage to the fuel cladding from reactivity excursions too rapid to be detected by pressure and temperature measurements.

During normal plant operation with all reactor coolant pumps operating, reactor trip is initiated when the reactor power level reaches 105.5% of rated power. Adding to this the possible variation in trip setpoints due to calibration and instrument errors, the maximum actual power at which a trip would be actuated could be 112%, which is more conservative than the value used in the safety analysis. (4)

#### Overpower Trip Based on Flow and Imbalance

The power level trip set point produced by the reactor coolant system flow is based on a power-to-flow ratio which has been established to accommodate the most severe thermal transient considered in the design, the loss-of-coolant flow accident from high power. Analysis has demonstrated that the specified power-to-flow ratio is adequate to prevent a DNBR of less than 1.3 should a low flow condition exist due to any electrical malfunction.

The power level trip set point produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides both high power level and low flow protection in the event the reactor power level increases or the reactor coolant flow rate decreases. The power level trip set point produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides overpower DNB protection for all modes of pump operation. For every flow rate there is a maximum permissible power level, and for every power level there is a minimum permissible low flow rate. Typical power level and low flow rate combinations for the pump situations of Table 2.3-1A are as follows:

1. Trip would occur when four reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 105.5% and reactor flow rate is 100%, or flow rate is 94.8% and power level is 100%.
2. Trip would occur when three reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 78.8% and reactor flow rate is 74.7% or flow rate is 71.1% and power level is 75%.
3. Trip would occur when one reactor coolant pump is operating in each loop (total of two pumps operating) if the power is 51.7% and reactor flow rate is 49.0% or flow rate is 46.4% and the power level is 49%.

The flux-to-flow ratios account for the maximum calibration and instrument errors and the maximum variation from the average value of the RC flow signal in such a manner that the reactor protective system receives a conservative indication of the RC flow.

For safety calculations the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors for the power level trip were used.

The power-imbalance boundaries are established in order to prevent reactor thermal limits from being exceeded. These thermal limits are either power peaking kw/ft limits or DNBR limits. The reactor power imbalance (power in the top half of core minus power in the bottom half of core) reduces the power level trip produced by the power-to-flow ratio such that the boundaries of Figure 2.3-2A - Unit 1 are produced. The power-to-flow ratio reduces the power

- 2.3-2B - Unit 2
- 2.3-2C - Unit 3

level trip and associated reactor power/reactor power-balance boundaries by 1.055% for 1% flow reduction.

### Pump Monitors

The pump monitors prevent the minimum core DNBR from decreasing below 1.3 by tripping the reactor due to the loss of reactor coolant pump(s). The circuitry monitoring pump operational status provides redundant trip protection for DNBR by tripping the reactor on a signal diverse from that of the power-to-flow ratio. The pump monitors also restrict the power level for the number of pumps in operation. The reactor trip upon loss of one pump during 4-pump operation above 80% FP is specified for Unit 1 in order to provide a minimum of 11.2% DNBR margin in the flux/flow trip setpoint to accommodate the possible reduction in thermal margin due to rod bowing. For units 2 and 3, loss of one pump trip is not required because of thermal credits from excess RC flow.

### Reactor Coolant System Pressure

During a startup accident from low power or a slow rod withdrawal from high power, the system high pressure set point is reached before the nuclear over-power trip set point. The trip setting limit shown in Figure 2.3-1A - Unit 1  
2.3-1B - Unit 2  
2.3-1C - Unit 3  
for high reactor coolant system pressure (2355 psig) has been established to maintain the system pressure below the safety limit (2750 psig) for any design transient. (1)

The low pressure (1800) psig and variable low pressure (11.14 T<sub>out</sub> -4706) trip (1800) psig (11.14 T<sub>out</sub> -4706) (1800) psig (11.14 T<sub>out</sub> -4706) setpoints shown in Figure 2.3-1A have been established to maintain the DNBR 2.3-1B 2.3-1C ratio greater than or equal to 1.3 for those design accidents that result in a pressure reduction. (2,3)

Due to the calibration and instrumentation errors the safety analysis used a variable low reactor coolant system pressure trip value of (11.14 T<sub>out</sub> -4746) (11.14 T<sub>out</sub> -4746) (11.14 T<sub>out</sub> -4746)

### Coolant Outlet Temperature

The high reactor coolant outlet temperature trip setting limit (619 F) shown in Figure 2.3-1A has been established to prevent excessive core coolant 2.3-1B 2.3-1C temperatures in the operating range. Due to calibration and instrumentation errors, the safety analysis used a trip set point of 620°F.

### Reactor Building Pressure

The high reactor building pressure trip setting limit (4 psig) provides positive assurance that a reactor trip will occur in the unlikely event of a loss-of-coolant accident, even in the absence of a low reactor coolant system pressure trip.

## Shutdown Bypass

In order to provide for control rod drive tests, zero power physics testing, and startup procedures, there is provision for bypassing certain segments of the reactor protection system. The reactor protection system segments which can be bypassed are shown in Table 2.3-1A. Two conditions are imposed when

2.3-1B  
2.3-1C

the bypass is used:

1. By administrative control the nuclear overpower trip set point must be reduced to a value  $\leq 5.0\%$  of rated power during reactor shutdown.
2. A high reactor coolant system pressure trip setpoint of 1720 psig is automatically imposed.

The purpose of the 1720 psig high pressure trip set point is to prevent normal operation with part of the reactor protection system bypassed. This high pressure trip set point is lower than the normal low pressure trip set point so that the reactor must be tripped before the bypass is initiated. The overpower trip set point of  $\leq 5.0\%$  prevents any significant reactor power from being produced when performing the physics tests. Sufficient natural circulation (5) would be available to remove 5.0% of rated power if none of the reactor coolant pumps were operating.

### Single Loop Operation

Single loop operation is permitted only after the reactor has been tripped and is subject to the limitations set forth in Specification 3.18. The RPS trip setting limits and permissible instrument channels bypasses will be confirmed prior to single loop operation.

### REFERENCES

- (1) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.2
- (2) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.7
- (3) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.8
- (4) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.3
- (5) FSAR, Section 14.1.2.6

Table 2.3-1A  
Unit 1

Reactor Protective System Trip Setting Limits

RPS Segment	Four Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power 100% Rated)	Three Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power -75% Rated)	One Reactor Coolant Pump Operating In Each Loop (Operating Power -49% Rated)	Shutdown Bypass
1. Nuclear Power Max. (% Rated)	105.5	105.5	105.5	5.0 <sup>(3)</sup>
2. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Flow (2) and Imbalance, (% Rated)	1.055 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.055 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.055 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	Bypassed
3. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Pump Monitors, (% Rated)	NA	80%	55%	Bypassed
4. High Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Max.	2355	2355	2355	1720 <sup>(4)</sup>
5. Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Min.	1800	1800	1800	Bypassed
6. Variable Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure psig, Min.	(11.14T <sub>out</sub> - 4706) <sup>(1)</sup>	(11.14T <sub>out</sub> - 4706) <sup>(1)</sup>	(11.14T <sub>out</sub> - 4706) <sup>(1)</sup>	Bypassed
7. Reactor Coolant Temp. F., Max.	619	619	619	619
8. High Reactor Building Pressure, psig, Max.	4	4	4	4

(1) T<sub>out</sub> is in degrees Fahrenheit (°F).

(2) Reactor Coolant System Flow, %.

(3) Administratively controlled reduction set  
only during reactor shutdown.

(4) Automatically set when other segments of  
the RPS are bypassed.

Table 2.3-18  
Unit 2

Reactor Protective System Trip Setting Limits

<u>RPS Segment</u>	<u>Four Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power -100% Rated)</u>	<u>Three Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power -75% Rated)</u>	<u>One Reactor Coolant Pump Operating in Each Loop (Operating -49% Rated)</u>	<u>Shutdown Bypass</u>
1. Nuclear Power Max. (X Rated)	105.5	105.5	105.5	5.0 <sup>(3)</sup>
2. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Flow (2) and Imbalance, (X Rated)	1.055 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.055 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.055 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	Bypassed
3. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Pump Monitors, (X Rated)	NA	NA	55%	Bypassed
4. High Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Max.	2355	2355	2355	1720 <sup>(4)</sup>
5. Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Min.	1800	1800	1800	Bypassed
6. Variable Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure psig, Min.	$(11.14 T_{out} - 4706)^{(1)}$	$(11.14 T_{out} - 4706)^{(1)}$	$(11.14 T_{out} - 4706)^{(1)}$	Bypassed
7. Reactor Coolant Temp. F., Max.	619	619	619	619
8. High Reactor Building Pressure, psig, Max.	4	4	4	4

(1)  $T_{out}$  is in degrees Fahrenheit ( $^{\circ}F$ ).

(2) Reactor Coolant System Flow, %.

(3) Administratively controlled reduction set only during reactor shutdown.

(4) Automatically set when other segments of the RPS are bypassed.

Table 2.3-1C  
Unit 3

Reactor Protective System Trip Setting Limits

RPS Segment	Four Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power -100% Rated)	Three Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Operating Power -75% Rated)	One Reactor Coolant Pump Operating in Each Loop (Operating Power -49% Rated)	Shutdown Bypass
1. Nuclear Power Max. (% Rated)	105.5	105.5	105.5	5.0 <sup>(3)</sup>
2. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Flow (2) and Imbalance, (% Rated)	1.055 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.055 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	1.055 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance	Bypassed
3. Nuclear Power Max. Based on Pump Monitors, (% Rated)	NA	NA	55%	Bypassed
4. High Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Max.	2355	2355	2355	1720 <sup>(4)</sup>
5. Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Min.	1800	1800	1800	Bypassed
6. Variable Low Reactor Coolant System Pressure, psig, Min.	$(11.14 T_{out} - 4706)^{(1)}$	$(11.14 T_{out} - 4706)^{(1)}$	$(11.14 T_{out} - 4706)^{(1)}$	Bypassed
7. Reactor Coolant Temp. F., Max.	619	619	619	619
8. High Reactor Building Pressure, psig, Max.	4	4	4	4

(1)  $T_{out}$  is in degrees Fahrenheit ( $^{\circ}F$ ).

(2) Reactor Coolant System Flow, %.

(3) Administratively controlled reduction set  
only during reactor shutdown.

(4) Automatically set when other segments of  
the RPS are bypassed.