

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

Regulatory Docket File

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

September 9, 1976

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269/76-13

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence
Report RO-269/76-13.


Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "William O. Parker, Jr." with a stylized flourish.

William O. Parker, Jr.

LJB:vr
Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Management Information
and Program Control



9897

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Received w/ Ltr Dated 9-9-76

Report No.: RO-269/76-13

Report Date: September 9, 1976

Occurrence Date: August 10, 1976

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Penetration room valve PR-2 discovered inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 75 percent full power

Description of Occurrence:

On August 10, 1976, prior to purging the Reactor Building, penetration room valve PR-2 was discovered inoperable. This valve, which is located outside the Reactor Building in the purge piping, provides containment isolation following an ES actuation. Valve PR-2 failed in the intermediate position and could not be cycled to a fully-open or fully-closed position. Prior to investigation of the problem, valve PR-2 was immediately isolated by locking closed redundant valve PR-1 located inside the Reactor Building pursuant to Technical Specification 3.6.4.b.2.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

PR-2 is an air-operated valve. The exhauster in the air supply, which removes air when the valve is closed, contained a ruptured diaphragm resulting in insufficient air pressure to activate the valve.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Valve PR-2 was properly isolated in compliance with Technical Specification 3.6.4.b.2 by securing redundant valve PR-1 in the closed position. In the event that containment integrity had been required prior to securing valve PR-1, valve PR-1 would have closed upon an ES actuation. There have been no previous defects in valve exhauster diaphragms. This failure is, therefore, considered a random occurrence and not an indication of a generic problem. Containment integrity was not affected by this incident and it is, thus, concluded that the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action:

Valve PR-2 has been repaired and its operability verified.

U.S. AIR OPERATIONS
REGULATORY REGION II
ATLANTA, GA.

SEP 13 11 04 AM '76