

DUKE POWER COMPANY


POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

August 15, 1975




Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station
Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report
UE-269/75-7.

Very truly yours,


William O. Parker, Jr.

MST:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Angelo Giambusso

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNIT 1

Report No.: UE-269/75-7

Report Date: August 15, 1975

Event Date: July 3, 1975

Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Event: Modification completed without prior authorization

Conditions Prior to Event: Not applicable

Description of Event:

On August 22, 1974, a request for a station modification to the Oconee turbine generators and Keowee hydro generators was initiated by Duke personnel external to the station organization. The modification to the loss-of-field-excitation relay KLF-1 was determined to be necessary because voltage elements in the relay were incorrectly rated for their application. The modification was classified as safety-related and was processed by the appropriate personnel in the prescribed fashion. The complete modification package, including the procedure for implementation, safety evaluation, and quality assurance documentation, was forwarded to the station for the appropriate Station Review Committee review and approval and station manager approval required prior to implementation. The modification was implemented, however, prior to receiving SRC and station manager approval. The turbine generator modifications were completed in December, 1974 and the Keowee modifications in February, 1975. This incident was discovered on July 3, 1975 during a review of records.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:

The apparent cause of this event was a misunderstanding of the approvals required prior to implementation of modifications at a nuclear station by the personnel involved. These personnel were not assigned to the station organization.

Analysis of Event:

The KLF-1 relay serves to protect the Oconee turbine generators and the Keowee hydro generators in the event of a loss-of-field-excitation. Prior to the modification, it was believed that several spurious trips of the turbine generator had been experienced due to the improper rating of the voltage elements. This modification has increased the reliability of all generating units. It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected by this incident.

Corrective Action:

Subsequent to implementation, this modification has been reviewed and approved. The Administrative Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations was revised December 20, 1974 to more clearly define the reviews and approvals required prior to implementation of station modifications to prevent a similar recurrence. In addition, the requirement to have required approvals prior to implementing a station modification has been re-emphasized to the organization involved.