

AEC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL
(TEMPORARY FORM)

CONTROL NO: 871

FILE: _____

FROM: Duke Power Company Charlotte, N. C. 28201 A. C. Thies		DATE OF DOC 1-25-74	DATE REC'D 1-31-74	LTR X	MEMO	RPT	OTHER
TO: A. Giambusso		ORIG 1 signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR _____ X SENT LOCAL PDR _____ X		
CLASS	UNCLASS XXXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-269		

DESCRIPTION:
Ltr trans the following:

PLANT NAME: Oconee Unit #1

ENCLOSURES:
REPORT UE-269/73-15: (date 1-27-73)
regarding the failure of engineered safe-
guards valve Hp-20 to close

**DO NOT REMOVE
ACKNOWLEDGED**

(1 Orig cy rec'd)

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 2-1-74 GC

- | | | | |
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INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- | | | | | |
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| REG FILE
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✓ CASE
GIAMBUSSO
BOYD
✓ MOORE (L) (BWR)
DEYOUNG (L) (PWR)
SKOVHOLT (L)
P. COLLINS | <u>TECH REVIEW</u>
✓ HENDRIE
SCHROEDER
✓ MACCARY
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BALLARD
SPANGLER

<u>ENVIRO</u>
MULLER
DICKER
KNIGHTON
YOUNGBLOOD
REGAN
PROJECT LDR.

HARLESS | <u>LIC ASST</u>
DIGGS (L)
GEARIN (L)
✓ GOULBOURNE (L)
LEE (L)
MAIGRET (L)
SERVICE (L)
SHEPPARD (E)
SMITH (L)
TEETS (L)
WADE (E)
WILLIAMS (E)
WILSON (L)
DURHAM (E) | <u>A/T IND</u>
BRAITMAN
SALTZMAN
B. HURT

<u>PLANS</u>
MCDONALD
DUBE w/Input

<u>INFO</u>
C. MILES
✓ B. KING (RO) |
|---|---|--|---|--|

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| ✓ 1 - LOCAL PDR Walhalla, S. C. | (1) (2) (10) - NATIONAL LAB'S | 1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY |
| ✓ 1 - DTIE (ABERNATHY) | 1 - ASLBP (E/W Bldg, Rm 529) | 1 - GERALD LELLOUCHE |
| ✓ 1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN) | 1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT | BROOKHAVEN NAT. LAB |
| 1 - ASLB (YORE/SAYRE/
WOODARD/"H" ST. | 1 - CONSULTANT'S | 1 - AGMED (Ruth Gussman)
RM-B-127, GT. |
| ✓ 16 - CYS ACRS XXXXXXXXXX SENT TO LIC. ASST.
2-1-74 GOULBOURNE | NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN
1 - GERALD ULRIKSON... ORNL | 1 - RD..MULLER..F-309 GT |

DUKE POWER COMPANY

POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28201

A. C. THIES
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION

P. O. Box 2178

January 25, 1974

Mr. Angelo Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Re: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Pursuant to Sections 6.2 and 6.6.2 of the Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, please find attached Unusual Event Report UE-269/73-15, "Engineered Safeguards Valve HP-20."



Very truly yours,



A. C. Thies

ACT:vr
Attachment

cc: Mr. Norman C. Moseley



Received w/Ltr Dated 1-25-74

DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1
UNUSUAL EVENT REPORT UE-269/73-15
ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS VALVE HP-20

Description of the Incident

On December 27, 1973, Oconee Unit 1 was in the process of being placed in a cold shutdown condition for routine maintenance. The controlling procedure for unit shutdown OP/1/A/1102/10 requires the closure of engineered safeguards valve HP-20. The valve was inoperable because the torque limit switch on the electric motor operator was binding, causing the torque switch contacts to open, thus preventing valve closure. (Reference Oconee FSAR Figure 7-4)

Valve HP-20 is a reactor building isolation valve in the reactor coolant pump seal return header. The limit switch is on a Limitorque motor operator, Type SMB-00.

Regulatory Operations, Region II, was notified of the incident on December 27, 1973.

Corrective Action

The torque limit switch was replaced and the valve was tested for proper operability. The valve was satisfactorily cycled 12 times.

Safety Analysis

The unit was shutdown with all reactor coolant pumps secured and in the process of being placed in cold shutdown when the incident occurred. The redundant isolation valve HP-21 was shut thus providing the required isolation. This incident did not affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.